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Abstract 
 
This study examines the context and nature of British attitudes to China and the 
Chinese in the period 1928 to 1931, between the initial consolidation of the 
Nationalist Revolution in China and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The 
relationship between official and popular levels of this discourse provides the 
dominant theme of this work. It is argued that these years saw the start of a major 
long-term shift in British attitudes prompted by the Nationalist Revolution and by 
changes in Britain's official policy towards China. 
 
A wide range of official, institutional, and private primary and secondary material 
relating to Sino-British relations and to British treaty port life in China is examined in 
order to identify the sources, nature, and influence of British attitudes. The 
introduction surveys the existing literature on "attitudes" and "images" and outlines 
the limitations of traditionally textually-based approaches. Part 1 examines 
metropolitan and treaty port sources of British attitudes and their articulation and 
relates these to the structure and mores of British society in China, its socialisation of 
new arrivals, and its relations with the Chinese as hosts, competitors, colleagues, 
customers and employees. It shows the extent to which hostile and suspicious 
attitudes towards the Chinese pervaded British popular culture, diplomacy and treaty 
port society. Part 2 describes the nature and limitations of British attempts at social 
and institutional reform in the three main sectors of British society: the structures of 
treaty port life, businesses and missions. 
 
Although British residents accepted the need for reform, in practice they were insular 
and conservative. Furthermore, successful changes were introduced with the intention 
of protecting the British presence in China rather than changing its character. This 
work concludes, however, that genuine attempts were made in this period by 
influential individuals to alter the character of British treaty port life, and treaty port 
attitudes, and that the long-term repercussions of these efforts underlie improvements 
in Sino-British cultural relations since 1928. 
 
This study is a contribution to the social history of the foreign communities in China, 
the history of Sino-British relations and the social history of British attitudes to China 
and the Chinese. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“A Message from some Chinese Friends” 
 
On March 7, 1928 the Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Legation in London 
complained to the British Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain about “the 
increasing tendency in Dramas and Plays which are now being produced in London to 
represent Chinese people in consistently vicious and objectionable form.” “No other 
Oriental nation,” he continued, “is thus singled out for objectionable dramatic 
treatment, so far as its people are concerned.”1  The Foreign Office passed on his 
complaint to the Lord Chamberlain’s office whose response was a bemused rebuff, 
tempered before being passed along to the legation.2 
 Two months later G.W. Swire, a director of John Swire and Sons in London, 
having received a letter from Joseph Bailie, a professor at the Chinese Institute of 
Technical Training in Shanghai, wrote to his Hong Kong and Shanghai managers that 
Bailie: 
 
gave us what he called a “message from some Chinese friends”.  Although he 
said expressly that he was merely alluding to a general principle applicable to 
foreigners as a whole, this message was... a lesson in manners and can be 
summarised in the following incident...  It sounds perhaps a little near home, 
but we are perfectly certain he did not have us in mind.  Dr. Woo, the director 
or manager of Han Yang, wishing to arrange a charter, came into the office of 
a foreign firm and finding the shipping clerk out, sat down to read the paper.  
The shipping clerk returned in due course, rather made Dr. Woo feel by his 
general bearing that he was taking a liberty in reading the paper, sat down, put 
his feet on the desk, lit a cigar without any offer to Dr. Woo and then asked 
what he wanted.  One must of course not forget that the foreign educationist in 
China has his own point of view and doubtless he exaggerates, but he is quite 
right to rub it in.3 
The two letters, although unconnected, have a common theme: the relationship 
between and debate about popular and media images of China, the standard of 
knowledge about the country, and the behaviour of British subjects there in the years 
1928 to 1931.  This was an issue of contemporary debate and also one which 
historians have long felt has had a profound impact on Chinese attitudes towards 
Britain and the West, and on the history of Western involvement in China.4 
                                                          
1 W.C. Chen to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 7/3/28, FO 228/3801/1 23J. 
2 The whole file can be found in FO 371/15525 F1190. 
3 John Swire and Sons, Limited [hereafter JS], London to Butterfield and Swire [hereafter BS] Hong 
Kong and Shanghai, 11/5/28 “Anglo-Chinese Relations”, Swire Papers [hereafter JSS] II 2/7.  Bailie’s 
letter to G.W. Swire, dated 26/4/28, can be found in JSS Additional [hereafter ADD] 1185. 
4 It was “the barbed wire thread which wove together the whole fabric of foreign imperialism in 
China”, Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1976), p.101, see also pp.110-11; Jerome Ch’en, China and the West: Society and 
Culture 1815-1937 (London, 1979), pp.89, 232-34; Wolfgang Franke, China and the West (Oxford, 
1967), pp.124-31; Rhoads Murphey, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1977), pp.9-10, 227. 
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  Nineteen twenty-eight is not usually taken as a notable date in chronologies of 
changing attitudes to China because of the attention focused on other twentieth 
century events such as the Pacific War or the establishment of the People’s Republic 
in 1949.  The literature on the subject is inconsistent about the chronology of 
developing attitudes except in the broadest of terms.  Most of it has been textually 
based, and covered “cultural” representations rather than the behaviour of individuals.  
However, by 1928, with the triumph of Chinese nationalism, individual and group 
behaviour in the treaty ports was perceived in British government, business and 
missionary circles as a threat to the continuation of good Sino-British relations. 
 
Britain and Chinese Nationalism in 19285 
 The Nationalist Revolution was arguably the greatest shock to the treaty 
power status quo in China since the Boxer rising.  Britain’s diplomatic position in 
China from 1925 onwards was greatly strained and could be described as in a state of 
crisis.  The May 30 Movement, which grew out of the Shanghai and Shamian (or 
Shaji) shootings of Chinese demonstrators, was directed against British interests in 
China despite the original issue being the killing of a Chinese worker in a Japanese 
factory.6 The Hong Kong - Guangzhou strike and boycott began two days after the 
Shamian shootings and severely disrupted British trade in south China for sixteen 
months, whilst boycotts elsewhere were very effective in the short-term.7 
                                                          
5 This period is covered by W.R. Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford, 1971), 
and Richard Stremski, The Shaping of British Policy during the Nationalist Revolution in China 
(Taibei, 1979).  The most recent and comprehensive examinations of the subject can be found in 
E.S.K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain’s South China Policy, 1924-1931 (Hong 
Kong, 1991), and Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the 
Chinese Revolution of the 1920s (Hanover, New England, 1991).  None of the above supersedes the 
unpublished monographs of Sir David Clive Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-1928: A 
Study of the Interaction of Official Policies and Perceptions in Britain and China”, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1973); Peter G. Clark, “Britain and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1927”, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1973), and W.J. Megginson III, 
“Britain’s Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-27: The Foreign Office Search for a New Policy”, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, George Washington University, 1973).  A general survey can be found in 
Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1965), (although this predates the opening of the British Foreign Office archives for the 
period), whilst the American diplomatic experience is chronicled in Dorothy Borg, American Policy 
and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York, 1948); the best English narrative of the Northern 
Expedition can be found in C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 
(Cambridge, 1983), passim.. 
6 On the May 30th incident and movement see Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp.97-126, and 
R.W. Rigby, The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes (Canberra, 1980); much contemporary 
material can be found in H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., China Yearbook 1926 [hereafter CYB [year]] 
(Tianjin, 1926), Chpt. XXVI. 
7 Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp.382-83; for the strike see, D. Kwan, “Deng Zhongxia and 
the Shenggang General Strike 1925-26”, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1985).  
Kwan gives a useful analysis of the background and organisation of the strike and firmly locates its 
origins within the wider context of the anti-imperialist policies of the Guomindang and Communist 
parties, pp.97-112; on the short-term success of the boycott movement see Rigby, May 30 Movement, 
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 The British bore the brunt of the Guomindang’s anti-imperialist struggle 
during the Northern Expedition [beifa], which began in July 1926.  This policy was 
partly inspired by the Comintern but was largely tactical (in order to split the Powers).  
It also arose from popular resentment at the behaviour of the British communities and 
military in China.8 [See figure 1, following page] The British position so deteriorated 
and the threat seemed so great that, especially after the September 5th, 1926, Wanxian 
incident (when British gunboats shelled the Upper Yangzi town after a failed attempt 
to rescue British ships seized by local troops) military action of some sort seemed 
imminent.  This was aggravated by the contagious anti-nationalist hostility of the 
British business community; as C.J. Bowie has pointed out, “Britain’s men on the 
spot operated in a political climate which supported the use of coercive action against 
the Chinese.”9 British subjects were evacuated from the interior and from mission 
stations.  Many business and mission buildings and institutions, schools and hospitals, 
and foreign homes, were closed, destroyed, damaged or seized by soldiers of one or 
other of the Chinese belligerents.  Business operations were disrupted.10 
 In an attempt to calm and retrieve the situation and in reaction to the imminent 
arrival of the National Revolutionary Army [Guomin gemingjun, NRA], led by the 
Guomindang, in the Yangzi cities the British Foreign Office produced the “December 
Memorandum” and circulated it to the other Washington Treaty Powers before 
publishing it.  This suggested renouncing any idea “that the economic and political 
                                                                                                                                                                      
pp.141-46; for a sober examination of long term success, or otherwise, see C.F. Remer, A Study of 
Chinese Boycotts with special reference to their economic effectiveness (Baltimore, 1933). 
8 Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp.55-56; P. Cavendish, “Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923-
8”, in J. Chen and N. Tarling, eds., Studies in the Social History of China and South East Asia 
(Cambridge, 1970), p.35; Ku Hung-Ting, “The Emergence of the Kuomintang’s Anti-Imperialism”, 
Journal of Oriental Studies, 14, Nos.1-2 (1978), pp.90-97; “As to foreign relations, we must 
concentrate our forces upon [the] anti-British movement... For a while we can forbear from extending 
the anti-imperialistic movement to Japan, France, America, in order to keep Great Britain isolated.” 
“Political Report of the Central Committee [of the CCP] (January 26, 1927), C.M. Wilbur and Julie 
Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), Document 76, p.808, For the Russian influence also see Conrad 
Brandt, Stalin’s Failure in China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), and D.J. Jacobs, Borodin, 
Stalin’s Man in China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981). 
9 C.J. Bowie, “Great Britain and the Use of Force in China 1919-1931”, Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, 
University of Oxford, 1983, p.52. The Navy was not completely innocent though, as the Foreign 
Office was well aware: “One must... take into account the tendency of our gallant navy to shoot when 
they get a chance, and make a chance when they don’t get one”, [FO 371/11696 F5391/4090/10], 
quoted in Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, p.471, this viewpoint can be confirmed by any 
cursory reading of, say, the Hamilton Papers in the National Maritime Museum. For other arguments 
for the use of force see Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, p.379; Clark, “Britain and the Chinese 
Revolution”, pp.167-71. A naval plan for military action throughout China, can be found in China 
Station General Letter, No.3, Enclosure 10, From C-in-China (261/2301) 11/3/27, PRO ADM 
116/2509. In 1925 even George V was in favour of a Yangzi blockade feeling that “practical proof of 
our self assertion might have a salutary effect,” Baron Stamfordham to Chamberlain, 21/8/25, FO 
800/258. 
10 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp.194, 227-28. 
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 development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage” and furthermore 
that, 
 
the Powers should yet recognise both the essential justice of the Chinese claim 
for treaty revision and the difficulty under present conditions of negotiating 
new treaties in place of the old, and they should therefore modify their 
traditional attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights.11 
These intentions announced a new set of criteria for policy in China and specifically 
for policy towards the Guomindang.  The memorandum was not well received12 and 
was rather overtaken by events but it continued to be the touchstone of future policy 
announcements and discussions.  It was followed up on January 27th 1927 with the 
“January Offer” which unilaterally offered a package of concessions, most notably an 
offer to discuss the status of the British concessions.  Other compromises dealt with 
the recognition of the competency of modern Chinese law courts, the extraterritorial 
status of missionary institutions, the status of Chinese Christian converts and mission 
ownership of land.13 
 The NRA’s advance on the Yangzi appeared to threaten Shanghai in early 
1927 especially after the mob seizures of the British concessions at Hankou (January 
3rd) and Jiujiang (January 6th).14 Control of these British Concessions was handed 
over to Nationalist officials to defuse short-term tensions and protect British lives and 
property.  These fait accompli were confirmed after negotiations in the Chen-
O’Malley agreements (February 19th and 20th).15 Troop reinforcements had already 
been ordered by the British Cabinet to Hong Kong in November 1926 but in January 
1927 it was decided to send out a division-strong “Shanghai Defence Force” [SDF] to 
prevent a similar seizure16; British subjects were evacuated to the coast cities (in 
active preparation for war, many felt.)17 The NRA’s capture of Nanjing (March 24th) 
was accompanied by attacks on foreigners by ill-disciplined troops and a retaliatory 
bombardment of the city by foreign warships.  Several foreigners were killed, and the 
British Consul-General was wounded in what was seen by most foreign observers as a 
deliberate and pre-planned attack.18 Tension remained high as the Guomindang 
secured their hold on the Yangzi cities and the Wuhan and Nanjing regimes fought 
                                                          
11 The full text of the memorandum, and other relevant documents, can conveniently be found in Sir 
Frederick Whyte, China and Foreign Powers: An Historical Review of their Relations (London, 2nd 
and revised edition, 1928), Appendix V. On the Washington Treaty Powers see Fung, Diplomacy of 
Imperial Retreat, pp.16-19. 
12 Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp.441-46. 
13 The text of the offer can be found in Whyte, China and Foreign Powers, pp.64-68. 
14 Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp.73-77. 
15 Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, pp.126-28. 
16 Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp.501-509. 
17 Quakers, characteristically, Lucy Harris to H.T. Silcock, 3/2/27 and W. Sewell, journal letter, 6/1/27, 
FSC C/5/3 China 1927. 
18 Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp.91-92; CYB 1928, pp.756-62. There is no evidence at all to 
support the charge of pre-meditation. 
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amongst themselves; it was kept high as the British and other powers continued to 
react to the Hankou and Nanjing incidents.  The issue of a reparations settlement of 
these issues came to dominate British policy after initial enthusiasm for a military 
response waned.19 
 By the end of the year a calmer acceptance of the implications and reality of 
Guomindang victory was spreading.  Despite continued anti-Guomindang feeling 
there was an increasingly influential body of more neutral thought within the Foreign 
Office which was able to cope with this new situation.20 Missionaries and 
businessmen were allowed to return inland.  This easing of tension was helped by the 
split within the Guomindang and the rejection of the alliance with the Communists 
and their bloody suppression and the “re-interpretation”21 of the anti-imperialism of 
the Guomindang’s right-wing and Jiang Jieshi. 
 In early 1928 the NRA continued its drive northwards and, despite a bloody 
clash with the Japanese at Jinan, destroyed or enrolled the northern warlords and 
captured Beijing.  This was the last, militarily consolidatory, phase of the Northern 
Expedition and the end of the state of abnormal crisis in relations between Britain and 
the de facto power in China.22 
 1928, then, was a “year zero” when both sides consolidated and made 
conciliatory moves.  The re-opening of the British Consulate-General in the new 
capital Nanjing marked the resumption of close contact between the British and the 
Guomindang after an eighteen month gap.  In December that year the British 
Minister, Sir Miles Lampson formally presented his diplomatic credentials to Jiang 
Jieshi after agreeing the first of the treaty revisions by signing the tariff-autonomy 
treaty.23  
 Against this bleak and bloody background the British communities in China 
had generally (and usually successfully) attempted to continue life and business 
normally, except during the grand peur of 1927.  Businessmen faced boycotts, 
missionaries an organised and violent anti-Christian movement and everybody the 
lack of law and order, endemic piracy and banditry.24 It is against this background 
only that the events and themes of the following four years can be understood.  
Although public interest in Britain soon waned, feelings amongst the British in China 
                                                          
19 See the fuller discussion of this issue in chapter four. 
20 Clark, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp.354-60. 
21 The phrase is Cavendish’s, “Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang”, p.42. 
22 Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp.170-85. 
23 Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp.695-96; E.S.K. Fung, “Britain, Japan and Chinese tariff 
autonomy, 1927-1928,” Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, 6, No.1 (1981), 
pp.23-36. 
24 On the anti-Christian movement see Jessie Gregory Lutz, Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: 
The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920-28 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988); Ka-che Yip, Religion, 
Nationalism and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-27 (Bellingham, 
Washington, 1980). 
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 still ran high.25 Many felt that they had been betrayed by a weak Government and 
weaker Legation in 1927 (many Chinese felt a similar betrayal in the winding down 
of the Guomindang’s populist anti-Imperialism).26 
 The implications for the future could be summed up as a threat to end the 
privileges associated with and forming extraterritoriality, the legal ones based on the 
treaties, and the customary ones based on prestige, wealth and colour.  The effect of 
these privileges had been to create what one supporter of this situation later called “a 
state within a state.”27 The reclamation of tariff autonomy by the Chinese was the first 
retrocessive step but others were feared, such as the ending of extraterritorial status, 
the ending of inland navigation rights, the retrocession of the concessions and 
settlements and the application of Chinese commercial, fiscal and other legislation to 
British and other foreign companies, organisations and individuals.  A kind of part-
nationalist, part-anti-foreign programme was feared. 
 In the face of this threat, and in the light of the victory of Chinese nationalism, 
but also in an attempt to heal the wounds of the past half-decade and to ensure the 
smooth daily fulfillment of their functions, businessmen, diplomats and missionaries 
thought, debated and acted to change their institutional structures and their 
institutional and individual attitudes.28  
 The next four years were, in comparison to the period of the Nationalist 
Revolution, relatively peaceful for the foreign communities.  The rebellions of 1929 
and especially of 1930, although violent, did not seriously endanger the foreign 
presence in China.29 Before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, it was widely 
assumed that Chinese nationalism, in one form or another, had opened a new era in 
Sino-Western relations.  This meant that compromises in the structure and character 
of life and business in the treaty ports were inevitable and necessary.  In the four 
years before 1931 it is possible to look at a period when British attempts to come to 
                                                          
25 See the comments of H.H. Catford in a letter to C.M. Stubbs in Shanghai, 15/12/27, FSC China/11. 
Interest waned in the United States as well and, according to the journalist Vincent Sheean, was ended 
by Lindebergh’s crossing of the Atlantic, Personal History (New York, 1937), p.190.  
26 For the British case see, for example, J.O.P. Bland on “The “F.O. School of Thought””, in China: 
The Pity of It (London, 1932), pp.176-97. The Chinese situation is analysed in Cavendish, “Anti-
Imperialism in the Kuomintang”, pp.42-56. 
27 O.M. Green, The Foreigner in China (London, 1943), p.7. On the development and structure of the 
extraterritorial system see W.R. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China (Berkeley, 1952), pp.1-
25. 
28 G.W. Swire to T.H.R. Shaw and N.S. Brown, 8/11/29, “We are anxious to help the Chinese in any 
way we can and to be friends with them, we wish to meet them in a reasonable way in their efforts at 
(for example) municipal improvements and we think it sound policy to proceed upon the lines of treaty 
revision and generous concession in the effort to find a solution, which will give the Chinese the face 
etc., which they will want. In a word we are what they call “reasonable people””, Swire Archives Misc. 
121/IV Inter-War Political Letters 1925-1938 (Sept.) Political File. 
29 Lloyd Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927-1937”, in Lloyd Eastman, et 
al., The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 (Cambridge, 1991), pp.11-13. 
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terms with the “new” China were not obscured by the repercussions of the 
Manchurian and Shanghai crises and the build up to the Sino-Japanese war. 
 
The Historiography of Attitudes to China 
 There was a paradigmatic shift in general British attitudes towards the Chinese 
and towards China, its society and culture, in the inter-war period.  The root of that 
change lay in the repercussions of the triumph of political and cultural nationalism in 
China under the Guomindang.  That regime’s subsequent failures and limitations 
matter less than the principles it represented and broadcast.30 From 1928 onwards 
British residents in China and the treaty port “China-experts” had the opportunity to 
come to terms with a situation that was not an inevitable result of the previous half-
decade of civil war, that is, a nationalistic regime in power, perhaps permanently.  Not 
since the first Opium War had a nationalist regime in China forced the foreign powers 
and foreign citizens to analyse and rethink their attitudes. 
 There are several broad themes within historical works on Sino-foreign 
attitudes.  The earliest dealt mostly with the role “China”, as a construct, played in 
European intellectual history, especially that of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, 
and the way images of the country changed because of this.31 The role of China in 
European literature was also covered in this way.32 This approach continues to be the 
theme in most general works and its conclusion is best summed up as the fact that 
“changes have not reflected changes in Chinese society so much as changes in 
European intellectual history.”33 This approach was widened in 1939 by M.G. Mason 
who looked at a much more modern period, and a much wider range of observers 
without concentrating on intellectual history.  The interaction between constructs of 
                                                          
30 “The Chinese objection to the settlement and concession areas was none the less real for being 
mainly psychological”, Sir Eric Teichman, Affairs of China (London, 1938), p.141. 
31 V. Pinot, La Chine et la Formation de L’Esprit Philosophique en France (1640-1740) (Paris, 1932); 
Adolf Reichwein, China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in the Eighteenth Century 
(London, 1925); Basil Guy, The French Image of China before and after Voltaire (Geneva, 1963); E.J. 
Van Kley, “Europe’s “Discovery” of China and the Writing of World History”, American Historical 
Review, 76 (1971), pp.358-85. 
32 W.W. Appleton, A Cycle of Cathay: The Chinese Vogue in England during the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (New York, 1951); Pierre Martino, L’Orient dans la Littérature Française au 
XViie et au XViiie Siècle (Paris, 1906); Qian Zhongshu, “China in the English Literature of the 
Seventeenth Century”, Quarterly Bulletin of Chinese Bibliography (English Edition, new series), 1, 
No.4 (1940), pp.351-84; and “China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century”, ibid., 2, 
No.1 (1941), pp.7-48, No.3, pp.113-52. For more recent works see, for example, Mimi Chan, Through 
Western Eyes: Images of Chinese Women in Anglo-American Literature (Hong Kong, 1989); Robin W. 
Winks and James R. Rush, eds., Asia in Western Fiction (Manchester, 1989); W.F. Wu, The Yellow 
Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850-1942 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1982); Colin 
Mackerras, Western Images of China (Hong Kong, 1989); Jonathan Goldstein, Jerry Israel and Hilary 
Conroy, eds., America Views China: American Images of China Then and Now (London and Toronto), 
1991. 
33 Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese 
Civilization (Oxford, 1967), pp.7-8. 
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 China and direct experience of it has also been the subject of recent monographs.34 
The history of Chinese emigration has prompted a series of studies on racial prejudice 
against Chinese immigrants in the United States, Australia and Canada.35 In reaction 
to Western hostility towards Communist China (and vice versa) a number of books 
over the last four decades have attempted to understand the wider context of attitudes 
to China and the hostility of the PRC to the West.36 A continuing but increasingly 
important strand is more synthetic and concerned with what was always a two-way 
process.  This tends to merge into a different type of work on the intellectual relations 
between China and the West and the history of modern Chinese thought.37 Most 
recently work has begun on Chinese attitudes to the West.38 
 Most of these approaches have tended to deprecate the impact both of 
institutional structures and expectations and of the individual behaviour of Britons in 
China in favour of European-centered “Orientalist” analyses.  This type of work has 
been encouraged by the work of Edward Said, with his basic premise that “all 
knowledge is interpretation.” Related analyses have concentrated on more subtle 
examinations of the relationship between knowledge in cultural discourse and 
political power.39 Yet it is clear that at the level of quotidian individual and 
                                                          
34 “I am interested primarily in showing the part China played in Western thought and also in setting 
forth the ideas which Europeans entertained of the Orientals and their country;” Mary Gertrude Mason, 
Western Concepts of China and the Chinese, 1840-1876 (New York, 1939), p.vii. On interactions see, 
for example, Zhang Shunhong, “British Views on China during the time of the Embassies of Lord 
Macartney and Lord Amherst (1790-1820)”, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1990). 
35 Cheng-Tsu Wu, “Chink”: A Documentary History of Anti-Chinese Prejudice in America (New 
York, 1972); for a short bibliography of such works see Sucheng Chan, Entry Denied: Exclusion and 
the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943 (Philadelphia, 1991), pp.xiv-xv; on Canada see Peter 
W. Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy towards Orientals in British 
Columbia (Montreal, 1990); Andrew Markus, Fear and Hatred: Purifying Australia and California 
1850-1901 (Sydney, 1979). 
36 Harold Isaacs, Scratches On Our Minds: American Images of China and India (New York, 1958, 
revised as Images of Asia: American Images of China and India, New York, 1972); Dawson, Chinese 
Chameleon, passim.; Franke, China and the West, passim.; Mackerras, Western Images, pp.175-261. 
David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton, 1991), 
passim.. 
37 Adolf Reichwein was inspired in 1925 by living in what he thought was the second period in 
European history in which “Eastern Asia... entered into metaphysical contact with the West”, by which 
he meant Western intellectual interest in ancient Chinese philosophies, China and Europe, p.4; the 
latter category includes such works as Franke, China and the West; Ch’en, China and the West (much 
the best yet) and Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949 (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, 1966). 
38 On Chinese attitudes see Ch’en, China and the West, pp.59-91; André Chih, L’Occident “Chrétien” 
vu par les Chinois vers la fin du XIXe Siècle (1870-1900) (Paris, 1962); R. David Arkush and Leo O. 
Lee, eds., Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the mid-Nineteenth Century to 
the Present (Berkeley, 1989), and the collection of accounts in Zhong Shuhe ed., Zou xiang shijie: 
Jindai Zhongguo zhishifenzi kaocha xifang de lishi (Beijing, 1985), and the Zou xiang shijie congshu 
republication of travellers’ reportages (Changsha, 1985-1986). On the role of Westerners in Chinese 
racial discourse see F. Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (London, 1992), passim.. 
39 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine what we see of the rest of 
the world (New York, 1981); p.164; and Orientalism (London, 1978). Such works include, for 
example, Philip Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge, 1988); Warren I. Cohen, 
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institutional behaviour in the treaty ports there was a clear relationship between 
constructs of knowledge of the Chinese and attitudes towards them. 
 The most prominent and influential exponents of British attitudes to China and 
the Chinese were British residents of the treaty ports.40 They were prominent both in 
Western and Chinese eyes, and were the British equivalent of those labelled by Akira 
Iriye as “representative” Americans, that is, Americans in China who were “crucial in 
the formation of a Chinese view of the United States.”41 Although, as shall be shown, 
metropolitan attitudes certainly informed their own attitudes it is clear that it is largely 
in the treaty ports that the tale of this phase of the British discourse about China is set.  
This will be, first and foremost, an examination of the attitudes of representatives and 
residents of the British treaty port communities. 
 Attacks on the behaviour of the foreign community in China by Chinese or 
anti-imperialist historians have a long pedigree.  In fact most historians of the foreign 
presence in China deal at some point with this question although academic 
examinations of the racial character of the wider conflicts of competing imperialisms 
in the Far East are relatively recent.42 The mythical Shanghai park sign “No dogs or 
Chinese” is the enduring characterisation of the foreign treatment of Chinese there.43 
Such charges played functional roles in political theory and action.  They formed part 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ed., Reflections on Orientalism (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981); B.J. Moore-Gilbert, Kipling and 
“Orientalism” (London, 1986). 
40 The effects of the treatment by British society of Chinese resident in Britain was, in comparison with 
the American example, negligible. Far fewer Chinese students studied in Britain than in America and 
the immigrant society was tiny. As shall be shown, however, the fictional treatment of Britain’s 
Chinese did have some influence; Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East 
Asian Relations (New York, 1967), pp.28-32, 39; Ng Kwee Choo, The Chinese in London (London, 
1968), pp.6-20. 
41 Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp.33-39. This assumption forms the basis of James Huskey’s “Americans 
in Shanghai: Community Formation and Response to Revolution, 1919-1928,” (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of North Carolina, 1985). 
42 In the recent historiography of Sino-British relations see, for example, Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial 
Retreat, pp.136-37. On the wider context W.R. Louis has suggested that “the origin of the Pacific war 
might have been in part racial,” while Christopher Thorne has outlined “the stress that was placed upon 
racial issues as underlying the Far Eastern situation”, and more recently concluded that the strength of 
racial feeling encouraged or uncovered by the war “ensured that relations between whites and non-
whites... became the object of greatly increased attention and passion.” Louis, British Strategy in the 
Far East, p.1; Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis 
of 1931-1933 (London, 1972), pp.44-47; Thorne, “Racial Aspects of the Far Eastern War of 1941-
1945”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 66 (1980), p.377. 
43 When the author visited the park in 1991 it was being redeveloped but in the late 1980s a sign still 
stood at the park entrance describing this “insult” to the Chinese which had “aroused popular 
indignation and disgust”, Paul Theroux, Riding the Iron Rooster: By Train Through China (New York, 
1988), pp.132-33. For other negative representations of the Shanghai foreign community see G.E. 
Miller, Shanghai: Paradise of Adventurers (New York, 1937); E. Hauser, Shanghai: City for Sale 
(New York, 1940), or Henri Champly’s The Road to Shanghai: White Slave Traffic in Asia (London, 
1934), for example, or the films Shanghai Express (1932), Shanghai (1935) and The Shanghai Gesture 
(1941); in another medium there is Hergé’s 1934 Shanghai-set “Tintin” adventure The Blue Lotus. 
More recently see Harriet Sergeant, Shanghai (London, 1991) and J.G. Ballard’s novel Empire of the 
Sun (London, 1984), a conspicuous example, especially as it was filmed by Steven Spielberg in 1987.  
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 of the demonisation of “Imperialism” in the mobilisation of anti-imperialist 
movements during the Nationalist revolution of 1923 to 1928 and in Guomindang 
propaganda afterwards.44 
 The acceptance amongst historians that foreign attitudes were a problem might 
be claimed purely to derive from hostile post facto sources but it is obvious that the 
debate was a contemporary one.  W.P. Chen and G.W. Swire were two amongst many 
who for differing, even contradictory, reasons were involved.  The evidence is wider 
and worth a short survey.  Quaker missionary refugees from Sichuan in early 1927 
were shocked by the daily behaviour of “Shanghailanders” (as the foreign residents 
there liked to call themselves)45.  So were other visitors, such as the writer W. 
Somerset Maugham, whose works on China were largely concerned with a negative 
portrayal of the British communities and their behaviour, and Arthur Ransome who 
invented the term “The Shanghai Mind” to describe the common anti-Chinese 
attitudes amongst the British in “the Ulster of the East.”46 It takes little searching to 
find such criticism and even less to find evidence justifying it. 
 There were also many Chinese complaints: from the Legation in London; in 
journal articles (especially those aimed indirectly at a foreign readership in The 
People’s Tribune47); through reports of Westerners such as Professor Bailie or 
Vincent Sheean;48 in memoirs;49 or those shown as having been significant in the lives 
and thinking of Chinese racial theorists.50 During the Nationalist Revolution while 
much of the theoretical and polemical debate in the Guomindang and the Chinese 
Communist Party concerned the structures of foreign power in China it often focussed 
on foreign attitudes and their manifestations.  Nothing inspires more quickly than 
                                                          
44 See Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp.68-73. For propaganda afterwards see the pages of The 
People’s Tribune, 1932-34, passim.. 
45 William Sewell saw a “disdain for the Chinese on the part of the foreigners that makes you sick,” 
journal letter, 25/3/27, FSC CH/5 ; Clifford Stubbs was later to note “the underlying spirit of 
superiority and contempt”, Letter to H.T. Silcock, 28/10/27, FSC CH/5. 
46 For Maugham see his novel The Painted Veil (London, 1925), the travelogue On a Chinese Screen 
(London, 1922), or the play East of Suez (1922) in his Collected Plays Volume III (London, 1931). His 
vignettes of British treaty-port life won him few friends there (see the preface to the novel), the same 
method was to cause him unpopularity elsewhere, T. Morgan, Somerset Maugham (London, 1980), 
pp.251-52. Arthur Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle (London, 1927), pp.28-32, 30. See also Vincent 
Sheean’s account, Personal History, pp.199-202. 
47 See, for example, Jolin Huang, ““China Tea” A Farce in One Act”, satirising the efforts of a returned 
missionary to set up a Chinese wedding scene for a garden fete, People’s Tribune, 1 (NS), No.3, 
2/1/32, pp.73-91; People’s Tribune, 5 (NS), No.2, 16/8/32, “Some Aspects of the “Shanghai Mind””; 
Hao Wuteh “The Breaking Colour Bar in China”, People’s Tribune, 7 (NS), No.10, 16/11/34, pp.476-
87. 
48 See Sheean on the comments of a secretary of Quo Tai-chi [Guo Daiqi] and Eugene Chen, Sheean, 
Personal History, pp.196, 206-207; see, also, Ransome, Chinese Puzzle, p.148. 
49 In his autobiography the writer Xiao Qian [Hsiao Ch’ien] recalls discrimination in London, even 
during the war, Traveller Without A Map (London, 1990), p.75; some comments by China Association 
secretary E.M. Gull about housing discrimination back this claim up, Facets of the China Question 
(London 1931), p.191. 
50 Dikötter, Discourse of Race in Modern China, pp.113-15, 155-58. 
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tangible physical evidence of injustice and prejudice, such as the segregated park on 
the Shanghai Bund.51 
 
Defining Attitudes 
 Most historians and international relations writers do not use the terms 
“attitudes”, “perceptions” or “images” consistently or in line with other disciplines 
(most psychologists’ definitions of “image” and “perception”, for instance, are not 
useful for historians) or in any well defined manner.  International relations writers 
are no clearer, they use a variety of conceptual approaches, such as cognitive codes, 
operational codes, images and belief systems, which are all concerned with the same 
process: “the nature of the filtering device of existing beliefs about empirical and 
normative issues”.52 Furthermore they have generally looked at the role of attitudes in 
decision making and reporting rather than the wider role of attitudes in “social” 
interaction.53 
 “Attitude” is one useful concept for this type of work, being the one more 
likely to retain similar definitions in different disciplines (such as social psychology, 
social anthropology and sociology).  It has been defined as: 
 
a relatively stable predisposition or readiness to react in a specific way to a 
person, group, idea, or situation.  Attitudes are complex products of learning, 
experience, and emotional processes and include, e.g., our enduring 
preferences, prejudices, superstitions, scientific or religious views, and 
political predilections and aversions.54 
The individual articulation of attitudes may, for the purposes of this thesis, be 
described as being informed by and contributing to a wider discourse on the character, 
or “characteristics”, of the Chinese.  This definition enables us to look at processes of 
socialisation, that is the deliberate teaching and learning, or indirect acquisition, of 
certain attitudes; this also involves examining the relationship between dominant 
                                                          
51 For the theoretical debates see Ku, “Emergence of the Kuomintang’s Anti-Imperialism”, pp.87-97, 
and Cavendish, “Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang”, pp.23-56. In 1929 the National Government’s 
Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting told a British Legation official about “his own past treatment in 
Shanghai when first told on calling at a private house that the Chinese must come in by the back door,” 
B.C. Newton to Legation, No.95, 11/7/29, FO 228/3987/13 22Z. 
52 S. Smith, “Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations”, R. Little and S. Smith, eds., 
Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford, 1988), p.11. 
53 See, for example, the discussion on the influence of hostility to communism on official American 
perceptions of Chinese nationalism in Martin Mun-loong Loh, “American Officials in China, 1923-
1927: Their Use of Bolshevism to Explain the Rise of the Kuomintang and Chinese Anti-foreignism”, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1984). 
54 R.M. Goldman, ed., The Longman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry (New York, 1984), 
p.71. 
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 group and individual attitudes.55 Other definitions neglect the role of social groups 
and concentrate on individuals.56 
 It must be remembered that many of the problems outlined in this study partly 
result from basic problems of cultural interaction between two strong cultural 
traditions.  Some theorists of ethnicity have even argued that these are “evolutionary” 
problems.57 There is also probably still resistance against analysis of such discourses 
of the kind met by V.G. Kiernan; despite the increasing body of such research it still 
appears not to be seen as “proper history.”58 It is, after all, difficult to pin down and 
quantify attitudes and demonstrate cause and effect.  Characterisations of attitudes 
tend to assume, also, that such attitudes were important and influential without always 
proving this fact.59 Attitudes and behaviour can contradict yet coexist.60 While attacks 
on the whole academic debate about the attitudes, cultural implications and 
characteristics of (generically) imperialism are unconvincing it would be sensible to 
be aware, with Christopher Thorne, that there is: 
 
a temptation for those living in a post-imperial Europe, influenced by a very 
different climate of opinion and often by a sense of guilt, to cast into one 
stereotyped mould the men who encouraged and carried out Western 
expansion into Asia.61 
However, by firmly locating attitudes in their social background and by attempting to 
explain and understand their social, political and economic functions these criticisms 
will be met and such dangers avoided.  The heterogeneous nature of British society in 
China will also be more faithfully portrayed; this is intended to be a functional, not a 
moral, analysis.62  
                                                          
55 For a working definition of socialisation see B.B. Wolman, ed., Dictionary of Behavioural Science 
(2nd edition, San Diego, 1989), p.317. 
56 S. Sutherland, Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology (London and Basingstoke, 1989), p.38; F.J. 
Bruno, Dictionary of Key Words in Psychology (London, 1986), p.19. 
57 P.L. Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York, 1981); the state of studies in this field 
can be assessed from V. Reynolds, V. Falger and I. Vine, eds., The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: 
Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism (London, 1987). 
58 See the introduction to the second edition of his Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to the 
Outside World in the Imperial Age (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp.xiii-xlii. For one opponent see Simon 
Leys on “Orientalism and Sinology” in The Burning Forest (London, 1988), pp.96-100. 
59 Toshio Yokoyama’s Japan in the Victorian Mind: A Study of Stereotyped Images of a Nation, 1850-
80 (London, 1987), is a classic example of this failure. 
60 George Orwell realistically discussed the need for this in his essay on Nationalism: “You cannot get 
rid of these feelings by just taking thought. But you can at least recognise that you have them, and 
prevent them from contaminating your mental processes. The emotional urges which are inescapable, 
and are perhaps even necessary to political action, should be able to exist side by side with an 
acceptance of reality.” He was pessimistic about the numbers of people who made this “moral” effort, 
Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism” (1945), Collected Essays (2nd edition, London, 1961), pp.302-303. 
61 Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy, p.16; As regards guilt, Wolfgang Franke, for example, hoped to 
“do a little towards removing this burden” of [mutual] “mistakes and misunderstandings”, China and 
the West, p.vii. 
62 Importantly what has been called, in response to some of the polemical excesses of Said’s 
Orientalism, an “Occidentalisation” of the West should be avoided. 
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 Attitudes also informed and can be inferred from structures (socialising ones 
such as work and recreation habitats, and the expected place of Chinese callers in a 
shipping clerk’s office) and behaviour (the cigar and the feet on the table).  There are 
concrete forms such as the organisation of housing and other facilities, or marginally 
less obvious forms such as recruitment, employment and promotional patterns within, 
say, commercial enterprises or the delegation of areas of responsibility within a wider 
range of organisations. 
 
The Ingredients of Attitudes 
 Harold Isaacs’ 1958 study of American twentieth century attitudes, Scratches 
on Our Minds, was exceptional in its tangible relation of attitudes to political context.  
Isaacs interviewed 181 elite members of US society about their attitudes, images and 
memories of China and the Chinese, and India and Indians.  He was interested in their 
impressions of first encounters, memories, later impressions and the relationship 
between experience, image and attitude.  The results are fascinating and informative 
but the methodology is unrepeatable at this chronological distance from the subject.  
Still, an attempt can be made to use traditional historical materials to deal with some 
of the processes of learning and articulation Isaacs dealt with. 
 The social sciences are divided over definitions of, let alone approaches to, 
this subject.  This is unnecessary, as Michael Hechter has pointed out: 
 
there is nothing about ethnic and race relations per se that warrants the 
development of a special theory.  Indeed, the subject concerns phenomena - 
like group formation, solidarity, assimilation and collective action - that also 
occur among many other kinds of groups, be they based on class, religion, or 
territory.63 
Historians should also be aware of this.  Even a basic introduction to social 
psychology tells us that there is little exceptional about forming and using images and 
the formation and use of attitudes: 
 
In the normal course of events, any act of competition or cooperation between 
two or more human beings is part of a long-term pattern, explicit or implicit.  
This pattern cannot exist without some kind of a representation or an “image” 
of what the other person is like, is doing, and is likely to do: and this is as true 
of competition as it is of cooperation.  Our “strategies” also depend upon the 
image we have of the other person’s image of ourselves: and so it goes on.64 
As it “goes” on then it would follow that up-to-date tools are necessary and that 
images could be expected to change in the light of, say, changing diplomatic and 
political relations between Britain and China.  Indeed, international relations writers 
have stressed the relationship between events and dominant images of different 
                                                          
63 M. Hechter, “Rational Choice Theory and the Study of Race and Ethnic Relations”, J. Rex and D. 
Mason, eds., Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations (Cambridge, 1986), p.265. 
64 H. Tajfel and C. Fraser, “Social Psychology as Social Science”, Tajfel and Fraser, eds., Introducing 
Social Psychology: An analysis of individual reaction and response (Harmondsworth, 1978), p.29. 
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 countries.65 Changes in British attitudes to China and the Chinese can likewise most 
rewardingly be related to events in China’s twentieth century history.  As a 
Department of Overseas Trade [DOT] pamphlet put it in 1934: “much more is known 
abroad of China and the Chinese than was the case a few years ago” because “China 
has been “in the news.””66 Such change is not simultaneous, as shall be shown.  Nor 
should it be assumed that change occurs “naturally”: it will be shown that it took a 
great deal of efforts on the part of more progressive Britons to induce changes.  
Furthermore, political change highlighted attitudes and especially their more extreme 
articulations. 
 It should be borne in mind that the image of the “other” requires an image of 
the observer.  In opposition to traditional anthropological theories of ethnicity which 
implied group isolation and insular continuity Fredrik Barth stressed the importance 
and value of looking at the consequences of ethnic interaction which, he concluded, in 
no way diminished or blunted group identity.67 He was led to emphasize the formative 
role of interaction and the problem of “boundary maintenance”.  From this he 
concluded that  
 
ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors 
themselves, and thus have the characteristics of organising interaction between 
people.68 
Self-ascription entailed “systematic sets of role constraints” on the behaviour of 
individuals.69 There are, of course, some limits to self-ascription as a working criteria 
such as skin colour (non-”white” British subjects in China were never considered by 
“white”-Britons as British, although neither were British Jews), class and power 
relations.  But even with these qualifications the interest that this holds for the present 
work can easily be seen.  The British in China organised themselves, their attitudes to, 
and relations with the Chinese, upon various self-defined and self-restraining lines.  
This generally involved the ascription of certain characteristics to the Chinese.   
 These ascriptive processes were informed by such wider contextual discourses 
as those of race, “orientalism”, imperialism, anti-communism and paternalism.  Anti-
communism was a political tool (it was used to discredit the whole of the 
                                                          
65 K. Deutsch and R. Merrit, “Effects of Events on National and International Images”, H.C. Kelman, 
ed., International Behaviour: A Socio-Psychological Analysis (New York, 1965), pp.130-87. 
66 Department of Overseas Trade, China: Notes on Some Aspects of Life in China for the Information 
of Business Visitors (London, 1934), p.1. 
67 F. Barth, Introduction to F. Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of 
Cultural Difference (Oslo, 1969), p.9-10. For his influence see R. Cohen, “Ethnicity: Problem and 
Focus in Anthropology”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 7, 1978, pp.379-403, and R.E. Holloman 
“The Study of Ethnicity: An Overview”, R.E. Holloman and S.A. Arutiunov, (eds.), Perspectives on 
Ethnicity (The Hague, 1978), p.4. 
68 Barth, Ethnic Groups, p.10. 
69 “Ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play, 
and the partners he may choose for different kinds of transactions,” ibid., p.17. 
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Guomindang and Chinese nationalism for instance70).  It was an ideological and 
pragmatic motive amongst British observers and actors in China as well as a form of 
cultural expression71; “Englishness” did not involve sympathy for left-wing values.72 
W.J. Megginson’s work has firmly located British opposition to “Communism” 
(actual or labelled) in China in its domestic context: the decade of the first and second 
Labour governments, the “Red Scare” election of 1924, the Zinoviev Letter and the 
General Strike.73 
 The general question of Western attitudes to non-”white” groups is sometimes 
approached by its historians as an aspect of “Imperialism”.  It is taken for granted that 
the structure of an imperialistic relationship causes, indeed necessitates, specific 
supporting attitudes.74 Unless otherwise noted the term shall be taken literally here, 
after the OED, “pertaining to an empire”, in this case the British one, and not in its 
later disparaging usage.75 Regardless of the structure of British involvement in China 
there appears to be no reason to disagree with V.G. Kiernan’s comment that: 
 
Whether empires were agencies of civilisation or of exploitation, they rested 
on power, and all attitudes towards backward countries or “native” peoples 
were deeply imbued with the sensation of power, of imperial dominion.76 
 China was not subject to direct British imperial dominion, except in Hong 
Kong and Weihaiwei (until 1930), but Britain’s privileges and actions as a treaty 
power, as will be shown, make the application of Kiernan’s comment quite valid 
there.77 If imperialism is treated as a process which affects all the participants, not just 
the “victims”, but the “Imperialists” too, then it is more likely that clues as to how it 
perpetuated itself, how it behaved (or why) and its implications would be found.  A.P. 
                                                          
70 See, for example, North China Daily News, The Foreigner in China: An Outline History of Foreign 
Relations in China, Of the reasons for China’s Descent into Chaos, Of the Soviet’s Part in Fostering 
Confusion, And of the Chinese “Nationalist” Reaction to these several Influences (Shanghai, 1927), 
passim., where Chinese nationalism is characterised as Bolshevik-agitated anti-foreignism.  
71 Racial expression too, some have claimed. For example the frequent linking of Jews with 
Communism in the twentieth century, Colin Holmes, Anti-Semitism and British Society, 1876-1939 
(London, 1979), pp.142-43. 
72 Whatever George Orwell was later to claim to the contrary in his The Lion and the Unicorn: 
Socialism and the English Genius (London, 1941). 
73 Megginson, “Britain’s Response to Chinese Nationalism”, passim.; T.O. Lloyd, Empire to Welfare 
State: English History 1900-1985 (Oxford, 1986), pp.130-34. Julian Symonds, The General Strike A 
Historical Portrait (London, 1957), pp.66-70, gives a flavour of the instinctive anti-socialism of the 
British middle classes a that time.  
74 Kiernan, Lords of Human Kind, p.326. 
75 Competing definitions can be found in W.J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism (London, 1981), 
and A.P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (London, 1965). 
76 Kiernan, Lords of Human Kind, p.326. The structure of British involvement is discussed in 
Feuerwerker, Foreign Establishment, passim., and G. Woodcock, The British in the Far East (London, 
1969). 
77 Britain’s strength in the Far East was more in the nature of a self-recognised con-trick than anything 
else, Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937 (Cambridge, 1975), p.4; On Weihaiwei see P. 
Atwell, British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers: The British Administration of Weihaiwei (1898-
1930) and the Territory’s Return to Chinese Rule (Oxford, 1985), and Shiona Airlie, Thistle and 
Bamboo: The Life and Times of Sir James Stewart Lockhart (Hong Kong, 1989). 
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 Thornton wrote that “Imperialism is less a fact than a thought. At its heart is the 
image of dominance, of power asserted; and power is neither used nor witnessed 
without emotion”.78 It must be remembered that this is a two-way process.  
Thornton’s comment is an exaggeration, since, as has been shown, British 
imperialism in China was as much a fact as a thought.  There were British troops in 
Tianjin, Shanghai and Beijing, who were deployed as needed; there were British 
gunboats on the Yangzi and Pearl rivers whilst Weihaiwei and Hong Kong were 
administered by the British Colonial Office.   
                                                          
 Both the official and unofficial articulation of imperial ideology, especially 
imperial propaganda, rested on attitudes of racial superiority and guardianship that 
were apparently effective in shaping wider attitudes.79 It could be argued that the 
ideology as well as the reality of empire, or at least of its “care and maintenance”,80 
had secured a hegemonic position within the world-view of much of British society 
and government; this hegemony extended through education, various media and 
popular culture.81 This was not shaken by the 1914-1918 war, nor, to any great extent 
by the Great Depression, nor by the practicalities and economics of empire itself: for, 
as John Darwin wrote of the inter-war period, “the evidence of its decline was 
tiresomely elusive.”82 
 The structure of British imperialism relied on bluff, which was the true 
meaning of the totemic word prestige.  If, after its considerable, but overstretched, 
force of arms, British power abroad (both formal and informal) was maintained 
through its prestige it is clear that a certain set of attitudes and behaviour would be 
78 Thornton, Doctrines, p.2. 
79 R. Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914 (London, 1976), pp.156-62; J. Mackenzie, 
Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984), 
pp.2, 183-85, 253-58. See also Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj: Imperial 
Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1793-1905 (London, 1980); Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes 
to Race (London, 1971); P.D. Curtin, Imperialism (London, 1972); Kiernan, Lords of Human Kind; 
D.A. Lorimer, Colour, Class and the Victorians (London, 1978); P.B. Rich, Race and Empire in 
British Politics (Cambridge, 1986). 
80 J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post War World (London 
and Basingstoke, 1988), p.30. A.J. Christopher chose 1931 as the key date for his The British Empire 
at its Zenith (London, 1988), p.16. 
81 On this topic see, for example, Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, passim.; J.M. Mackenzie, ed., 
Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1985); J.A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and 
Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal (Harmondsworth, 1986). 
82 J. Darwin “Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the wars”, 
Historical Journal, 23, No.3 (1980), p.658. “Most of the best current writing on the subject starts from 
the same point of view and does not detect the defeatism which in the light of the true balance of 
forces, demographic, economic and military, might have been considered more realistic”, Max Beloff, 
Imperial Sunset, Volume II, Dream of Commonwealth 1921-1942 (Basingstoke, 1989), p.3. See also 
the recent symposium on “The Decline of Great Britain”, Internationl History Review, 13, No.4 
(November 1991), pp.662-783. Not surprisingly, Penelope Hetherington found among British 
intellectuals “almost universal support for the idea that it was necessary for Britain to stay in Africa”, 
British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940 (London, 1978), p.154. 
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required of the British participants to maintain that reputation.83 Shared British 
ethnicity meant that this covered both official and “unofficial” British, as Barth makes 
clear that it would: 
 
The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group 
implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement.  It thus entails the 
assumption that the two are fundamentally “playing the same game.”84 
The British abroad were fervent believers in the ideal of “playing the same game.” 
China’s independence should have required subtler handling than was accorded India, 
for example, but there is little evidence, as the following chapters will show, of 
anything but pragmatic, mostly official, subtlety.  In fact the renunciation in the 
“December Memorandum” of any official objectives in China except the protection of 
trade meant that, apart from the considerable constraints of ethnic solidarity, most of 
the British had no checks on their behaviour and no wider responsibilities towards 
their host nation. 
 What needs to be added to Barth’s analysis is an awareness of the fact that the 
structure of imperialism involves domination of one national group by another, either 
directly or indirectly.  Domination implies suppression.  One aspect of suppression, in 
a hegemonic sense, is denigration and thereby the removal of self-confidence from the 
suppressed; at the same time inflating the social, cultural and racial self-importance of 
the dominating group.85 
 The self-image of the British is clearly seen in their image of the Chinese.  
The Chinese were ascribed characteristic behaviour, national and individual, which 
was the antithesis of British norms.  At its most facetious this was symbolised by the 
image of “topsy-turveydom” in which all Chinese customs were the opposite of 
Western ones.86 The acceptance of this dichotomy necessitated the exaggeration of 
“English” characteristics as a form of boundary maintenance.  As the nature of 
foreign imperialism was threatened, the response of ordinary British residents also 
unveiled their more deeply-held beliefs as well as areas of possible compromise. 
 Imperialism compounded group behaviour.  Yet these British groups in China 
would not have existed without imperialism.  Nor would imperialism have its special 
                                                          
83 Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, pp.158-62. J. Galsworthy’s novel Flowering Wilderness 
(London, 1932) was a seriously intended reductio ad absurdum of this view where the apostasy and 
conversion at gunpoint of a young British poet in the Sudan appears to threaten the survival of the 
whole British empire. Galsworthys’ novels were favorites of G.W. Swire, who decreed that copies of 
them should be in the library of the company’s Swatow Club for shipping officers, G.W. Swire to JS 
London, 4/1/29, SP ADD 15. 
84 Barth, Ethnic Groups, p.15. 
85 Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, pp.157-58. 
86 See the entry on this topic in J. Dyer Ball (revised by E.T.C. Werner), Things Chinese; or, Notes 
Connected with China (Shanghai, 1925), pp.668-71. 
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 characteristics without the history of British and foreign intervention in China.87 So 
the changing character of these institutions, the changing character of “Imperialism” 
in China and the behaviour of the individual must be studied as a whole.88 
Feuerwerker’s term “foreign establishment” is too neutral a phrase given the 
characteristics of foreign, treaty power, life in China, such as extraterritoriality, 
concessions and settlements, troops and gunboats in the interior and inland navigation 
rights.  These are, by any definition, “imperialistic” rights, regardless of their 
“formality”.89 They enabled even the lowliest member of the protected foreign-
community to flaunt his privileges and abuse his status.90 It is clear that even those 
Europeans no longer governed by treaties were able to take advantage of them, 
Germans, for instance, and the luckier Russians.91 
 “Imperialistic” attitudes92, hierarchical and paternal, were closely related to 
class attitudes.  As will be shown below, the British communities in China were 
extremely class-conscious, snobbish and divided on class line, even the missionaries, 
despite claims to the contrary.93 This rigid consciousness (enforced close proximity 
probably heightened the awareness acquired in Britain) was also extended towards the 
Chinese.  Most of the Chinese foreigners met, or allowed themselves to meet, were 
servants, employees or coolies.94 It was only a short step to believing that all Chinese 
were lower class.  The ready importation of class-antagonism into race-relations has 
been well remarked: 
 
                                                          
87 Innes Jackson blamed what she perceived as the violent behaviour of Shanghailanders towards the 
Chinese on “money and a respected Consular service,” China Only Yesterday (London, 1938), p.32. 
88 “The psychological implications of this “sharing” of wider social settings could not be encompassed 
by a social psychology restricted to the study of face-to-face interaction”, Tajfel and Fraser, 
Introducing Social Psychology, p.35. 
89 In “British Informal Empire: The Case of China”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, 14, No.1 (March 1976) pp.64-81, Britten Dean has argued that it is wrong to include China as 
part of Britain’s Informal Empire because there was no “systematic process by which British subjects 
effectively subordinated” China “by the systematic application of non-market constraints.” [p.76] 
China was low on the list of British government priorities but this does not mean that it was any less 
efficiently dealt with in order to achieve more limited aims, the reverse is probably true. He is right to 
claim that a set of attitudes alone do not make informal empire but too rigorous in his definitions and 
wrong to assert that the study of attitudes is “inapplicable” to discussions of informal empire [p.75]. 
90 Fishel, End of Extraterritoriality in China, pp.217-18; Isaacs, Scratches, pp.150-51, “even to the 
lowlier members of the master race came all the appurtenances of high caste and high creature comfort 
at low cost.” As opposed to colonial Asia, no responsibility, of behaviour or of interest, was demanded, 
[ibid.]. 
91 Franke, China and the West, p.125. In the Municipal Gaol in Shanghai all non-Chinese, with or 
without extraterritorial rights, were accommodated in the Foreign Gaol, E.W. Peters, Shanghai 
Policeman (London, 1937), p.164. 
92 This remains a question of class attitudes, not a class analysis of race and ethnic relations, see for 
example, M. Banton, Racial Theories (Cambridge, 1987), pp.146-69. 
93 Teichman, Affairs of China, p.281-82. 
94 A term sometimes used pejoratively as a general description of the Chinese.  
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in innumerable ways [the gentleman’s] attitude to his own “lower orders” was 
identical to that of Europe to the “lesser breeds”...Much of the talk about the 
barbarism or darkness of the outerworld, which it was Europe’s mission to rout, was 
transmuted fear of the masses at home.95  British attitudes to China and the Chinese 
then were located in the context of the fact, and necessity, of “white” race supremacy, 
imperial maintenance and paternalism, and anti-communism.  These were positive, 
mobilising beliefs, accepted, or internalised, by most “representative Britons” in 
China. 
 
This thesis is concerned with two processes.  It first assesses the content and function 
of British attitudes to China taking the treaty port British as its “representative” focus.  
The next chapter will discuss the nature of the prevalent construct of the Chinese 
character and its sources; chapter 3 is an examination of the structure and mores of 
British treaty port society.  This will be followed by three chapters examining 
attempts to change British behaviour and public discourse.  This analysis will be 
based on the archives of selected representative institutions in the three main areas of 
the British community: official and municipal life, missionary society and the 
commercial world.  It will focus on the relationship between the attitudes, values and 
needs of the wider and the particular communities and also on the behaviour and 
beliefs of individual Britons.  It will describe the changes introduced, their 
motivations, the effects desired and the resistance encountered.  British attitudes to 
China and the Chinese will be examined then, at that point when they were most 
exposed and most influential, that is when they were the subject and object of reform. 
 
95 Kiernan, Lords of Human Kind, pp.30, xvi-xvii. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Chinese Characteristics and treaty port society:  
An armour of false facts? 
 
Introduction 
 
Standing on the wharf at Singapore we “new hands” out from England are 
suddenly confronted by a line of lean, grunting, slant-eyed Chinese 
rickshaw pullers, our first Chinese. Forgotten pictures in bound volumes of 
the Illustrated London News, read in the school reading-room on wet 
autumn days, surge up to our minds; pictures of the Boxer Rebellion, 
bloodthirsty pictures indeed. Up they rise to memory, and one’s “inside” 
gives a second’s gasp: “Good heavens! Is there a whole nation of such 
sinister people awaiting my arrival in China in five days’ time?”1 
Information about China was easy to come by in Britain in the 1920s. There were 
newspaper and magazine reports, hundreds of books specifically on the country in print 
and dozens of new ones appearing yearly while Chinese themes pervaded British fiction 
and theatre. There were around 13,000 Britons in China at any one time writing letters, 
(most missionaries wrote circular letters to friends and supporters), or similarly 
communicating with relations and friends. There were missionary and secular lectures, 
films, plays, a few university courses, and memories of childhood reading in school 
reading-rooms. 
 The accuracy of this information was variable and much of it was partisan. In 
sum, however, it represented a discourse concerned with all aspects of Sino-British 
relations. This discourse supplies contextual evidence for this investigation of British 
treaty port attitudes towards the Chinese and China. It will be shown that Britons arriving 
in the treaty ports went through a process of socialisation that built on and extended 
metropolitan-derived notions of the Chinese. 
 A large proportion of printed works dealing with all aspects of China routinely 
referred to Chinese “characteristics”, or used “characteristics” as an explicatory construct 
within their analyses. While the use of such a construct was not solely a feature of writing 
on China, nor its sole feature, there was a particular emphasis on such analysis, especially 
in works aimed at more popular audiences; related emphases can also be found in fiction, 
in theatre and also in private correspondence and reports of conversations. The context of 
this analysis was the diplomatically unequal relationship between Britain and China 
before the Nationalist Revolution. The construction, perpetuation, and justification of the 
structure of the British communities in China relied on the ascription of specific, 
negative, characteristics to the “sinister” Chinese, in contrast to the positive self-ascribed 
                                                          
1 G. Barnes, Enter China: A Study in Race Contacts (London 1928), pp.103-104. 
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attributes of the British. The substitution of “characteristics” for more objective economic 
or socio-political analysis was functional. It had a profound impact on the character of 
public discourse about China and consequently on the preconceptions of those going to 
China or already there. 
 
Chinese “Characteristics” 
 National “character” or “race” analysis was a widely used and largely 
unquestioned mode of discourse before the experience of Nazism discredited it.2 In most 
cases the discourse of “race”, and popular use of the term, were characterised by what 
have been termed “folk concepts of race.” These are elastic concepts that “can be utilised 
in ways that lack biological or social scientific justification” in the explanation of 
apparent differences between identifiable ethnic groups.3 In the formation of the 
construct of Chinese characteristics the use of this “folk” vocabulary and an a posteriori
mode of arguing from effects to “causes” were pr
 
evalent. 
                                                          
 The body of literature which dealt solely with such analysis was small but 
influential. American missionary A.H. Smith’s popular Chinese Characteristics (1890) 
was still a good seller and widely recommended reading in the 1920s. One survey in 1925 
placed it top of a list of “The Most Helpful Books on China” and second best-seller in 
three Shanghai foreign-language bookstores.4 Smith’s book was motivated by the 
necessity of analysing defects in the Chinese that Protestantism would remedy. He 
claimed to be an objective “observer” and dismissed the objections of previous writers 
who had felt unable to attempt to analyse the character of the Chinese.5 The work was 
critically dismissive of Chinese civilization and culture, concluding in short, that the 
Chinese lacked “character and conscience” and that the solution was reform from outside, 
through the introduction of “Christian civilization.”6 The importance of this work was 
2 See, for example, Sir Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (London, 
1927), which deals mainly with Britain and W. Thompson, The Mexican Mind: A Study of National 
Psychology (Boston, 1922), many of whose chapter headings are reminiscent of A.H. Smith’s Chinese 
Characteristics. On criticism see Banton, Racial Theories, p.xi. 
3 Michael Banton, Racial and Ethnic Competition (Cambridge, 1983), p.53. 
4 CR, May 1925, pp.299-305. It can be found, recommended as “interesting but somewhat out of date” in 
Bailie-Grohman papers, GRO/5 “Quite Useful Bibliography”, 1928; in H. Hodgkin, China in the Family of 
Nations (London, 1925), p.253 and in the 1928 War Office pamphlet Notes on Shanghai, p.31. See also 
A.D.C. Sowerby, “What is Right With China”, China Journal, 8, February 1928, p.58. It was later 
recommended by Erich Teichman for its honesty and because it derived from Smith’s own experience in 
China, Affairs of China, p.297. In 1928 it was on the language syllabus of the LMS in Fujian, E.A. Preston 
to F.H. Hawkins, 5/7/28, LMS China Fukien Box 15. 
5 Smith, Chinese Characteristics, p.11. 
6 Ibid., pp.396, 404. These criticisms ran through his other works such as his influential Village Life in 
China: A Study in Sociology (New York, 1899, London 1900), p.349. The chapter titles give the flavour of 
the book: “Face; Economy; Industry; Politeness; The Disregard of Time; The Disregard of Accuracy; The 
Talent for Misunderstanding; The Talent for Indirection; Flexible Inflexibility; Intellectual Turbidity; The 
Absence of Nerves; Contempt for Foreigners; The Absence of Public Spirit; Conservatism; Indifference to 
Comfort and Convenience; Physical Vitality; Patience and Perseverance; Content and Cheerfulness; Filial 
Piety; Benevolence; The Absence of Sympathy; Social Typhoons; Mutual Responsibility and Respect for 
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that it codified a set of previously disparate characterizations, and supplied a recognisable 
construct of the Chinese character which other commentators referred to as well, as a 
model of analysis which they could follow. In this model the Chinese were an object for 
study, rather than individual participators in an evolving and changing culture. It 
anticipated the respected and self-consciously sociological work of ex-British consul 
E.T.C. Werner, which married these characteristics with an evolutionary theory of racial 
development, at an early stage of which the Chinese race was placed.7 
 Smith’s work was liberally cribbed and copied. Hong Kong Bishop R.O. Hall’s 
Eminent Authorities on China (1931) was the reductio ad absurdum, a compilation of 
passages from Smith and other Western writers. It was arranged in three sections, 
ostensibly to allow readers to judge the Chinese character themselves: “The Realists”, 
“The Optimists” and “The Pessimists”; Smith was quoted under “Potted Chinese 
Psychology”.8 A revised fifth edition of J. Dyer Ball’s eclectic Things Chinese (1892) 
was published in Shanghai in 1925 and was still advertised by Kelly and Walsh in 1929 
under the heading “5,000 Things You Ought to Know About China... How Many Do You 
Know?” This combined analyses of the Chinese character with an almanac. The sections 
on “Riots”, “Suicide”, “Time”, “Topsyturvydom” and “Chinese People, Characteristics 
of” (more balanced than some such essays) owe much to Smith.9 
 A later generation of commentaries by treaty port writers such as Rodney Gilbert, 
A.F. Legendre and R. d’Auxion de Ruffé were largely also predicated on identifying the 
faults of the Chinese character and did so using, or referring to, racial theories. Their 
motivation was explicitly political. Gilbert’s What’s Wrong with China (1926) was a 
popular journalistic polemic and its negativity was anchored on the claim that China “is 
already spoiled and capricious beyond words, simply because she has been consistently 
overpraised and overrated when she should have been spanked.”10 The book was 
structured on the premise that “There are inferior races in the world” and warned that 
unless the “Anglo-Germanic” people solved the political problems of Asia and Africa 
there would be race-war:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Law; Mutual Suspicion; The Absence of Sincerity; Polytheism, Pantheism, Atheism; The Real Condition of 
China and Her Present Needs.” For an analysis see C.W. Hayford, “Arthur H. Smith and his China Book”, 
S.W. Barnett and J.K. Fairbank, eds., Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985), pp.153-174. 
7 E.T.C. Werner, China of the Chinese (London, 1919), pp.7-8. 
8 Hall felt that the Chinese exhibited “callous brutality - duplicity - untruthfulness - an amazing absence of 
thievishness - patience - perseverance - generosity, and a sense of character,” Eminent Authorities on China 
(Shanghai, 1928), pp.225-39, 247. 
9 J. Dyer Ball (revised by E.T.C. Werner), Things Chinese; or, Notes Connected with China (Shanghai, 
1925); NCDN, 2/5/29, p.1. It was reprinted in London and Shanghai in 1926. It can be found recommended 
in Julean Arnold, Commercial Handbook of China, Volume 2, (Washington, 1920), p.464, and was still in 
print in 1934, A Glimpse of China: A Handbook of Information for the Resident and Visitor (Nanjing, 
1934), p.163.  
10 Rodney Gilbert, What’s Wrong with China (London, 1926), p.7. 
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in which a mere handful of Anglo-Germanic superiors, with no preparation and no 
binding organisation among themselves, will be called upon to revert completely 
to Nietzschean militarism and subdue, exterminate or enslave all the inferior 
peoples of the earth, organised into a vast rebellion of the unfit, or go under.11 
Differences between the Chinese and Occidentals were so great, and so exacerbated by 
the closer proximity caused by improved communications that conflict was felt to be 
inevitable until one side or the other took the initiative and dictated to the other.12 This 
was by no means an original premise, it owed much to the work of influential polemicists 
such as Lothrop Stoddard and other writers on “race” questions;13 nor was it unfamiliar to 
the Chinese themselves.14 Grafted on to this scenario was a body of critical comments 
about the characteristics of the Chinese (they were unmanly,15 docile, mendacious, idle, 
intolerant, etc.), and Chinese society, which was largely based on the premise that “the 
Chinese are children.”16 The book was timely, originally appearing in article form in the 
North China Daily News; it was published in March 1926, and, with its attacks on 
Western diplomatic (and military) inaction and flattery of Westerners in China, was very 
popular amongst expatriate Britons, and if disliked at least read.17 Gilbert’s later work 
was also based on these themes.18 This racial analysis of Chinese characteristics was 
reinforced by the works of other treaty port residents such as A.F. Legendre’s Modern 
Chinese Civilization (1929) which was also firmly within the mainstream body of 
acceptable China analysis.19 
 
This influential genre was created and perpetuated in the missionary and political self-
interests of both writers and audience. It was, however, only the most obvious of the 
forms in which the discourse on Chinese characteristics was articulated. Others, in 
differing and often widely-circulating media, reinforced its influence. 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid., pp.14, 18. 
12 Ibid., p.199. 
13 See Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy (London and New York, 
1920) and The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under-Man (London, 1922). On scientific 
grounds J.W. Gregory advocated mass segregation of the races, warned against miscegenation and 
predicted “jarring friction” in mixed race societies, The Menace of Colour (London, 1925), pp.239, 241. On 
the influence of these writers see P.G. Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial 
Discrimination (Boulder, Colorado, 1988), pp.110-11. This theme did not vanish in the 1930s, see, for 
example, Éttiene Dennery, Asia’s Teeming Millions: and its Problems for the West (London, 1934), 
pp.233-43; Champly, Road to Shanghai and his White Women, Coloured Men (London, 1936). 
14 Dikötter, Discourse of Race in Modern China, p.159-162;   
15 Gilbert, What’s Wrong, pp.166-200; the otherwise pro-Chinese John Nind Smith agreed on the question 
of manliness, China’s Hour (London, 1930), pp.164-66. 
16 Gilbert, What’s Wrong, pp.45-49. 
17 There were two editions in London in 1926 and one in 1927. For individual recommendations of the 
book see W. Agnew papers, Letter to Mother, 24/4/27; Hamilton papers, Letter to Freddy, 13/6/27 and 
Lampson Diaries, 28/10/26. 
18 The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigner (London, 1929). 
19 A.F. Legendre, Modern Chinese Civilisation (London, 1929), pp. 288, 160, 170, 175-77, 182-85. It was 
well reviewed by J.O.P. Bland, NCH, 16/3/29, p.470, (reprinted from the Sunday Times). 
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Newspapers, Commentaries, Commentators and their clichés 
 China’s newsworthiness after 1925 encouraged the publication and republication 
of China-related commentaries. It also prompted a vivid press debate in which many of 
the familiar notions about the Chinese, codified by A.H. Smith, were repeated. Many 
writers took as given the viability of his analytical model; some even borrowed his catchy 
title.20 Much of this discourse naturally came from the pens of treaty port writers. A.M. 
Kotenov, a white Russian clerk at the Mixed Court in Shanghai, and author of works on 
the Court and the SMC, prefaced his analysis with the statement that:  
 
A knowledge of politico-economic facts and exact situations does not constitute 
true knowledge of the Chinese people... We assert that the very structure of the 
Chinese mind requires a knowledge of reactions rather than actions and of 
consequences rather than events.21 
With few exceptions most professional commentators adopted this approach in varying 
degrees or peppered their analyses with references to the Chinese “mind”.  
 French Shanghai resident and lawyer R. d’Auxion de Ruffé’s Is China Mad? 
(1928) claimed that “it is necessary to penetrate into the labyrinth of the mentality of the 
Chinese” before commentating on recent political events.22 E.M. Gull, secretary of the 
China Association, set out to deal with some “incontestable” facts about the Chinese 
mind, devoting chapters of his Facets of the China Question (1931) to “Non-Practical 
China” and “The Sinister Side”.23 Hong Kong University lecturer J.N. Smith, began his 
China’s Hour (1930) with a chapter on “The Chinese Mind”.24 Even B. Lenox Simpson 
(“Putnam Weale”), whose work usually eschewed such analyses, announced that “The 
problem of China is largely pathological, and very slightly political.”25 Treaty port 
journalist H.G.W. Woodhead remarked, for example, that “the Chinese is not noted for 
moral courage. He can easily be worked up into a state of hysteria against foreigners...”26 
Ex-SMC Secretary and Times journalist J.O.P. Bland argued for “the duty of reparation” 
                                                          
20 Notes on Shanghai, Appendix: “Some Chinese Characteristics”; DOT, Notes on Some Aspects of Life in 
China, Chapter VI, “Chinese Characteristics”; O.M. Green, Discovering China (London, 1938), pp.5-6. 
21 A.M. Kotenov, New Lamps for Old: An Interpretation of Events in Modern China and Whither they Lead 
(Shanghai, 1931), foreword. On Kotenov see “Guanyu “Shanghai huishen gongtang yu gongbuju” he 
“Shanghai gongbuju yu huaren” de zuozhe Ketaineifu de dangan” [Concerning the records of A.M. 
Kotenov - author of “Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council” and “Shanghai: The Council and the 
Chinese”], Dangan yu Lishi, No.2 (1986), pp.4-8. 
22 d’Auxion De Ruffé spent 45 pages listing bad qualities (an arrested and impossible language, “mental 
torpidity”, “incoherence - disorder - bad will”, face, “lack of national solidarity” and the use of fingers to 
blow noses) and 4 only on good ones, d’Auxion de Ruffé, Is China Mad? (Shanghai, 1928), pp.13-58, 59-
63. This was originally published as Chine et Chinois d’aujourdhui: le nouveaux peril jaune (Paris, 1926), 
and translated into English by a North China Daily News journalist. 
23 Gull, Facets of the Chinese Question, pp.15-38, 111-23. 
24 Smith, China’s Hour, pp.17-31. 
25 Putnam Weale, Why China Sees Red (New York, 1925), p.114. See his The Conflict of Colour (London, 
1910), passim.. His attitude to inter-racial sex was unfavourable however, see his “The Forbidden 
Boundary” and “The Fever Bed” in The Forbidden Boundary and other stories (London, 1908). 
26 H.G.W. Woodhead, The Truth About the Chinese Republic (London, 1925), p.267. 
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the West owed China but was convinced that “the permanent causes of unrest” were 
“inseparable from China’s deep-rooted social system” and “the structural character of the 
people;” and that “vain doctrines of racial equality” should be ignored.27 Lionel Curtis of 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, who took a strong interest in China at this 
point, also elaborated a few of the qualities of the Chinese.28 
 Not all such accounts were hostile but works such as Bertrand Russell’s The 
Problem of China were in a minority.29 Many writings based on the discourse of 
characteristics can also be found in newspapers and periodicals and in the missionary 
press.30 It was perhaps unusual for an editorial in the North China Daily News to directly 
paraphrase Bret Harte’s line about “the Heathen Chinee”31 but it was quite common to 
find comments about the various accepted characteristics of the Chinese, heathen and, 
especially, otherwise, mostly in commentaries on Chinese politics or society, but at times 
as separate articles.32 News stories often contrasted the characteristic reactions of Chinese 
and Westerners, especially their responses to accidents, as did their correspondence 
pages.33 
 Some of this analysis was explicitly offensive. The British Consulate-General in 
Shanghai described one British paper, The Showdown, (which had a respectable 
circulation of 1,500), as aiming to “exploit the craving for scurrilous abuse of the 
Chinese, which exists on the part of a section of the Foreign Community in Shanghai.”34 
The Showdown’s editor, China-raised W.B. Lockhart, also wrote frequently in a similar 
vein for the North China Daily News.35 
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33 See, for example, CMC official C.S. Archer (who later wrote some novels about China) in an article 
reprinted from the Daily Express, NCH, 23/6/28, p.536. 
34 “List of Foreign Newspapers in Shanghai”, Shanghai No.202, 25/7/30, FO 228/4189/3 22. Lockart’s 
father had  been born in Shanghai in 1850 and Lockhart had lived most of his life there, Shanghai 
Municipal Police Report, “William Bruce Lockhart”, 3/11/28 in Shanghai No.256, 6/12/28, FO 228/4045/3 
61L. 
35 See, for example, NCDN, 12/8/27, p.4; in 1931 he wrote opposing the collection of funds for flood relief 
because “it is no longer the business of the foreigner to dissipate his dwindling resources on the shifting 
human quicksands of this ever hostile race of people”, NCH, 18/8/31, p.237. Most of the letters in response 
supported his stand, ibid. and NCH, 25/8/31 p.272-73. 
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 An allied, but more sociological, debate on race relations was intermittently a 
feature of these commentaries, especially missionary writings. This largely involved 
discussions of what Bland dismissed as “doctrines of racial equality”, such as were to be 
found in the work of George Barnes and the introspective pages of the Chinese 
Recorder.36 Barnes regretted missionary “paternalism” and argued that “the Chinese 
require neither whitewash nor blacking for their characters.”37 Basil Mathews, like other 
writers influenced by Stoddard, was worried by the threat of “a catastrophic race-
migration of unexampled magnitude and menace to the peace of the world”, especially as 
“When we talk of the unity of man, we do not mean the uniformity of men.”38 
 
Commentators’ Clichés 
 The reliance of the treaty port writers on the discourse of characteristics involved 
them in the use of a set of stock clichés with, it will be shown, functional intent, when 
dealing with political and economic events and trends in China. 
 In these works China was felt to be a civilization in decline (a concept which 
often, as in Legendre’s work, had racial implications39), which needed foreign assistance 
of one sort or another, but not foreign connivance with nationalism.40 Furthermore, as the 
Chinese were, characteristically cruel, the rendition of extraterritoriality would lead to a 
repetition of the judicial cruelties inflicted on Britons in the years before 1842 (which 
were often itemised to emphasize this point).41 On a positive note their characteristic 
selfishness and loyalty to the family made it impossible for communist ideas to take 
hold.42 
 There was a general refusal to admit that the Nationalist Revolution represented a 
new departure in Chinese politics, it was portrayed as a new Boxer rising or else as the 
                                                          
36 Barnes, Enter China, passim.. On the Chinese Recorder see for example, T.C. Chao “Some thoughts on 
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38 Basil Mathews, The Clash of Colour: A Study in the Problem of Race (London, 1924), pp.50, 151. By 
1931 this had been through 23 impressions. 
39 Legendre, Modern Chinese Civilisation, pp. 206-208, 288. 
40 Putnam Weale, Why China, pp.262-64; N. Peffer, China: Collapse of a Civilization (London, 1931), pp 
3-9. 
41 W.E. Soothill, China and England (London, 1928), pp.32-41; Putnam Weale, Why China, pp.323-32; 
H.G.W. Woodhead, A Journalist in China (London, 1934), p.261. 
42 Bland, China, p.284; P.T. Etherton and H.H. Tiltman, The Pacific: A Forecast (London, 1928), p.59. 
Some writers claimed, however, that communism was not a new phenomenon in China, see F.R. Martin, 
Communism in China in the XI Century (London, 1927), passim., and Mrs Alfred Wingate, China Through 
the Ages (London, 1932), pp.120-21. 
 36
child of Bolshevik gold.43 This cliché spread as far as that bastion of middle-class clichés, 
Punch magazine (see figure 2, following page). The attempt by the National Government 
to regain effective control of the Maritime Customs, for example, was reduced in the 
foreign press to a stereotypical story of corrupt Chinese politicians seeking a steady 
income.44 
 In tandem with this insistence on analysing China in terms of the past, there was a 
bias against “modern” China; that is, the effects of Westernization and Western education 
(both within China and on the returned students.)45 Whilst commentators asserted the 
necessity of foreign help, tutelage or education, they were not happy dealing with the 
fruits of that education. The deracinated and “half-educated” returned student was blamed 
for the nationalism which threatened the foreign position. In effect the hegemonic 
function of Western tutelage was undermined as the pupil-teacher relationship was thus 
threatened.46 As in the Empire proper, many Britons seem to have only felt happy 
speaking from their own traditional paternalistic positions to traditionally placed 
Chinese.47 The Chinese scholar-gentry were idealised48 and the passing of the Manchus 
regretted.49 Attacking the returned student was also, perhaps, a way of “reasonably” 
attacking the notion of Chinese progress itself to which all commentators had to pay lip-
service (as part of the ideological baggage of paternalism) but which in practice 
undermined the Western position in China. 
 Not all commentators were so transparently serious. Events in China were often 
trivialised and the country portrayed as a land of comic-opera warlordism and pidgin-
English, while Chinese personalities were exoticised or rendered picturesque. As late as 
                                                          
43 Lenox Simpson claimed in 1927 that “foreigners could trace almost identical situations during the past 16 
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singled out for especial attack”, NCH, 14/5/27, p.290. “The present anti-foreign feeling running through 
China is perhaps more widely spread than such exhibitions of feeling have been in the past, but it is not 
different from those that have gone before”, L.A. Lyall to Sir Francis Aglen, 28/5/27, Maze papers, 
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44 NCH, 5/1/29, p.2. 
45 For example see Bland, China, pp.137-53; Putnam Weale, Why China, pp.99-101, 115-17; Peffer, China, 
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Zimmern, The Third British Empire (London, 1926), p.83. 
48 H.A. Giles, Chaos in China (Cambridge, 1924), pp.36-38; Soothill, China and England, p.45. 
49  Soothill felt that the 1911 Xinhai revolution had been “unnecessary and harmful,” China and the West: A 
Sketch of their Intercourse (London, 1925), p.192; Bland: China, p.3. 
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1928 the North China Daily News felt able to begin a humorous column in pidgin 
English. Company journals often printed letters received in broken, bad, or picturesque 
English from Chinese correspondents.50 
 Western stereotypes based on Chinese subordination were also threatened as the 
Chinese bourgeoisie grew in wealth and strength in the years before 1927 and made 
increasing political demands, especially concerning power within the foreign settlements. 
Leading Chinese figures, such as Yu Xiaqing in Shanghai, were demonised51 and the 
legend of the “silent majority” of politically conservative Chinese businessmen, on whose 
behalf the foreigner was compelled to speak, was actively propagated.52 
 Until the 1930s the conditions of life in rural China which usually offended the 
sensibilities of travellers were not viewed as the effects of poverty but of the ingrained 
characteristics of the Chinese. It is also probable that the identifiably growing Western 
concern for the Chinese peasant - whilst accurately reflecting their numerical dominance 
in Chinese society - was also related to this dislike of modernized urban China and its 
elites; this had increasingly been the pattern in British India.53 The Chinese peasantry was 
always portrayed as the passive victim of the corruption of the political and military 
elites.54 
 The underlying theme and one which was also implicit in the position of the 
China expert and in his use of Chinese “characteristics” was an imperialistic paternalism. 
The political status quo made it usual to assume “the continued supremacy of the white 
race in the Pacific”;55 although there was some debate on how the dominant race ought to 
behave (and whether it had been misbehaving in the past).56 This paternalism was 
occasionally expressed in racial terms and frequently as a more general duty of the 
“West” but was often much more explicit. For some the Chinese, like subjects of the 
British empire, needed occasional chastisement as if they were naughty children, both 
                                                          
50 See also, for example, [Dr.] Neville Whymant, “Pidgin English in China”, 11/1/28, BBC Written 
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54 Bland, China, pp.317-24; Sir Meyrick Hewlett, Forty Years in China (London, 1943), pp.250-51. 
55 P.T. Etherton, China: The Facts (London, 1927), pp.256. 
56 Lady Hosie, Portrait of a Chinese Lady (London, 1929), pp.82-83; Bland, China, p.4. 
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individually and as a nation. Consul Hewlett felt that six months as a prep school master 
taught him “lessons which were of real value in my subsequent relations with the 
Chinese.”57 
 For others the collapse of Manchu rule left a vacuum which only foreign 
intervention could fill, as the Chinese people themselves were presently unfitted for self-
government. Paternalism softened the image of military intervention, making an altruistic 
duty out of what otherwise appeared merely to be aggressive imperialism.58 
 
These clichés suggested then, that the Chinese were to be distrusted, that they were 
corrupt, that they were not to be taken seriously, that they had to be treated as if they were 
an imperial subject race and that their politics lacked any integrity. This negative analysis 
was intended as a contrast to the standards ascribed to foreign behaviour, and to the 
situation in the foreign concessions and settlements.59 It implied that China must be dealt 
with firmly at a diplomatic level, and that the Chinese were to be distrusted as 
individuals. It supported the maintenance of the treaty port status quo. 
 
Eminent Authorities 
 Most of these commentaries were written by writers with direct experience of the 
treaty ports. They were, after all, superficially the best informed about China. As such 
they were recommended to those actively seeking such analyses and were widely read. 
Their authors’ status as treaty port writers, however, meant that their analyses were 
dominated by an agenda that was far from objective. They wrote, mostly, to support the 
treaty ports they lived and worked in. These writings on China and the Chinese must be 
seen in relation to their authors and the roles they played, or felt they played.  
 Most of these commentators were untrained “experts” or professional writers. 
Theirs was the approach of the “China-hand”, the professional China-commentator. They 
assumed that the foundation of any analysis of China lay in knowledge of Chinese 
“characteristics”, and in a body of salient and static facts about the Chinese derived from 
their racial or cultural history, of which they had a monopoly. They professed a love of 
China despite, and because of, their critical approaches.60 They were journalists, 
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pamphlet writers and authors. They paraded their knowledge at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs and in similar conclaves. They reviewed books and gave radio talks. 
 Due to the successful self-mythologisation of those who applied the term “China 
Hand” to themselves and their contemporaries the phenomenon is familiar. This self-
image was vital, both to their position in the British community in China, and to their 
reception by it and by the wider community of interest in Britain.61 Of Lenox Simpson 
one newspaper wrote, for example, that he “has to be credited with being a keen observer 
of Eastern problems. He has studied the mentality of the Oriental.”62 
 The Chinese and their society were felt to be easy to explain, and people quickly 
set themselves up as informal or formal experts on the basis solely of residence in China, 
or a little knowledge of it.63 China had its “Pagett MPs” (after Kipling’s instant expert on 
Indian questions64), brief visitors who came, saw, and wrote with authority on the topic, 
such as Bertrand Russell, Somerset Maugham, Arthur Ransome, Mrs. Cecil K. Chesterton 
and Lionel Curtis.65 China residents affected to scorn such visitors66 and reserved their 
praise for those with long-term “experience”, (long enough, at least, to learn the “5,000 
Things You Ought to Know About China”). They were few in number and tended to 
monopolize the transmission of information while attacking competing interpretations, 
such as those offered by the “missionary cranks at Honolulu” in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations.67 
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 O.M. Green and H.G.W. Woodhead were the leading British newspaper editors 
and opinion formers on Chinese questions in the treaty ports and in Britain. Woodhead, 
editor of the standard reference work The China Year Book from 1911, edited the Peking 
and Tientsin Times from 1914 to 1930 before moving to Shanghai to write for the 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury and edit his own journal, Oriental Affairs. Green 
was editor of the North China Daily News from 1911 to 1930, and correspondent for the 
Times both when in China and when he retired. Both men published widely on Chinese 
topics and were correspondents for British papers.68 Rodney Gilbert was an American 
journalist and editor of the North China Daily News during its most virulent phase in 
1927;69 he retired from the staff of the paper in 1929 to great praise.70 This trio shared 
their expert’s status with, among others, J.O.P. Bland and Bertram Lenox Simpson. These 
three were professional China commentators, and they were still analysing the Chinese 
scene in the later 1920s long after the China they initially knew was the subject of history 
(Simpson was born there and had joined the Chinese Maritime Customs in 1896,71 Bland 
went out in 1893 and Gilbert in 1912). Bland was usually dismissed by other 
commentators after the mid-1920s but still published and was still asked to write reviews 
and lecture, although he apparently only returned to China once, in 1920, after leaving it 
in 1910.72 
 These authorities rarely had any professional training; Gilbert went to China as a 
medical salesman,73 Bland joined the Chinese Maritime Customs and was then Secretary 
of the Shanghai Municipal Council and agent for the British and Chinese Corporation, 
combining these posts with journalism and book writing.74 Most professionals, such as 
academics, were ex-missionaries, consuls or customs men and this was still considered a 
natural course for them to take upon leaving these services.75 Polemicists, sinophiles,76 
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the off-spring of treaty port families, and frauds complete the professions involved in 
interpreting China, doing so plainly under the influence of their own untrained favourable 
or unfavourable prejudices. All of these took strong partisan lines in their political 
commentaries.77 
 A crucial feature of the China expert was that he was not Chinese, although he 
could, and did, often refer to Chinese self-criticism. Chinese writers who wrote in English 
were usually ignored but were not numerous.78 The good expert, like the good resident 
generally, kept his distance and avoided compromising the essentials of his British 
approach; for that very reason it was assumed that a missionary could not make a good 
expert (A.H. Smith was an exception, but his work was not contemporary commentary). 
The paradigmatic example lies in the famous library of European-language works on 
China built up by Times journalist and advisor to Yuan Shikai, G.E. Morrison; Morrison 
himself was unable to speak Chinese.79 
 While there may be some truth in the broad statement by ex-missionary historian 
K.S. Latourette that “at his best the alien can write with a detachment and perspective 
which the native can only rarely command,”80 his claim was only justifiable as a 
generalisation. In practice the underlying theme of the China expert was more vulgarly 
paternalistic. With the exception, for obvious reasons, of Hu Shi, the outspoken critic of 
the Guomindang and Chinese culture, those Chinese who could have interpreted China in 
person - the returned, or the Western-educated, students - were disliked and distrusted. 
For Woodhead they were “often a menace to a better understanding” of the problems of 
Sino-Western relations.81 To allow the validity of their claim to interpret themselves and 
their society would have questioned treaty port social taboos by implying an equality to 
the Chinese; it would also have threatened the livelihood of foreign interpreters of China. 
Chinese commentators would have had a head start linguistically and culturally, and were 
likely to have been better educated than most of their foreign counterparts.  
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 It was, then, quite usual for people to claim to know China and the Chinese better 
than the Chinese themselves. This was a familiar characteristic of such discourses and, 
after all, the Chinese were their prime object of study.82 The China experts wrote before 
the advent of large-scale professional academic research on China, which they were apt to 
dismiss83 in preference for their own groups who clustered around the China Society in 
London and the Royal Asiatic Society [RAS] in Shanghai and their academic 
publications.84 At this time foreign papers relied on treaty port community English-
language papers and journalists for their news, which meant that news reporting from 
China not biased towards supporting the position of the treaty port communities was 
scarce, except during such emergencies as the early months of 1927.85 
 In response to Nationalist criticisms of the editorial policy of the North China 
Daily News in 1929 Green declared that: 
 
he thought in the absence of official opposition some adverse criticism of the 
Chinese government was good for it and was appreciated by a large number of 
Chinese whose own opinions were stifled by rigorous control of the press.86 
The logical extension of this was that the China experts also tended to see themselves as 
actors (handlers), or possible actors, in events, a notion which reflected their paternalism 
and their confidence in their approach. “For some millions of roubles... I guarantee to get 
a pro-British movement in China tomorrow” claimed Bland in 1927.87 R.F. Johnston, not 
content with tutoring the Emperor Pu Yi and later governing Weihaiwei, toyed with 
involvement in Chinese politics.88 Bertram Lenox Simpson was an advisor to Zhang 
Zoulin from 1922 to 1925, and was murdered in 1930 after seizing control of the Tianjin 
customs for Yan Xishan, during the revolt of the Northern Coalition.89 
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 In fact experience at handling any type of Orientals was considered useful. In 
1929 G.W. Swire suggested sending advisers to the Nationalists: 
 
There must be scores of the right kind of man in India, - Suttons but of the really 
right type -, who would take on this kind of Chinese Gordon job on their own 
more or less and gradually make the Chinese think that we were the real friends.90 
Sir Frederick Whyte, whose career had been previously spent in India, was sent out to 
China by a number of British companies in 1928. He eventually became an adviser to the 
National Government.91 The experts were certainly actively involved in treaty port 
affairs: Simpson was on the first board of the Shanghai Publicity Bureau in 1927, H.G.W. 
Woodhead was a founder and leader in the Shanghai British Residents’ Association in 
1931 and Green its London agent.92 
 
The works of the China experts were aimed at populist audiences, at the British 
community in China of which they were a part, or those in the community of China-
interests at home. They both informed and represented the mentality of the treaty port 
foreigners. There were, of course, exceptions, but it is clear that more people read Rodney 
Gilbert than Sir Frederick Whyte, however often he was recommended. The volume of 
negative works far outweighed that of more positive writings. 
 
Friends of China 
 It must be remembered that this largely negative image specifically applies to the 
British community in China. It is not intended to apply to writing about China as a whole, 
although it pervaded a large part of it. It is also clear that, although for many writers a 
stated sympathy for China was merely a literary cliché, there were treaty port critics who 
felt that their criticisms were positive and wrote to present favourable and conciliatory 
aspects of Chinese life and society to a British audience. Much academic work on 
Chinese topics in the West was politically disinterested and increasingly of a higher 
standard. However, in 1930 Latourette criticised the emphases in modern history which 
he felt served, in a sense, to exoticise China, by concentrating on its ancient philosophy, 
or marginalise it, by concentrating on what E.R. Hughes called the Western “invasion.”93 
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 A great deal of positive reporting was broadcast on BBC radio, and subsequently 
republished in The Listener. In spring and summer 1929 a series of cultural programmes 
by Lionel Giles were complemented by a series of commentaries on “China Today” by 
Chinese personalities.94 Some Britons supported the political aims of the Guomindang 
and the Chinese Communist Party, or were sympathetic to the cause of nationalism.95 
Nationalist Chinese works were published in Britain.96 Reportages concerning foreign 
treaty port life were generally sensationalist, if not openly hostile, and grew more so in 
the 1930s.97 Arthur Ransome’s attack on the “Shanghai Mind” in the Manchester 
Guardian in 1927 was particularly effective, especially in view of the sensitivity shown 
to his charges by the Shanghai British.98 
 Some Britons went specifically to live in China to experience its culture, and 
wrote engagingly about their experiences. Harold Acton, Osbert Sitwell and Innes 
Jackson went to sample the Chinese past and to seek the exotic. There were nascent 
scholars such as C.P. Fitzgerald and itinerant ones such as William Empson. For John 
Blofeld the attraction of Beijing was that “so much of the ancient past was still vigorously 
alive within her walls”. Their “Peking” was that of Sir Edmund Backhouse’s “Décadence 
Mandchoue”, R.F. Johnston’s Twilight in the Forbidden City, and Segalen’s René Leys, 
exotic, erotic and aristocratic.99 Most of their works were elegiac and rooted in Beijing, 
but a Beijing largely of their own imagination and selective experience.100 
 Missionaries rather than aesthetes were, superficially, the biggest source of 
“friendly” material about China. However, the ideology of mission often obscured the 
widespread denigration of China’s status, Chinese life and culture. This was exacerbated 
by its altruistic articulation, and a dualistic view of the world which pitted Christian 
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against heathen. Heathenism was fearful, but it was also child-like, a perception which 
fitted in comfortably with notions of the Chinese character.101 The missionary enterprise 
was, by nature, introspective, but it also required a self-confidence which was single-
minded and often appeared arrogant. This was especially noticeable in its dismissal of 
Chinese beliefs and the culture.102 
 Of course, the missionary approach to the Chinese began with the premise that 
they were, as Quaker Chemistry teacher William Sewell reported, far from perfect and 
that was one reason for the whole missionary enterprise.103 Even by 1928 this was 
recognised as rather an old-fashioned view, at least too old-fashioned to hold in public. 
Sewell’s more colourful and hostile passages were not reprinted in circulated versions of 
his letters. This form of censorship was common, subjects uncensored included the stock 
clichés of mission propaganda, such as opium growing.104 Published missionary writings 
are not, therefore, generally a reliable source of information about their views towards the 
Chinese.  
 Missionary accounts of the Chinese in private and circulated correspondence in 
the late 1920s were ambiguous and often contradictory. The revulsion exhibited, at 
cruelty to animals or the apparent “cheapness” of human life, was real but Chinese 
“faults” were usually perceived as resulting purely from the deficient moral values of the 
Chinese. William Sewell announced that the “disdain for the Chinese on the part of the 
foreigners” in Shanghai made him “sick” but in his own judgement the Chinese were 
decadent, ignorant, childlike, cowardly, dishonest and their civilisation inert, a “jelly-
fish”. When sufficiently exasperated he would announce that “East is East and West is 
West and they just won’t meet” before denouncing China’s “topsy-turvy” nature. When 
on furlough, however, he lectured widely and effusively on China and on the absolute 
necessity of British understanding of the Chinese.105 In later years Sewell, a founder 
member of SACU and a pro-communist publicist, accepted the primacy of economic 
factors in many of the areas in which he found the Chinese wanting.106 At the time his 
was the disgust of a Briton confronted by practices he believed barbaric and beliefs he 
felt superstitious. That is, the disgust of a Briton with superior values, a treaty port Briton. 
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More positive images of China, then, were available but these were not, largely, the 
works produced by, and for, the treaty port British. It was the discourse of the 
commentaries of Gilbert, Woodhead and Bland, which was more influential, and 
contributed to the processes of socialisation. This discourse was reinforced by the 
attitudes to China and the Chinese that pervaded fictional media in Britain. 
 
 
Fictional Authorities 
 Fictional works dealt with many of the same issues and characterisations as 
commentaries. Furthermore, although fiction was primarily a form of relaxation, if “the 
picture of the interwar Englishman, particularly of the middle class, is incomplete unless 
we see him reading thrillers, detective stories, and P.G. Wodehouse”, then it is necessary 
to investigate attitudes to the Chinese expressed in these, and similar writings.107 Some 
professional commentators used the fictional form for didactic purposes, as did 
missionaries,108 and many others did so indirectly. Fiction was frequently recommended 
as a source of information on China and, in recognition of its influence, criticised for 
being misleading: 
 
There are many surprises in store for the man who, having read about the 
East and dreamed about the East, at last comes East. Fiction about China is 
notoriously untrustworthy, whether it be in the slander of the silent-
gliding, inscrutable villain, or the idealization of romance and oriental 
splendour.109 
 Fictional works involving and invoking China or the Chinese were common and 
increased in numbers published (and identifiable), towards the end of the 1920s.110 They 
composed a small proportion of total literary production but did form a recognisable and 
recognised genre with its own conventions. Novels, plays and films must be analysed 
together. Some stories appeared in all three formats, thereby compounding their 
popularity and influence. Some of the most popular plays on the London stage of the 
early part of the century had Chinese themes or settings while the cinema was the major 
form of entertainment patronised by Britons in the inter-war period.111 
 Certain fictional themes were perennial: most notably a hostility to political 
change in China after 1911, denigration of the Chinese and Eurasians, and disapproval of 
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mixed-race liaisons. Many writers also used the familiar clichés about the Chinese, their 
characteristics and their country, which were informed by and informed the structure of 
Sino-British personal relations in the treaty ports. Their writings were important channels 
for the circulation, articulation and, indeed, the development of these clichés. This section 
will explore works published or seen in London or the Far East in the three decades or so 
before 1928, and through to the mid-1930s. This selection represents those works likely 
to have been read specifically by those seeking fictional accounts of China or Chinese, 
and also those available, in the normal course of events, to the average reader or viewer in 
the metropole, as a familiar genre within romance, mystery or other fictions. They were 
so prevalent as to be familiar to all whose work took them to China. Many of the writers 
were treaty port residents, or had previously been so, or else visited China in search of 
material. 
 Most novels set in China or involving the Chinese can be categorised as roman à 
clef, thrillers, or romances. Those not classifiable as “popular” literature were less 
common. Apart from Pearl Buck’s works, Somerset Maugham’s The Painted Veil (1925), 
André Malraux’s Man’s Fate (1934), and Malcom Lowry’s Ultramarine (1933) are 
possibly the only works well-known today. In Maugham and Lowry, however, China was 
a background of little importance to the themes of the book, although both visited the Far 
East in search of material, or found it there.112 Stella Benson lived in China as the wife of 
a Customs Commissioner. She wrote three novels set in China, in two of these her own 
eclectic themes were explored in small treaty port locales; the Chinese characters were 
not important and were dismissively handled. The dismissiveness with which all three 
writers treated Chinese characters was in itself telling.113 
 Bertram Lenox Simpson, under the pseudonym Putnam Weale, also wrote novels. 
These dealt with a variety of political topics, such as missions and financial 
imperialism,114 and always with the position and attitudes of the foreigner in China. His 
topically opportunistic fictional discourse (he published none between 1920 and 1927 
when the vogue for books on China prompted a resumption) complemented more 
conventional writings on Chinese and East Asian politics and allowed him the freedom in 
which to make libellous comments.115 These novels relied on their romantic interest and 
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their appearance as romans à clef.116 This was deliberate: the preface to Wang the Ninth 
(1920) declared that it had the “quality of being true and should therefore be known.”117 
Two novels contrived to describe the setting and working out of the 1911 Xinhai 
revolution,118 whilst a later trilogy followed the career of a Chinese peasant from Boxer 
era infancy to a successful career as a warlord.119 
 Other explicitly political writers included Rodney Gilbert whose The Indiscretions 
of Lin Mang (1929) allowed him to cash in on the vogue for atmospheric and informed 
fiction about China. The book was politically and culturally hostile to China and the 
Chinese but chose missionaries and supine foreign diplomats as villains to equal corrupt, 
xenophobic Chinese official-cum-banditdom. It was publicised as “an attempt to depict 
the Chinese Racial Character, and it is a real contribution to our knowledge and 
understanding of the Chinese.”120 J.O.P. Bland’s Something Lighter (1924) was a light 
fiction aimed at the treaty port communities containing gentle satire about the foreign 
diplomatic enterprise in China and the characteristics of the Chinese. André Malraux’s 
fiction dealt sympathetically with the Chinese communists and unfavourably with the 
treaty port communities.121 
 Latterly the most influential and widely-read of these writers was Pearl Buck, 
whose novels, especially The Good Earth (1931), were political in the sense that their 
subject matter was an unromantic and didactic portrayal of the mass of ordinary Chinese 
people and their problems.122 Buck had her Chinese critics, who objected to the subject 
matter, but also Chinese approval.123 The Good Earth had sold four million copies in the 
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US by 1972, while the film was seen by an estimated sixty-five million viewers. Buck 
won a Nobel prize for literature.124 
 
Romance and the East 
 Before Buck the most popular books with Chinese themes were romantic fictions 
and thrillers. The prolific and popular Louise Jordan Miln, hailed after her death as Pearl 
Buck’s “nearest literary parallel”, specialised in tales of the wealthy and aristocratic in 
China.125 Her fiction on China and the Chinese began in 1918 with a best-selling 
novelistic adaptation of the play Mr Wu in which an Oxford-educated Mandarin takes his 
revenge on the family of a young Englishman who has seduced his daughter.126 For all of 
Miln’s empathic writing and criticisms of individual Western behaviour127 Wu was a 
caricatured Chinese sadist who owed much to the then fashionable “eastern” novels with 
their rape-inclined Arab Sheiks.128 (The climax of the book involved Wu’s 40 page long 
attempted rape of the Englishman’s mother in revenge.) Sino-British romantic and sexual 
incompatibility and a horror of Eurasian children were themes which dominated her large 
output of novels.129 The opening lines of By Soochow Waters (1929) announced that “Not 
every White and Yellow marriage is a failure” but it is soon clear that this childless and 
companionate exception proved the rule. The message was not always appreciated but the 
books continued to sell.130 Other writings developed such themes against the backdrop of 
the 1900 Legation siege, and Shanghai in 1927.131 Her politics were anti-Nationalist but 
generally sympathetic to China; romance mattered more than politics. 
 Miln had many copyists, such as Mrs P. Connellan who set Ten Thousand 
Yesterdays (1932) amongst anti-Manchu intrigues in the early years of the century; it was 
a familiar story of failed inter-ethnic marriage and the undesirability of Eurasian 
children.132 For other romantic writers China was a convenient exotic backdrop,133 one 
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known from personal experience,134 or one which offered a little geographical variety 
after the fashionable and salacious “desert” novels. Joan Conquest’s Forbidden (1927) 
offered a blatantly pornographic exploration of the theme by a one-time Peking 
resident.135 Floridly speaking Chinese characters and a gushing enthusiasm for the 
splendours and mysteries of Asia characterise most of these books, except those written 
for missionary purposes.136 There were also copyists who combined Pearl Buck’s gritty 
realism with sentimentality and sensationalism.137 
 
Treaty Port Fiction 
 Many of the fictions already discussed were written with first hand knowledge of 
contemporary China. Such experience was often exaggerated for publicity purposes, such 
as by André Malraux, who got no closer to Shanghai than 3 months in Hong Kong in 
1925. Buck was a missionary child, and married a mission educationalist. Simpson, 
Gilbert and Bland made much use of their journalistic or professional experiences in 
China. J.W. Bennett lived in Beijing with his novelist wife Dorothy Graham where 
resided, for eighteen months, Ann Bridge, in life the wife of the one-time British Legation 
Counsellor Owen O’Malley.138 
 Some of them attempted to depict, in epic and propagandistic form, the 
development of the foreign presence in China, or its “daily round.”139 This fiction 
complemented the more straightforward propaganda histories or descriptions of the 
foreign presence. The lighter fiction of treaty port life restricted itself to tales of Chinese 
servants or the stock figures of foreign caricature, the Compradore, the Shroff, and the 
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comic-opera general.140 For the popular Alicia (Mrs. Archibald) Little, China was either 
an incidental backdrop or a hostile one.141 Ann Bridge wrote about China in three of her 
popular romantic novels. The Chinese portrayed were either servants, bandits or warlords. 
She wrote the first at the suggestion of a publisher and the half-finished manuscript was 
accepted immediately, largely because of its subject matter. She had already discovered 
and exploited the periodical market’s thirst for writings on China.142 
 Another treaty port genre was more salacious. W. Carleton Dawe wrote, often in a 
Conradian fashion, of sexual relations between white men and Asian women. His style 
was popular, and copied by Simpson and “William A. Rivers”.143 The tragedy and 
violence were compounded if the story involved Chinese men and European women. 
Dawes’ other adventures reprised Guy Boothby’s popular Doctor Nikola (1896); they 
featured secret societies and a great deal of torture, and were characteristically 
sinophobic.144 Like many other informed writers, his apparently “informed” fiction 
actually owed more to the clichés of uninformed popular fiction. So prevalent and 
recognisable were these constructs that it was difficult for treaty port writers to write 
without reference to them. 
 
Thrillers and “Yellow Perils” 
 Apart from these specific tales of China the Chinese featured pervasively in 
British popular fiction and these popular stereotypes influenced, and were influenced by, 
in a circular relationship, the more informed works. From the early 1900s the Chinese 
story always had its place in collections of mysteries and was a familiar theme in thriller 
novels.145 The most successful of these were the works of Sax Rohmer (Arthur Henry 
Sarsfield Ward). Rohmer’s inspiration was purely opportunistic: the Xinhai revolution 
and contemporary reports on crime in Limehouse, east London, (one of which he 
                                                          
140 Jay Denby, Letters of a Shanghai Griffin to his father (Shanghai, 1910, London 1911, 1923); Daniel 
Varé, The Maker of Heavenly Trousers (London, 1935), and The Gate of Happy Sparrows (London, 1937); 
J.O.P. Bland, Houseboat Days in China (London, 1919), and Something Lighter (London, 1924). 
141 A Millionaire’s Courtship (London, 1906); A Marriage in China (London, 1896); Out in China! 
(London, 1902). 
142 Ann Bridge, Peking Picnic (London, 1932); The Ginger Griffin (London, 1934); Facts and Fictions, 
pp.35-42. 
143 Dawe, Yellow and White (London, 1895), Kakemonos: Tales of the Far East (London, 1897); Simpson, 
Forbidden Boundary; Rivers (Veronica and Paul King), Anglo-Chinese Sketches (London, 1903). 
144 Dawe, The Mandarin (London, 1899); The Yellow Man (London, 1900); The Plotters of Peking 
(London, 1907). 
145 See, for example, J. Leroux, Big Book of Mystery Stories (New York, 1927) (“The Death Gong”) which 
had the moustached head of a leering “Chinaman” on the cover; Thrills: Twenty Specially Selected New 
Stories of Crime, Mystery and Horror (London, n.d.) (Thomas Burke’s “The Golden Gong”) and H. De 
Wint, “A Celestial Hell” in C.C. Thomson, ed., Gruesome Cargoes (London, 1928), pp.131-41. 
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researched himself in 1911) built on yellow peril ideas that had been popularised by 
reactions to the 1900 Boxer rebellion; as Rohmer is recorded as saying, “Conditions for 
launching a Chinese villain on the market were ideal.”146 His first “Fu Manchu” story 
was serialised in 1912-13 and launched a villain with all the: 
                                                          
 
cruel cunning of the entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with 
all the resources of a wealthy government - which, however, already has denied 
all knowledge of his existence... Dr Fu-Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate in one 
man.147 
The Chinese were portrayed as cruel, exceptionally clever, and out to destroy the “White 
race”. Most of the stories were set in Limehouse. The Fu Manchu books continued to 
appear throughout the next five decades although there was a seven-year hiatus before 
interest in themes Chinese was re-kindled by the Nationalist revolution and a magazine in 
the United States commissioned a new Fu Manchu.148 Their popularity was exploited and 
strengthened by the many films made from them and through the copyists of the 1930s.149 
There were three major silent adaptations of Fu Manchu stories and these were continued 
in the sound era with a Paramount series.150 The key selling point of the films was the 
motif of the cruel Chinese, as was shown in the advertising for the start of the 1924 series 
in which: “In the Underground stations, all over London, larger than life sized posters 
depicted the leering visage and clutching hands of the Devil Doctor”.151 Rohmer also 
took advantage of Limehouse’s post-Great War notoriety to write more particular, and 
equally influential, works about that area in which drug smuggling, “white slavery” and 
146 Quoted in R.E. Briney, ed., C. Van Ash and E.S. Rohmer, Master of Villainy: A Biography of Sax 
Rohmer, (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1972), p.75, on his journalism see pp.73-74. See also a partial exploration 
of this theme in Clive Bloom “West is East: Nayland Smith’s Sinophobia and Sax Rohmer’s Bank 
Balance”, in C. Bloom, ed., Twentieth Century Suspense: The Thriller Comes of Age (London, 1990), 
pp.22-36. 
147 The Mystery of Dr Fu-Manchu (London, 1913), p.23. 
148 Briney, Villainy, p.170. The first three were reprinted in one volume in 1929 as The Book of Fu-
Manchu: A Complete and Detailed account of the amazing criminal activities of this sinister Chinaman 
(London, 1929). A much shorter and bowdlerised version of the first book was printed as a Collins English 
Library Level Three English primer in 1988 in Glasgow.  
149 On the copyists see Wu, Yellow Peril, pp.183-206. See also, impressionistically, the pulp covers 
reprinted in P.M. Haining, ed., The Art of Mystery and Detective Stories: The Best Illustrations from Over a 
Century of Crime Fiction, (London, 1986), pp.108, 144. 
150 The Yellow Claw (1921), The Mystery of Dr Fu-Manchu (1923), The Further Adventures of Dr Fu-
Manchu (1924). The paramount films starred, at one point, Boris Karloff, whose brother, Sir John T. Pratt 
was consular adviser to the Far East Department of the Foreign Office and involved in efforts to undo the 
sort of damage that the Fu Manchu idea did to perceptions of the Chinese, see below, Chapter 4; Leslie 
Halliwell, Halliwell’s Film Guide (7th edition, London, 1989), p.383. 
151 Briney, Master of Villainy, p.157. This caricature surfaced often, on the covers of M.P. Shiel’s Yellow 
Danger (London, 1989) and The Dragon (London, 1913) for example, where queue-wearing Chinese reach 
out to grasp the globe, on the cover of the 1929 Book of Fu Manchu, and the title page of the American 
edition of The Insidious Dr Fu-Manchu, on the cover of J. Leroux’s, Big Book of Mystery Stories, and, not 
leering for once, on the cover of the 1923 edition of Jay Denby’s Letters of a Shanghai Griffin (Shanghai). 
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opium dens played major roles in varying proportions.152 His marketing of things Ch
further extended to music-hall songs and even to the creation of a perfume, called 
“Honan”, manufactured by a Chinese workforce in Limehouse and launched with opium-
redolent packaging and publicity in 1919.
inese 
                                                          
153 
 Rohmer’s opportunism mirrored that of one of the inventors of the yellow peril 
novel, the fantasy writer M.P. Shiel. He was asked to “do a war serial” when “some 
trouble broke out in China” in 1898 and wrote what became The Yellow Danger, a tale of 
a Chinese invasion of Europe.154 Such timely opportunism characterised his other 
works.155 Apocalyptic yellow peril fictions were a familiar and continuing genre.156 
 Most writings inspired by the “Fu Manchu” vogue were thrillers. Edgar Wallace, 
one of the best-selling popular authors of his day, devoted a tiny but telling proportion of 
his immense output to Chinese themes. The Tomb of Ts’in (1916) set in London and 
China involved secret societies, puzzlingly ingenious murders and bitter Eurasians 
battling with a British adventurer to find the tomb of Qinshihuangdi. There was sadistic 
cruelty and sexual salaciousness, and the same ingredients can be found in all his 
Chinese-ish works.157 Rohmer dealt in the broad, imaginary generality of the yellow peril 
but Wallace was more explicitly sensationalist and racist.158 The cover of one 1929 
collection [see figure 3, following page] is a powerful indication of the manner in which 
Wallace used the theme of inter-racial sex.159 
 Wallace was equally aware of Chinese newsworthiness. He changed the villain of 
his crown-jewel stealing, and white-woman kidnapping The Traitor’s Gate (1927) from 
152 Such as The Yellow Claw (London, 1915), and Dope: A Story of Chinatown and the Drug Traffic 
(London, 1919), which claimed to be an exposé of a drug smuggling scandal; see also Tales of Chinatown 
(London, 1922) and Yu’an Hee See Laughs (London, 1932). For one copyist see S.C. George, The Secret 
Six (London, 1940). The notoriety was sparked off by a scandal in November 1918 when a music hall 
actress, Billie Carlton, died of a cocaine overdose; this lead police to uncover a thriving drug sub-culture in 
the capital, The Times, 13/12/18, p.3; 14/12/18, p.5; 21/12/18, p.5. 
153 For examples of Rohmer’s songs see Catalogue of Reynold’s Musical Monologues, n.d. [c.1914-1918]; 
Briney, Master of Villainy, pp.112-16. 
154 M.P. Shiel, “About Myself”, A.R. Morse, The Works of M.P. Shiel: A Study in Bibliography (Los 
Angeles, 1948), p.5. 
155  In 1913 he rehashed similar elements, possibly in competition with Fu Manchu, in The Dragon which 
was republished as The Yellow Peril in 1929. In the late 1930s he revised The Yellow Danger for planned 
publication as China in Arms. It was rejected by various publishers as anachronistic, not because of the 
theme, apparently, but because it was written before the era of modern warfare, Morse, Shiel, pp.40-41. 
156 S.N. Sedgewick’s The Last Persecution (London, 1909) had Christians burnt at the stake in Trafalgar 
Square in an attempted Confucianisation of a conquered Britain; Robert Allen’s Captain Gardiner of the 
International Police: A Secret Service Novel of the Future (London, 1917) described a war between the 
civilised West and “a secret association which controls the government of China” and the rest of the East, 
[p.61]. Variations on these themes can be found in Luke Netterville, The Queen of the World or Under the 
Tyranny (London, 1900); Luigi Motta, The Princess of the Roses (London, 1919); Gawain Edwards, The 
Earth Tube (London, 1929); Edmund Snell, The Sign of the Scorpion (London, 1935), Yellow Jacket: The 
Return of Chanda-lung (London, 1936). 
157 E. Wallace, The Tomb of Ts’in (London, 1916), pp.54, 77, 282-85. 
158 Ibid., p.160. 
159 E. Wallace,The Governor of Chi-Foo (London, 1929). 
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an Indian prince to a Chinese governor when the novel was staged as a musical drama, 
The Yellow Mask, in 1928 (it was filmed in 1931). The revival of news interest was also 
responsible for the yellow-peril plot of The Yellow Snake (1929). Wallace’s novels were 
formulaic and escapist but the venom with which his Chinese villains were treated is 
striking.160 
 Other thriller writers loaded their works with political messages. Beijing resident 
James W. Bennett’s writing was politically hostile to Chinese nationalism and mixed 
topicality, verisimilitude, apparent “inside knowledge” and romance. The Yellow Corsair 
(1928) involved Bias Bay piracy, kidnapping and the Shamian incident of July 1925.161 
The Chinese were portrayed as xenophobic, cowardly, cruel and corruptly unpatriotic. 
The Shamian shooting was blamed on Russian Bolsheviks whilst some of the 
characterisation of the Chinese is reminiscent of Rohmer. The work’s violence and 
clichés about racial instinct pervaded Bennett’s other novels.162 
 Warren Hill’s thrillers written with an obvious first-hand knowledge of Shanghai, 
were full of Fu Manchu-like secret societies and murders, stolen jewels, bitter, sadistic 
Eurasians and improbable rock-chambers under the Shanghai bund.163 Several of the 
thrillers of A.H. Mills were set in China as a result of his short period of army service 
there. Intrigue Island (1930), for example, involved the defeat of a Chinese plot to 
                                                          
160 M. Lane, Edgar Wallace: The Biography of a Phenomenon (London, revised edition, 1964), pp.233-36. 
161 The Yellow Corsair (London, 1928), p.126. 
162 Son of the Typhoon (London, 1929); Manchu Cloud (London, 1929). Another timely thriller set in 
Shanghai with the usual cast of Bolsheviks was Lieut. Col. W.P. Drury, The Flag Lieutenant in China 
(London, 1929). This was one of a popular series of books and was quickly filmed. 
163 “Warren Hill” (probably a pseudonym) Yellow Will Out (London, 1929) (the title referred to the leading 
Eurasian villain); That Which is Crooked (London, 1930) and The Crystal Skull (London, 1930). 
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overthrow the British administration in Hong Kong. His books were hostile in tone to the 
Chinese who were portrayed as dirty, sadistic, and xenophobic, their menfolk were 
sexually repulsive whilst their daughters fell in love with British men. The white villains 
in the books were Portuguese or, it finally transpired, Eurasians.164 The Chinese often 
turned up as villains in other novels set in South and South East Asia.165 
 Different Chinese and a different Limehouse, more realistic, sentimental and 
interracial, was a major source of inspiration for Thomas Burke. His books on the theme, 
beginning with the best-selling Limehouse Nights in 1917, were not thrillers but dealt in a 
“realist”166 fashion with much the same drug-filled settings as Rohmer’s and were also 
seized upon as film material. Burke himself claimed a childhood involvement with the 
Limehouse community.167 Burke’s Chinese were invariably more human than Rohmer’s, 
were usually poor and usually sexually attracted to white women.168 He was much copied 
and filmed although his portrayal of Limehouse also drew objections.169 These books and 
the themes they touched on were taken up elsewhere; in boys’ comics, such as Edwy 
Searles Brooks’ St Franks in London (c.1926) which involved opium dens and drug 
smuggling and cruel queue-wearing Chinese, and in films such as the Arnold Bennett-
scripted Piccadilly (1929), which portrayed “Limehouse” and had, as a villainess, a cruel 
Chinese dancer played by Anna May Wong. American Chinatown stories and films were 
also available.170 
 Another familiar sensationalist genre was the pirate book or bandit-captive 
memoir. “Bok’s” Vampires of the China Coast (1932) was not the first171 but was 
certainly the most powerful of these - a fiction illustrated with gruesome photographs, it 
                                                          
164 A.H. Mills, From Piccadilly to Devil’s Island (London, 1932), p.16; The Yellow Dragon (London, 
1924), pp.98, 272; Intrigue Island (London, 1930). Other thriller writers with obvious first-hand knowledge 
included Geoffrey Ellinger (The Ricksha Clue, London, 1931) and Gilbert Collins (Chinese Red, London, 
1932). 
165 E. Snell, The Yellow Seven (London, 1923), and The Yu-Chi Stone (London, 1925); George Varney, The 
Bungalow of Dead Birds (London, 1929). 
166 As his editor claimed, Twinkletoes: A Tale of Chinatown (Readers Library Publishing Company edition, 
London, 1927), Editor’s Note, p.ii; Limehouse Nights: Tales of Chinatown, (London, 1917). 
167 The Wind and the Rain: A Book of Confessions (London, 1924), pp.9-23. 
168 See, e.g. “The Chink and the Child”, “The Father of Yoto” and “The Pain”, in Limehouse Nights; The 
Song Book of Quong Lee of Limehouse (London, 1920) and Twinkletoes. 
169 His “The Chink and the Child” was filmed as Broken Blossoms in 1919 and 1936, and Twinkletoes in 
1927. For copyists see, for example, Dorota Flatau, Pong Ho: A Volume of Stories (London, 1924); or “The 
Ginger Jar”, in The Tales of Elinor Mordaunt (London, 1934). One objector was J.G. Birch, Limehouse 
Through Five Centuries (London, 1930), p.11. 
170 E.S. Brooks, St Franks in London: A Jolly Yarn of Schoolboy Life and Adventure in the City, The 
Monster Library of Complete Stories No.8 (London, c.1926). Other Limehouse films included Limehouse 
Blues (1934) and the 1935 comedy Stormy Weather. On American Chinatowns see Robert Simpson, 
Welcome Danger! (London, 1930); L. De Bra, Ways that are Wary (London, 1924) and such films as 
Welcome Danger! (1930) and East is West (1930). 
171 See also, for example, R.J. Bakewell, The Lost Tribute: A Tale of the China Seas (London, 1926); H. 
Kingsley, Kong (London, 1927); H. Kingsley, The Fifth God (London, 1928); Bennett, Yellow Corsair; 
“Taffrail”, Pirates (London, 1929); Aleko E. Lilius, I Sailed with Chinese Pirates (London, n.d. c.1930), 
Dudley Lenton, The Blue Mandarin: A Story of Naval Adventure in the China Seas (London, 1938. 
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combined scenes of physical and sexual violence and sadism in a supposed roman à 
clef.172 The non-fictional works dealt less explicitly with the same topics.173 The 
boundary between fiction and non-fiction was blurred here, as it was in the salacious 
“white-slave trade” exposés of Henri Champly174 or the later adventure works of Charles 
Low;175 Bok’s salacious portrayal was not far removed from respectable commentators, 
such as E.M. Gull, who paid particular attention to the prevalence in China of “sexual 
licentiousness, in open association with cruelty.”176 
 The monthly, popular, Sexton Blake Library published several stories with 
Chinese villains over the years which used most of these clichés: pirates, Limehouse 
opium dens, secret societies led by master-minds trying to conquer the “cursed white 
pigs”, temple harems, kidnapped white girls and stolen religious icons. The stories were 
frequently accompanied by fact-pages which confirmed the veracity of the background of 
the stories, and lurid cover art emphasising the stereotyped features of evil “Chinamen”: 
queues, sneers and sneakiness.177 The popular “Yank mags”, widely available in Britain, 
such as Detective Story Magazine, also published such stories.178 
 Reportages and memoirs, especially those aimed at more popular audiences, 
frequently mirrored these fictions and conveyed many of the same clichés. An exposé of 
the drugs trade peddled the canard of “yellow plots” to undermine “the white race 
through “dope” and when the time was ripe... command the world”. One policeman’s 
memoirs described Limehouse as “ruled by a judicial system of its own, and one of 
horribly callous cruelty and indifference”. Both books denigrated “miscegenation”.179 
 
                                                          
172 Vampires of the China Coast (London, 1932). It was such a successful formula that “Bok” kept 
repeating it: Tong (London, 1933); Corsairs of the China Seas (London, 1936); Dragons to Slay (London, 
1937); Piracies, Ltd. (London, 1938). 
173 H.J. Howard, Ten Weeks with Chinese Bandits, (London, 1927); C. Jones, Pirate Junk: Five Months 
Captivity with Manchurian Bandits (London, 1934); Tinko Pawley, My Bandit Hosts (London, 1935). 
174 Champly, Road to Shanghai and White Women, Coloured Men. 
175 Secret Asia (London, 1939); Great Asiatic Mysteries (London, 1937). 
176 Gull, Facets, p.118. 
177 Sexton Blake Library (G.H. Teed), The Yellow Tiger! (London, 1915); The Case of the Yellow Pearls! 
(London, 1925), “The China Coast Today”, p.64; The Tiger of Canton (London, 1927), p.64, “The Law of 
the Dragon”; The Yellow Skull (London, 1931), “Chinese Bandits”, p.64; The Chinatown Mystery (London, 
1932), “Haunts of Chinatown”, p.64; Murder in Manchuria (London, 1934), etc.. 
178 A favourite in this magazine, for example, was A.E. Apple’s “Master Criminal of the Century”, Mr 
Chang: “cruel, diabolical, cunning and pitiless” and pitted against a “hardly less clever Chinese detective, 
Doctor Ling”; two stories had been printed by 1928, Mr Chang’s Crime Ray and Mr Chang of Scotland 
Yard. Both of these were also published in book form in the United States, Detective Story Magazine, 
3/11/28, inside back cover. On the popularity of these magazines see Q.D. Leavis, Fiction and Reading 
Public (London, 1932, 1939 edition) p.14. and George Orwell, “Boys’ Weeklies”, Collected Essays 
(London, 2nd edition, 1961), p.88-89. 
179 E. Murphy, The Black Candle (Toronto 1922, London, 1926), pp.189, 45, photos opposite pp.30, 46. 
Ex-Detective Inspector Herbert T. Finch, Traitors Within (London, 1933), p.200, see also pp.205-207 on 
Chinese secret societies. 
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Theatre 
 In the theatre “crook” plays were very popular in the late 1920s and plays with 
Chinese villains were prominent enough to be regarded as clichéd.180 Matheson Lang’s 
Mr Wu, had been an instant success (403 performances from 1913 and 114 in 1922),181 
and provided the model villain, although it was originally conceived of as a realistic 
antidote to “the usual stage Chinaman”182 because it showed a Western-dressed and 
educated Hong Kong Chinese on the stage. Like many novelists the authors were at pains 
to point out the truthfulness of their portrayal with asides in the script justifying Wu’s 
actions; the “hypnotic influence of the Chinese is an actual fact, experienced every day by 
Europeans even in business dealings with them,” went one example.183 Wu was free from 
the aphoristic-quipping mandarin quaintness of L.M. Lion’s The Chinese Puzzle (1918), 
which gave away a booklet of “Proverbs and Aphorisms from East and West” as an 
advertising gimmick.184 Mr Wu’s success relied on two aspects of the villain’s character 
that were Rohmer-ish: ingenious cruelty and control of a powerful organisation. This 
combination had other copyists.185 Lang himself recreated his figure in The Chinese 
Bungalow (1929) while “Sapper” (Cyril McNeile) swopped his post-war Bolshevik 
villains for more contemporary Chinese in The Way Out (1930), in which the seeming 
pillar of respectability in British colony, Choo Lung, turns out to be:  
 
a crafty, incomprehensible Chinaman, cunning and diabolically cruel beneath a 
veneer of Western education,... engaged in anti-British propaganda.186 
Matheson Lang reprised his roles in films of Mr Wu (1919) and The Chinese Bungalow 
(1926 and 1930). Mr Wu was remade in 1927 in the US and a BBC radio version was 
broadcast in 1928.187 
 In Maugham’s long running drama The Letter (1927 for 338 performances and 
filmed in 1929) the leading Chinese character was a blackmailer praised by one critic as 
                                                          
180 “At the time of writing [1928], the form of entertainment commonly known as “the crook play” is ruling 
the dramatic world both in Great Britain and the United States”, P.S. Barry, How to Succeed as a 
Playwright (London, 1928). p.61. 
181 Who’s Who in the Theatre, 14th edition (London, 1967), p.1535. 
182 Matheson Lang, Mr Wu Looks Back: Thoughts and Memories (London, 1941), p.112. 
183 Mr Wu, H. Owen and H. Vernon, Note, p.16, Script, British Theatre Association Library, Theatre 
Museum. Joan Conquest was so anxious to convince readers of the veracity of her asides about Chinese 
tortures and cruelty that footnotes were placed to state that they had been “seen by the writer”, Forbidden, 
pp.28, 61. 
184 Theatre Museum, Production File [after this TMPF], New, 11/7/18 and 27/1/19, The Chinese Puzzle, M. 
Bower and L.M. Lion. 
185 TMPF, Queens, 8/8/25, The Man From Hong Kong, Mrs Clifford Mills; J.G. Brandon and G. Pickett, 
The Silent House, TMPF, Comedy, 8/6/27; R. Berkeley, Listeners, TMPF, Wyndhams, 9/2/28; and The 
Moving Finger [anon], TMPF, Garrick, 28/8/28. 
186 TMPF, Comedy, 23/1/30, The Way Out, “Sapper”, Times Review, 24/1/30.  
187 CET, 19/1/28, p.38. 
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“a little masterpiece of smug, half-Westernised orientalism”.188 East of Suez (1922) 
featured an unsympathetic and cruel Chinese returned student who was used to conjure up 
Yellow Peril imagery.189 The intent of the play as one critic saw it was to prove, again, 
that “East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet - except to their mutual 
discomfort”.190 Salacious and sadistic use of sexual and racial themes reached its apogeé 
in John Colton’s The Shanghai Gesture (1926), which was banned by the Lord 
Chamberlain but allowed a Sunday performance under club conditions in 1929.191 
Most American films would be seen in Britain and the categories of films about 
Chinese identified in Hollywood productions are relevant for British output as well: these 
have been identified as serial films with Oriental villains, Chinatown films, those dealing 
with interracial relationships,192 warlord films such as Shanghai Express (1932), which 
was based on the 1923 Lincheng train hijack,193 and the realistic films of the 1930s.194 
The range of stereotypes in these was small and either unfriendly or condescending. An 
exception, such as Broken Blossoms, which was favourable to its Chinese character, still 
conveyed an ultimately negative message about interracial love. These genres were also 
the genres of fiction and theatre, from which they originated, or with which they were 
closely linked (novelisations of films were a new and popular literary form). Changing 
fashions in these other forms were also represented in film. 
 
                                                          
188 Anon., The Times, 25/2/27, p.12, quoted in A. Curtis and J. Whitehead, eds., W. Somerset Maugham: 
The Critical Heritage (London, 1987), pp.251, 253-54. 
189  “What will become of your superiority when the yellow man can make as good guns as the white and 
fire them as straight? You have appealed to the machine-gun and by the machine-gun you shall be judged.”, 
Maugham, Collected Plays, Volume III, p.192. 
190 D. MacCarthy, New Statesman, 7/10/22, quoted in Curtis and Whitehead, Somerset Maugham, pp.242-
44. A young Englishman marries a Eurasian girl who unbeknown to him, has been previously engaged to 
his best friend and restarts that affair. She is portrayed as excitable, and arbitrary. At the end of the play 
“The jungle takes back its own” and dressing in Manchu clothing she “takes a black pencil and touches her 
eyebrows. She gives them a slight slant so that she looks on a sudden absolutely Chinese”. At the end of the 
play she sits silently and “contemplates in the glass the Chinese woman of the reflection”. Maugham, 
Collected Plays, Volume III, pp.218-19.  
191 TMPF, Scala, The Shanghai Gesture, J. Colton, 13/5/29; it was published as The Shanghai Gesture: A 
Play (New York, 1926). 
192 Such as Shanghai, 1935. 
193 This prominent hit starred Marlene Dietrich and Anna May Wong. The Lincheng hijack took place 
when the Tianjin-Pukou train was held up by bandits and a large party of foreign and Chinese passengers 
were kidnapped and held hostage for some weeks. For full details of the incident and its international 
repercussions see Chan Lau Kit-Ching, “The Lincheng Incident: a case study of British policy in China 
between the Washington Conference (1921-22) and the Nationalist Revolution (1925-28)”, Journal of 
Oriental Studies, 10, No.2 (1972), pp.172-86. See also The Bad Man (1930), remade as West of Shanghai 
(Warlord) in 1941. 
194 Jones, Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, pp.13-20. See also the complementary 
article by Dick Stromgren, “The Chinese Syndrome: The Evolving Image of Chinese and Chinese 
Americans in Hollywood Films”, in P. Loukides, ed., Beyond the Stars: Stock Characters in American 
Popular Film (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1990), pp.62-77. 
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The Picturesque 
 The “picturesqueness” that could be attributed to traditional Chinese customs, 
language, clothing and scenery, was certainly a further key part of the appeal of China for 
novels, the stage and for the cinema screen. The main tool used was the flowery, literal 
“translation” of Chinese speech. Ernest Bramah’s “Kai Lung” novels, and those of 
Maurice De Kobra and Charles Pettit exploited exotic, and erotic, Chinese imagery and 
scenes. The Chinese setting sometimes appeared to be merely a suitably distanced and 
exotic setting for sexually suggestive writing bordering on “soft” pornography. Bramah 
especially, was extremely popular and his books remained in print throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s while new ones appeared.195 Such operas as Puccini’s Turandot (1926), which 
had its first performance in London in 1927, and ballets such as Bartok’s The Miraculous 
Mandarin (1926) (which also owes something to Rohmeresque stereotypes) made a more 
violent use of this approach.196 
 When Somerset Maugham wanted to write a spectacle he did so with East of Suez 
(1922), which had an opening, dialogue-free, scene showing the hustle and bustle of a 
Beijing street.197 The “picturesqueness” could be much hollower than this and grew out 
of a popular tradition that included Gilbert and Sullivan’s The Mikado (1885) and Hall’s 
The Geisha (1896).198 Oscar Asche’s Chu Chin Chow was a record-breaking musical in
its time, and often identified as an early source of impressions of China by Britons (se
below). First performed in 1916 and running a record 2,238 performances it was actually 
an Arabian Nights tale of robbers in Chinese disguises set in a mythical Baghdad.
 
e 
                                                          
199 Its 
success was heightened by two film adaptations. This genre was a perennial favourite.200 
195 Maurice Dekobra, His Chinese Concubine (London, 1935); Charles Pettit, The Son of the Grand Eunuch 
(London, 1927). For details of Bramah’s publications see the bibliography. 
196 The fact that both of these works appeared at the height of warlord-era violence in China can surely not 
be coincidental, Stanley Sacker, ed., The New Grove Dictionary of Music (London, 1980), v.2, p.202, v.15, 
p.439. 
197 “East of Suez purports to be a play of spectacle. I had long wanted to try my hand at something of the 
sort and a visit to China presented me with an appropriate setting”, W. Somerset Maugham, Collected 
Plays Volume III, Preface, p.ix-x. 
198 Dance and Talbot’s A Chinese Honeymoon, was an similarly successful spectacle in 1901 and ran for 
1075 nights after 1915 while another “Chinese” musical, San Toy ran for 768 performances after 1899, 
Who’s Who in the Theatre, pp.1530, 1537. 
199 Who’s Who in the Theatre, pp.1530. The title song had what passed for a cod-Eastern melody, servants 
kept their arms crossed and their hands in their sleeves, and a statue of a seated Buddha made an 
appearance in a “cactus grove” in act 1, the limit of Far-Eastern verisimilitude. Chu Chin Chow: A Musical 
Tale of the East, Oscar Asche, Music by Frederic Norton, [1916] (London, 1931). The musical inspired at 
least one author in his attempt at another typical caricature, the Chinese pirate, see H. Kingsley, Kong 
(London, 1927), dedication to Oscar Asche. 
200 The spectacle was praised, for example, in Shanghai: Spectacular operette, TMPF, Drury Lane, 28/8/18, 
W.C. Duncan and L. Wylie. Edgar Wallace’s The Yellow Mask (1928) involved “highly decorative and 
elaborate” scenes in the Empress Dowager Cixi’s court and in other Chinese palaces, TMPF, Carlton, 
8/2/28, clippings, The Sketch, 29/2/28, pp.401-403. Asche failed to repeat his earlier success with a pirate 
musical, Kong, but which, “as spectacle... was brilliant from end to end”. Franz Lehar’s light opera Land of 
Smiles, which told of the dangers of marrying Chinese princes, was a hit in London in 1931 and San Toy 
was revived in 1932 although critics felt its chinoiserie was dated. TMPF, Cambridge, 5/2/31, Kong: A New 
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 There were attempts to bring Chinese drama itself to the London stage, or drama 
with Chinese conventions at least; such plays included The Yellow Jacket (1922), The 
Circle of Chalk (1929 and 1931) and S.I. Hsiung’s Lady Precious Stream (1934). Their 
successes were, in part, due to the scope for spectacle and the exotic involved in the 
stagings, costumes, customs and the stories.201 Indeed, the fantasy writer Lord Dunsany 
wrote, in a preface to the published version of another of Hsiung’s plays, that: 
 
if China had not been there, this land of dragons, peach-trees, peonies, and plum 
blossoms, with its ages and ages of culture, slowly storing its dreams in green 
jade, is just the land that poets would have invented.202 
 
Children’s Fiction 
 Boys’ adventure fiction had its quota of bloodthirsty and unfavourable Chinese 
tales by G.A. Henty or F.S. Brereton.203 Bessie Marchant’s Among Hostile Hordes (1901) 
portrayed the Taiping rebellion as bloodily xenophobic, and eulogized Gordon’s role in 
suppressing it and its cowardly Chinese soldiers. The Taiping Emperor was portrayed in a 
manner which suggested Rohmer’s Fu Manchu and pointed to the pre-existence of a 
stereotype which Rohmer refined and publicised.204 Most books for children about China 
or the Chinese were dominated by the influence of, or products of, the mission presses. 
The LMS published a monthly magazine for them, News From Afar.205 In most books 
China was a quaint clichéd land of queues and pidgin English; Arthur Ransome 
demanded of the illustrator of his Missee Lee (1941): “trees and Chinks - and - donkeys - 
and chopsticks - and opium pipes - sampans - water keys - costumes - whatnot.”206 Some, 
books, however, were self-consciously explanatory and didactic, such as Burke’s Billy 
and Beryl in Chinatown (1935) which countered the misconceptions he usually 
propagated.207 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese Drama, Harold Kingsley, Daily Telegraph review, 6/5/31; TMPF, Drury Lane, 8/5/31, Land of 
Smiles, Franz Lehar; Daly’s, 22/2/32, San Toy, Observer review, 28/2/32. 
201 TMPF, Kingsway, 7/3/22, The Yellow Jacket: A Play in the Chinese Manner, G.C. Hazelton and 
Benrimo; New, 14/2/39, The Circle of Chalk, Klabaund, English version by James Laver; Little, 17/12/34, 
Lady Precious Stream, S.I. Hsiung. 
202 S.I. Hsiung, The Professor from Peking (London, 1939), Preface, p.viii. 
203 G.A. Henty, With the Allies to Peking (London, 1900); F.S. Brereton, The Dragon of Pekin: A Tale of 
the Boxer Revolt (London, 1902). 
204 Marchant, Among Hostile Hordes, pp.88. See also Herbert Strang’s The Air Scout (London, 1912, 
1918), in which the Chinese are also portrayed as cunning and indifferent to sentiment, pp.128-29. 
205 Throughout 1928 the leading story in this was “The Westons in China” by George Barnes. This story 
was set against the background of the SDF and China’s newsworthiness and identified many popular 
perceptions of the Chinese, News from Afar, 1928, passim.. 
206 John Bennet, The Pigtail of Ah Lee Ben Loo (London, 1928). A.W. Chrisman, Shen of the Sea (London, 
1925), The Wind that Wouldn’t Blow: Stories of the Merry Middle-Kingdom for Children and Myself 
(London, 1927); Ransome to Margaret Renold, quoted in Hugh Brogan, ed., The Life of Arthur Ransome 
(London, 1984), p.381. 
207 See also, for example, C.E. Roberts, Vagabond Wong (London, 1936). 
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 Such fiction catered for what has been termed the “perennial fascination” of the 
Chinese for children. In one extreme case in 1929 a young shoplifter’s legal defence 
rested on his dual personality and “peculiarities” which began with “his liking for 
Chinese images” but which became an obsession with meeting real Chinese, mostly 
laundrymen.208 
 
Fictional Clichés 
 The essential ingredients of the majority of these widely available fictions were 
negative or sentimental images of the Chinese, both in China and in communities abroad, 
and of relations with them. The basic themes involved violence, Chinese cruelty, opium 
and a hostile approach to inter-racial sex and marriage which was usually accompanied 
by frequent sensationalist portrayal of it. Some of these texts were obviously 
pornographic in intent and this element was heightened by the inter-racial sexual taboo. 
Verisimilitude was also an important element and writers such as Simpson, Miln and 
Gilbert used it to push forward political viewpoints. 
 Most of these writers were concerned with writing saleable books and Chinese 
themes, or Chinese variations on well-known themes, were recognised sellers.209 It has 
been argued that exaggerated representations of fictional villains are necessary and 
particularly that “racial symbolism” is “a means of intensifying and dramatizing 
conflicts” and should not be taken seriously as an expression of the author’s, or the 
reader’s, beliefs.210 It is clear, however, that there was a strong continuity of attitudes 
between popular fiction and serious commentaries and, as the next chapter will show, 
between both types of work and the structures of treaty port life in China. In fact fiction 
provided a forum for the discussion of topics often unsuitable for “serious” 
commentaries, notably the issue of sex and the moral corruption of Britons in the tropics. 
In this sense fiction reinforced, explicitly, many of the taboos and injunctions implicit in 
the serious commentaries.211 
 The more extreme fictions were usually written by those with no direct experience 
of China, but so pervasive and successful was the genre that it influenced the writings of 
those with first-hand knowledge and literary ambition. The influence of the tone adopted 
                                                          
208 Iona and Peter Opie, The Singing Game (Oxford, 1985), pp.465-67; CET, 28/2/29, p.142. 
209 The use of “local colour” by Rohmer, Burke and “Eastern” novelists’ was praised by the influential 
writing advisor Michael Joseph, “Short Story Writing for Profit”, Complete Writing for Profit (London, 
1930), pp.192, 139. That part of the plot of Wilkie Collins’ The Moonstone (London, 1868) which involved 
the attempts by the Indian priests to recover a stolen jewel, was frequently rewritten with Chinese settings, 
see for example, Sexton Blake Library, The Tiger of Canton, Fergus Hume, The Golden Wang-Ho 
(London, 1901, 1928 as The Secret of the Chinese Jar); The Mandarin’s Fan (London, 1904). 
210 J.G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture (Chicago, 
1976), pp.31-32. 
211 One uncompromisingly titled roman à clef dealt with the corruption and downfall of a young 
businessman in Hong Kong, John Lambourne, Squeeze: A Tale of China (London, 1935). 
 63
towards the Chinese, for example, by Wallace, Bok, Mills or Hill, and towards Eurasians 
by Miln and others, is underlined by the fact that for a work to be commercially 
successful as a literary product both the author and reader must share certain attitudes 
about the world, or in this case, about the Chinese.212 In fact fictional clichés about the 
Chinese were widely understood and recognised, widely enough to encourage self-
reference and the use of a limited number of stock characters.213 The consistency of this 
narrow characterisation prompted Earl Derr Biggers to create Charley Chan in reaction to 
them, although this aphorism-quipping character is itself related to the stereotype used in 
the play The Chinese Puzzle and Ernest Bramah’s Kai Lung novels.214 Some of the most 
influential of these books were extensively circulated and reprinted.215 
 Not all fictions were negative of course. However, those that were not, such as 
Harold Acton’s Peonies and Ponies (1941) and the novels of Keyte, Stewart and Sewell, 
were far outnumbered by those that were. Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth (1931) was 
internationally successful, but more Britons, ultimately, read “Sexton Blake”. 
 The basic Yellow Peril structure of the Rohmer or Wallace novels, whether or not 
“incarnate in one man,” was transparently fantastical yet was related to the racial 
theorising of Stoddard and others which influenced so many serious commentators; and it 
has been shown that Rohmer felt Fu Manchu would appeal because of the background of 
more seriously held political views and fears and current events.216 These attitudes were 
also easily capable of being transposed from “Limehouse” fictions to Far Eastern non-
fictional sketches.217 Some writers used such backgrounds to deal specifically and 
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didactically with military threats to the British Empire from China.218 Furthermore one of 
the strengths of popular literature lies in its ability to confirm widely held attitudes whilst 
imaginatively flouting them, the most obvious case being the consistent denigration of 
sexual and marital relations between Britons and Chinese whilst sensationally 
representing them.219 
 
 Many treaty port fictions were also critical of the conciliatory policies of the 
foreign powers. Gilbert, Bland and Lenox Simpson used fiction to augment the attacks 
they made in their more serious works against those who were betraying the treaty ports 
(including the missionaries).220 Bennett and Mills’ fictional heroes wreaked imaginary 
revenge on Chinese nationalists and their alleged co-conspirators - Bolsheviks and 
Eurasians - while Graham and Hobart wrote elegiacally of the achievements of the treaty 
port communities. In the adventure novels Chinese master criminals, bandits, pirates and 
communists were always defeated. In reality, of course, Chinese nationalism had 
triumphed and the European powers had retreated. 
 
The Influence of fiction 
1 Protest and Censorship 
 Although the number of novels with Chinese themes or settings was greater than 
has hitherto been thought there were few specific complaints about them, although there 
were generalised complaints. However, one contemporary critic charged Sax Rohmer 
with spreading “race-suspicion and contempt” and was equally critical of the 
sentimentality and lack of realism in Miln’s “China”.221 
 It is clear that while entertaining audiences who were quite able to suspend their 
disbelief for an evening222 and informing Britons about the characteristics of the 
“Chinese”, plays were frequently pointed to by Chinese observers as offensive. There 
were objections to such complaints. James Agate commented on The Shanghai Gesture 
                                                          
218 Herbert Strang’s, The Air Scout, a boy’s book, dealt with Chinese attempts to invade and colonize 
northern Australia; Vernon George’s The Crown of Asia (London, 1939), warned against a Sino-Japanese 
invasion of India. One Rohmer copyist, Achmed Abdullah, placed a Fu Manchu figure (“a new Attila, a 
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219 Cawelti, Adventure, pp., 35-36. 
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yellow coolie” wrote Gilbert, Indiscretions of Lin Mang, p.31. 
221 Paul Linebarger, Jr., “Western Fiction About China: General Misconceptions and Misrepresentations”, 
The Chinese Nation, 10/12/30, pp.602, 617. 
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logical.”, Unsourced review, 22/6/27, TMPF, Comedy, 8/6/27, The Silent House, J.G. Brandon and G. 
Pickett. 
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wondering if the cages offended “Chinese susceptibility” at the presentation of a truth or 
if they themselves were a “libel”. He concluded that “no Englishman will hold that in 
China all the young women are caged birds.”223 
 There were Chinese protests against Mr Wu before it was performed because:  
 
the plot is unchinese and we were afraid that this attempt to foist it upon 
the British public as a specimen of modern Chinese civilization might 
engender prejudices unfavourable to the Chinese in their midst. 
Chinese students who were asked to assist the production refused when changes they 
asked for were rejected and attempts to have the Lord Chamberlain ban the play were 
rebuffed.224 (In fact an earlier version of the play, in which Wu’s revenge was carried out, 
was vetoed by the censor).225 Lang himself claimed that the First Secretary of the 
Legation advised the production on its Chinese aspects.226  
 In March 1928 the Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Legation in London 
complained about five plays which the Lord Chamberlain’s Office were asked to 
suppress.227 The British would have been quite happy to comply if there were 
“objectionable political references” (in 1933 they abetted the withdrawal of one 
commentary from publication because of hostile references to Jiang Jieshi) but in such 
cultural matters there was nothing they were prepared to do.228 Questions were asked in 
Parliament and the producer of Hit the Deck! took the opportunity to get some useful 
publicity.229 The Lord Chamberlain’s response was in fact indicative of the nature of the 
problem, he felt: 
 
bound to admit that, owing partly to the antiquity of Chinese civilization, 
the disparity of Chinese ways and customs as compared with Western 
Europe, the picturesqueness of costume and ceremony inseparable from 
the Chinese Nation, there has always been an inclination on the part of 
                                                          
223 TMPF, Scala, The Shanghai Gesture, J. Colton, 13/5/29, Review, n.d., James Agate. See also the China 
Critic, 6/3/30 p.218. 
224 M.C.T.Z. Tyau, London Through Chinese Eyes or My Seven and a half years in London (London, 
1920), pp.293-97; W. Langley [FO] to The Comptroller, Lord Chamberlain’s Department, 25/11/13 
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TMPF, Strand, 27/11/13, New 15/4/22, The Play Pictorial, 23, No.140, p.96. 
227 The Plays were The Silent House, The Yellow Mask, Listeners, Hit The Deck! and Tin Gods, W.C. Chen 
to A. Chamberlain 7/3/28, FO 371/13225 F1190/F1190/10. 
228 The book was Mrs C.K. Chesterton’s Young China and New Japan (London, 1933). For details of the 
case see the file in P2394/2394/150 FO 395/502, and the summary in the Foreign Office Index, 1934. 
229 Daily Telegraph, 19/3/28, in FO 371/13225 F1341/F1190/10. 
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dramatists in this country to draw upon China and its people for their 
themes, characters and the settings in their plays.230 
The problem was left unresolved. While the Lord Chamberlain’s Department felt that the 
plays merely exhibited the “picturesque”, the plays themselves were strident in their use 
of established Rohmer-ish and other stereotypes.231 Most of them began their runs in late 
1927 or early 1928, a timing which suggests, especially given the origins of Wallace’s 
show, a commercial response to the newsworthiness of China and which was hinted at by 
the Chinese Legation’s complaint about “an increasing tendency.” 
 These were not isolated cases of protest. In fact after 1928 they became more 
frequent as the diplomatic relationship between Britain and China changed and an 
increasing tendency to accept the need for sensitivity in such matters gained ground.232 
Chinese commentators continued to complain about such dramatic and fictional 
representations in general and against particular productions, especially in the treaty 
ports.233 
 More attention was paid to cinema. Many “Chinese” films drew protests of one 
sort or another. Lao She made a protest, from Chinese resident in London, against a film 
set in a criminal and opium-filled Limehouse, a key part of the plot of his novel Er Ma 
(1931).234 Douglas Fairbank’s The Thief of Bagdad (1924), in which the “Mongol 
monarch is cold, complacent and sinister”,235 caused such complaints about the treatment 
of Asians that Fairbanks was assigned a police bodyguard when he visited Shanghai in 
1929.236 Other films caused protests in Shanghai.237 The Chinese Legation in the United 
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234 Lao She, The Two Mas, trs. K.K. Huang and D. Finkelstein (Hong Kong, 1984), pp.299-303. This may 
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protest from Shanghai audiences as did Shanghai Express, NCDN, 21/2/30 p.30; 24/2/31, p.13, 28/2/30, 
pp.4, 6. On Shanghai Express see Pan Ling, In Search of Old Shanghai (Hong Kong, 1982), p.131; the film 
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States complained about The Mask of Fu Manchu (1932) while in 1931 Chinese students 
in England complained to the Chinese Consul-General about the film version of 
Wallace’s The Yellow Mask.238 
 Films of the 1930s which were actually set in China drew protests because they 
concentrated on aspects of contemporary China that the National Government did not 
wish to see emphasized, such as warlordism in Shanghai Express (1932), or rural poverty 
in The Good Earth (1937). The National Government used its consuls abroad to protest 
against the distribution of offensive films, while the Chinese Consul-General in Los 
Angeles attempted to intervene before films were shot.239 A combination of 
censorship,240 fear of losing markets (Mexico and France had both embargoed America
films in the 1920s),
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241 and Government offers of help in film-production in return for 
vetoes over content were the main factors in this shift; several “warlord” films, for 
instance, were shelved after a Producer’s Association investigation of the subje
1
The Influence of Fiction 
2 Ordinary Authorities: Britons in China 
 In tandem with these public and official concerns about fictional portrayals of
Chinese it is clear that  individual behaviour and attitudes were also influenced. The
successful establishment of the mythical Limehouse in the popular mind caused its 
creators some problems: “The superficial visitor goes away convinced that the romanc
of the Asiatic quarter has no existence outside the imaginations of writers of fict
wrote Rohmer in 1922 and Burke’s editor made a similar admission in 1927.243 
Newspaper writers seem to have found the area a disappointment by the end of the 19
but this did not prevent a steady stream of articles dealing with such topics, even the 
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240 See J.E. Harley, World
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241 Jones, Portrayal, p.4. 
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his creation in Abduction: A Story of Limehouse (London, 1939) in which the abductors were white, a 
Chinese character spoke fluent English and tourists who had flocked to the area since “that awful book w
published” were mocked, pp.48-49. 
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Times was apt to report Opium “den” raids in Limehouse.244 The area, its inhabitants a
their contrived reputation worked their way into London guide books.
nd 
 China, what influence it had was actually the work of hack journalism 
 
 
on were frequently commented on.247 Sir John Pratt was 
correct to write in 1943 that: 
ude is 
ection of the indifference to things Chinese that exists in this 
xhibition at Wembley provided at least one resident with their earliest 
245 The Chinese 
community in Britain was too small to have any tangible “representative” effect itself on 
British attitudes to
and hack fiction. 
 Britons who went to China were usually ignorant of Chinese realities before they 
went. This was despite the fact that many people in all walks of life not related to China 
would have some acquaintance with visitors to the country or residents there; many local
churches or other small groups, for example, supported particular missions.246 Certainly 
many of them were equally as ignorant of China as of many other places and topics; the
deficiencies of British educati
 
even today the number of Englishmen who make any attempt to cross over to the 
Chinese side of the gulf remains infinitesimal... the explanation is not to be found 
in any facile criticism of the treaty-port mind for, though these communities may 
not be a fair cross section of the social structure in Great Britain, their attit
in fact a refl
country.248 
This ignorance was by no means new or exceptional. The efforts of the Imperial Institute 
to educate the British about their Empire were never very successful,249 although the 
1924 Empire E
memories of “China”.250 
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contempt in his novel The Two Mas [Er Ma], p.112. 
248 Sir John T. Pratt, War and Politics in China (Lon
249 Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp.122-43. 
250 ST - 5, p.2; on the exhibition see Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp.107-12. 
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 Blank ignorance, Chu Chin Chow,251 literature, and missionaries appear to hav
represented the sum possibilities of remembered fore-knowledge.
e 
c 
ll 
 
red he was “for the first time... visiting a typical 
 
t 
onal 
 Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth and Alice T. 
252 There were romanti
or exotic notions too, inspired especially by the clichés of children’s and picturesque 
literature - of pagodas, queues and topsy-turveydom - and by nautical tales, “visions of 
lofty, sparred tea clippers, sinister water-front dens, and bronzed, tattooed seamen of a
nations,” or combinations of the two.253 When H.C. Simms saw his first pagodas from the 
Yangzi he wrote that, “it was the first bit of the real China I had seen.”254 When E.H. 
Scott of the EPM in Shantou saw Quanzhou’s ““boat-shaped” roofs” and “city walls with
their Pagoda-flanked gateways” he decla
town of real China.”255 For these men the perceived reality of China was strongly rooted
in fictional representations and clichés. 
 Fictional works were frequently recommended as sources of information abou
China’s past and present.256 The China Christian Year Book regularly included ficti
works in reviews of literature on China in English. Those going to China often read 
novels in preparation, or were recommended to. Richard Dobson of BAT prepared 
himself for business life in China by reading
Hobart’s Oil for the Lamps of China.257 In this way many of the novels fulfilled the 
didactic function their authors intended.258 
 Fiction was drawn upon, consciously or otherwise, by Britons in China when 
articulating their experiences. A ship’s pilot had “a large moustache... just like Fu 
                                                          
251 ST - 15, pt.1, p.3; Moneypenny, “Ningbo More Far”, Unpublished Memoirs (1947), IWM, p.1. “Willow 
pattern and Chu chin chow” was the sum of Thomas Woodrooffe’s knowledge in his semi-autobiographical 
fiction River of Golden Sand (London, 1936), p.13. 
252 “My mother brought me up on Missionary Stories” remembered the Rev. Lyall [CIM], BBC Tape roll 
elt on 
nghai] is”, but most Western books on 
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rally a mysterious land full of pig-tails and 
ghai] 
wa Pagoda”, Handbook for China 
isit to Amoy and Chuanchow 7th to 16th April 1931”, 19/4/31, EPMA Lingtung 
t”, 
e 
e Laughing Buddha (London, 1926) and Keyte’s Daughter of Cathay and 
0-81; CCYB 1929, pp.546-48; CCYB 1931, pp.421-23; Richard Dobson, China Cycle 
rival, and 20% had read none, P.J. Mclean, “The Junior Missionary’s Mind”, 
11, p.1. Harold Isaacs found a similar situation in the United States, Scratches, pp.127-32. After 1931, of 
course, there was Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth. Baptist Carrier Prentice had read so much that she f
arrival that “I belong here already”, Prentice to M.E. Bowser, 22/1/31, BMSA Ch/64; Baptist Hilda 
Stacey’s reading had not warned her about “how very Chinese [Sha
Shanghai would not do so, circular letter, 19/1/27, BMSA, CH/75. 
253 “A.H.W.”, “Shanghai”, The Pipeline, 1/7/28, p.213; “Romantic visions of San Francisco waterfron
sailors lashed to the masts of sailing vessels - ... and gene
inscrutable faces”, Moneypenny Papers, “Ningpo”, p.1. 
254 H.C. Simms Papers, IWM, Journal, 15/5/25. Carl Crow recommended that “The visitor [to Shan
who cannot visit any other city in China should see the Loongh
(Including Hong Kong), (4th edition, Shanghai, 1926), p.149. 
255 E.H. Scott, “A V
Swatow Box 43b. 
256 J.W. Bennett’s Manchu Cloud gave the reader “a workable general notion of what the trouble is abou
CET, 12/1/28, p.26. Bland’s Something Lighter, and Buck’s The Good Earth were recommended in th
bibliography of the Department of Overseas Trade’s Notes on Some Aspects of Life in China. Barnes 
recommended J.L. Stewart’s Th
Minsan (Enter China, p.164). 
257 CCYB 1928, pp.38
(London, 1946), p.7. 
258 Although a 1926 survey found 60% of a sample of mainly American missionaries had read less than 
three books on China before ar
CR, August 1926, pp.573-75. 
 70
Manchu.” R.V.C. Bodley described meeting in China a Daoist priest with “a moustache 
suggestive of Chu Chin Chow.”259 In 1924 Charles Drage recorded visiting a temple in 
China, viewing a Buddha and imagining Human sacrifice - a view of that religion 
incompatible with its usual practices but quite in line with the caricatured atmosphere of 
cruelty to be found in Rohmer or Sexton Blake.260 A Daily Express correspondent in 
1928 wrote on Shanghai with “hazy ideas of Sax Rohmer’s Chinese underworld and 
opium den life flitting through” his mind.261 Malcom Lowry used to boast imaginatively
about being wounded by cross fire in an underworld gun-battle in Shanghai in 1927.
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words 
 
 connection between the 
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o 
 wife 
                                                          
262 
Nineteen year old Shanghai-born John Thorburn had various schemes of adventure, 
including fighting pirates with a “Q” ship at Bias Bay and joining the Chinese army to 
fight communists and bandits. He left home in May 1931 in an attempt at “adventuring” 
in which he took his service pistol, ammunition, SVC uniform trousers and a mind 
apparently too well-fed on adventure fiction. Unfortunately for him, and unlike the 
fictional white adventurers of the thrillers, Thorburn was mortal.263 “Everyone has he
of the Chinaman’s cunning, silence and inscrutability,” mused ex-SMP Sergeant E.W. 
Peters, “After spending several years in close contact with them, these three brief 
seem to me to describe them better than any others”. Peter’s repertoire of ignorant clichés 
prevented empathy and possibly helped create the attitudes which led to his arrest and
trial for the gratuitous murder of a Chinese beggar.264  The
Chinese and poisons - pervasive in fiction - surfaced in reality.265 The wife of a returnin
trooper of the Shanghai Defence Force claimed he had brought back poison and tried t
administer it to her. A medical orderly in Weihaiwei feared for his life. H.B. Morse’s
hated the Chinese and told J.K. Fairbank that they would poison him.266 
 Theatrical Chinese villains were popular with their audiences and with amateur 
performers. The amateur dramatic society at the Headquarters of the APC in London 
produced two such plays in 5 years, possibly watched, or acted in, by staff members 
259 ST - 21, p.41; R.V.C. Bodley, Indiscreet Travels East (London, 1934), p.187. 
260 Drage papers, Diary, 20/5/24. This response is strikingly reminiscent of a key element in the plot of the 
Sexton Blake thriller The Yellow Tiger!. 
261 “Notorious City of the Far East”, it was reprinted in China under the heading “As others see us: Typical 
Misdescription of Shanghai”, NCH, 14/7/28, p.82. 
262 Day, Malcom Lowry, p.91. Lowry’s attitude towards the Chinese on this trip was apparently infused 
with the belligerence of 1927, see the song he allegedly composed in Gordon Bowker, Malcom Lowry 
Remembered (London, 1985), pp.33-34. 
263 There was no clear news about his whereabouts for several months. In fact, Thorburn was almost 
immediately arrested by the Chinese military after fatally wounding two railway policemen as he walked 
along the Nanjing-Shanghai line in the dead of night. He was killed while in military custody. His 
disappearance caused a serious diplomatic incident and enraged treaty port opinion, CYB 1931-32, pp.268-
72; Peking No.830, 12/6/31 and encs., FO 371/15509 F3677/3361/10. 
264 Peters, Shanghai Policeman, p.34. 
265 “There are poisons in the East which no Occidental mind can conceive, which no Occidental pen has the 
macabre power to describe”, Karen Brown, The Girl from China (London, 1930), p.243. 
266 CET, 25/10/28; F.W. Bunter papers, Memoir, p.11, IWM No.87/22/1; J.K. Fairbank, Chinabound: A 
Fifty Year Memoir (New York, 1982), p.21. 
 71
bound for China in the future. The “characteristics” displayed were widely recognised a
well, an actor in Mr Wu being congratulated for a “fine character study, perfect in ever
detail, of the suave, impassive Chinese magnat
s 
y 
e” whose “assumption of a Chinese accent 
 
no 
orance of the realities of Chinese life 
nd society were misplaced then. Popular knowledge of China and the Chinese was 
widely propagated in the press, in s and in fiction. Not only were 
constructs of Chinese “characteristics” transmitted but so were assumptions about the 
nature 
 
s 
ere is never any lack of things to say” wrote W.G. Sewell.270 
xperts, 
 
t, and so the myth of the “China Hand” had 
(not that we have any pretensions to expert knowledge of the subject)” was “exceedingly
well done.”267 In an earlier production of The Chinese Puzzle the leading actor “had 
difficulty in creating the requisite Oriental atmosphere and fired off his inexhaustible 
supply of aphorisms with perfect aplomb.”268 
 Specific complaints about the technical ign
a
 treaty port commentarie
of relations between Britons and Chinese. 
Ordinary Authorities 
 
I am... quite used to the pink exhausted expression on Shaema’s face when a 
bankclerk from Clapham, a soapmaker from Lancashire, a painter or poet from 
Bloomsbury begins telling him all about the situation in China.269 
wrote Stella Benson in 1929 about her husband, an official in the Chinese Maritime 
Customs. Benson’s comment touches on a usually ignored aspect of Sino-British 
relations, the fact that every one was an expert and was required to be through the proces
of socialisation. “Th
Surviving correspondence from China is astonishingly didactic and many of the potted 
histories and explanations similarly so, and derived directly or indirectly from the e
from Gilbert and from the North China Daily News. The profusion of China memoirs is 
also related to this. 
 A hierarchy of age and wealth characterised the British communities in China, 
experience of which, recounted verbally or in the books of the China experts, was 
perceived as the sole source of creditable knowledge about the Chinese.271 Socialisation 
in the treaty ports required those already socialised to pass on the values acquired, which
were often legitimised and bolstered in prin
been born. The compliments paid to the professional commentators were also used of 
ordinary residents. A consul was praised because he “talks Chinese, knows the workings 
                                                          
267 The Pipeline, 9, 27/11/29, p.380. 
268 Ibid., 4, 30/1/24, p.32. 
269 Benson Diaries, 17/12/29. 
270 Sewell, journal letter, 9/9/28, Sewell Papers, SOAS PPMS 16/3. 
271 Lenox Fane, Legation Street, p.310. 
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of the Chinese mind probably as well as any European, suffers under no delusions, and
has preserved his sense of proportion.”
 
d 
 
oks, 
t 
 
bout”, as did APC 
lesma
7 
 my 
 
ly 
e, selfishly individualist and “out of 
step with the world.”281 The Foreign Office had worried that the 20,000 British troops of 
the Shanghai Defence Force were criticising the treaty port British in letters home but a 
r 
272  
 It is clear that many ideas were transmitted in the expatriate communities from 
mouth to mouth in the context of the structures of sociability such as the dinner party an
the club. Talking “shop” excessively was perhaps natural in a community so replete with 
“experts.”273 One impressionable naval officer imbibed several new theories at dinner 
parties up and down the Yangzi: that the Chinese having tasted superiority over the 
Germans and White Russians were now eager vengefully to exert themselves over other
Europeans and Americans; the Chinese were decadent as a race; they needed putting in 
their place at the point of a bayonet once a decade, and so on. His informants were bo
Consuls, Customs officials and businessmen.274 Consul Blunt in Yichang told W.F. Scott 
that “if one could make the Chinese laugh we need never be afraid and as they were jus
like children this was quite easy.”275 Captain Bazalgette, talked with men with “twenty
years experience” in China and described Chinese life as “backwards a
sa n, J. Philips.276 Stella Benson came to feel that the Chinese were ugly, dirty, 
politically and morally complacent, and their country dishonest and “retrogressing.”27
By 1930 she had become openly dismissive of Chinese civilization: “I find nothing in
experience... to suggest that any utterance of any Chinese, past or present, would have
seemed to us worth listening to, if it had been uttered by a Nordic.”278 
 Non-fictional attitudes, and the vocabulary of “characteristics”, were also wide
disseminated in company journals, guide books and handbooks.279 The War Office’s 
pamphlet about Shanghai, for example, recommended Gilbert’s What’s Wrong with 
China, d’Auxion de Ruffé’s Is China Mad? and, for history, Bland and Backhouse’s 
China Under the Empress Dowager, (which was still a popular seller in 1925).280 In an 
appendix entitled “Some Chinese Characteristics” it was announced that the Chinese 
mind was passive, the Chinese ignorant and gullibl
reading of surviving papers of a score of military men does not bear this fear out; thei
                                                          
272 Hamilton papers, Letter to Freddy, 13/6/27. 
273 Lampson to Walford Selby, 15/11/28, FO 800/263; Rupert Hart-Davis, ed., The Autobiography of 
rs to parents, 11/5/27, 2/5/27; “It is just inversion... they just seem to see 
to P.S. Jones, 15/12/24. 
n Shanghai (London, 1928). 
Arthur Ransome (London, 1976), p.325. 
274 Hamilton papers, Journal, 28/1/28; 11/5/27; 27/5/27. 
275 Scott papers, Letter to Sisters, 23/10/26. 
276 Bazalgette papers, lette
everything upside down”, J.M. Philips papers, letter 
277 Benson Diaries, 22/11/29; 14/12/29; 10/4/30; 19/12/29. 
278 Benson to Stephen Hudson, 14/4/30, Schiff papers, BL Add. Mss. Add 52916. 
279 See, for example, “Experiences of an Exile”, The Pipeline, 4, 10/9/24, pp.234-35. 
280 CR, May 1925, p.302. 
281 War Office, Notes o
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views were largely conservative, often bellicose, and replete with the characterisations 
later to be found in the War Office’s pamphlet.282 
 Analyses of Chinese character were as symptomatic as they were formative. The 
market for them already existed but characteristics “observed” tended to be self-
fulfillingly prophetic; people saw in the Chinese what they expected to see. They u
vocabulary supplied to articulate their own feelings and impressions and so consciously 
or unconsciously accepted and reinforced the validity of the notions outlined. The 
discourse of Chinese characteristics offered a dismissive and distancing vocabulary for 
articulating experience: “Often I feel that one experiences in China the things that o
only reads of in novels at home” remarked one quaker missionary. For William Sewell 
life in China often revealed “that side of the Chinese character which is so grossly 
exaggerated in the cinema and in the cheap magazines at home.”
sed the 
ne 
as 
ings 
d 
mpathise and articulate; for Miles 
ampso  
eaty 
na 
283 Memoirs written by 
residents of China refer often enough to such comments to show how accepted notions 
were internalised, and how clichéd a vocabulary it was.284 What was more important w
the pervasiveness and ordinariness of the discourse of characteristics in British print and 
related cultures. Richard Wilhelm wrote of the revelatory nature of his insight that the 
abstract term “coolie” had prevented him from seeing Chinese labourers as human be
with human relationships.285 Stella Benson wrote of one of her acquaintances in Englan
that she “had donned an armour of false facts about everything” to do with China, a 
metaphor which suggests both aggression and self-protection.286 Some fiction, such as 
Pearl Buck’s, could also enable people understand, e
L n seeing the summer flooding of 1931 from the air “Reminded one forcibly of the
opening passages of Mrs Buck’s “Good Earth”.”287 
 The influence of this dominant discourse can also be seen in the way those tr
port residents who were initially sympathetic to Chinese political aspirations or to the 
Chinese themselves grew disillusioned and adopted the clichés and virulence of the 
experts.288 There was, then, a tangible continuity in the discourse presented by the Chi
                                                          
282 Lampson to Barton, S/O, 29/1/28, FO 228/3779/15 15e. Most SDF soldiers did not appear to question 
British policy whilst those that did considered it far too lenient and appeared to want a full scale war. Some 
with doubts about the situation in China found that the turn of events combined with life in the treaty port 
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 human intercourse with a people”, Benson to Doris Estcourt 2/5/20, BL Add. Mss. Add 59659, 
atmosphere caused them to change their minds; see, for example, W. Agnew, Letter to Mother, 3/4/27, 
IWM Agnew papers. 
283 Rose Tebbutt to Bertha Bracey, 13/9/31, FSC CH/6; W.G. Sewel
284 See, for example, A.H. R
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comme tators and that of the treaty port communities. The “China Hands” knew their 
market
pages o
husban
had never found or met a Chinese whose 
psychology seemed to him more mysterious than his
n
 well. The effect on individual behaviour of lessons rammed home daily in the 
f the North China Daily News was marked. In 1930, for example, Stella Benson’s 
d told a Chinese guest: 
 
that he had been 16 years in China, and 
 psychology seemed to every 
Chinese. Europeans studied and understood China much better than Chinese 
 
f 
t Sir 
s 
re seen to be of secondary importance. Such an approach generally 
d” was 
 
th largely 
g 
uling 
contacts with them, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
understood Europe - Austen Chamberlain’s lightest note to the Chinese 
Government showed more brains, subtlety and understanding than China’s most 
portentous national pronouncement.289 
 
Conclusion 
 The pervasiveness of “knowledge” about China and the Chinese, the facility with
which knowledge was acquired and disseminated, and the static nature of the stereotypes 
involved in all media served to provide a basis for, or to reinforce, the foreign sense o
superiority and domination. Sir Frederick Maze was fond of repeating the claim tha
Robert Hart’s success in taking over and running the Maritime Customs was due to hi
“unparalleled knowledge of Chinese psychology,”290 the point being that Maze believed 
this to be true, and also seemed to take the fact as an analogy for his own success in 
taking control of the Customs in 1929. Diplomatic, military, economic or political 
considerations we
distanced the handlers from any responsibility to adapt themselves to change or to accept 
the validity and integrity of Chinese politics and society. “Expecting the unexpecte
a common Legation cliché, intimately linked with the “topsy-turveydom” peddled by the
China experts.291 
 The community of informers of British public opinion was, then, one wi
first-hand information about the country through residence there. It was certainly 
interested, in the Saidian sense, in “dealing” with China in various degrees: “by makin
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, r
over it.”292 The discourse of knowledge it articulated was rigid in its structural 
implications, that the Chinese needed to be controlled and dominated as if they were a 
subject nation. This discourse argued in favour of the treaty port status quo of the pre-
Nationalist years. Furthermore by denigrating the Chinese and 
 
ella Benson; Bailie-Grohman papers, GRO/7, Bailie-Grohman to Fitzherbert, 
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son’s minute on the expected fall of the Nationalist regime in 1930, to FO 
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290 See his comments on a letter received from L.A. Lyall, 28/5/27, Maze papers, Confidential Letters,
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especially sexual ones, it had a communally protective function. As in the case of India 
inculcated or reinforced the behavioural taboos of the British communities.
it 
ublic 
 
bert 
d 
ts who challenged their interpretations and 
ompet  
ereoty and 
ure 
vice. 
 as a 
 
                                                          
293 The p
discourse of the China experts was in this way at loggerheads with the stated policy of the
British Government and the activities of the British Legation. 
 The experts had reputations to create and jobs to do, to justify, and protect. The 
protection was as much on an individual as a communal scale. “He talks and writes 
merely to keep his precious job”, wrote Maze of E.M. Gull.294 Bland, Woodhead, Gil
et al all had precious jobs to protect, which explains the especial virulence they reserve
for the largely better-educated returned studen
c ed for their interpretative roles; more especially so as the quality of their work was
often questioned.295 These experts also saw the value of controversy as much as Sax 
Rohmer saw the value in a Chinese villain or M.P. Shiel saw the value in reissuing his 
yellow peril books in times of political crisis. 
 Although not always explicitly used in written analyses or commentary it is clear 
that the “characteristics” involved in the denigration of the Chinese were commonly 
assumed to be understood and recognised by readers. Chinese themes were common and 
the stereotypes instantly recognisable across different media. Metropolitan fictional 
st pes were used both to articulate experience in China, and as guides to British 
Chinese behaviour there, and the negative influence of film and stage characterisations 
itself became a cliché.296 This discourse, then, involved both metropolitan popular cult
and the analyses of most of the China experts in a continuum of information and ad
 British literature on, or dealing with the Chinese ultimately taught one major 
lesson, that of the necessary social isolation of the British in China from the Chinese
result of the superior status of the British; it taught this explicitly, by warning against
fraternisation between the groups, and implicitly, by calling for fraternisation and 
recognising that this was not the status quo. The language used was familiar and similar 
to that used about other British-dominated nations and peoples and by other conial 
rulers.297  The discourse of the China experts was functional and usually based on a 
293 For the emphasis on sexual and social isolation from Indians in Anglo-Indian fiction see Moore-Gilbert, 
Kipling and “Orientalism”, pp.51-56. 
294 Maze to W.F. Tyler, 10/7/29, Maze papers, Confidential Letters, Vol. 3. B.L. Simpson’s correspondence 
with his publisher about his early political commentaries on the Russo-Japanese War is instructive, BL 
Macmillan Archive, passim..  
295 The Legation’s Chinese Secretary observed in 1929 that “mere stupidity” was “the cause of most of our 
trouble with the British press in China and Hong Kong, which is naturally run by third rate men - otherwise 
they would not be doing that sort of work,” Teichman minute on Canton No.178, 30/11/29, FO 228/3987/2 
22g1. 
296 Christian administrator Harold Hodgkin told of the son of a friend who once: “answered that he knew all 
about Chinamen; they were cruel, wicked people; he had seen lots of them at the pictures”, Hodgkin, China 
in the Family of Nations, pp.244-45; A.G.N. Ogden, draft notes, para.18, “Chinese Characteristics”, BT 
60/31/5 70a; Bridge, Peking Picnic, p.101. 
297 Kiernan, Lords of Human Kind, passim.; L.P. Curtis, Anglo-Saxons and Celts: A Study of Anti-Irish 
Prejudice in Victorian England (Bridgeport, Connecticut), 1968. 
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ds for supervision, 
aintaining one’s own aloofness and untainted correctness; in short the need for distance. 
tegral 
 were offensive and unfriendly prevented any 
asy alteration in the behaviour of the British in China that was required to accommodate 
triumphant Chinese nationalism and the change in official British policy. Secondly it was 
a tremendous source of good propaganda to nationalist Chinese and other political 
opponents of the British presence in China. 
 
posteriori reasoning. It articulated and confirmed degrees of difference and domination. It 
suggested principles of behaviour: firmness, condescension and the nee
m
These principles both rationalised and informed the social structure of, and socialisation 
in, the British communities; the armoury of attitudes and characterisations was an in
part of that socialisation in both a causative and symptomatic manner. 
 In the politically charged atmosphere of the late 1920s the popularity and 
influence of such writers as Rodney Gilbert and the strength of this reactionary influence 
on British coverage of China was doubly problematical. Firstly the influence of the 
repetition of attitudes about the Chinese that
e
 1
Chapter 3 
British society in China in 1928 
 
“An empire of men - and tenth rate men at that.”1 
 
 The British in China had mostly come to trade and reaffirmed this prime motive 
regularly and ritually in public, in private, to the Chinese and to each other. A significant 
minority had come as missionaries. These two groups formed the core of a British 
community composed of different, sometimes antagonistic, sub-communities and classes. 
Despite the apparent gulf between, for example, a member of the China Inland Mission 
and the average British businessman they were all, ultimately, identified by their 
nationality. They were allowed to engage in their separate occupations because of the 
historical and contemporary diplomatic activities of the British government. It is therefore 
possible and rewarding to talk of a British community and its constituent communities 
and to look at the unity in this diversity as well as contradiction and conflict. 
 In this chapter both the variety and the similarity of the structures and processes of 
entering, participating in and retiring from these communities will be examined. In 
particular the way in which new members were socialised, and the implications of the 
values and attitudes thereby acquired, or reinforced, for individual and communal Sino-
British relations, shall be explained. This socialisation had implications for other national 
communities in China.2 It will be shown that, despite the paramountcy of trade, the idea 
that the British communities were an extension of the British Empire was an important 
theme in the self-ascription of resident Britons. They were conscious of themselves as 
agents of Empire and the institutions of their society had an imperial flavour. This 
consciousness had serious implications for their behaviour and attitudes towards the 
Chinese, who were implicitly regarded as subjects, or placed in a subject relationship. An 
added complication was the fact that the distance between the imperial aspirations of the 
treaty port British and their individual and group behaviour was marked. Their 
imperialism reinforced the disdainful characterisations of the Chinese prevalent in 
metropolitan culture and became a serious obstruction to the attempts at reforming British 
attitudes necessitated by the triumph of Chinese nationalism by 1928. 
 
How many, who and where? 
 According to the Chinese Maritime Customs there were 12,383 registered British 
subjects in China in 1928. In 1931 there were 13,344 in the treaty ports, concessions, 
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2 For the influence of the British on the American community see Huskey, “Americans in Shanghai”, 
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settlements and inland areas of China with a further 6,800 in Hong Kong, excluding 
servicemen.3 British communities were spread throughout China. In 1928 there were 
concessions (with British controlled municipal councils) in Tianjin, Jiujiang, Shamian 
(Guangzhou) and Xiamen; British dominated International Concessions in Shanghai and 
Gulangsu (Xiamen) and the colonies of Weihaiwei and Hong Kong. By 1931 Weihaiwei 
and the concessions at Xiamen and Zhenjiang had been retroceded to the Chinese - 
Hankou and Jiujiang being handed over formally in 1927 having been seized by the 
Guomindang. Shanghai was much the largest settlement, followed by Tianjin, the others 
containing hundreds of Britons at the most, usually only scores. 
 Outside of these the pattern of settlement was dictated by trading networks 
(notably along the China coast, in Manchuria and along the Yangzi at Yichang and 
Chongqing) or patterns of missionary evangelisation. Albert Feuerwerker has calculated 
that in 1919 only 106 out of China’s 1704 xian (about 6%) were without some foreign 
missionary presence. In their small numbers missionaries were lost in the vastness of 
China but there were urban concentrations - in Shanghai and Hankou especially - which 
made their presence felt beyond their numbers.4 
 The largest group within this total were businessmen - traders, bankers, 
manufacturers and those with mining, shipping or railway interests. The second largest 
group were missionaries involved in running schools, hospitals, universities, nurseries, 
publishing and ecumenical organisations and theological schools as well as more obvious 
evangelistic institutions.5  Then there were those in British government service, a small 
but prominent number of diplomats, diplomatic staff (such as policemen and archivists), 
consuls and servicemen - there were troops at Tianjin, Legation guards in Beijing and 
gunboats on the Yangzi and Pearl rivers. There were also the employees of the Shanghai 
Municipal and Tianjin British Municipal Councils:- policemen, engineers, firemen, 
surveyors, doctors, prison wardens, accountants, chemists, teachers, musicians in the 
Shanghai Municipal Orchestra or brass band, and tax inspectors. There were others who 
serviced the treaty port communities: journalists, accountants, lawyers, estate agents, club 
secretaries, hoteliers, ships’ pilots, brokers, doctors, travel agents, prostitutes and even 
piano tuners. There were Nanjing Government advisors such as Sir Frederick Whyte or 
W.H. Donald, and the men of the British Naval Missions, or warlord advisors such as 
“Two Gun” Cohen; and the staff of government agencies such as the Maritime Customs, 
Salt and Postal administrations; there were also those who worked for Chinese companies 
                                                          
3 CYB 1930, p.2; CYB 1933, p.2; Hong Kong Administrative Reports for the Year 1932 (Hong Kong, 1933), 
Medical and Sanitary Report for the Year 1932, p. M30.  
4 Feuerwerker, Foreign Establishment, p.39. 
5 The number of British missionaries had been declining rapidly in relative terms compared to those from 
the United States; in 1905 half of the 3,833 missionaries in China were British and one third American, by 
1920 these proportions of the 6,536 mission population had been reversed, ibid., p.44. 
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such as the Ships’ officers who worked for the China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company (Lunchuan zhaoshangju). 
 While there were many families that stayed out East for more than one generation, 
most of these people went to China knowing that they would retire, mostly to Britain, 
although many chose British Columbia, after a period of two or three decades of service 
punctuated by lengthy periods of home leave, for home Britain remained. This further 
cemented the fact of their being a community abroad rather than a loose coalition of 
exiles sharing the same patrimony. They were seen as a homogeneous community by 
visitors and by the Chinese and were expected to act as such, by the Legation, for 
instance, which chastised or deported troublemakers and cooperated with charitable 
groups in assisting the passage home of the indigent. Furthermore, most people did not go 
out to China autonomously, or on the off-chance of employment. They went or were sent, 
they were met and they were moulded. 
 Identifiable groups with British passports or under British protection were 
excluded in varying degrees from this community as it defined itself, in its public 
discourse and especially in its memoirs and commentaries. Lower middle class and lower 
class Britons formed a noticeable sub-group within the British community proper. This 
included, for example, the men of the SMP, employees of the SMC, “outdoor” customs 
staff and “floating” staff of the shipping companies.6  There was some overlap, Shanghai-
born Britons did sometimes get jobs with the big British companies. Generally however, 
they lived and socialised apart from each other, although the patterns of sociability and 
socialisation were very similar. In proportion they formed a much smaller group than the 
Japanese lower middle-class community, and consequently had much less political 
influence on British treaty port life.7 However there were clear class antagonisms, at 
work, at play and politically.8 G.W. Swire and Sir John Pratt both agreed that municipal 
reforms in Tianjin, Hankou or Shanghai which gave political power to “low whites” were 
to be avoided.9  The impotence of the “low white” when faced by the conciliatory 
policies of the British Government and, eventually, the treaty port oligarchs, was often 
                                                          
6 Accounts of this life can be found in the correspondence of Frank Harold Davies in the J. Glyn Davies 
and George M. Davies collections in the National Library of Wales and in Peter T. Jackson, Commission in 
Chinese Waters (London, 1938). 
7 On the Japanese see Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937”, P. Duus, 
R.H. Myers and M. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, 1989), 
p.172. 
8 See, for example, remarks on tensions between “floating” and shore staff at Butterfield and Swires in 
Shanghai: “the atmosphere [there was] thoroughly uncongenial” to the lower class seamen, G.W. Swire to 
H.W. Robertson, 16/12/27, SP ADD 15, Evidence can also be found in fiction. See, for example, John 
Lambourne’s Squeeze and Warren Hill’s novel The Crystal Skull (London, 1930) in which there is some 
interesting satire on the snobbery of Shanghai when a Nanjing road department store manager acquires an 
occult tool which gives him the power to control people’s thoughts, which he uses to increase his social 
standing in the British community. 
9 JS London to BS Shanghai and Hong Kong, 18/3/27, SP ADD 1079; J.T. Pratt to G.W. Swire, 24/4/28, 
SP ADD 1185. 
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translated into the class hostility and racial hostility to be found in the pages of Bruce 
Lockhart’s The Showdown or the correspondence of SMP Detective R.M. Tinkler.10 
                                                          
 The Sephardi Jewish community certainly identified itself as British but does not 
appear to have been regarded as such on a social level;11 for Eurasians with British 
protection the same applies.12  Poorer Eurasians, who took advantage of “vulgar” 
extraterritoriality, were regarded as a nuisance by British officialdom, although outport 
consuls were liable to be more sympathetic than the Foreign Office if they were of “good 
character, British education, and [in view of] the hardship of discontinuing 
registrations.”13 Wherever possible protection was withheld or withdrawn and in any case 
only those born in Hong Kong were recognised as British protégés.14  There was also an 
Indian community, mostly policemen or night-watchmen, and the British poor, most of 
whom do not feature in the public life of the concessions, except as the recipients of 
charity, namely tickets home.15 This last group often merged with the last, British 
criminals, of whom there was always a presence.16 Hong Kong Chinese, who were also 
British protegés, were naturally excluded. 
 
In the following discussion, unless otherwise stated, the term “British community” refers 
to the “white”, middle and upper-middle class business community. 
 
Why did they go? 
 The motivation that sent most people to work in China was similar to that which 
sent people to work in the British Empire of which treaty port China was considered to be 
a part. “China” was socially more open than the institutionalized and hierarchically stuffy 
10 Tinkler papers, letters to Aunt Florence, 9/1/21, 9/7/21, letters to Edith, 17/6/23, 26/6/25, 25/7/26. 
11 See the comments of Jack Bazalgette on the Kadoorie family and his other Jewish acquaintances, 
Bazalgette papers, letters to parents, 2/5/27 and 4/7/28. See also the comment on Sir Victor Sassoon by an 
Shanghai ex-resident reported in Harriet Sergeant, Shanghai (London, 1991), p.131. For details of British 
protegé Silas Aaron Hardoon’s singularly close involvement in Shanghai and national Chinese affairs see 
Chiara Betta, “S.A. Hardoon: An Intercultural Intermediary in Shanghai” (unpublished conference paper, 
1992). 
12 The nomination of Eurasian businessman W.R. McBain to the SMC in 1928 was welcomed by Swires 
because “he is in touch with important Chinese merchants and speaks Chinese,” BS Shanghai to JS 
London, 13/1/28, SP ADD 1080. Wealth did not necessarily soften British prejudices against Eurasians, 
personal information, Mrs Beattie Donaldson, (neé White). See also the evidence offered by the trial of L. 
Kentwell, a Eurasian Shanghai barrister, NCH, 5/2/27, pp.201-202. G.W. Swire and his Hong Kong staff 
did not approve of the power wielded in the colony by such Eurasian businessmen as Sir Robert Hotung, JS 
London to BS Hong Kong, 14/3/30, JSS II 1/9; BS Hong Kong to JS London, 21/3/30, JSS III 1/8. 
13 Legation to FO No.162, 13/2/30, FO228\4324\2 84x. 
14 See, for example, the case of cinema manager H.C. Best, born of a British father and Chinese mother in 
Xiamen, whose protection was withdrawn in 1930, FO228\4073 84x 1929 and FO228\4324 84x 1930. 
15 The Indian population, which was 1,842 in 1930, was counted as a separate group on the SMC’s census 
totals, see, for example, SMC, Annual Report, 1935, p.49. 
16 For an atmospheric description of indigent British life in China see Bob Moore, Don’t Call me a Crook: 
My True Autobiography (London, 1935). 
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Empire; it was also easier to enter and less competitive than the socially more prestigious 
apparatus of the Raj and other services in the Empire.17 
 Missionaries apart, this society was predominantly and characteristically male. 
The wives - like domestic society it generally did not include single working women - 
were usually met in Britain or else were the daughters or relatives of treaty port families. 
Thereafter they usually did not work; Chinese and Eurasians were cheaper for companies 
to employ.18 
 Not surprisingly very few of the residents were attracted to China out of any sense 
of appreciation of its culture and civilization. Most missionaries went out to alter that 
culture because it was “heathen.”19  The criteria for assessment of candidates for the 
China Inland Mission, for example, placed evidence of a “call” to serve in China in 
particular only fourth among its requirements.20  Some went expressly to offer their 
professional skills to the Chinese - doctors and teachers for example - whilst others felt a 
religious vocation for working in China that usually defied secular interpretation.21  Some 
saw even mission service in China as social advancement. For Gladys Aylward Britain 
meant being “consigned eternally to “servants quarters”” in a rigid caste system. In 
China, even when self-supported, her status was immeasurably and instantly improved.22 
 As for businessmen, some had no choice in the matter - especially those who had 
joined multinationals such as BAT or APC who “simply got [their] marching orders and 
went.”23 Some joined companies especially to go East where they expected to achieve 
greater wealth, comfort and importance faster than would be possible in Britain;24 some 
joined such companies to go back to where they had been brought up,25 and others just 
                                                          
17 On the lack of enthusiasm for service in China in government service see P.D. Coates, The China 
Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943 (London, 1988), pp. 432-33; Sir Miles Lampson called the 
China Consular Service the “cream of the second class”, Diaries, 28/10/26; others were unkinder, G.W. 
Swire to JS London, 11/1/29, SP ADD 15. 
18 Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield, Out of the Cage: Women’s Experiences in Two World Wars 
(London, 1988), pp.137-43. There were exceptions, Phyllis Harrop went to Shanghai as a single woman in 
1929 and worked first for the telephone company and then as secretary to Sir Victor Sassoon, Harrop, 
Hong Kong Incident (London, 1943), pp.7-12. See also the memoir of Mrs Isabel Duck, “All in a 
Lifetime”, Duck papers, IWM. 
19 “We are living in a heathen country, - business, society, education, government, are all impregnated with 
a heathen atmosphere”, H.B. Rattenbury to C.L. Andrews, 24/2/28, WMMSA, Hupeh Correspondence, 
fiche 388. 
20 CIM London Council Minutes, 13/5/31, p.317. 
21 See for example Ronald Rees Life in China 1922 - 1947, [Harrow, 1971], p.1. (Sewell Papers, PPMS 
16/38); Sewell himself went “in response to the promptings of our Chinese student friends”, “Early Days of 
Medical Education in China”, Talk given at the ECA summer school, Oxford, 1929, p.1, PPMS 16/18. 
22 Alan Burgess, The Small Woman (London, 1957), p.56. 
23 John Logan, China: Old and New (Hong Kong, 1982), p.3; Maurice Lister went out on the same draft: 
“My feelings were one of great surprise because I’d spent a long time learning Spanish and they sent me to 
China.”, BBC. “Lion and the Dragon”, Tape Roll 38/1, p.1.  
24 C. King, ed., “The First Trip East - - P and O via Suez” in F.H.H. King, ed., Eastern Banking: Essays in 
the History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (London, 1983), p.205. 
25 Consul Sir Meyrick Hewlett’s son went out with John Logan, Logan, China, p.3 (and personal 
information); Consul A.G.N. Ogden’s son joined the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, (Austin Coates, 
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needed work, any work.26 Some drifted to China because their record, criminal or 
otherwise, made returning to Britain difficult.27 Some had come after demobilization at 
the end of the Great War - among them, perhaps, those arriving expressly to leave the 
Europe of the trenches behind. Graham Greene saw working in China for BAT as a 
means of escape from thwarted love and quotidian pettiness in Britain.28 Others with a 
taste for adventure and fighting, possibly inspired by “One-Arm” Sutton or “Two-Gun” 
Cohen, came, for example, to work for “the local Chinese warlord.” Some, shrewdly, 
desired to take advantage of the tangles of extraterritoriality.29 
 The myth of making a quick fortune in China had evolved into a desire to enjoy 
the other, more reliable benefits of the foreign but familiar treaty port world - social 
importance, servants, spacious living and so on.30 China itself was as incidental to these 
considerations as it was to the treaty port world; although some, brought up on a diet of 
literary adventure, or who read about warlords and Chinese events in the The Times, did 
see this wider setting as a source of excitement and interest.31 The choice of China was 
frequently incidental and accidental. H.G.W. Woodhead was escaping an unhappy job 
and home life by following up an offer from a family friend, whilst J.T. Pratt had not 
considered China at all until he came upon an announcement of the Consular 
Examinations. Meyrick Hewlett was bullied into keeping a childhood decision to go 
whilst others opted for the Chinese Consular service because it was easiest to get into or 
were offered it after failing diplomatic service exams. Stella Benson’s husband was given 
the idea of joining the CMC by meeting a serving Customs officer on an Irish train.32 
Some came with the Shanghai Defence Force or on regular army postings and stayed: a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
China Races (Hong Kong, 1983), p.305) whilst Shanghai pilot W.E. Kent’s son went back to join an 
insurance company, Algar and Co., (personal information). 
26 ST - 20, p.1. 
27 C.Y. Jones went to Shanghai direct from a prison in Nyasaland, “Almoner’s Report”, 28/3/30, NARA 
SMP D3002. 
28 So many came after the war that the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai set up an employment 
register for them, British Chamber of Commerce Journal (hereafter BCCJ), April 1930, p.80; See also Paul 
Fussell, Abroad: British Literary Travelling Between the Wars (Oxford, 1980), pp.3-15; the emotional and 
other reactions to the war, shortages and restrictions which motivated his “literary travellers” cannot but 
have been shared by many un-literary ones. Baptist Missionary Emily Pentelow “felt that by going out to 
China she would escape” after the death of a brother in the trenches, “Elsie” to M.E. Bowser, 7/10/27, 
BMSA, CH/74; Norman Sherry, The Life of Graham Greene, Volume One: 1904-1939 (London, 1989), 
pp.195-96. 
29 D.S.I. W. Kennedy, Report on C.Y. Jones, 27/3/30, NARA SMP D3002. One “shady character”, who 
went to Shanghai in 1927, married the daughter of the former Cuban minister to China, and often took 
refuge from his creditors in the Cuban Legation, NARA SMP D6384, 18/4/36. 
30 See A.H. Rasmussen’s reasons for returning to Shanghai in his China Trader, p.171; also see D.N. 
Noble, The Eagle and the Dragon: The United States Military in China, 1901-1937 (New York, 1990), 
Chapter 6, “Going Asiatic: Sevicemen who remained in China”, pp.171-86. A description of the traditional 
treaty port good-life can be found in Oliver G. Ready, Life and Sport in China (London, 1904), especially 
the chapter “Anglo-Chinese Life”, pp.1-25. 
31 ST - 19, p.1; ST - 20, p.1; Fitzgerald, Why China?, p.12-13. 
32 Woodhead, Journalist in China, , p.13; Pratt, War and Politics, p.9; Hewlett, Forty Years, p.1; Grant, 
Stella Benson, p.156. 
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Lance Corporal looked for a job as a Godown manager, W.R. Giles became Beijing 
correspondent for the Daily Mail and Stanley Fisher an SMP constable.33 
 Many residents already had family connections with China - Consuls Lionel and 
Bertram Giles, sons of the Sinologist and ex-consul Herbert Giles,34 for example, or 
family traditions of Imperial service.35 It may also be said that service overseas provided 
a way of escaping the greater competition for jobs and position that mass education and a 
democratic mass society was slowly bringing Britain. Even the lowliest member of the 
British community in China could afford, or was issued with, a servant, and could feel 
himself part of an elite, even within the wider foreign community.36 Promotion prospects 
were generally much better, Woodhead and W.V. Pennell both acquired positions of 
authority and respect in treaty port society much faster than they could ever have hoped 
to as journalists in Britain.37 Compared to Britain the treaty port business communities 
were less class-aware and more meritocratic but by no means as egalitarian as treaty port 
lore claimed.38 
 Surrounding, and encompassing, the British community itself was a supposedly 
cosmopolitan world. Its American characteristics appealed to some but repelled most.39 
This cosmopolitanism, whilst being an unavoidable fact in Shanghai and Tianjin, was not 
at all accepted by the British communities, which were widely felt to still be at least 
Edwardian in their habits and social niceties. This was true of the smaller ports especially 
but was a common feature of expatriate life. It was also an aping of the life of the British 
                                                          
33 BCCJ, March 1928, p.72, “Employment Register”, “Applicant, at present Lance-Corporal in Shaforce”; 
NCH, 10/3/28, p.388, 20/10/28, p.110; An impression of the comfortable benefits of a posting to China can 
be gained from the short memoir of then Lance-Corporal F. Robinson, Robinson papers, IWM and A.C. 
Boreham, “The Saga of a Suffolk Soldier”, passim., Boreham papers, IWM, 91/21/1. For naval crews there 
were similar advantages: “Out here the Chinese do all the under-water work, scraping, painting and 
refitting whereas in Malta the bottom has to be scraped by the ship’s company”, Hayes Papers, IWM, 
Diary, 12/2/32. Civilian naval officers on the China coast had “more stewards per man than on any 
European ship, and we had personal stewards”, ST - 1, p.1. 
34 Their niece married a British Army officer who was serving with the Legation for a year - Norman, BBC 
“Lion and the Dragon”, Tape Roll 8, p.4. See also W.G.C. Graham, A.L. Scott (Coates, China Consuls, 
pp.540, 537) and Hewlett with his “Uncle Archer”, Forty Years, p.1. 
35 Leslie Gill, BBC “Lion and the Dragon”, Tape Roll 21, p.1. 
36 Hewlett was issued with his “boy” on his first day (Forty Years, p.3), as was J.A. Sinclair, BBC “Lion 
and the Dragon”, Tape Roll 4, p.1; A.D. Rasmussen, as a customs “outdoorman”, possibly the lowest of the 
foreign low, inherited his predecessor’s boy, China Trader, pp.8-11; Tinkler Papers, Letter to Aunt 
Florence, 22/8/19. 
37 Woodhead, Journalist in China, p.49; W.F.V. Pennell, A Lifetime With The Chinese (Hong Kong, 1974), 
p.89. 
38 Teichman, Affairs Of China, p.281; Hauser, City for Sale, p.263. 
39 Tinkler Papers, Letter to Edith, 11/3/25. The novelist J.G. Ballard was born in Shanghai and has made 
much of the city’s Americana in his novels and other works; see, for example, Empire of the Sun (London, 
1984) and The Kindness of Women (London, 1991). Raphael Samuel is quite right to point out that “The 
most virulent Anglocentrism of the war and post war years was directed,... against... the Americans”; this 
was true of the inter-war period as well, R. Samuel “Introduction: Exciting to be English”, R. Samuel, ed. 
Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity Volume 1 (London and New York, 
1989), pp.xxvi-xxvii. 
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in colonial India.40 There were rigid distinctions based on hierarchy (only managers of a 
certain seniority could use one end of the Shanghai Club bar), wealth, profession and 
address. It was a distortion of British domestic values but was not in opposition to them. 
In fact the smallness of most communities served to heighten class-distinctions. 
 As Jonathan Spence has rightly noted of his “China Helpers”: “implicit in most of 
their actions is..., a desire not so much to help China as to help themselves. [They] left for 
China to avoid “feared or experienced frustrations at home.”41 There were those who 
went who hated British society because it was too reactionary and those who felt it was 
too democratic.42 In the wider materialistic sense, of course, the British community as a 
whole was there to help themselves.43 Their success was manifested in the buildings and 
public life of the larger ports, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou and Shamian.44 Their 
ostentation and vulgarity appalled some visitors whilst others found it merely suburban 
and provincial45 - this despite the community’s self-images of service, charity and 
imperial duty which were hammered home in the pages of the North China Daily News 
and in memoirs.46 
 
Socialisation 
 Ignorance of China before departure or misinformed images derived from treaty 
port propaganda and fiction were not, however, a particularly important point on their 
own. Much more significant was in what they learnt, and how, when they got there and 
the ways in which socialisation reinforced and justified the attitudes taught by the China 
experts: 
 
Captain Miners... gave me a friendly welcome and that first evening we sat 
on his verandah while he informed me of the prevailing local conditions 
and gave me a preliminary briefing on my new duties. I remember feeling 
a little surprised to learn that social contacts with Chinese were rare and 
were not encouraged by either the Chinese or the Foreign community.47 
                                                          
40 On “Edwardian” China see John Maitland Philips, to Philip Suttill Jones, 28/9/24, IWM DS/MISC/55, 
(hereafter J.M. Philips Papers); C. Cook, The Lion and Dragon: British Voices From the China Coast 
(London, 1985), pp.110-13; Stella Benson approvingly recorded one description of the “serviette 
civilization” of Hong Kong, Diary, 17/6/30. On the influence of the Indian pattern on British colonial 
societies see Helen Callaway, Gender, Culture and Empire: European Women in Colonial Nigeria 
(Basingstoke, 1987), pp.70-75; on that pattern see Charles Allen, Plain Tales From the Raj: Images of 
British India in the Twentieth Century (London, 1975), pp.82-98. 
41 J. Spence, The China Helpers: Western advisers in China, 1620-1960 (London, 1969), p.292. 
42 Tinkler Papers, Letter to Edith, 11/3/25; Fussell, Abroad, pp.15-23. 
43 “God helps those who help themselves” claimed Ranald McDonald when urging the Shanghai foreign 
ratepayers to refuse an increase in the number of Chinese councillors in 1930, see below, chapter 4, SMC, 
Annual Report, 1930, p.21. 
44 Jon Huebner, “Architecture of the Shanghai Bund”, Papers on Far Eastern History, 39 (March 1989), 
pp. 127-65. 
45 “Pompous toadstools... trying to give materialism importance”, Acton, Memoirs, p.292; Jackson, China 
only Yesterday, p.25; Sir W. Hayter, A Double Life (London, 1974), pp.52-53. 
46 Green, Foreigner in China, p.14. 
47 W.J. Moore, Shanghai Century or “Tungsha Flats to Soochow Creek” (Ilfracombe, 1966), p.31. 
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This was not unusual even if it was a little explicit.48 The insularity of Chinese society 
was in this way frequently stated to be the justification for such behaviour. 
 Most institutions “met” their new arrivals and showed them the ropes. Hewlett 
and novice consular companions were met at Beijing station by an earlier draft who 
“although they had only preceded us by five months, ...made us feel that they were old 
hands”; the students were immediately issued with a room, a servant and a teacher.49 
Whilst there was probably more of this implicit education than the explicit lessons given 
by Captain Miners, J.A. Sinclair, for example, was bluntly warned by Sir Erich Teichman 
against sinophilia: “don’t forget you’re British.”50 
 Most missionaries after training in Britain for a year or two, went first to a 
language school: the North China Union Language School in Beijing, an American 
school in Nanjing, Coastal Schools at Xiamen and Shantou or the CIM Training Schools 
in Anping and Yangzhou.51 After language training they would be sent either straight to 
their designated station where most of the learning was done on the job or first to a 
different nearby station for further language study. 
 Most arrivals in China would be very young, unmarried (by company or mission 
society regulation) and leaving home for the first time. Their life seems to have been an 
extension of the minor public schools they had mostly been to. Starting on the boat the 
men teamed up, later on in bachelor “messes” or more informally in clubs they lived, 
worked, ate and played together.52 It was in both the short-term and long-term interests of 
“griffins” (as new young male staff were known) to fit in from the very start, from the 
voyage out. In the short-term this was to overcome loneliness and disorientation, and in 
the long-term to ensure a smooth professional future. One businessman recalled that: 
 
First class travel for juniors was an introduction to the life they were 
expected to lead as a form of education. A bank needed its young to 
circulate, play games, etc., and often the friends one made rose with you to 
high seniority.53 
Firms also required their staff not to compromise or bankrupt themselves in pursuing the 
delights of being monied and abroad for the first time. To that end, for example, the new 
Masonic Club opened in 1928 was described as: 
 
a social hall, where the younger Masons could associate and spend happy 
evenings together rather than that they should be forced to seek relaxation in less 
favourable places.54 
                                                          
48 IOLR, Bazalgette, 11/5/27, p.3. 
49 Hewlett, Forty Years, pp.2-3. 
50 J.A. Sinclair, BBC Tape Roll 4, p.3. 
51 F.K. Sanders, “The Training of Missionaries in China”, E.C. Lobenstine and Warnshuis, eds., CMYB 
1918, pp.311-20. 
52 Lister, memoirs, p.13, Cook, Lion and the Dragon, pp.17-18; King, “The First Trip East”, p.212-13. 
53 Ibid., p.213. In fact the process began before the staff left Britain, see, for example CET, 14/11/29, p.784 
and “Eastern Banks’ Swimming Gala”, CET, 26/9/28, p.71 
54 NCH, 28/1/28, p.140. 
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Worried about the fact that “Shanghai for a young man fresh from home is the devil” J.K. 
Swire started a riding club at Butterfield and Swire in the city. He was hoping to 
influence new arrivals with a “very good riding clique” there who “go to bed early and 
ride before breakfast, keep fit and do not waste their money on wine women and song.”55 
The cost of living in Shanghai was felt to be appreciably rising all the time. Temptations 
and indebtedness amongst younger men was felt to be a real danger. In 1928 employees 
“once of excellent character, ... have had to be shipped home, simply because they have 
gone to pieces from night life and easy credit”. The cashless chit system was blamed. 
Civil actions for debt would ruin a career - especially as the bad publicity was felt to be 
“letting the side down”.56 Some took more drastic action, criminal or suicidal.57 
 Despite these problems, and to counter the treaty ports’ reputation (“17,000 shady 
characters”58), there was a widespread belief that the quality of the young British in 
China was up to that expected of the Empire. The virtues of manliness and 
characterizations were identified in the obituary of a 26 year old banker, T.E. Tricker: a 
horseman, a shooter, a Volunteer and “a true presentation of the standard Englishman, for 
he was bluff honesty personified.”
other 
                                                          
59 A commentator in the CIM journal China’s Millions 
put it well when he wrote that “the average businessman in China today is a specially 
selected man, a man who has learnt to play the game in the public schools and 
universities of his homeland”. This is the familiar idealised description of the young 
Briton, fair, firm, sporty and an Imperialist.60 
 This ideal was not matched by the reality of treaty port behaviour. The majority of 
British residents were not “specially selected” and did not “play the game”. For 
missionary E.R. Hughes British businessmen did not live up to the gentlemanly standards 
they aspired to, notably in their relations with the Chinese.61 Visitors often remarked on 
55 J.K. Swire to G.W. Swire, 11/5/25, SP ADD 1079. The club closed for lack of interest in 1933, JS 
London to BS Shanghai, 24/3/33, SP ADD 1082. 
56 NCH, 30/6/28, p.551; 21/4/28, p.93. For examples see NARA SMP D3708: “Whereabouts of D.A. 
Fowler”, 7/6/32, SMP D3002: D.S.I. Kennedy on Allen, an ex-Shanghai policeman, 27/3/30. 
57 See, for example, “D.A. Rushton alias D.A. Berkeley-Rushton”, 30/7/31, NARA SMP D2610; 
“Temptations were too much”, and too costly, for Policeman S.A. Fisher - barely a year out of the SDF - 
who was jailed for larceny, J.R. Llewellyn got six months for stealing a pair of trousers, his night school 
teaching obviously not paying enough, NCH, 20/10/28, p.110, 16/6/28, p.478. It was not just Shanghai’s 
problem, the Beijing Legation was short of accommodation space for its civilian wireless telegraph 
operators and lodged them in a hotel outside the Legation Quarter: “This in itself was conducive neither to 
good discipline nor to the satisfactory conduct of the men... two have proved thoroughly unsatisfactory, 
having incurred debts, taken to drink and other excesses”. One was dismissed but still treated with 
understanding leniency by the Minister, Lampson to C-in-C, S/O, 21/11/28, FO228\3745\24 7a, “Dismissal 
of Mr J Milner”; to FO No.1525, 5/12/28, FO228\3745\26 7a. 
58 An anonymous “socialist swine” was here being quoted by the very shady R.M. Tinkler, Tinkler Papers, 
Letter to Edith, 28/3/27. 
59 NCH, 14/1/28, p.54. See Mangan, Games Ethic and Imperialism, pp.18-19; and also E. Ingram, “The Raj 
as daydream: The Pukka Sahib as Henty Hero in Simla, Chandrapore, and Kyauktada”, Gordon Martel, ed., 
Studies in British Imperial History: Essays in Honour of A.P. Thornton (London, 1986), pp.159-77. 
60 China’s Millions, August 1929, p.123. 
61 E.R. Hughes to Crowe, 15/12/32, BT 60/31/5/65. 
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the violent behaviour of foreigners towards the Chinese and diplomatic records show that 
British residents were often guilty of this.62 Violence was common enough to enter 
Shanghai slang; eating waiguohuotui [foreign ham] meant receiving the all too frequent 
kicks aimed at rickshaw pullers by foreign passengers [see figure 4, following page], too 
frequent, according to American lawyer N.F. Allman, for this “common offense” to be 
viewed seriously by the American Supreme Court in Shanghai.63 The fabled cheapness of 
human life in China could be catching, as evidenced by the famous Peters case in 1935.64 
 
A Network of Lives that Intersect 
 For many people this was their first taste of life outside school - or a brief 
apprenticeship at offices in London.65 Missionaries had usually spent a year or two 
studying at colleges such as Carey Hall in Birmingham before being sent out to China.
 Companies wanted efficient, hard-working and hard-playing young businessmen, 
missions wanted energetic and linguistically capable evangelists, new arrivals wanted to 
find their places and establish themselves quickly. 
                                                          
62 For examples of reported aggression see Jackson, China Only Yesterday, p.32; Hosie, A Chinese Lady, 
pp.82-83; see, for example, Maze papers, S/O Letters, Shanghai, 1927, Maze to I.G., 9/9/27 “Assaults on 
Chinese Tidewaiters”; “One Sanders, a young Englishman... appears to have emerged early in the evening 
and in a state of semi-intoxication from a cabaret... and to have taken exception to a Chinese chauffeur who 
he imagined was laughing at him. He pursued the man in order to punch his head...”, W. Russell Brown to 
Lampson, Hankow S/O, 18/2/30, FO228\4312\164 84. Similar cases can be found in Shanghai No.172, 
3/9/30, FO228\4317\388 84 and Shanghai No.329, 2/12/30, FO228\4284\4 69h. After A.H. Mills was 
mugged in Shanghai he “would have killed a Chink if I could have found one by himself on the way 
home”, From Piccadilly to Devils Island, p.205. 
63 Yan Fusun, Shanghai suyu dacidian, [Dictionary of Shanghai Colloquialisms] (Shanghai, 1924, 
[Facsimile edition, Tokyo, 1971]), pp.30-31; N.F. Allman, Shanghai Lawyer (New York, 1943), pp.96. 
64 Peters, an SMP Sergeant was tried with a companion for the cold-blooded murder of a sick Chinese 
beggar, British public opinion was in his favour and he was acquitted despite overwhelming evidence as to 
his guilt, NCH, 12/2/36, pp.278-80, 19/2/36, pp.321-22. This was not an unexpected result. Of an earlier 
case the Shanghai Consul General remarked, “My impression was that the jury would never bring in a 
verdict of “guilty” against a “white” British subject charged with murder or manslaughter of a Chinese”, 
Shanghai No.172, 1/6/29, FO228\3980\3 20k. 
65 Benson Dairies, 20/12/29. 
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 They established themselves by joining a club, a volunteer corps (a “social unit 
which partakes very largely of the nature of a club”66), the Police Specials,67 a Masonic 
lodge, a sports club, an old boys association, a church.68 These institutions formed 
informal and formal networks of association and they tended to shape and characterize 
the community. Some were extensions of networks from home - schools or lodges, for 
instance, which provided a ready entrée into society.69 With such a variety of competing 
and differing reasons for being in China, it is clear that only through the institutions and 
processes of socialisation could a sense of community have been established. 
 This communal structure reinforced values acquired in Britain such as those 
associated with public schools: imperialism, militarism and sportiness, and the ethos of 
public service.70 The doctrines of service and militarism were catered for by treaty port 
volunteer corps, which in Shanghai an estimated one third of eligible British men had 
joined in 1928 - the highest national percentage.71 Traditionally they had no choice in the 
matter; this had changed by 1928 but informal pressures were probably still strong.72 
Sportiness was characteristic of treaty port life from the earliest days, so much so that the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank sometimes asked its London branch to send out new staff 
with specific sporting talents.73 These were middle class, masculine values. Patriotism 
was also at a premium, hence the national associations and the exaggerated importance of 
national days and the King’s Birthday. 
 New values were also inculcated through these media: isolation from the Chinese 
- distance from the other national groups, loyalty to the firm, to the British enterprise in 
China and to their race - which also involved publicly impeccable social behaviour. The 
heightened Englishness of the treaty ports was a rejection of the Chinese world which 
                                                          
66 NCH, 22/6/28, pp.503-504. This was also quite a usual function of the volunteer force in Britain, the 
Territorial Army, P. Dennis, The Territorial Army 1906-1940 (London, 1987), pp.152-53, 167-70. 
67 500 strong, of whom approximately 320 undertook routine duties 5 days a week, Shanghai Publicity 
Bureau News Bulletin, No.2, August 1928, p.15. 
68 Arnhold’s-employed H.S. Butterfield’s father was “anxious that his son should come into touch with the 
right sort of people at Hankou” wrote WMMS China Secretary C.W. Andrews to H.B. Rattenbury, 1/3/29, 
WMMSA China Hupeh fiche 392. 
69 The two could be linked but there don’t appear to have been any specific public-school lodges in China, 
P.J. Rich, “Public School Freemasonry in the Empire: “Mafia of the Mediocre”?”, J.A. Mangan, ed., 
“Benefits Bestowed”? Education and British Imperialism (Manchester, 1988), pp.174-92. School could 
sometimes provide networks of possible employees, the Kailan Mining Association tried to trace the “fag” 
of one of their staff to offer him a job, E.J. Nathan to P.C. Young, 6/2/25, Nathan Papers. 
70 See Mangan, Games Ethic and Imperialism, passim.. 
71 NCH, 16/6/28, p.467. Anne Summers is wrong in asserting that “Popular British militarism after 1918 
had nowhere very much to go” (“Edwardian Militarism”, Samuel, ed., Patriotism, p.254), The notions of 
the facility of military solutions and the importance of military organisation had strengthened their 
hegemonic grip after 1918, if only because so many of the male population went through the military 
experience. See also Dennis, Territorial Army, p.261. 
72 NCH, 16/5/28, p.455, “Needs of the SVC”; Woodhead, Journalist, p.15.; King, Eastern Banking, p.226; 
W.H. Evans Thomas, Vanished China: Far Eastern Banking Memories (London, 1952), p.50. 
73 C. Cook “The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in Lombard St”, King, ed., Eastern 
Banking, p.200. Maurice Springfield got a job with the Shanghai Municipal Police because he hunted and 
his father was a master of hounds, Hunting Opium and other Scents (Halesworth, 1966), p.31. 
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otherwise swamped them, physically as much as metaphorically. The great clichéd danger 
was of “going native”, which was widely interpreted and generally meant showing too 
much interest in things Chinese. The danger was two-fold: eccentricity and deracination. 
Sinclair was warned against losing the right perspective by Sir Erich Teichman, when his 
enthusiasm for the language seemed to be getting the better of him: that those who went 
Chinese were “no use to us”.74 Popular mythology held that such enthusiasm was 
dangerous, as was study of the language itself: 
 
foreigners who really study and master Chinese (no mean feat) change. To 
the dense they appear ‘a bit queer’ but it’s just the bald fact that their 
outlook on life becomes partly Chinese and the result is often the quaintest 
of eccentrics.75  
Reginald Johnston was frequently pointed out as the prime example of such eccentricity. 
“They lived pleasant lives” wrote Dobson of those who went Chinese “ yet were never 
much good to the tribe anymore”, a comment which neatly summed up the expected 
pattern of race-defined loyalties.76 
 An acceptable interest in China was expressed in “curio” collecting. The 
acquisition of Chinese antiques, a hobby which enthralled many residents, although 
transparently evidence of an appreciation for things Chinese actually represented in many 
cases a refusal to acknowledge any interest or validity in modern China and modern 
Chinese culture.77 It paralleled the activities of the sinologues of the Royal Asiatic 
Society whose interests also lay firmly in the distant past. Some ran curio shops or 
businesses themselves, others were involved in less legitimate ventures.78 
 Few Britons seem to have felt any attraction to the danger of going native. The 
socialising patterns of the following appear to be reliable examples of the interests and 
loyalties of the majority. Noel Kent, son of a Shanghai Pilot, returned to China after 
schooling to work for and then manage a firm of architects. In 1924 he joined the elite 
Light Horse of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. He was a ratepayer with four votes on the 
SMC, a member of the Shanghai Club, the Country Club, the Shanghai Paper Hunt Club 
and on the committee of the Hungjao Golf Club: he also raced his pony at the Shanghai 
Race Club. These activities would have involved him in meeting a wide variety of the 
Shanghai British. He was also a mason.79 R.M. Tinkler, an SMP Detective Constable and 
                                                          
74 BBC, Lion and the Dragon, Tape Roll 9/1 p.3. 
75 J.M. Philips Papers, letter to P.S. Jones, 15/12/24. 
76 See the memoirs of O.W. Philips (no relation) on Johnston who was: “Sinophile to a degree which 
tended to warp his judgment on any Anglo-Chinese issue, had that indefinable eccentric something that 
pervades all those westerners who have made a deep study of China and Chinese,” IWM PP/MCR/153 
pp.214/5; Dobson, China Cycle, p.50. 
77 Lampson Diaries, passim.; Denton Welch, Maiden Voyage (London, 1943), passim.. 
78 See, for example, the fictional but realistic Mrs Mascot in Acton’s Peonies and Ponies (London, 1941); 
Shanghai lawyer and China expert Auxion De Ruffé owned a shop, NARA SMP D4025; Trevor-Roper, 
Hidden Life, p.113. 
79 Noel Essington Kent, manager of Algar and Co., Shanghai, Letterbook and other papers, passim.. 
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later Inspector, joined a club on arrival in China in 1919, then the Masonic Lodge Erin 
and through that the Shanghai Masonic Club. As an ex-soldier he joined the United 
Services Association. He was, like most of his compatriots, a keen shot, frequently hiring 
a boat with friends for the purpose. In his earlier days he took night classes.80 As an 
“Outdoor” Customs worker (“almost like the untouchables in India”) A.H. Rasmussen 
joined the socially less-prestigious of the two clubs in Zhenjiang but his later successful 
business career for H.E. Arnhold and Company was accompanied by a successful 
Masonic career.81 Jack Bazalgette, a member of the Shanghai Defence Force stationed in 
Shanghai from 1927 to 1928, organized Old-Boys’ meetings for fellow pupils from his 
prep school meeting - in this way, a Consul, an accountant, three fellow soldiers, and 
businessmen from the APC, Butterfield and Swire, Brunner Mond (ICI) and Lever 
Brothers.82 
 Newspaper obituaries and appreciations provide similar pictures of a sociable but 
introverted society in which little more than formulaic protestations of Sino-British 
fraternity were felt necessary. The SVC, the Race Club and a social club or two and an 
association - national, veteran or similar, were the social institutions that characterized 
and satisfied the treaty port resident. The informal social life was busy and mythologized 
at the time but was rarely any more mixed.83 
 
Clubs and Suchlike 
 In 1925 there were an estimated 70 “foreign institutions” in Tianjin, including 
Churches, tennis clubs, Masonic lodges, national societies and national clubs. In 
Shanghai there were 108 associations and 158 clubs alone listed in one directory - 
including sports clubs, work-related clubs, philanthropic associations, even a South 
African War Veterans Society. There were also 16 British Masonic lodges.84 
 The Club provided accommodation and recreational facilities, a library, a bar, 
meeting hall, and so on. Shanghai was described as “the city in which a man is lost if he 
has not at least one club at his disposal.”85 So important was it that attempts to bring the 
foreign and Chinese communities together usually involved the setting up of a new club. 
Whilst in itself inoffensive and necessary, the function of the club abroad was more than 
social, as it usually served as an informal political centre where the locally powerful met 
and discussed, especially in Shanghai. By remaining nationally and racially exclusive it 
                                                          
80 Tinkler Papers, letter to Edith, 27/11/21, then passim.. 
81 Rasmussen, China Trader, p.5; The History of Freemasonry in Northern China 1913-1937 (Shanghai, 
1938), pp.107, 172, 
82 IOLR, Bazalgette Papers, Letters, 5/4/27, 16/6/27. 
83 See, for example, the vision of Shanghai offered by one American guide book, Maurine Karns and Pat 
Patterson, Shanghai: High Lights, Low Lights, Tael Lights (Shanghai, 1936). 
84 O.D. Rasmussen, Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History (Tianjin, 1925), p.304; Shanghai Commercial 
and Shopping Pocket Guide (Shanghai, c.1935), pp.391-409. 
85 NCH, 18/8/28, p.287. 
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tended to emphasize the quasi-colonial character of the British community. It also failed 
to represent the real balance of power amongst the differing communities within 
Shanghai itself, an inbalance that was being formally recognized after 1928 by increasing 
Chinese representation on the Council of the SMC.86 This contrasts with the Cèrcle 
Sportif Française, to which access was much less restricted, the American Club, which 
permitted Chinese to become members in 1929 and the German Club Concordia, which 
admitted Chinese members in 1917.87 
 
Freemasonry  
 Freemasonry in North China dated from 1849 when the first lodge was granted a 
warrant in Shanghai, and amongst the foreign communities it appears to have been very 
popular.88 In 1928 there were 848 members of the 11 lodges in the North China District 
and 939 in 1931.89 Some lodges catered for particular groups of foreign residents - St. 
Georges Lodge, No.4575, for example, which was mainly for SMC employees, or the 
China Fleet Lodge of instruction at Shanghai and a subsequent lodge at Weihaiwei for 
naval masons.90 Membership included newspapermen (O.M. Green), Consuls such as Sir 
Herbert Phillips (Consul General in Shanghai 1937-40) or the Legation’s Commercial 
Councillor Louis Beale, the Judge of the British Supreme Court in Shanghai (Sir Peter 
Grain), merchants and Municipal Councillors such as W.J.N. Dyer (also R. Calder 
Marshall one-time Chairman of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce), 
missionaries, such as Frank Rawlinson, but also many others, providing a cross-section of 
treaty port society.91 However, some lodges were more fraternal than others, the Union 
Lodge Tientsin, for example, had a recognisably purely lower-middle class membership 
while others were more socially refined.92 
 Membership was frequently plural and Lodges would visit each other. R.M. 
Tinkler described one such visit of his Shanghai Lodge to the Doric Lodge, Chinkiang 
                                                          
86 Woodcock, British in the Far East, pp.185-90. Social exclusiveness was also guaranteed by the high cost 
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(Zhenjiang). For Tinkler Lodge membership represented social advancement, enabling 
him to join a better club and cement himself further into Shanghai; in 1923 he was acting 
secretary of the Lodge and in 1925-26 Master.93 A.H. Rasmussen’s climb from Customs 
Outdoorman to manager for Arnhold and Co. was accompanied by his enthusiastic 
masonry.94 Others were already masons and this would have made assimilation into 
treaty port society easier for them. 
                                                          
 
Women95 
 Whilst some British women did work in the treaty ports, for most of these the only 
work was secretarial. Others were teachers or nurses with the SMC and in private 
hospitals. In 1928 it was calculated that only 4 foreign women in Shanghai were of 
sufficient seniority to sign “per pro” for their companies.96 Women had begun working 
for British companies during the Great War, Swires employed their first in 1915, and 
there were twelve in 1917-18.97 The prospects for employment were felt to be worsening, 
especially as many daughters of treaty port families took secretarial and other jobs before 
marrying.98 Lower class women could be found running boarding houses or cafés whilst 
in 1934 there were two recorded British cabaret dancing partners in Shanghai’s 
International Settlement. It is probable that there were more, and that some British 
women were employed by the foreign brothels in the city’s Kiangse and Foochow 
roads.99 
 Stella Benson felt that British “Women are never apropos or relevant in China - 
they are never people - only ladies - a sort of social backwater.”100 She was right about 
93 Tinkler papers, letters to Edith, 27/11/21, 10/10/23, 16/12/25. He was not a mason before he went to 
China. 
94 Freemasonry in Northern China 1913-37, p.107, 207. 
95 Little has been written on British women’s’ experiences of life in China itself, Hong Kong excepted. 
Some material can be found in Cook, Lion and the Dragon, passim., and in memoirs such as Averil 
Mackenzie-Grieve, A Race of Green Ginger (London, 1959), and Bridge, Facts and Fictions. For the 
American experience see Jane Hunter, The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-
the-Century China (New Haven and London, 1984). 
96 NCH, 28/7/28, pp.149, 153. Stella Benson first went to Hong Kong as a teacher then as a secretary to 
Beijing, Grant, Stella Benson, p.148-52. 
97 C. Drage, Taikoo (London, 1970), pp.216, 225. Unlike Britain the women stayed on at work in the East, 
they were cheaper. In 1932 there were at least 24 of them, mostly single, working for Swires, Directory of 
China and Japan, 1932, passim.. 
98 NCH, 19/5/28, p.307, “A Dimming Paradise”. 
99 On the cabaret dancers see the report dated 9/3/34 in NARA SMP D5695. On foreign prostitution see 
Percy Finch, Shanghai and Beyond (New York, 1955), pp.34-49. There were 17 licensed foreign 
prostitutes in Hong Kong in 1930, Susanna Hoe, The Private Life of Old Hong Kong: Western Women in 
the British Colony, 1841-1941 (Hong Kong, 1991), pp.249-50. 
100 Benson Diaries, 21/2/30. It is hard to accept the applicability here of Janice Brownfoot’s claim that 
British women in Malaya - because of their different educational experience - were less infused with 
Imperial ideas than men. Nor were all the men there, or in Shanghai, “subject to a narrow, standardised 
public-school training” so that the women were therefore “more open-minded and adaptable... to the 
realities of the colonies”. Socialisation took place in China itself amongst the British communities and was 
a very effective finishing school. The women appear to have been no worse and no better than the men; J. 
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the circles in which she moved as a wife. For most middle-class women in the larger 
settlements there was no question of work nor was there any question of access to real 
power in their communities. There was, however, much to do. There was the Tientsin 
Women’s Club or the British Women’s Association in Shanghai which was one of a 
number of such national organisations catering for the “social backwater” with its 
needlecraft, social service, sports and arts, drama and music departments.101 Charitable 
and other such organisations were also numerous. There were drama societies, sport, the 
races, (and from 1928 the hugely popular greyhounds), the paper hunt, servants to 
supervise and mahjong to play. On a smaller scale these patterns were copied in the 
outports if numbers were sufficient. A “Ladies Committee” led by the Consul’s wife 
organised the Ningbo Empire Day Celebrations in 1928, as did the women of Hankou. 
Mostly however their relationships were more informal and centred on club life.102 
 Very little of this charitable and recreational work brought them into direct or 
more than token contact with the Chinese, nor was it intended to. Nor, it must be said, 
outside of more or less conservative Chinese society would it be expected. The Social 
Service Division of the BWA was “for the relief of needy British women stranded in this 
port” and during 1927-28 most charitable energies were directed at supporting the SDF 
troops.103 These sometimes absurdly overlapping clubs, associations and committees 
existed to provide something for the women to do as well as a mutual support structure. 
They were also expressive of the values and ideas which had brought the British to China 
in the first place. The BWA for example was to be a founder member of the pro-Japanese 
Shanghai British Residents Association.104 
 
Power 
 The larger communities were more oligarchic than autocratic, being controlled by 
the bigger China Houses and local notables. Gerontocratic might also be an apt 
description. Age signified power and promotion was still largely through dead mens’ 
shoes.105 In Shanghai British representation on the SMC was dominated by Jardines, 
Swires and other big businesses. Elections were avoided where possible through 
gentlemen’s agreements about who should and who should not stand, while voting was 
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103 NCH, 11/2/28, p.243. 
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rarely enthusiastic.106 The franchise was restricted to avoid the danger of a politicisation 
of the ballot and possible mobilisation of the “low white” vote.107 Despite this the 
conservatism of the British voters was to cause headaches for the oligarchs when they set 
themselves on a reformist course. 
 Other groups, clubs and associations were run by a limited number of notables 
who sat on committees and took turns to preside.108 Some of these organisations, such as 
the China Association, the British Chamber of Commerce, the China Committee and later 
the British Residents’ Association were possessed of some power or influence. Most of 
the posts so held were voluntary which makes this “musical chairs” more understandable 
but these positions signified social standing and were also expressive of the integrity of 
the British community as an entity separate from the wider community of Shanghai. The 
same applies on a smaller scale to the other communities. 
 
The Outports 
 This was the name given to the smaller communities; there were the settled ones 
such as Xiamen, Shantou, Fuzhou, Qingdao, Yantai, Zhenjiang, Jiujiang, Changsha, 
Hankou and Chongqing, and the smaller ones scattered through China along the railway 
and river networks. Some found the quietness and the opportunities for social status, sport 
and saving money very agreeable.109 Others found them claustrophobic and petty, full of 
what Hyam has called the “misery of Empire”.110 
 Many young businessmen of the larger companies on arrival in China first had to 
work in the “up country” distribution agencies. This included the sugar and insurance 
businesses of Butterfield and Swire, Oil for the APC and tobacco for BAT. The “up 
country” experience involved a great deal of rough living and functioned as a rite of 
passage in which they learnt the language and understood how to negotiate with Chinese. 
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It tested and taught them the basics of business. It also explains, partly, the marriage 
ban.111 
 They were usually based in large towns from which their tours of inspection of 
Chinese agencies were made.112 Philips of the APC was first based in Wuzhou, with three 
other secular foreigners (just enough for bridge) who were shunned by the missionary 
community, and then at Nanning, an equally lonely posting.113 Dobson, for BAT, worked 
firstly at Zhengzhou in 1936 with one colleague, a Belgian, a Scot and the inhabitants of a 
mission, then at Changsha with its 18 members of the Changsha Club.114 John Logan at 
Shijiazhuang in 1930 described the foreign community as containing himself, his superior 
(an eccentric, “gone-native” English bachelor) and 15 Frenchmen, each with his 
concubine.115 
 The loneliness of this period could not but have made young newcomers more 
than anxious to fit in when they graduated to the larger communities.116 Dobson admitted 
this - his early disdain for treaty port society was at first confirmed by British life in 
Hankou - but such disdain was replaced after his up country experiences with a great deal 
of affection.117 The process would also have thrown them as much onto themselves as 
onto the companies they worked for.118 Most expatriates working for foreign-based 
companies were also moved around the county frequently, thereby gaining them as much 
experience as possible. It also occurred as a result of promotion but was again useful for 
cementing their loyalty firmly towards the company itself and to the small and similarly 
peripatetic British communities in which they lived and through which they moved. For 
many missionaries too, based permanently “up-country”, this was an intensely lonely 
experience, especially, but not always, at the beginning. Confrontation with the novelty 
and unfamiliarity of place and language could never adequately be prepared for 
beforehand.119 
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 Other Britons, missionaries apart, whose jobs were static, became fiercely loyal 
to, and protective of, their own communities. The smaller sites had their recognizable 
“Pooh-Bahs” - U.J. Kelly in Zhenjiang, for example: “Secretary of the Doric Lodge, 
Chief of Police, Fire Dept., Public Works Dept., Waterworks, Sanitation, Secretary of the 
British Municipal Council and of all the Clubs”;120 Brian Power’s “Peebles” (probably 
Jardine’s E.C.P. Peters) in Tianjin was Chairman of the British Municipal Council and 
the General Chamber of Commerce, Lodge Master and President of the St Andrews 
Society.121 Swire’s Shantou manager Hance ruled the roost in that port as other long-time 
residents did in theirs. It was obviously quite tempting, even Stella Benson’s husband got 
“a sort of tyranny complex sometimes in China, he gets spoilt and his little authority in 
this kind of port goes to his head.”122 Consuls tended to fill this role in the smaller ports, 
although there was always an element of competition with the Customs Commissioner 
who, as a Chinese government official led the wider foreign community. 
 
Missions and Missionaries 
 Missionaries formed an identifiable sub-community which ultimately relied on 
their national status for protection, despite the stated policy of the CIM to forego it and of 
the Quakers to forgo the protection of force. Never the less the vulgar extraterritoriality of 
being European foreigners was as useful in relations with the Chinese as technical 
extraterritoriality. 
 They tended to live in small isolated groups, and occasionally alone, and stayed 
within these communities; their work required more long-term personal contact with a 
wider variety of Chinese people than that of the businessmen. Each society had its own 
district organisations in the areas it worked in and these held monthly, quarterly and 
annual meetings. “Itinerating”, or trekking out into the countryside either to 
unevangelised areas or to check on converted ones was the equivalent of the 
businessman’s “up-country” tour and no more comfortable. 
 Most businessmen paid public lip-service to the rightness of their enterprise but 
there was a great deal of hostility. Lord Inchcape caused a minor scandal by attacking 
missionaries at the 1926 annual general meeting of the Peninsular and Orient 
Company.123 Rodney Gilbert disliked the results of the influence, they were blamed for 
creating the anti-Imperialist movements through their educational and Westernizing 
efforts which were destroying traditional Chinese society.124 Evangelical Protestants from 
the United States were the main targets of this abuse, nationality playing an important 
                                                          
120 Tinkler Papers, letter to Edith, 16/12/25. 
121 “The Pooh-Bah of Tientsin”, E.J. Nathan to P.C. Young, 23/3/25, E.J. Nathan Papers; Brian Power, 
Ford of Heaven (London, 1984), pp.44, 72, 150. 
122 Drage, Taikoo, p.273; Benson Diaries, 7/4/30. 
123 The Times, 9/12/26, p.24, 10/12/26, p.15. 
124 Gilbert, What’s Wrong, pp.295-98. 
 22
role as well. This seems to have been a mantra learned reasonably early in a 
businessman’s career. “Very poor fish” wrote Philips, who elaborated later: 
“Unconvincing, jealous, bickering, bigoted, Pharisaical and, on the whole, unchristian.” 
R.M. Tinkler was quite splenetic about “petty, arrogant, local missionaries.”125 
 The teetotal, anti-smoking and pious rigidity of many protestant missionaries 
accounted for part of the social gulf. Philips announced that he and his fellow 
businessmen had been shunned by the local mission community. Miss J.M. Dixon 
resigned from the LMS in 1931 because of loneliness and the puritanical intolerance of 
colleagues who resented her independent attitudes and her golfing.126 
 The gulf was partly a matter of class. The claim that the LMS were “usually 
people who got jobs as office boys or clerks” in Britain was characteristic.127 
Missionaries were hardly free from this themselves. In 1929 the Rev. Taylor of the LMS 
was transferred away from China at the request of his colleagues, partly because of 
linguistic inabilities, but mostly because of failings cause by his “lack of early cultural 
environment”, a class bias against a working class man from Plaistow, East London, for 
whom “Living with colleagues of an entirely different stamp must have been mutually 
exceedingly difficult.”128 The class divide was also a question of money. Young 
businessmen were by no means paid well, although the rewards of promotion could be 
high, but missions could ill afford to pay their workers anything excessive. Because of 
this missionaries generally travelled second-class on trains and ships in and to China for 
reasons of economy and thereby segregated themselves from other foreigners. 
 The dislike could be mutual if equally as predictable and ritualistic. Sewell was 
shocked by the behaviour of the foreign community in Shanghai towards Chinese; 
Marjorie Clements records the drunkenness and abusiveness of American train 
passengers; T. Biggin feared for the morals of young police recruits going out to China 
for the first time. The Reverend Hope Moncrieff vividly complained about business life: 
“the amount of money wasted on gambling, wine, cigars, horse and dog racing, and social 
vice, would meet the salary of most missionaries two or three times over.”129 Of course it 
was not always hostility of the type caricatured by Somerset Maugham in his story God’s 
Truth. Bazalgette had quite a liking for the CIM workers whose old-fashioned, anti-
modernist aggressive fundamentalist approach to Chinese society suited many foreigners 
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who shared their dislike of that society. In 1928 Bazalgette found a kindred spirit in an 
ex-Shanghai Municipal Policeman turned CIM who put down “the trouble to the foreign 
education of Chinese.”130 Naval Chaplain W.F. Scott found a couple of CIM workers in 
Chongqing to his liking who were ready in late 1926 “to bear arms themselves if 
necessary” to protect their brethren. Scott claimed to be “utterly uncorrupted about 
Missionaries” but had come to think more of them after acquaintance in China.131 Roman 
Catholic missionaries also tended to be admired for similar reasons, notably their success 
and, by inference, their doctrinal confidence.132 Theirs was the “missionary muscularity” 
so approved of by the pro-Imperialists.133 
 Ultimately businessmen and others resorted to cliché. “We are all missionaries” 
declared Charles Addis at a London Missionary Conference in 1934 whilst O.M. Green 
lauded their “altruism”.134 In return the head of the China Inland Mission was keen to 
point out that “the fact of our being missionaries does not make us less loyal 
Englishmen”.135 
 
 
The Consequences of the Ghetto 
Isolation and Distrust  
 The institutions of British treaty port society had certain features in common, the 
most important being their racial and to a lesser extent national exclusivity.136 Chinese 
were barred from most clubs, most sports clubs, most Masonic Lodges and treaty port 
schools.137 (Most national clubs admitted other Europeans or Americans.)138 Concessions 
were made in the later 1920s; the Peking Jockey Club held separate meetings from the 
Chinese Nanyuan Club until 1928 but only the Hong Kong Jockey Club ever admitted 
Chinese members; whilst the Shanghai Paper Hunt Club had its first Chinese steward in 
1929 and, although still far from enthusiastic about Chinese riders, in 1930 conceded the 
necessity of making “a serious effort to get Chinese gentleman riders”, which was a 
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concession to gentlemen at least.139 There were the odd exceptions, Zhang Xueliang was 
allowed to join both the Hankow Recreation Club and the Peking Club, and ex-Emperor 
Puyi was granted membership of the Tianjin British Country Club as a “special Chinese”; 
the British usually capitulated to force or royalty.140 As most of these clubs formed the 
limits of British society’s experience it was not surprising that “one lived amongst one’s 
own kind.”141 In the main the other foreign communities also kept themselves separate to 
the Chinese, except professionally.142 Those national clubs which were more 
cosmopolitan, such as the Cèrcle Sportif Française, were widely disliked by Britons for 
their “mixed and dubious” company.143 
 The only Chinese met by Britons, as by most other foreigners in China, were 
rickshaw pullers, servants, compradores and staff, and sometimes interpreters.144 They 
were often “invisible”.145 Missionaries had greater and closer contact but in the 
recriminations that followed the mass exodus of 1927 it became clear that this was 
sometimes more form than substance.146 Captain Miner’s advice correctly indicated the 
true state of relations. Mixing was kept to formal occasions arranged by Compradores or 
Chinese managers.147 This was usually dinner for business contacts or seasonal 
celebrations providing a ritual acknowledgment of fraternal relations when it was quite 
likely, for example, that Stella Benson’s neighbour Humphreys would be “drunk all day 
with holiday-making Chinese in order to uphold the prestige of the APC” a practice that 
the company “definitely encourages.”148  
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 Few seem to have regretted this state of affairs despite calls at the time for greater 
social intercourse to facilitate good relations and trade. “I think I was kept too busy to 
worry about whether I was missing anything with the Chinese”, remembered one, but the 
evidence of Shanghai’s reputation for socialising usually contradicts this.149 A Union 
Club was formed in Shanghai in 1919 to provide Britons, Chinese and Americans with “a 
suitable centre where representative businessmen of China and the Occident might meet 
for friendly intercourse and discussion.” Membership was low and usage nominal and 
formal, prompting the Club to move to new premises in late 1928 in an attempt to 
encourage more casual use by members. An International Recreation Club had been 
formed in 1908 but the membership here seems disproportionate.150 
 Although only a few articulated the situation in this way at the time, the 
assumptions, structures - even the vocabulary of British India (tiffin, lakh, shroff, 
godown, coolie, bund, boy, chit) - were carted to China.151 Furthermore on the voyage 
out to China Britons would have passed through the Straits Settlements and Hong Ko
where Chinese formed a part of the formal imperial subject population, on arrival in 
Shanghai or Hankou they would have found Sikhs employed in the British controlled 
police forces as a visible colonial affectation. The effect on their perceptions of the nature 
of their relationship with the Chinese in China must have been tangible. The impression 
this must have made on the Chinese should also be noted. As one Swire employee put it: 
ng 
                                                          
 
I am rather ashamed of the boycotts we had rather. They arose very largely 
from the way we treated the Chinese. It was perfectly natural and perfectly 
understandable and I think a relic of India rather, which had spread to 
China. And they got a bit impatient.152 
 Exceptions to this segregation were often to be found in the marginal British 
groups - the Sephardi Jews, Eurasians, or the British poor or criminal. Eurasian A.W.H. 
Grant’s cabaret companions were mostly Chinese. S.M.P. Sergeant H.J. Connolly was 
dismissed from the force in 1931 after being charged, in collusion with four Chinese 
constables, with aiding and abetting a robbery. Shady boarding-house manager W.A. 
“Jerry” Morgan speculated in various business ventures with Chinese and Japanese 
friends.153 
 Language was a problem although the British had an advantage, as one Swire 
employee remembered: 
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In the main parts... every Chinese in the business world speaks English, perhaps 
not well enough for real interchange of ideas, but some do... in Chunking 
communication was restricted to just friendly noises about trade and trivia.154 
Inability to communicate meant that most formal occasions were a trial for both 
nationalities. These problems forced communication either to be undertaken in pidgin-
English, a language of domination between master and servant, which served as a vehicle 
for ridicule of the Chinese, or else to be reduced in English to these “friendly noises” 
between fellow businessmen. 
 Chinese still had to be learnt by young businessmen. It was not popular, and many 
Britons considered it a demeaning or deracinating exercise.155 Classes provided at various 
British Chamber of Commerce Language Schools were usually under-subscribed despite 
the financial incentives and exhortations of commercial bodies and trade reports.156 The 
standard practice of moving men around the country militated against their spending their 
time learning a dialect unintelligible elsewhere in China. Furthermore most companies 
expected staff to study outside office hours, but these were quite elastic in China and 
there were frequent complaints that men worked too hard to study fruitfully afterwards, or 
learn on the job. Six years after it was founded, the School of Oriental Studies still felt it 
was failing “to receive that encouragement from Business firms which the position of the 
School in the heart of the city might have led us to hope for.” In 1923/4 there were 32 
“commercial” students, in 1924/5 29 and in the following year only 14. Only in 1928 did 
the school feel that it was beginning to get reasonable support. In 1929 BAT sent 6 
students for an intensive 3 month course and in the year 1929/30 there were 100 part-time 
and occasional commercial students, the largest number in the inter-war years. 
Depression, followed by war put an end to this upward climb.157 It is doubtful if there 
was ever much improvement in this area. 
                                                          
 The refusal to mix was apparently reciprocated: 
 
At that time the only people who really one had very much to do with were 
the sort of lower order of clerks who were almost as unwilling to associate 
with you.158 
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Such remembered reciprocation may also be post-facto justification.159 The unwillingness 
was possibly related to the existing inbalance in relations and the unwillingness of 
Chinese to accept the self-ascribed higher status of British colleagues for, as one resident 
remarked, “Everybody liked the Chinese, provided they did what was expected of 
them.”160 
 The situation is acknowledged to have changed by and after the Second World 
War (“We got quite close to them, I think, between the Wars, We did know they existed 
anyway”161) and there were some exceptions made to Westernized Chinese although they 
were usually avoided because of that very Westernization. 
 Isolation and the inability and unwillingness to communicate fuelled distrust. This 
exacerbated the suspicious attitudes towards the Chinese which were taught by the 
models of Chinese characteristics. The limitation of contacts with the Chinese in general 
to the Chinese poor - who had a vested interest in dishonesty - was partly the source of 
the British obsession with Chinese dishonesty. Memoirs and recollections abound with 
tales of “squeeze” by household servants and corruption in public life and business.162 
 Chinese society in general, of course, was able to function quite autonomously of 
the small foreign communities it played host to. This lack of social intercourse applies 
largely to British and Chinese groups with mutual or shared business or other interests, 
who worked together or competed. In Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, in fact in all the treaty 
ports, courtesy and pragmatism suggested that closer relations were a necessity. As 
chapters four and five will show, the events of the years 1925 to 1927 and the assumption 
of power by the Guomindang exposed this need even more forcefully. 
 
Communal Loyalty and Communal Power 
 There were other expressions of communal loyalty. The formal requirement of 
British subjects to register annually with the British Consul became a ritual of accession 
to the community.163 The relationship between the British and their consuls could at 
times be “rather like undergraduates and Proctors at Oxford. It was amazing how they 
stood up for it.”164 Protection could be withdrawn and unregistered subjects, who were 
not entitled to Consular Protection, were deemed to be “unrecognized”. 
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 Consuls took a wider lead in the communities too, there were Honorary 
Presidencies of the British Chambers of Commerce,165 whilst Sir Sydney Barton in 
Shanghai was President of the Boy Scouts Association (Shanghai Branch) and the 
Shanghai Horticultural Society, among others. There were national celebrations to preside 
over and troops to review. 
 British patriotism in China, as in most expatriate colonies, was rather exaggerated: 
 
After the Parade foreigners and everyone adjourned to the Consulate 
where we drank the King’s Health after the Consul had made an excellent 
Imperialistic speech, this part of the programme finished off by singing 
God Save the King - a thing one would look on as somewhat theatrical if 
done at Home, but then an Englishman has got to go abroad before he 
realises what the King stands for and means to him personally.166 
The annual King’s birthday celebrations in Shanghai were an impressive display of 
national sentiment and military force as was the case for the other large foreign 
communities on their national days.167 In 1928 3,000 troops and SVC members paraded, 
a 21 Gun Salute was fired, every 7 shots being interrupted by a rifle fusillade from the 
SVC and the singing of a verse of the National Anthem.168 Such rituals were conducte
on Armistice Sunday (some companies had their own ceremonies
d 
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169), St George’s 
(Patrick’s, Andrew’s and David’s) Day and usually involved Cenotaph Ceremonie
Church Services, March Pasts, receptions, dinners and balls. Most of the communitie
had a cenotaph, or at least a war memorial.170 Empire day was also celebrated, although
this was usually, but not uniquely, aimed at the children
 One memoir of Tianjin revolves around parades and march pasts.172 The marching 
through the settlement of army units as they left or arrived at Shanghai and Tianjin 
became a regular feature of life there, especially, but not only, during times of crisis.173 
The Volunteer forces were prominent in these public displays. The annual inspection and 
the annual Church Parade of the SVC in Shanghai involved route marches through the 
165 In fact the Legation and the Consular Establishments had been instrumental in setting these up during 
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Settlement whilst Corps members were usually given ostentatious funerals with full 
military honours. The Police Specials also did their share of marching.174 
 These were public shows of British and communal confidence for the benefit both 
of the participants and surely also as a reminder to the Chinese in the settlement of where 
effective military power lay. In the charged atmosphere of May 1927 one naval 
commander paraded his troops in Jiujiang as a deliberate provocation.175 The spectacle of 
armed British merchants on the march could hardly have appeased those Chinese who 
doubted British protestations of fraternity and desires only for mutually beneficial 
trade.176 It also arguably contributed to the aggressive insularity of the British community 
itself and encouraged the “imperial tendency” and the strains of paramilitarism, which 
barely lay beneath the SVC and SMP uniforms, and the belief in seeking solutions though 
action, as opposed to diplomacy. For example, British civilians not under SVC control 
took an active part in the fighting that took place in Shanghai in the days after May 30th 
1925.177 This was also manifested in various short-lived “anti-Communist” organisations 
such as the Constitutional Defence League (1925-28), the Shanghai Fascisti (1927-28), 
whose immediate programme included the formation of units to help the SMC defend the 
Settlement, the anti-communist Entente (1928), and later by the BRA.178 More important 
expressions can be seen in more informal groupings179 and in the evidence of private 
attitudes.180 
 On Empire Day in 1928 at the Shanghai Club Sydney Barton declared that he 
hoped that “the spirit which animated our Empire had not been wholly absent from the 
representatives of the Empire’s people who lived here.” Empire was present in more than 
spirit, as Barton continued: 
 
In Shanghai, though outside the bounds of the Empire, we had concrete 
evidence of the privileges of citizenship in the Empire in the presence of 
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His Majesty’s naval and military forces, who had come from many corners 
of the Empire for the protection of this community.181 
Others were aware of an imperial role. Frederick Maze, Inspector-General of the 
Maritime Customs felt in 1930 that he was playing “a “lone hand” in what may be 
described as an “Outpost of Empire.” “The Flag at Chinkiang” was how the North China 
Herald chose to announce the reopening of the Consulate there in 1928, emotionally 
emphasising the patriotic and imperial element.182 
 
The Exclusion of Transgressors 
 This insularity led the British community to close ranks against perceived 
transgressors of its rules. “the community usually cured them, but if it didn’t it broke 
them”, remembered Gompertz, a Jardine’s employee.183 Sir Frederick Maze was the 
target of one particular communal exclusion during the struggle for control of the CMC. 
He was expelled from the Shanghai Bowling Club and later vilified in the press for 
swearing an oath of loyalty to the Guomindang and Sanminzhuyi.184 Another Customs 
official, Colonel Hayley-Bell, was “cut in the streets - in the clubs all turned their backs 
on him and his daughters” over his mishandling of the 1930 Tianjin customs dispute.185 
This was not specifically a British trait but the British made a greater virtue of national 
solidarity and prestige (especially in criminal cases) than other national groups in China 
professed to.186 This sensitivity led to individuals who were not in favour of “gunboat” 
policies to be accused of being “pro-Chinese”. The application of this term in particular 
was indicative of the community’s insularity and hostility to the Chinese community.187 
 
Communal Legends 
 The treaty port communities required, as all communities do, legends to bolster 
their technical legitimacy and define themselves. These legends were passed on to new 
arrivals as justifications, both of their presence in China and of their right to stay. 
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Principal among these was what can only be described as “mudflat-ism”, that is the 
common belief that the treaty ports and Concessions had been mud flats or marshes 
before the arrival of the Europeans. This was usually technically true but the implied and 
frequently explicit gloss was that the Europeans had been solely responsible for 
constructing the successful ports and industries, and usually this was felt to be more than 
just their providing safe and secure havens for the Chinese in which to trade.188 
 The Boxer rising provided another unifying legend, more grounded in reality and 
more important to the missionary community with its long professional interest in 
persecution and martyrdom. Many of the participants were still alive in the late 1920s. In 
1926 Drage was entertained at dinner by Hewlett’s account of the Legation Siege whilst 
one young banker was often told similar first-hand stories in 1929. The treaty port press 
kept memories active.189 For others nationalism was “boxerism” (heightened, fanatical, 
almost insane, mass anti-foreignism), especially when it was allied with anti-Christian 
movements. In early 1925 Simms recorded in his journal that: “The trouble at Shanghai 
gets worse every day... There are other serious things as well; such as anti-foreign risings 
in Hankow. It looks well as if there might be another Boxer rising.”190 The organisation 
of underground communist movements also struck some observers as being as secretive 
and fanatical as the Boxers were supposed to have been. This refusal or inability to see 
the political dimensions of events and the perception of them as archetypes meant that 
many Britons in China failed to understand the nature of events after 1925. A modernised 
version of the Boxer “outrages” may be seen in the reaction to, and the totemic use of, the 
Nanjing Incident in 1927.191 It also arose during the publicity generated by the Thorburn 
case: 
 
Are there any indications that these ancient people warped by centuries of 
custom and prejudice have in less than a generation changed their hearts, 
have they become more civilised or milder in their disposition? 
asked the proposer of a motion at a public meeting of British residents in Tianjin which 
was called to censure the Legation for inactivity over the matter.192 
 Within the British communities there were other unifying legends. Curiously 
enough the Britons lionized in China were not the Jardines, Dents, Keswicks or Swires, 
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whose activities had established the British in China, but the imperialists such as General 
Gordon (after whom the headquarters of the Tientsin British Municipal Council was 
named), Sir Harry Parkes and Robert Hart, both of whose statues stood on the Shanghai 
Bund. These business communities then saw their forebears then not as men of trade but 
as men of war and Empire, not as men who cooperated with the Chinese but as men who 
fought them, advised them, saved them and organized them in such a way as benefited the 
foreign powers. Key events in this history were the “Battle of the Muddy Flats”, which 
marked the foundation of the SVC, and the Boxer battles.193 The Wanxian Incident, for 
example, was immediately portrayed by the treaty port press as a British military victory 
solidly within this tradition of imperial military history.194 These beliefs had practical 
consequences. They provided rationales for attacks on British government policy and the 
activities of British officials in China.195 The British Empire’s heroic myths were in fact 
“primarily military” and these local variants emphasized the imperial nature, and by 
implication importance, of the British presence in China.196 
 These historical, and instantly-historical, legends were reinforced by histories of 
the foreign presence written by treaty port residents and by fictions such as those by 
Bennett, Graham, Hobart and Lenox Simpson. When, for example, the editor of the 
Peking and Tientsin Times was evacuated from occupied China in 1942 he spent the 
voyage writing “a book about the historic role, and the final passing, of the treaty ports, in 
the form of a historical novel.”197 
 The myth of quick money and easy living in China was still strong. Certainly a lot 
of fortunes were made in China and the obituarists and leader writers on the North China 
Daily News  never let people forget this. “Rags to riches” stories were the stuff of the 
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legends by which the foreign community characterized itself.198 This was also mixed up 
with the advantages of outport living and the sense of isolation and racial threats. For 
Tinkler, Zhenjiang in 1925 was: 
 
(like Foochow) a glimpse of the “good old China” of the earlier White 
men, when lavish... hospitality was the keynote of everything. In olden 
days in ports like this the foreigner did very little work... made money 
easily and spent it easily.199 
This had a diminishing basis in reality, (there were 85 unemployed Britons searching for 
work in August 1932) but it influenced the behaviour and motivations of ordinary 
people.200 
 Modern legends continued to be made: it was claimed that the Foreign Office had 
betrayed the treaty port British, especially over the seizure of Hankou; mission 
educationalists had “bolshevised” China’s students; the Nanjing incident was described as 
a planned Nationalist trial for the attack on Shanghai, lurid rumours of the mass-rape of 
European women circulated. These legends had the function of uniting the community 
against hostile outsiders, or those it felt endangered it: Whitehall, foreign liberals, the 
Guomindang, and especially against the Chinese in general. They also represented a 
convenient simplification of recent political history for new arrivals to learn. It is clear 
that they did so.201 
 
Communal Protection 
 As we have seen from earlier sections the British in China had every intention of 
staying British. Theirs was not migration requiring assimilation but expatriate trading. 
Their children were educated to be British, not cosmopolitan. Butterfield and Swire’s 
London managers threatened, for example, to withdraw funding from the British School 
in Hankou if it was at all American influenced.202 Children were either sent “home” for 
their education or to schools in the treaty ports, some of which, such as the Cathedral 
Schools for Boys and Girls in Shanghai, barred non-British children. At Gordon School 
in Tianjin Brian Power remembered that “the walls were hung with pictures of English 
scenes” and portraits of the King and Queen. The aim of the school was to give its pupils 
knowledge of the “British way of life.” There was a recognised absence of education 
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about their host country in British schools in China, and of the Chinese and their 
languages, so little in fact that one critic saw the lack as a source of “race” antipathy.203 
The CIM’s Chefoo School also did not teach the Chinese language, nor did it encourage 
its pupils to maintain the Chinese most of them spoke upon arrival at the school.204  
 Empire day was celebrated with sports and Scout parades. The Scouts held an 
annual camp in Shanghai and had been made use of during the crisis of early 1927 in 
Shanghai. The Boys Cathedral School had an Officer Training Corps which sometimes 
marched with the SVC. The annual round of ceremonies, celebratory days and marches 
was important for the children too. These were the socialising methods common in 
Britain and more important in China if children were going to maintain, or acquire, a 
British identity. So important were they that Power remembered being taught nothing 
about China at school.205 
 
Censorship 
 Censorship, especially in Shanghai, was another important factor in both 
protecting the solidarity of the foreign community and “white” prestige where it was 
possible. Cinema censorship was introduced in the International Concession in October 
Shanghai in 1927. This was, initially, partly to prevent outbursts of violent national 
chauvinism directed against films felt to be anti-French or anti-Italian.206 More 
importantly censorship policy was constructed with the Chinese in mind and was felt to 
correspond in general to that of Hong Kong. There, films discrediting “white” women or 
else “showing the white man in a degrading or villainous light”, portraying mixed-race 
marriage, conflict between the Chinese and “the white man”, and bolshevist or mob 
violence were banned.207 
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 A similar set of priorities in Shanghai governed censorship of books and 
photographs. “Indecent” publications, especially those featuring European women, 
communist, and later anti-Japanese material, were the targets of the efforts of the SMP’s 
Special Branch S.5..208 These activities were directed against English-language material 
as well, mirroring the targets of censorship in Britain itself. It is clear, however, that the 
greater worry was the Chinese market, especially salacious works portraying 
Europeans.209 
 
At Home 
 At the other end of their lives, and on the other side of the world, the China 
British kept their sense of identity and loyalty. A hundredth anniversary dinner of the 
SVC was later held in Hong Kong in 1954 whilst an annual dinner for Shanghai-born 
British is still held. Memoir writing seems to have been an addictive and self-important 
habit, perhaps to counter the fact that, as some complained, nobody was really interested 
in China.210 Given the quality of most of the memoirs, usually bland and eulogistic, this 
is not surprising. The Thatched House Club in London was informally their Club, 
especially on Wednesdays, and there, and through the China Association and other 
groups, many of them kept up active interests in their old communities. G.E. Hubbard, 
political agent of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and his wife, for example, hosted an 
annual dinner in London for “Peking folk”.211 In 1928 a committee of four ex-Councillor
was formed in Britain to combat and correct adverse press reports about treaty port China 
and especially
s 
 Shanghai.212 
 The importance of Britishness in China comes across forcefully in memoirs and 
transcripts through the very absence of the Chinese. The names of servants and 
compradores were, unless idealised, forgotten. Such dehumanising designations as “boy”, 
“amah” and “coolie” aided this.213 Political events in China were also forgotten whereas 
                                                          
208 “Special Branch Reorganisation Circular No.4: Duties of Special Branch No.5”, 23/6/30, NARA SMP 
D8/7. For an example of their work see the file concerned with action taken against the public display of 
German advertising photographs of nude women in 1934, “Action taken regarding photographs of Nude 
Women Exhibited Locally”, 10/4/34, NARA SMP D5402. 
209 For the foreign material that interested them see “Radical and indecent books on sale in Settlement 
bookstores”, 11/3/31, NARA SMP D1964/1; by 1940 D.H. Lawrence was particular target and James 
Joyce’s Ulysses was deemed “unfit for public sale, “Modern Book Co. Fall Catalogue 1940,” 4/9/40, 
NARA SMP file N374. For the type of Chinese material that interested them see, for example, the story of 
a foreigner’s visit to a “guide agency” in the mosquito paper Danxing huabao, in NARA SMP N1366 or 
the extracts from the novel “The Door of Soul and Flesh” in NARA SMP D2344. 
210 ST - 4, pp.12, 19; ST - 16, p.40. 
211 NCH, 6/10/28, p.23. As the depression hit home in Britain the Thatched House Club advertised 100 free 
admissions through the letters page of the North China Daily News, NCH, 5/4/31, p.30; W.J. Oudendyk, 
Ways and By ways in Diplomacy (London, 1939), p.24. 
212 NCH, 25/2/28, p.294; 9/6/28, p.396. 
213 ST - 18, p.16; ST - 3, p.7; ST - 6, pp.9, 33. 
 36
details of shooting, partying, practical jokes and other aspects of British communal life 
abound.214 
 
Class Taboos 
 As in Britain class-awareness was accepted and acceptable if publicly impolite.215 
Being mostly businessmen and without a governing civil service to snub them as in the 
Empire there was a degree of meritocracy.216 There was an obvious and observed 
hierarchy amongst the foreign community. This was an amalgam of class and race bias, in 
Shanghai: “the truly international area known as Hongkew, [was] considered very low on 
the social scale”.217 In the nineteenth century consular registration fees were fixed at two 
levels, one for “gentlemen” and one for “artisans” (poorer Indians paid a lower rate after 
1908).218 
 A.H. Rasmussen wrote of “a reality that none could escape” and later found it 
“hard to conceive of a bigger change than that of an outdoor staff man in the Customs 
suddenly finding himself in the merchant class.” C.E. Temlett remembered being cut dead 
in mid-dance when his partner learnt that he was a Customs outdoorman (“the dead end 
boys”). The membership roll of the Tientsin Union Lodge makes it quite clear that this 
was a lodge for the petit-bourgeois, army NCO’s and suchlike. This was quite usual, there 
were two clubs in Zhenjiang earlier in the century, one for the outdoor Customs staff and 
one for the Consul, the Indoor staff and the merchants. The Shanghai Club was the elite 
club. The Shanghai Light Horse was the elite unit of the SVC which in had a membership 
application procedure akin to a social club.219 
 The social status of a British businessman in China was probably greater in China 
than it would have been at home. Theirs was a middle and upper-middle class community 
with that imperial aspect to its work that made it feel that business was socially 
acceptable. Some were not convinced, Stella Benson considered them “converted 
kitchenmaids and promoted commercial travellers” whilst the Navy never seems to have 
been happy with them in general terms.220 The prospect of committing himself to a career 
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in China surrounded by men he considered socially inferior caused Graham Greene to 
resign from BAT shortly before he was due to sail East.221 
 The tenuousness of this social status - especially among lower-middle class 
Britons in regard to the Chinese - was seen by some as a cause of the perceptibly high 
level of racist aggression: “they take it out of the Chinese so as to make themselves feel 
big” claimed William Sewell. As he admitted, most of the Chinese that the British 
community came into contact with were lower class - servants, clerks, rickshaw men and 
coolies.222 Those that were met at business or official functions - Compradores, 
merchants - were rarely socialised with. Class prejudice was used to articulate race 
prejudice - all Chinese were socially inferior. 
 
Sexual Taboos 
Sex 
 The sexual taboo, as has been shown, was an important and conspicuous theme in 
fiction about China. It is difficult to know whether the taboo was more honoured in the 
breach than in the observance, but it was certainly honoured in the public and institutional 
observance; certainly when it came to marriage. Abroad has always been associated with 
sexual opportunity, and certainly not just by the British. Frequently this was for the banal 
reason that it was through going abroad that many young Britons left the security and 
restraining influence of family and home society for the first time. The ban on marriages 
in most companies on the first term’s service should not be forgotten either.223 Abroad 
was also associated with eroticism and pornography, especially in popular fictions. 
Chinese settings and Chinese women, as was shown in chapter 2, were often the subject 
of such portrayals. 
 Although still largely bachelor societies the treaty ports, unlike during the earlier 
stage of the British presence,224 contained enough wives, daughters, single working 
women, White Russian, Eurasian and European prostitutes and vulnerable (or artful) 
passport-less women to make stable sexual relationships with Chinese as much 
“unnecessary” as taboo. This at least was the public view. “Most of us preferred Shanghai 
because the girls were white”225 recalled a sailor, although that still leaves a minority 
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who “tasted some of the fruits.”226 Adultery seems to have been fairly common in the 
larger communities as well if the impressionistic evidence of court reports and the disgu
of some visitors is to be believed.
st 
27 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2
 Male sexual exploitation, then as now, was a feature of expatriate life. The social 
and peer-pressure barrier against mixed marriage even with Eurasians was “a complete 
alibi if you found yourself getting into trouble;”228 as one company director put it, “there 
was no need to.”229 The letters of R.M. Tinkler relate the opportunities to exploit Russian 
women which he enjoyed and by which he maintained his “self-respect” and avoided 
Asian women.230 His dislike of “Asians” was unusual, Japanese mistresses were very 
common in colonial society in Malaya and Burma and Japanese prostitutes much in 
demand.231 
 Chinese women were still largely perceived as being generically ugly,232 although 
this is difficult to equate with the developing screen image of actresses such as Anna May 
Wong.233 It seems to be a cliché that did not always survive real meetings although one 
commentator was apt to believe that any prettiness among Chinese women was due to 
their having some “white blood.”234 Harold Acton’s aesthetic pursuit led him to prefer 
Chinese “beauty and indifference” to the charms of the Russians, his candidness and his 
choice were singular, if ambiguous.235 Victor Purcell was unusual in admitting to having 
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 39
set up a Chinese mistress in Guangzhou in 1921/2. A desire for a “sleeping dictionary” 
and “a bourgeois hankering after a regular establishment in place of brief encounters” 
were given as the reasons. While Britons often lived with Russians, it “was fairly 
common... and the Japanese seemed to be quite popular”, few lived with Chinese. 
(American servicemen mostly switched to Russian mistresses after the White influx from 
the Chinese women they knew as “pigs”.)236 
 
Marriage 
 To strengthen further its national and racial solidarity British society in China 
maintained a policy of colour-determined endogamy for middle class men. There were 
mixed marriages but pressure was exerted by relatives, colleagues and superiors to make 
sure that young businessmen and consuls did not get involved with Chinese, Eurasians or 
Russians.237 If they did their “services were normally dispensed with immediately” by 
companies such as Swires, Jardines, Standard Oil and the APC.238 The element of 
paternal protection had three purposes: subordinating the individual to his company, 
protecting him in the expatriate society he had chosen to live in and protecting that 
society from convention-breakers.239 
 The marriages that did take place seem to have done so outside China between 
overseas Chinese students and local women. Conservative Chinese families were not in 
favour of such unions either. Liu Rongsheng (O.S. Lieu) a Shanghai businessman who 
was active mover in the reconciliation of foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai wrote more 
than once to three of hs sons studying in Cambridge to warn them against such unions.  
Indeed, at their farewell party they had been publically cuationed against them.240  British 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese Writer whilst Lady Lytton was taken to see an opium “den”, P.D. Coates, “Documents in Chinese 
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A Social Survey (London, 1921), p.247. 
236 V. Purcell, Memoirs of a Malayan Official (London, 1969), pp.129-33; ST - 1, p.45; Noble, Eagle and 
the Dragon, p.129. Homosexuality is less well-documented although it seems that the foreign community 
in Beijing had a not wholly unfounded homosexual reputation. It was, after all, the city where Backhouse 
hid out his last years and composed his pornographic fantasies; Fitzgerald, Why China?, p.152; Oriental 
Affairs, July 1937, p.167; Trevor-Roper, Hermit of Peking, pp.291-334. 
237 Cook, Lion and the Dragon, p.27; F.H.H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, Volume three: The Hongkong Bank between the Wars and the Bank Interned, 1919-1945: 
Return from Granduer (Cambridge, 1988), pp.285-89; “Foreign, native, half-caste, are definitely taboo” 
wrote the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s Chief Manager in 1937, this ban was maintained until 1941 as 
far as Chinese were concerned, ibid., pp.286, 288. 
238 ST - 19, p.6. 
239 This was not a purely British phenomenon, see, for example the testimony of American George E. 
Sokolsky, “My Mixed Marriage”, Atlantic Magazine, August 1933, pp.137-46. 
240 All three sons quite agreed, and the warnings were unnnecessary, Liu Rongsheng to his sons, 18/8/33, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Business History Resource Centre, Liu Rongsheng 
archives, 14-014. 
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society was more liberal in this matter.241 Lt. Hilken’s letters from the China Station to 
his sister studying in Vancouver are full of attempts to persuade her not to marry “Tong, 
or any other chink!” Whilst conceding Tong’s probable worth and intelligence he stated 
that: 
 
you would find the situation here very embarrassing if you came here 
[Hong Kong] together. Except in business, and on official occasions the 
two races do not mix at all.242 
Hilken’s point is valid - mixed marriages would have necessitated a greater amount of 
mixed socialising than the demands of British self-ascription accepted on any except 
formal occasions. A further problem could arise in the differences in Chinese and British 
marriage customs but was probably feared more as a result of sensationalist fictional 
perceptions than objective ones. It was commonly assumed that a Westernised Chinese 
husband would “revert to type” in China (usually involving the taking of concubines) and 
treaty port opinion always had examples of this to present to unbelievers, quite apart from 
the lessons to be learnt from fictions on the subject.243  
 British women who intended to travel to China to marry Chinese men were 
interviewed by the Far East Department of the Foreign Office in an endeavour “to 
persuade [them] to give up the idea of such a marriage”. An official leaflet pointed out 
that the consequent loss of British nationality meant that British law could not “protect 
[them] in China from a treatment which does not conform with the rules applicable in 
Christian countries in regard to marriage”.244 
 Unorthodox unions were “letting the side down”. Of those who married Russians 
one woman remarked that “they were not quite as good as they should be.”245 
Unsurprisingly, given their prominent denigration in fiction, Eurasians were widely 
disliked, both as the partners and as issue. A vulgar Social Darwinian prejudice against 
mixed-types is much in evidence; William Sewell’s fictional alter ego found himself 
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p.51. 
242 Hilken papers, letters to Kathleen Hilken, 21/1/30, 22/12/30, she was obviously hard to convince. 
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Westernization, education and therefore compatibility of the Chinese spouses, 5/5/28, p.229, “Mixed 
Marriages in China”. See also the case of a woman who had married a Chinese student in Britain but who 
had been largely abandoned and illtreated in China, Rev. W.R. Stobie to Mr Blunt, 23/9/30, FO670\224 2a. 
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from the Overseas Settlement Department (Women) at the Passport Office, E.S. Harris, minute, 4/9/35, on 
Cadogan to Foreign Office, No.1231, 31/7/35, T10589/10589/378, FO372/3139; “Marriages Abroad and in 
the United Kingdom”, ibid; the correspondence was prompted by the case of Miss Lillian May, who wished 
to visit her fiancé in Wusi and who was “suitably warned” beforehand but who had defied the efforts of the 
Nanjing Consul-General to locate her; she was eventually repatriated, unmarried, ibid., and “Repatriation of 
Miss Lillian May,” FO291/21/5 to Shanghai No.72, FO232/48/13T 1936. 
245 ST - 8, p.35 
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“repelled” by the idea of mixed marriages and the progeny who “should not have been”; 
Hauser described the women as “slightly simian half-castes.”246 
 A recurring theme in correspondence from men in China is fear of male Chinese 
sexual desire for “white” women. Prejudice against negro male sexuality is well 
documented and if sex is “at the very heart of racism” then it is so as a totemic assertion 
of power relations.247 Henri Champly’s apocalyptic writings, for example, were 
predicated on a sexual undermining of “white” racial superiority and purity through 
European prostitution in Shanghai.248 In general the fear was articulated, often 
salaciously, as rape-hysteria. To an audience at the American Women’s Club after the 
Nanjing incident in 1927 Lenox Simpson demanded that “adequate punishments and 
reprisals which would not be forgotten should be carried out” by the foreign powers in 
retaliation for attacks on foreign women.249 The rapes that supposedly accompanied the 
incident were constantly held up as a sure guide to normal Chinese sexual etiquette. 
Chinese men were excluded from close physical proximity with foreign women for this 
reason, for example in swimming clubs. The Shanghai Rowing Club refused to allow 
Chinese to join the club in 1930 as, it “provides facilities for mixed bathing to which the 
Chinese would not be welcome.”250 Chinese had been kept out of European brothels, 
until the advent of the Russians after 1917, and the Cabarets too.251 Drage records his 
unease at friendship between an American missionary woman and her Chinese landlo
in the following terms: “it will always seem queer to me to hear a coloured man call a 
white girl by her Christian name,” the sub-text is clearly sexual.
rd 
ns 
                                                          
252 Marjorie Clements 
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attitudes towards the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1968), pp.150-63, and Callaway, 
Gender, Culture and Empire, pp.237-40; Hyam, Empire and Sexuality, p.203. 
248 See his Road to Shanghai and White Women, Coloured Men, passim.. 
249 “When it came to trouble no self-respecting Naval Officer would leave a European woman to the tender 
mercies of these swine” wrote Commander Hamilton, Hamilton papers, Journal, 12/6/27. For Simpson see 
NCH, 14/5/27, p.290. 
250 By 1928 this ban no longer applied to the municipal pool in Shanghai, NCH, 7/7/28, p.19; Brenan to 
Lampson, 6/6/30, Shanghai No.150, FO228\4285\4 69z; An extension of this hysteria is suggested by the 
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fondle her”, CE, 22/9/28, p.393. 
251 Wei, Shanghai, p.142; Ch’en, China and the West, p.217; NCH, 6/10/28, p.36, “Shanghai Never 
Sleeps”. 
252 Drage papers, Diary 21/10/25. See also King, History, Volume three, pp.288-89. 
253 Marjorie Clements, Letter to Mrs May, 20/6/31, LMS China Personal Box 13. 
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William Sewell and others decried the effect of the portrayal of European women in 
Western films (“the antics of the bathing beauties of the West”) as corrosive and 
dangerous, both in print and in his lectures.254 The dress and dancing of European wo
in China also came in for such criticism.
men 
ean 
eties.256 
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Sex and Class 
 There was a class aspect to the sexual taboo. “They were a bit more funny about 
their office staffs, because they came into the social life of Hong Kong much more than 
we did” remembered one sailor of his employers.257 Chinese prostitutes were provided 
for the troops of the Shanghai Defence Force in 1927.258 Marriages with Russians did 
occur and, as in India, so did marriages between Eurasians and lower-class Britons.2
article in the North China Herald in 1928 mocked this: “I hain’t no Don John, but I just 
been a’lookin’ around here a month or so and already I can sign on the dotted line with a 
Princess no less” an army Private is quoted as saying.260 In passport-hungry Shanghai the 
motive could also certainly be mercenary.261 This class divide was certainly present in the 
US armed forces whose officers would have ruined their careers but many of whose 
enlisted men did marry Chinese, at least before the Russian influx.262 
 
254 W.G. Sewell, Land and Life of China (London, 1933), p.130; Engagement Diary, “Talk to Bridlington 
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Balance (London, 1928), pp.190-91; O.W. Philips “Memoir”, Unpublished, [1961-2], p.217, IWM 
PP/MCR/153; “Nude Models and Public Morals”, China Critic, 31/7/30, pp.724-25. 
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18/2/28, p.300; CET 26/1/28, p.55; “No.3 British General Hospital 1927 Jan-July, War Diary,” WO191/43 
[SDF]. 
259 Allen, Plain Tales, p.159. Of 249 marriages registered at the British Consulate General in Tianjin 
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the British husbands were Customs Officers, servicemen or else were employed in other lower-class or 
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out of 150 registrations between 1917 and 1936, FO666\18-20 passim.. 
260 NCH, 17/11/28, p.266, “The Princesses of Shanghai: What the Welch Regiment are Afraid of Missing”. 
261261 Cook, Lion and the Dragon, p.26. See the marriage “contract” between A.V. Millar, a White 
Russian, and E.T. Maitland, a Briton, preserved in NARA SMP D7508. It cost her $2,500 Shanghai 
currency, and the expenses incurred, and was to be a purely nominal arrangement. 
262 Noble, Eagle and the Dragon, pp.129-30. 
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Sex in the Outports 
 Social and sexual isolation were compounded in the outports. Stella Benson 
described the Nanning foreign community in 1929 as “9 missionaries, 3 unregenerates”. 
Of the unregenerates, the Customs outdoorman was ill with syphilis contracted from a 
Chinese prostitute while twenty three year old Humphreys of the APC was “rather 
obsessed by his physical loneliness” and pinned his hopes on the local missionary girls. 
Fear of syphilis kept him away from the local prostitutes.263 Previous occupants of the 
Nanning APC post had included one suicide, two alcoholics, one murder victim and one 
man who did take a Chinese mistress; another “Mercifully for him was married just 
before he arrived here and left within four months.”264 
 Even missionaries suffered. Marjorie Clements admitted sexual and emotional 
frustration and anger at the Victorian proprieties of a widower colleague which denied 
her even the most respectable companionship. Methodist Dr. Hadden’s “platonic 
friendships” were too much for his scandalised colleagues who refused to let him return 
to China without his wife.265 
 Other nationals were more open about sexual matters - such as Logan’s fifteen 
French engineers, each with his concubine - but if Nanning is at all representative then it 
would appear that the British were just quieter about things, in the light of greater social 
taboos.266 Furthermore, whilst there must have been more sexual connoisseurs along the 
lines of Havelock Ellis’ “G.R.” it would appear that most sexual relations with Chinese 
women would be matters of contingency and necessity. Stella Benson’s husband wrote to 
her from Manchuria when she was wintering elsewhere that: 
 
You know that continence is a sore to me at anytime. And for 6 months at 
a stretch in this place, where one sits all day indoors in stuffy rooms, 
listening to the wind blowing outside, it really is awful.267 
Restrictions on marriage and the shortage of eligible women were the major cause of the 
situation and marriage was seen as the solution. This was so especially for those such as 
Charles Addis whose religious qualms about fornication eventually got the better of their 
libidos.268 
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Socialisation and Imperial Distance 
 The British poor in China were once described as a “disgrace to our race”.269 The 
difference between racial and imperial prestige was not always apparent. Usually the one 
was a synonym for the other. The sexual and social taboos helped maintain the important 
distancing of the rulers (in this case the informal rulers) from their (informal) subjects. 
Close contact with the Chinese was felt by some to be corrupting of British character, and 
not just for those whose interest in the language and customs got the better of them. The 
theatre of official and municipal life was about maintaining prestige and visible power on 
the streets. The public parades of the SVC and foreign defence forces and the use of Sikh 
policemen was an expression of this as was the continued gunboat presence. 
Extraterritoriality was not going to be surrendered in any de facto way before any 
concessions were made de jure. Some felt that this surrender was already the case outside 
the concessions, but defiance remained one of the articles of faith of the die-hard. 
 “White” prestige in China was felt to have been irrevocably damaged by three 
events, firstly the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, secondly the Chinese declaration of 
war on the Germany in 1917 and the ending of German extraterritoriality;270 and thirdly 
the White Russian refugee influx. Countless tales were told about the glee with which the 
Chinese maltreated White Russians, the Tianjin British Municipal Council’s propaganda 
bureau making a speciality of these stories.271 
 Anti-Communism was a force strong enough to overcome racial scruples but it 
was usually accompanied by some qualms. Hamilton described the Russians of Hankou 
being rounded up in an anti-communist purge in that city, seeing men, women and 
children “roped and chained together and marched through the freezing streets in their 
night attire - a dangerous precedent to my mind although they were communists.”272 The 
shooting of the Soviet consular staff in Guangzhou after the failed communist uprising 
there in 1927 occasioned similar mixed feelings mixed with delight at the chance given to 
get hold of the Consulate’s documents.273 
 
Virulence in extremis 
 The cumulative result of this distrust and segregation can be glimpsed in the 
extreme ways in which Britons in China reacted as a community and as individuals to 
                                                          
269269 NCH, 25/2/28, p.312. 
270 Hamilton papers, Journal, 28/1/28; Gilbert, What’s Wrong, pp.265-68. 
271 Ibid., pp.268-72; See, for example, the Bulletin of the Tientsin British Committee of Information, No.34, 
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occurrences such as the Nanjing incident and the Thorburn case, or personal attacks: that 
is, when the protection afforded by the community broke down.274 This was often 
articulated as a personal threat from all Chinese, who were blamed en masse for 
individual and often incidental cases of banditry and assault. Individual threats were 
swiftly re-articulated in generic terms which underlined the basic insecurity of the British 
in China and their suspicion of all Chinese. All Chinese were held accountable, and 
punishable, for the actions of individuals. The parallels with fictional treatments of 
“yellow perils” and vindictive mandarins are tangible. 
 After being attacked in Nanjing in 1930 one British woman’s “hatred of the 
Chinese [was] unbounded”. Her “inability to get on with or to keep her servants” was 
well known to the Consul-General and, after twenty years in China, she spoke no 
Chinese.275 After Bertram Lenox Simpson’s murder it was written of his widow that “the 
sooner she gets far away from this country and its natives the better it will be for her 
health.”276 R.M. Tinkler wanted to “have a go at these yellow Chinese swine” in 1921 
and in the immediate aftermath of May 30th 1925, while “longing for an opportunity to 
kill a bunch,” had to make do with ill-treating those arrested.277 
                                                          
 These are extreme cases but they are not exceptional and show a consistent 
pattern of reactions related to the propensity for violence towards Chinese and failure to 
perceive them as individuals. This insecurity was articulated as furious hostility. It was 
often fuelled by impotence: only rarely were the perpetrators of crimes brought to 
account, Chinese authorities were often felt to be ineffective and even obstructive in such 
cases, and the British establishment no longer wielded the big stick to encourage the 
Chinese. When J.M. Philips was killed by bandits in 1926 three British gunboats were 
rushed to the spot. When John Thorburn went missing in 1931 a lone vice-consul went to 
trace his steps.278 
 
Conclusion - Thinking of Lucknow 
 As a result of its social and professional structures and images of itself and the 
Chinese, and because of the reasons which led people to go there, British society in China 
was imperialist and profoundly insular and inward looking. Only missionaries or those 
with a penchant for adventure or the exotic attempted to establish themselves outside 
274 See, for example, the hysteria generated by the attempted sexual assault of a young American child at 
Guling by a Chinese policeman, NCH, 21/7/28, pp.141, 143, 28/7/28, p.187, 4/8/28, pp.187, 194. 
275 “Interview between Mr Clarke and Mrs Hearne on 25/9/30”, Minister’s Tour Series No.287, 27/9/30, 
FO228\4185\22 20s; Ingram to Legation, No.59, 13/8/30, FO228\4185\14 20s. 
276 G.A. Mossop to G.A. Herbert, 10/3/31, FO678\2024. 
277 Tinkler papers, letter to Aunt Florence, 9/7/21, letters to Edith, 26/6/25, 27/7/25. 
278 NCH, 26/6/26, p.579; CYB 1931-32, pp.268-69. The exception was in the case of piracy, but the Royal 
Navy’s firm response to the Shuntien piracy in 1934, which involved the outright violation of Chinese 
territorial integrity, marked the end of the era of effective gunboat diplomacy, S.L. Endicott, Diplomacy 
and Enterprise: British China Policy 1933-37 (Manchester, 1975), pp.11-12. 
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their own expatriate society. It was a pseudo-colonial society in character, without the 
outward responsibilities and tact of a colonial ruling class toward the ruled, as shown 
perhaps in the fact that only the Hong Kong Jockey Club ever admitted Chinese 
members. Individual behaviour towards the Chinese could certainly be aggressive and 
insulting but these were cases of minority behaviour. Mass behaviour towards China such 
as the parading of the SVC and the slow time it took to allow Chinese representation on 
the SMC showed an indifference to the wider realities and sensibilities of Chinese politics 
and society, and the initial ratepayers’ vote against extending that SMC representation in 
1930 also showed a hostility towards the treaty port oligarchs. Usually hostility to the 
Chinese took more subtle and less violent forms and was a direct product of the 
socialisation of new members into the treaty port society, and the demands made on them 
which militated against any other than superficial or voyeuristic relationships with China 
and the Chinese.279 
 The attitudes towards the Chinese prevalent in metropolitan culture and learnt 
through the processes of treaty port socialisation and reinforced by the structure of treaty 
port society militated against Britons adopting anything but a hostile attitude towards the 
diplomatic concessions necessitated by the victory of the Guomindang. The privileges 
and indeed the livelihoods of the majority of treaty port Britons were felt to depend on the 
perpetuation of the relationship with the Chinese founded on this imperial structure. “One 
thought instinctively of Lucknow” wrote the Reverend Scott when he saw the Chongqing 
APC installation surrounded by Chinese troops and flying the Fag in 1926.280  The 
following three chapters will show how far attitudes were articulated within the various 
sectors of treaty port society, and how intrusive they were in relations between Chinese 
and Britons. Then they will show how attempts were made by various official and private 
individuals to stop people instinctively thinking of Lucknow and Empire, and to make 
them think of China, the Chinese nationalist present and the future. 
 
 
279 “In Lampson’s day one student interpreter was rebuked for spending too much time exploring Peking 
and not enough time at the Club or on the Hockey pitch”, Coates, China Consuls, p.449. When stationed in 
Shanghai one Swire employee only once went to the Chinese city and did so on “a sightseeing trip”, ST - 
22, p.9 
280 Scott papers, Letter to his sisters, 23/10/26. Scott was not alone in using the Lucknow simile; Louise 
Jordan Miln’s authorial voice described the situation in Shanghai in January 1927 in a similar way: “There 
were Englishmen in Shanghai who thought of Lucknow: a few who said among themselves, but 
particularly careful not to be overheard saying it, that before long our position in the Settlement might be 
essentially a one of siege as ever Lucknow had been. And where was our Residency here? Lucknow’s had 
been a sorry refuge, and, God knows, a sad one. But it had been a refuge; its walls held. Where were our 
walls in Shanghai? Barbed wire!”, The Flutes of Shanghai (London, 1928), p.153. 
Chapter 4 
Chinese Characteristics and British Diplomats 
 
Introduction 
 The strength of the attitudes inculcated through treaty port socialisation has 
been shown in the previous two chapters, as have their pervasiveness and consistency.  
Although their precise articulation may have altered from time to time, they faced no 
major upset until the Nationalist Revolution.  After 1925 important changes in British 
government policy and treaty port activity became necessary.  This chapter will deal 
with the British establishment in China, and with the attempts of certain individuals 
within it, to foster change in the British treaty port community by reforming 
concession life.  These reforms were also to influence the personal behaviour of 
individual Britons by altering the structures within which their socialisation took 
place. 
  This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive diplomatic history of this 
period of Sino-British relations.1  That can best be studied in Fung, Diplomacy of 
Imperial Retreat and D.C. Wilson’s “Britain and the Kuomintang”.  It will, however, 
show how the general discourse of Chinese characteristics thoroughly permeated the 
attitudes of the British establishment.  It would, of course, be surprising if Britons 
who worked for the establishment did not bring to their jobs the attitudes taught by 
the culture of information in the metropole, and by treaty port socialisation, and 
interpreted and articulated their own experiences and work using the vocabulary of 
that discourse.  It is also not to be assumed that there was no awareness of the strength 
                                                          
1 That can best be studied in Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat and D.C. Wilson’s “Britain and the 
Kuomintang”. 
and implications for British behaviour of British attitudes.2 However, even with that 
qualification it is evident from both the quotidian and more theoretical files, that the 
discourse on China examined in chapter 2 was widely, if variably, accepted by British 
officials and influenced their work. 
 
Part I: The British Establishment in China 
 The British community in China was ultimately judged in China and abroad 
by the diplomacy of the British Government.  In China it was represented by a 
Legation (it was not upgraded to an embassy until 1935),3 the Consular service, 
armed forces in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, and the China Station ships on the 
Yangzi and Pearl rivers; there were the unofficial arms of diplomacy: the foreigne
who controlled the Chinese Maritime Customs, the Salt Gabelle, and Posts,
International Settlements and British Concessions, men with whom the British 
authorities had established close working relations.
rs 
 the 
                                                          
4 The Shanghai International 
2 See M.G. Fry’s conclusions in the context of a similar academic analysis, “In Pursuit of Lloyd 
George: International History and the Social Sciences”, B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss, eds., 
Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe 
(Edmonton, 1984), pp. 249-80. 
3 This was not a fact of great note. Britain only had 8 Embassies at the end of the Great War, but the 
upgrading does show a change in the perceived importance of the Government of China, and Britain’s 
need to deal with it directly, rather than, as before 1925, through the structures of informal empire. The 
lack of effective central authority between 1911 and 1927 was not the reason for China’s diplomatic 
status, although it was an excuse: there had only been a Legation under the centralised empire and it is 
arguable that centralisation after 1927 was so patchily accomplished as to discount Nanjing’s claims to 
national authority, D. Dilks “The British Foreign Office Between the Wars”, McKercher and Moss, 
Shadow and Substance, p. 183; R.E. Bedeski, State-Building in Modern China: The Kuomintang in the 
prewar period (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 48-49. 
4 Men such as Sir Francis Aglen, head of the Chinese Maritime Customs until 1927, his putative 
successor A.H.F. Edwardes, and, from 1913, the Foreign Chief Inspector of the Salt Gabelle. At lower 
levels E.W. Mead, for example, Foreign Secretary of the Chinese Government Salt Gabelle helped the 
British, Japanese and French ministers draft a statement about the future of that institution in 1928, 
when it was facing unilaterally instituted Nationalist reforms, whilst S.V. Mills, an official 
hydrographer for the Chinese Admiralty kept Naval Intelligence in Shanghai informed about 
Nationalist plans to survey the Yangzi, Aveling minute on “Draft Statement to be issued to Press by 
Jap. , French and British Legations”, 16/7/28, FO228\3770\77 12c; C-in-C China Station, Tywhitt to 
Lampson, 16/5/28, No.1038, FO228\3875\1 63. 
Settlement was widely seen in China as a British Concession5 whilst the North China 
Daily News was seen as an official British newspaper.  As a result of these 
perceptions the Legation had to wield informal influence on the Concessions and the 
press, besides exercising the varying constitutional and judicial powers held by 
consuls and diplomats.6 There was also the colony of Hong Kong which, for all its 
integration in the Chinese economy and the pattern of British treaty port life, was not 
a part of the British China establishment although it was the Head Quarters of the 
China Command, which affected the perspective of military matters. 
 
Pressures for Reform 
 By 1928 reforming the British community in China became a necessity.  
Nationalistic demands by the Chinese were compounded by the need to protect long-
term trade interests.  British and American public opinion was widely favourable to 
abstract notions of Chinese nationalism and critical of the British China community, 
especially such totemic acts as the exclusion of Chinese from parks in the Shanghai 
International Settlement.  With the Nationalist advance on the Yangzi cities and the 
sending of the SDF Shanghai was the focus of much media attention from December 
1926 to April 1927.  Criticisms by visiting journalists such as Arthur Ransome, which 
were rejected in the treaty ports on the grounds of the inexperience or ideological 
hostility of their articulators, were regarded as important, or at least influential, by the 
                                                          
5 Indeed referring to it as such was a common anti-British tactic. Consul Hewlett, in Xiamen, was 
driven to publish a pamphlet in Chinese refuting this claim in 1925, Forty Years, pp.  159-60. 
6 The counter proposition, that the “China hands” wielded a great deal of direct influence over British 
policy formation, whilst perhaps a useful fiction in the treaty ports and a charge levelled by Chinese 
critics, has been repeatedly disproved, see, for example, Pauline Y.N. Thomas, “The Foreign Office 
and the Business Lobby: British Official and Commercial Hostility to Treaty Revision in China 1925-
1930” (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1981), pp. 319-31. 
Foreign Office.  The treaty port commentators were beginning to lose their influential 
monopoly of interpretations of China.7 
 British policy in the years 1928 to 1931 was theoretically based upon the 
concessions embodied in the December Memorandum and the “January Offer”.  
These documents represented the British attempt to regain the initiative from the 
unilaterally-inclined reformist National Government and to contain treaty reform to 
its own time-table.8 This was the source of much friction after 1927 as National 
Government directives conflicted with the deliberately vague British time-table, while 
lower-level Nationalist functionaries acted as if de facto reform had already been 
achieved; chaotic conditions in many parts of China and jurisdictional disputes in 
others fuelled this.9 The vocabulary of retreat was prominent; the revolutionary events 
of early 1927 created an atmosphere of panic in the treaty ports which was shared by 
the British establishment and which retarded the work of treaty revision, making a 
rapprochement with the Guomindang difficult.  The British Minister Sir Miles 
Lampson was actually fighting on several fronts, trying at once to restrain and 
reassure the British community and goad it into concessions, while dealing with the 
Foreign Office in London and with the National Government and its lower level 
officials. 
 In general the British were attempting to re-establish their position in China 
after it had become belligerently adrift in 1925, and especially in 1927.  There was a 
danger that sending troops would be seen, by the Chinese, by other foreign powers, 
                                                          
7 Ransome, Chinese Puzzle, pp. 28-32. See a hostile review of his “prejudiced and superficial” book in 
NCH, 24/3/28, p. 506. On the settlement’s sensitivity see G.E. Marden, Municipal Gazette, 19/4/28, p. 
159c and Lionel Curtis’ farewell speech in Shanghai No.29, 13/2/30, Enc. NCDN, 13/2/30, 
FO228\4283\5 69; Mounsey to Lampson, S/O, 18/1/28, FO228\3883\8 69. 
8 In April 1928 Lampson minuted that: “My conclusion is that whilst we and the Foreign Office are 
debating what we will or will not agree to, we shall find that everything is taken, by a stroke of the 
pen”, Minute on “Tariff Autonomy”, FO228\3843\64 41c. 
and by the treaty port British themselves, as Britain’s only tangible policy in China, 
that or surrender to forcible seizure, as in Hankou; neither of these policies was 
expedient or acceptable. 
 
Imperial Prestige and Revolutionary Nationalism 
 British China policy did not exist in a sino-centric vacuum.  International 
opinion was considered and there was a special sensitivity to American criticism.10 
Considerations of wider imperial defence and prestige were important; upholding that 
prestige was seen to be vital for Britain’s position in Asia generally, let alone China.11 
The abandonment of Hankou set an example that some felt threatened that position.  It 
was a humiliating surrender to non-European force.12  
 In practical terms the question of imperial defence meant that there was active 
monitoring, by an Indian Government agent and the Legation’s M.I.6 officer, H.N. 
Steptoe, in contact with consuls and the SMP’s Special Branch Division IV, of links 
between the Guomindang and Indian nationalists, and the activities of Indians in 
China.13 The Shanghai settlement was also a perfect centre for Comintern activity 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 For a typical comment see Foochow No.54 30/11/28, FO228\3718\757 2. 
10 For the background to sensitivity to American opinion, partly prompted by concern over Naval 
policies, see B.J.C. McKercher “The British Diplomatic Service in the United States and the 
Chamberlain Foreign Office’s Perceptions of Domestic America, 1924-1927: Images, Reality, and 
Diplomacy”, in McKercher and Moss, Shadow and Substance, pp. 221-47. 
11 “The spectacle of the British being driven out of China is a direct incitement to the Indian enemies 
of the British connexion”, A. Hirtzel to Austen Chamberlain, 17/1/27, FO800\260. See also 
Chamberlain to Lloyd George 19/1/27, FO800\260, and Lampson to Chamberlain 16/4/27 FO800\260. 
12 Clark, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, pp. 535, 628. In later years some felt that Hankou was the 
first, catalytic defeat for European colonialism, H.E. Muriel, Memoir, p. 43, HSB S16.1, “Personalities 
and Narratives”. 
13 On the monitoring of Indians which began in earnest in 1927 see “Section IV Special Branch”, 
D.S.I. Golder, 11/2/36, NARA SMP D8/8, the attempted subversion of Indians continued throughout 
the 1930s, either by the Comintern or Japanese; see also “Indian Section”, 17/6/29, NARA SMP D8/8. 
For an example of the routine cooperation between MI6 and the SMP see H.N. Steptoe to T.P.  Givens, 
20/5/31, NARA SMP D2400 and file. The reality of these fears can be gauged from R.C. North and 
X.J. Eudin, M.N. Roy’s Mission to China: The Communist-Kuomintang Split of 1927 (Berkeley, 1963), 
directed against the European East and South Asian colonies.14 China was therefore of 
strategic importance in intelligence matters.  For the military it also supplied Britain’s 
pacific fleet with an important cool-weather summer base at Weihaiwei.15 
 Upholding British prestige involved a wider range of activities.  In China it 
had been built, historically, on the use and threat of force.  The Chinese, it was widely 
felt, respected force and respected those who chastised them with good reason.  
Maintaining British prestige in the face of a militant anti-British nationalism was 
hardly easy, especially as the easy option, direct military action, had been vetoed; 
after all, prestige without force was dangerously close to “another word for bluff.”16 
This was more profoundly felt among the British military establishment in China 
which had been clearly anxious for a fight during the early months of 1927. 
 An important factor was the Chinese concern for face, which it was felt should 
be shared by the British when dealing with them, in order to keep Chinese respect.  
This psychological approach rather conveniently justified the pomp of empire and 
attention to its outward prestige.  Pomp also served to boost morale, when 
necessary.17 
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pp. 15-19, and S.D. Gupta, Comintern, India and the Colonial Question, 1920-37 (Calcutta, 1
passim.. 
14 After 1929 the Far East Bureau of the Comintern was based in Shanghai, W.J. Duiker The 
Comintern and Vietnamese Communism (Athens, Ohio, 1975), p. 20. The breaking up of the Noulens 
spy ring in 1931 involved liaison between the SMP’s special branch, police in Singapore and in Frenc
Indo-China. Richard Sorge and members of his spy-ring operated in Shanghai and it has been claim
that Roger Hollis, later Director General of M.I.5, was recruited as a Soviet Agent in China when an 
employee of BAT, C.A. Willoughby, Sorge: Soviet Master Spy (London, 1952), pp. 221-56; Ruth 
Werner, Sonya’s Report, (translated by Renate Simpson, London, 1991), pp. 22-97; Anthony Gl
The Secrets of the Serv
pp. 304-99. Consuls were circulated an official “List of Suspects”, Mukden No.74, 2/
FO228\3776\37 14b. 
15 Atwell, British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers, pp. 269-70n50. 
16 On the historical comments see FO No.360 Ch
China”, 8/1/30, FO228\4134\25 3. On the Chinese and force see, for example, Sir Owen O’Malley, 
The Phantom Caravan (London, 1954), p. 103. 
17 “...I don’t think it pays to let these people think that one is in any sense running after them, nor doe
it tally with my idea of the national dignity that we should do so” Lampson to W. Selby, 15/11/28, 
FO800\263. See also Lampson to Chamberlain, 6/2/27, FO800\260. On the “psychological effect
 Upholding prestige was more than a rhetorical formula and populist cliché, it 
involved practicalities.  These included the physical structures of the British 
establishment in China: the gunboats,18 control of the CMC, and the large Legation in 
Beijing.  This “city within a city within a city” accommodated some 2,000 people: 
“There is no other Legation that can compare with it; either for beauty or for dignity” 
claimed Lampson.19 The Consulates and Consulates-General scattered throughout 
China fulfilled similar functions.20 The Guomindang, however, set up their capital in 
Nanjing and changed Beijing’s name to Beiping to expunge associations with the 
corrupt Northern governments and their subjection to the foreign powers.  The 
Legation remained in Beijing until 1935 and it is clear that despite the “practical” 
reasons elaborated against an earlier move the motivation was one of prestige.  A new 
Legation would have none of the dignity nor the historical associations - of the 
Legation siege and the allied victory - of that in Beijing.  Nanjing had also acquired 
humiliating overtones as a result of the Nanjing incident.21 Furthermore, scuttling 
down to the Yangzi looked uncomfortably like kowtowing to a childish Nationalist 
                                                                                                                                                                      
morale and faith in our (British) position in China” see Warren Swire’s explanation of a disagreement 
with Consul-General Fitzmaurice in G.W. Swire to Lampson, 4/5/29, FO228\4044\13 67b. 
18 Ichang No.47, 2/12/30, FO228\4190\13 22r. 
19 On this perception of the Customs see FO No.360, 8/1/30, enc. No.2 China Confidential F6720/3/10 
“British Policy in China”, FO228\4134\25 3. On the Legation see O’Malley, Phantom Caravan, p. 95; 
Lampson to Chamberlain, 9/3/27, FO800\260; the Anglophile Dutch Minister Oudendyk felt the 
Legation “must make an Englishman legitimately proud of his country”, Ways and By Ways in 
Diplomacy, p. 27. 
20 Although it was hardly dignified for the Kunming Consul-General to be living in “a ramshackle 
Chinese house” leased in the name of the Governor’s mistress who was trying to reclaim it, H. Phillips, 
“Inspection of Yunnanfu Consulate-General”, 2/3/29, FO369\2705 K5497/5497/210. 
21 The temper of the times can also be gauged from the documents published in CYB 1928, pp. 723-36. 
In discussing the Wiltshire Regiment Case compensation dispute Lampson declared himself “shocked 
and surprised that [Wang Zhengting] should be so ill-judged as to use” a comparison between the two, 
Lampson to Nanking No.110, 15/6/29, FO228\3980\9 20k. In this case a British soldier was found 
guilty of killing a Chinese boy. The issue was the amount of compensation demanded by the Chinese, 
an amount equal to that paid out by the Chinese to the foreign victims of the Nanjing incident, “It is of 
course childish to compare the value of this coolie’s life to his dependants with that of a foreigner”, 
Teichman minute on Shanghai No.176, 10/6/29, FO228\3980\6 20k. 
whim.22 Any such concessions would only lead to “accentuated arrogance” on the part 
of the Chinese, as was the result, it was claimed, of foreign representation at the State 
Funeral of Sun Yatsen in Nanjing in 1929.23 
 Beijing was also symbolic of the Warlord years when the British had 
successfully handled relations with the spurious Northern governments.24 A symbolic 
ending of this era occurred when Zhang Zoulin, whose autocracy they appreciated, 
evacuated Beijing in June 1928 and the diplomatic corps turned out and thanked him 
for protecting foreign life and property during his rule.25 
 Prestige was also upheld by the type of written communication to Chinese 
officials used by consuls.  Noting that the Chao hui [note] was being given up in 
favour of Kung han [letters] it was pointed out by the Legation in 1930, that the Chao 
hui “bears the kind of seal that the Chinese are accustomed to associate with more or 
less redoubtable authority”, whereas a Kung han “may merely have a circular stamp...  
like a handy chop used by a washerman”.  It would be a mistake if “anything that 
reminds the authorities that our Treaties are not yet abolished or fallen into desuetude 
                                                          
22 Lampson, “Meeting with the Spanish Ambassador”, 5/7/28, FO228\3797\5 21g. The reasons spelled 
out in 1930 were practical ones about moving, political instability in Central China and the heat in 
Nanjing, “it would clearly be mad to think of it yet”, wrote Lampson to the Foreign Office, No.143, 
27/5/30, FO228\4135\1 3f. On the issue of the change from Beijing to Beiping, although approval was 
given for the use of “Peiping” instead of “Peking” in local communications, few consuls seem to have 
done so with any consistency. The Foreign Office did not intend, at that point, to use the name when 
communicating with the Chinese Legation in London, Orde to Lampson, FO No.1169, 16/12/29, 
FO228\4169\1 13g. 
23 See Lampson’s paraphrase of the analysis of U.S. Consul Price, to FO No.113, 24/6/29, 
FO228\3937/420. 
24 Described by one critic as “the hopeless atmosphere of fatuous-notewriting to Chinese ministers 
who probably don’t exist”; J.K. Swire to C.C. Scott, 19/6/25, SP ADD15. 
25 NCH, 2/6/28, p. 361; Oudendyk, Ways and By Ways, pp. 359-60. Lampson especially liked Zhang, 
“I never knew him not to keep his word, and that is distinctly unusual in China today”, Lampson 
Diaries, 1/6/28; on Zhang’s autocracy see Lampson to Wellesley, 7/1/27, LP I, quoted in H.E. Kane, 
“Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation”, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of 
Economics, 1975), p. 95. 
should be lightly abolished”.  Unfortunately most consuls reported the routine use of 
Kung han.26 
 British prestige had to be upheld in other fields.  Some felt that missionaries 
undermined it through their vulnerability in the interior.27 As has been shown consuls 
attempted to dissuade or prevent marriages between Chinese men and British women.  
Prestige was also threatened by criminal behaviour on the part of Britons in China, 
and by indigent Britons, on whose behalf consuls could dispense charitable funds for 
repatriation.28 Cases of assaults by Britons on Chinese, especially by military 
personnel, were especially embarrassing.  They were kept out of the press if possible, 
or resolved out of China or as quietly as was decent.29 Fear of Chinese press reports 
harming British prestige caused R.F. Johnston to demand British press representation 
at the ceremony marking the rendition of Weihaiwei.30 While much of this was built 
into the structure of treaty port life - through early socialisation and peer pressure - 
the establishment, of necessity, played an active role in these areas. 
                                                          
26 “Written Communications between Consular Officers and the Local Chinese Officials”, E.S. 
Bennett, 6/2/30, FO228\4132\4 2h. A partial explanation of the working of this system can be found in 
P. D. Coates, “Documents in Chinese from the Chinese Secretary’s Office, British Legation, Peking, 
1861-1939”, Modern Asian Studies, 17, 2 (1983), pp. 245-46. 
27 “...doubtless they are prepared to face these dangers themselves, but they embarrass us and cheapen 
what is left of the foreigner’s prestige”, Teichman, minute on Yunnanfu No.14 27/10/29, “Looting of 
Yung Hsing by Soldiers and Carrying off of Mr Smith”, FO228\4011\2 35n. 
28 There were usually around ten “Distressed British Subjects” in the spaces reserved for use of the 
Shanghai Consulate-General at the Hanbury Institute, H. Phillips, “Inspection of Shanghai Consulate-
General”, 25/3/28, FO369\2018 K6379/6379/210. The Hanbury Institute was initially built as a 
seamen’s hostel, Rev C.E. Derwent, Shanghai: A Handbook for Travellers and Residents (2nd edition, 
Shanghai, 1920), p. 62. 
29 For an example see Lampson Diaries 20/10/30. In March 1928 there were five outstanding cases in 
Shanghai including a rape case where the defendant, a British soldier, had been acquitted “to a 
tremendous outcry in the Chinese press”, H. Phillips, “Inspection of Shanghai Consulate-General”, 
25/3/28, FO369\2018 K6379/6379/210. Chinese newspaper editors were requested by the SMP Special 
Branch to refrain from commentating on the Peters and Judd case in 1935. In Beijing British diplomats 
felt that it was just the type of case that could be dangerously inflamed, NARA SMP D7137, 11/12/35; 
for the Legation’s attitudes see the file “Murder of Chinese Beggar by British Policemen”, passim., 
FO676\249. 
30 Johnston to Lampson, 19/9/30, Weihaiwei tel. No.28, FO228\4256\153 51a. 
 A greater fear lay in the dangers perceived as threatening all Europeans as a 
result of the loss of extraterritorial rights by Germans and Russians; this was 
heightened by actions against Soviet Diplomats, by Zhang Zoulin in Beijing and in 
the aftermath of the Guangzhou revolt in December 1927, when Soviet officials were 
shot without trial in the streets.  This was “A most unwholesome precedent”, 
remarked Lampson, “some day it may be the turn of others including ourselves.”31 
The danger of these examples was more psychological than real but was keenly felt 
and widely broadcast.  Ill-treatment of Russians was continually reported by consuls, 
and thence by the Legation to the Foreign Office, to counter demands for progress on 
the question of extraterritoriality.32 
 Consular and Legation sympathies were mostly anti-Guomindang.  This was 
due to its Soviet links and the anti-British assault of the previous few years.  One 
diplomat noted in July 1928 when discussing how best to open relations with the 
Nationalists that: “We may have to swallow a lot of pride and prejudice to get on 
terms with this movement.”33 There was also an ideological dislike of revolutionary 
                                                          
31 Minute on Canton No.209, 28/12/27, and to FO No.63 21/1/27, FO228\3777\3 2l. After all, 
remarked the military in Hong Kong, “Illiterates can scarcely be expected to differentiate between 
Russians and other white nationals”, G.O.C. South China Command Intelligence Diary 1927-12 
No.CD 766/11 29/12/27, FO228\3901\1 83c. This was partly guilt, as Western diplomats connived in 
the Beijing action (British troops manned the Legation walls to prevent their Soviet neighbours 
escaping) and were involved after the fact in Guangzhou; C.M. Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, eds., 
Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927: Papers seized in 
the 1927 raid (New York, 1968), pp. 8-9; on Guangzhou see Canton No.204, 15/12/27, FO228\3728\2 
2l. 
32 See, for example, Harbin No.34, 16/5/28, FO228\3777\3 14e, and Harbin No.155, 2/12/29, 
FO228\4073\9 84, where Eastes reported seeing “three indigent Russians being whipped in the face”. 
Earlier that year it was reported that Russians in Harbin had boycotted the tram service because of “the 
insolence of the Tram Company’s Chinese employees”, Harbin No.38, 4/4/29, FO228\4005\3 32j. In 
Jiujiang in 1929 the treatment meted out to a Russian customs examiner accused of taking bribes was 
described as “a startling illustration of the treatment from which members of nations not possessing 
extraterritorial rights can never expect to feel themselves safe”, Kiukiang No.37, Intelligence Report, 
25/9/29, FO228\4006\6 32t. 
33 “...which is somewhat uncouth in its manners and habits”, he added for good measure, J.C. 
Sterndale-Bennett, Minute 23/7/28, “Nationalism and H.M.G.’s China Policy: Proposed Letter to 
C.T.Wang”, FO228\3733\41 3. 
nationalism.  Nevertheless Lampson went to present his credentials to Jiang Jieshi in 
Nanjing in December 1928, the first foreign Minister to do so, and felt that the 
“ceremonial caught the popular imagination” and thereby bolstered Britain’s 
position.34 This meeting concluded what had been a prickly phase in personal 
relations with the Nationalist leaders.  Lampson had resumed direct links in 1926 by 
meeting Eugene Chen in Hankou, and contacts had been continued as a result of the 
seizure of the Yangzi concessions in January 1927, but when the Nationalists took 
Beijing there were problems of protocol about who should call on whom first.  This, 
Lampson felt, was evidence of “how excessively touchy and unsure of their
and themselves” they were.  The evidence reveals as much about the British, and th
view of their position in Beijing, as it does about the Guomindang leaders; Lampson 
claimed “not to be protocolic but, representing a great country, I had first to think of 
these things here, where National dignity counted for so much.”
 position 
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Chinese characteristics and Nationalist Characteristics 
 Policy discourse among these officials in China largely reflected the 
prevailing stereotypes of the individual Chinese character and assumed that these 
were static.  Lampson and Chamberlain even exchanged letters in 1927 on the lessons 
of history for contemporary Sino-British relations.36 During the years of crisis and 
afterwards Lampson himself was apt to lecture his colleagues in London on the 
34 Legation to FO No.1620 28/12/28, FO228\3735\60 3c. This was a common idea, “formality” was 
“dear to the heart of the Oriental”, and the British were experts at supplying it, Canton No.19, 19/2/29, 
FO228\3940\29 3. 
35 Lampson Minute, 19/7/28, “Relations between Nationalists and Diplomatic Body in Peking”, 
FO228\3732\31 3. 
36 Chamberlain to Lampson, 16/11/27, FO No.1326 [F8314/2/10], FO228\3705\7 2. 
psychology of the Chinese.37 They were childish, worse, they were “scallywags”.38 
They were cruel and it was “always a good thing to remind the F.O. from time to time 
of the occurrence of such horrors [as execution by strangulation] - which strike few 
average Chinese as an anachronism”.39 Childishness required forcefulness and 
scallywags needed chastisement.  Sir Meyrick Hewlett “learnt ...  lessons which were 
of real value in my subsequent relations with the Chinese”, as an assistant master at a 
prep-school before going to China: when to exact “obedience by firmness, when to 
promote loyal devotion by sympathetic understanding and the joy of sharing in 
innocent fun”.40 The practical implication of this attitude and of the paternalistic 
atmosphere in which policy originated was Lampson’s insistence on a policy of 
“firmness with justice”.41 
 The surviving Legation files were written to be seen by a small group of like-
minded men who lived and worked closely together.  Minutes of meetings always 
reflected, naturally, to the advantage of the writer.  It is noticeable that the Chinese 
were usually described as reacting in stereotyped ways - with the “usual formalities”, 
evasively, or “sitting up and taking notice”, and responding to lectures.  This is what 
the reader expected to read.  It was also evidence that the reporter was an “expert”, a 
handler - and knew the tricks, and the formulae of intercourse with the Chinese.  Most 
                                                          
37 See, for example, Lampson to Wellesley, 11/2/27, Lampson Papers II, Quoted in Kane, “Sir Miles 
Lampson”, p. 39. See also ibid., p. 130 Lampson to Henderson, 1/12/29. 
38 Lampson to Selby, 9/1/27, Lampson Papers I, Quoted Kane “Sir Miles Lampson”, pp. 39-40; for the 
“scallywags” comment see Lampson to Henderson, 4/11/27, FO371\12505 F9390/4382/10, quoted in 
Wilson, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, p. 298. Hewlett used the same term to describe Nationalist 
Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting, Hewlett to Lampson, S/O, 6/12/29, FO228\3935\63 2. 
39 Ingram Minute on Garstin to Sterndale-Bennett, S/O, 13/9/29, “Strangulation of a Chinese (Further 
Photos)”, FO228\4063\192 84. 
40 Hewlett, Forty Years, pp. 1-2. 
41 Lampson to Chamberlain, 26/12/26, FO800\259b. The National Government was a “Boy Scout 
Government” needing “someone in the capacity of Scoutmaster to keep them straight”, was one 
condescending judgement quoted with approval by Lampson in 1928, Minute, 19/7/28, “Relations 
between Nationalists and Diplomatic Body in Peking”, FO228\3732\31 3. 
written archives, such as minutes of meetings and Legation minutes on incoming 
correspondence were written in this shared vocabulary, the discourse of 
characteristics; the same expectations of Chinese behaviour were shared by readers, 
actors and minuters.  It was also a form of shorthand.  Minutes also showed how 
British officials were able to “handle” the Chinese, and were therefore further 
evidence of their own superior position.  Reporting Chinese self-criticism heightened 
the validity of these critiques.42 In short these files are similar in tone to the works of 
the China experts.   
 This shorthand affected political perceptions.  Nationalism was usually 
stereotyped rather than examined; there were the clichés of the previous 20 years of 
republicanism such as endemic Government corruption,43 it was Boxerish 
xenophobia,44 it was the quasi-communist child of Borodin’s gold;45 and its unifying 
achievement was denigrated.46 Many of these remarks were prompted by facts, by the 
mobilised anti-religious movement, by attacks on missions and mission institutions 
and by the evacuation of 1926-1927, (whose only parallels lay in the Boxer events), 
by aggressive nationalism,47 by the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Left Guomindang, and the chaotic situation in China resulting from civil war.  Much 
of it was wishful thinking:  [Paul Cohen – Wusa – we are not Boxers, pp. 90-1. 
We have got into the habit of thinking that this state of affairs was 
chronic and that when the Nationalists captured Peking they would fall 
                                                          
42 See Lampson to Chamberlain, 15/6/27, FO800\261, reporting the comments of Sir Shosun Chow.  
43 Dining with Lampson and R.F. Johnston in Weihaiwei in August 1927 Naval Commander Hamilton 
learnt “that Chiang Kai Shek having made his pile is now “hopping it”, Hamilton Papers, Diary, 
16/8/27. For a report of a similar Chinese “self-criticism” (in this case the Northern Premier and Liang 
Shiyi) see Tel to FO No.3, 3/1/28, FO228\3705\3 2. 
44 Teichman minute on Tsinan No.6, 17/2/28, FO228\3784\14 18; Flt. Lt. O’Gowan report enclosed in 
Tsinan, S/O, 7/5/28, FO228\3807\58 25L. 
45 Clark, “Britain and the Kuomintang”, p. 352. 
46 Legation to FO No.355, 12/4/28, FO228\3707\173 2. 
47 The authorities in Jiujiang were suspected of “a deliberate policy of making the position of 
foreigners in the interior as uncomfortable as possible”, Kiukiang Intelligence Report, 25/9/29, 
FO228\4006\6 32t. 
out among themselves and the whole cycle of civil war could begin 
afresh.48 
 
Much reporting then, based as it still was on these premises, especially when 
apparently confirmed by the renewed fighting in 1929 and 1930, was unhelpful and 
ultimately obstructive when it came to objectively understanding events and trends in 
China.  The concepts resorted to relied on stereotypes which predated the Nationalist 
Revolution.  Nationalism was often portrayed as the latest manifestation of the old 
problems of Chinese civilisation49 and the “inherent defects - moral not intellectual - 
that are embedded in the Chinese character.”50 Corruption, for example, was certainly 
a large problem in Nationalist China but the objective fact was used as confirmation 
of the expected, rather than seen as a new phenomenon in itself.51 
 Nationalist officials were stereotyped, in predictable ways, as long-haired 
returned-student “types”’52 as slothful warlords or corrupt bureaucrats.  This was 
partly the uncomfortable and unpalatable result of consuls no longer being accorded 
the automatic respect that they still ideally expected from local officials; rudeness was 
promptly, colourfully, and repetitively reported.53 What made it worse was that older 
                                                          
48  J.C.S. Bennett, Minute, 23/7/28, “Nationalism and H.M.G’s China Policy: Proposed Letter to C.T. 
Wang”, FO228\3733\41 3. 
49 This sometimes had the flavour of Victorian missionary denunciations: “From the springs of 
Chinese thought there flows through every channel into the remotest parts of the social life of China a 
stream of corruption and hypocrisy and selfishness polluting a soil in which not even the bravery of a 
savage or the natural self-sacrifice of a beast for its young can take root. This is not the field in which 
the seeds of national life or of any noble aspiration can germinate”, Owen O’Malley, Memo, 10/6/26 
FO371\11691 F3005/3005/10, Quoted in Clark “Britain and the Kuomintang”, p. 360. 
50 “Memorandum respecting the Prospects of Stable Government in China”, 19/7/30, China Conf. 
F3981/61/10, FO228\4134\39 3. 
51 On Nationalist corruption see Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist 
Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), pp. 15-20. 
52 The CFA at Wuhu, for example, was a “spotted and spectacled youth... supercilious”, lacking 
“intelligence or activity where the interests of a foreigner” were concerned, Nanking No.40, 13/8/29, 
FO228\3980\3 20i. 
53 “After the briefest of greetings, in which a scowl and a grunt were the predominant features, he 
threw himself sulkily into a chair...”; “Interview with Chang Tsung-Ch’ang” [Zhang Zongchang], 
Tsinan No.58, 30/12/29, FO228\3790\2 19f. 
officials also began to adopt “unfriendly” attitudes, riding “roughshod over the 
foreigner”.54 
 Other issues were similarly obscured.  Rife banditry in Fujian province in 
1930 could “only be explained by the inherent characteristics of the Chinese 
mentality”.55 Chinese soldiers were either comic-opera troopers56 or else self-
mutilating, fast-running, cowards; at other times they were cruel and rape-inclined.57 
The success of the Soviet-led NRA which impressed observers58 instead of 
confounding such stereotypes, led to non-military observers wondering “whether 
there is or ever will be a “Yellow Peril”, presuming China continues on her present 
path of rampant militarism”.  This fear was equally rooted in fictional fantasy and the 
example of Japan.  The Legation’s Military Attaché prepared a paper on the question, 
largely predicated on the attributes of the Chinese character, and on that basis 
dismissed the notion.59 
 Approaches to the Guomindang were far from homogeneous.  Hong Kong’s 
commentators were more extreme and reflected the colonial atmosphere there and the 
colonial agenda, especially its insecurity in the face of militant nationalism.  Military 
commentators were also more extreme, partly as a result of a greater concern and 
                                                          
54 Mukden No.75, 23/10/29, FO228\4005\6 32h. 
55 These were “the lack of honesty and public spiritedness and of the essential qualities necessary to 
put good government into practice”, Foochow No.4, 18/2/30, FO228\4116\59 2. 
56 Two consuls independently sent in sarcastic accounts of military celebrations of the 1928 Double-ten 
celebrations, Mukden No.61, 12/10/28, FO228\3735\41 3c; Changsha S/O, 11/10/28, FO228\3735\42 
3c. 
57 “All Chinese soldiers are liable to break loose, murder, loot, rape etc. whenever they get the 
chance”, “Troopers” [Brigadier Heath O.C. North China Command] Tientsin GST 5/56, 15/5/28, 
FO228\3785\20 18c. 
58 See reports in Tsingtao No.26, 29/12/27, FO228\3705\1 2, and Tientsin No.259, 18/9/28 and enc., 
FO228\3716\648 2. 
59 Chinese troops only fought well when roused to a “temporary spirit of combat” by propagandists; 
military training methods smacked of “make believe” that reflected “the mentality of the people”, Col 
G. Badham-Thornhill, “The Military Equation in China: Past and Present Manifestations”, 27/11/29, 
[China Conf F464/93/10 28/1/30], FO228\4059\11 83e. 
practical involvement with Britain’s strategic position in East Asia, and partly 
because of a greater professional sympathy for more forceful policies.60 
 
Negotiating with Chinese Nationalism  
 It is not surprising then, that negotiations were characterised - or articulated 
afterwards - by this awareness of Chinese characteristics and British prestige.61 To a 
degree, of course, this was necessary; elements of “face” and Chinese customs had to 
be accounted for in the process of negotiation.  However, by fetishising these customs 
the diplomats showed the wide acceptance of the idea of the handler, the expert, and 
his resourceful knowledge of Chinese “characteristics”.  Knowledge of Chinese 
“characteristics” gave the British certain advantages.  Chinese venality could be 
appealed to, they could be lectured to, and so on.  It was widely felt, for example, that 
by giving the Chinese enough “face” over topics under negotiation they would be 
satisfied with that alone.62 The discourse of “characteristics led then, to a certain 
extent, to the British establishment not being able to take Nationalist demands 
seriously and not considering the demands as serious aspirations or anything but 
attempts to reap domestic “political kudos” (or financial gain) by Nationalist 
officials.63 This approach also encouraged a guardedness about the processes of 
negotiation and it became important not to allow the Guomindang too much 
opportunity for gaining such “kudos”.  On occasion this could lead to damaging 
                                                          
60 See, for example, Governor Sir Cecil Clementi’s official despatches to the Colonial Office for 1928 
in legation dossier 2L FO228\3728 to FO228\3731 and the Hong Kong based South China Command 
Intelligence Diary for the same years in dossier 83c, FO228\3901. 
61 By other characteristics too, in later life O’Malley referred to Eugene Chen as “a nigger from 
Trinidad”, C. Martin Wilbur transcript, “Talk with Sir Owen O’Malley, July 20, 1962.” 
62 On the question of tariff autonomy in 1928, for example, “it may be possible to satisfy their “face” 
and retain a considerable substance”, Alan Archer, minute on Tariff Revision, FO No.207, 16/8/28, 
FO228\3843\84 41c. 
problems.  Lampson decided against going to Hankou in person during the 
negotiations in early 1927, noting it would be a mistake “from the point of view of 
Chinese psychology”, but his absence left O’Malley to make concessions that he 
bitterly criticised.64 
 This dominant discourse prompted suspicion about the wisdom of starting 
negotiations about treaty revision: 
If they were perfectly normal people, one could give them concessions 
without an instinctive feeling that by doing so one was merely 
whetting their appetite for more.65 
 
It also prompted an almost conspiratorial view of the behaviour of the Guomindang.  
The language used was that of Chinese “try ons”66 (with connotations of schoolboy 
behaviour) and “moving in”.67 The response suggested by that behaviour was 
firmness and “standing up for our rights” which was “the only policy that pays with 
the Oriental and more especially with the Far Eastern variety of the species.”68 Using 
gunboats offensively was now largely out of the question, in fact even the 
effectiveness of naval reprisals against pirates was being questioned;69 there were 
other methods: delaying progress on the Boxer Indemnity Scheme could be used as a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
63 “Record of Interview with Dr J.B. Condliffe”, (IPR Research Secretary, Honolulu), to FO No.94, 
20/1/28, FO228\3883\3 69. 
64 Lampson to Chamberlain, 11/1/27, FO800\260, Lampson Diaries, 25/2/27. In later life Lampson 
accepted that the rendition was the right course to take but O’Malley was still sore, 35 years later, at 
Lampson’s initial reaction, C. Martin Wilbur transcripts, “Talk with Sir Owen O’Malley”, “Interview 
with Lord Killearn, July 12, 1962”. 
65 Lampson to Walford Selby 15/11/28, FO800\263. 
66 See Lampson on Wang Zhengting, Letter to Wellesley, 26/6/29, private, FO228\4033\38 51a. The 
Wiltshire case was described as a “try on”, a case “so typical of the modern Chinese”, Teichman 
minute on Shanghai No.243, 22/8/29, FO228\3980\25 20k. 
67 Teichman minute, 10/10/29, on “Members of Staff of Legation and Consulates: WCP requests 
Particulars”, FO228\3988\3 23f1. 
68 Lampson to Chamberlain, 6/2/27, FO800\260. 
69 “Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Piracy in Chinese Waters, January 1929”, 330-C 
COS 184, FO228\4053\34 75. 
chastisement, for instance.70 Inconsistencies between these stereotypes and real-life 
could cause bewilderment.  Song Ziwen was described in 1928 as “so surprisingly 
frank and confidential that he disarms criticism and one cannot bring oneself to say 
very nasty things to him.”71 
 The British initially hinged their reactions to Nationalist success on the 
Nanjing incident and their own immediately mythological versions of it.  Until 
formally settled the incident was to block normal diplomatic relations.72 Negotiations 
on the issue were problematical, for as far as the Guomindang were concerned the 
actual “Incident” was the naval bombardment; they also wanted the settlement to 
include undertakings on the British side to begin treaty revision.  The issue was 
settled in August 1928 and the Nanjing Consulate-General made ready for re-
opening.73 This, however, raised other problems.  At the planned ceremony marking 
the re-opening the British wanted pomp and a British guard of honour, and expected 
the Chinese to offer a guard to salute the flag.74 The prospect of British troops landing 
in its capital city was too much for the National Government which refused 
permission.  It showed, Lampson wrote, “that in their heart of hearts they do not 
repudiate the outrage”, and so there was to be no “entertainment to or by Chinese” at 
the opening.75 The settlement did, however, clear the way for Lampson to present his 
diplomatic credentials in December.76 
                                                          
70 Lampson to Wellesley, 26/6/29, private, FO228\4033\38 51a; for a schoolmasterly assessment of 
that action see Lampson to FO No.120, 28/6/29, FO228\4033\40 51a. 
71 “Report on Talk with T.V. Song”, H.H. Fox to Lampson, 20/11/28, FO228\3846\224 41c. 
72 “Pillage and murder... are hardly the kind of culture that we wish to encourage, and until some 
satisfaction is given to us in regard to the Nanking Incident; it seems to me idle to discuss better 
cultural relations” a representative of the National Government’s Education Bureau was informed by 
Sir Victor Wellesley, from FO No.1410, 6/12/27, FO228\3719\4 2a. 
73 The texts of the various settlements can be found in CYB 1929-30, pp. 893-901. 
74 Lampson Tel. to Nanking, No.125, 14/10/28, FO228\3723\189 2a. 
75 Lampson Tel. to Nanking, No.186, 2/11/28, FO228\3723\194 2a. 
76 A British vessel did not officially call at the city again until March 1929, Hewlett to Lampson S/O 
24/3/29, FO228\3940\36 3. 
 The squabble highlights the failure of the Legation to understand the state of 
feelings within the Nationalist camp.77 The British were, at this stage, still too 
responsive to, and reflective of, the feelings of the British community and trapped by 
their own perceptions and pride.  After the settlement, and with formal recognition, a 
psychological fillip was given to British diplomatic dealings and it became possible to 
escape from the defensive hostility adopted between 1925 and 1927. 
 This was in marked contrast to the settlement of the May 30th incident.  In 
1930, five years after the event, this was officially settled with payment of $150,000 
by the SMC directly to the relatives of those killed and injured, in return for their 
“formal acknowledgement of receipt of this sum.”78 Negotiations had been stalled for 
years; an initial offer of half that amount had been rejected because of the manner in 
which it was made.  The SMC had no intention of making any gestures which 
evidenced “expiation” on their part, or would provide a focus for perpetuating the 
memory of the shooting.79 When Wang Zhengting raised the issue in 1929 Lampson 
initially replied that it would be best to let it lie and only grudgingly were the 
difficulties raised by refusing the incident its “quietus” fully accepted.80 
 
Only occasionally were the roots and motivations of revolutionary nationalism 
accepted as having any integrity: “All revolutions are bound to be extreme, if they 
weren’t then they would lose all drive so that their attitude is at least intelligible, even 
                                                          
77 The lack of empathy was mutual, as Wang Zhengting admitted to Hewlett about the colour guard: 
“their failure to do what we wanted was due to a lack of their understanding of [British] race 
psychology”, Nanking Tel. No.98, 8/11/28, FO228\3723\202 2a. 
78 Lampson to FO No.168, 11/2/30, FO228\4132\2 2f. 
79 Such as the hospital for the poor suggested by Yu Xiaqing and backed by Lampson, see Shanghai 
No.179, 15/5/29 and enclosures, FO228\3938\3 2f. The SMP scapegoats dismissed by the SMC, 
Everson and McEuen, were still receiving large pensions in 1939. The combined annual total was 
£2,000 (SMC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 426) so that by 1941 they had received much more than was 
paid out to the victims of the incident. 
80 Lampson, “Minute of Interview with MFA”, 20/5/29, FO228\3938\6 2f. 
if unacceptable.”81 In general so pervasive was the denigration of Chinese motives, 
ambitions and abilities, and so strong was the national solidarity enforced by treaty 
port life, that effective understanding of nationalism was severely hampered. 
 
Part II Improving Relations 
 
Serious Dinners 
 The problem of Sino-British relations in the late 1920s went further than 
ideological hostility: structures of relationships, patterns of trade and of formal 
institutional organisation were questioned.  Most of these had evolved under the 
shadow of Britain’s informal empire and the imperialist behaviour of the British in 
China.  Their curtailment under nationalist attack involved widespread formal and 
informal changes, not just those involving the rapprochement with the Guomindang.  
Informally, improved social intercourse with Chinese officials and personalities was 
vital.  Lampson admitted in 1927 that “the Legation has of recent years had 
practically no contact of the human kind with the Chinese”.  He embarked on “serious 
dinners for all Chinese of note” and threw a “gala show” for Zhang Zoulin.82 A Sino-
British Club was formed in 1928 in pursuit of this gastronomic détente whilst the 
Peking Race Club held its first joint meetings with the local Chinese club.83 The real 
focus, of course, was now Nanjing.  Here the convivial Consul-General, Sir Meyrick 
                                                          
81 Lampson minute on FO No.178, 19/7/28, FO228\3732\33 3. 
82 Lampson to Chamberlain, 9/3/27, FO800\261; Lampson Diaries, 25/2/27. A fictional account of the 
“gala show” can be found in Bridge, Ginger Griffin, pp. 334-42. 
83 Lampson Diaries, 12/5/28, 15/5/28, 13/11/29, 20/12/29; Lampson even dined with some Cambridge-
educated “rabid nationalists” in 1927, Lampson to Chamberlain 9/3/27, FO800\260. 
Hewlett, lubricated relations liberally with senior Government officials and an 
International Club was founded to capitalise on these improvements in early 1929.84 
 In Changsha Consul-General Harding was reported to be on the friendliest 
terms of any consul with the local officials, largely as a result of his mahjong 
parties.85 Other consuls were less happy, R.S. Pratt in Tianjin heartily disliked the 
Chinese and wished to escape China and A.G. Major was “very pessimistic over 
conditions in China and...  looking forward to retirement” in Shantou in 1928.86 Su
attitudes, which partly resulted from the strains of the revolutionary years, were 
unhelpful; so was the die-hard attitude of the able Consul Kirke.
ch 
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-
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to get into closer touch with local Chinese officials88 but progress was slow; in 
Guangzhou it was only the efforts of the Chinese CFA which brought foreigners and 
Chinese together.89 Efforts were made to rid the Consular service in China of the die
hards, such as Sir Sidney Barton, kicked upstairs to become Minister to Abyssinia, 
and liabilities such as the crude and intemperate Sir James Jamieson and A.E. 
Eastes.90 At higher levels personal relations improved to the point that, despite wide 
84 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made over the old German Consulate to the club for a nominal rent 
of $1 p. a., Wang Zhengting, the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs was first president, and 
Hewlett the vice-president; other board members included Song Ziwen, Kong Xiangxi and Sun Fo, 
NCH, 9/2/29, p. 224, 9/3/29, p. 395, 16/3/29, p. 438. See Lampson Diaries, 7/12/28, for a description 
of one evening Lampson spent in this convivial company; for details of one of Hewlett’s high-level 
Bridge parties see Hewlett to Lampson, S/O, 10/2/29, FO228\3940\22 3. 
85 H. Phillips, “Inspection of Changsha Consulate-General”, 4/11/28, FO369\2021 K15557/15557/210. 
86 H. Phillips, “Inspection of Consulate-General in Tientsin”, 15/2/28, FO369\2019 
K10346/10346/210; H. Phillips, “Inspection of Swatow Consulate”, 4/3/29, FO369\2706 
K5499/5499/210; Major was criticised by British merchants for not cultivating the local Chinese, G.W. 
Swire to John Swire and Sons, 1/2/29, SP ADD 15. R.S. Pratt was also, like his brother Sir J.T. Pratt, 
the butt of racist remarks from the treaty port British, inspired by their part-Indian descent, Coates, 
China Consuls, pp. 429-30. 
87 H. Phillips to Edward Crowe, 15/1/28, FO369\2017 K2988/2299/210. 
88 H. Phillips, “Inspection of Ningpo Consulate”, 30/3/28, FO369\2018 K6294/6294/210. The Tianjin 
Consulate-General was “rather out of touch” with the Chinese authorities, whilst in Yingkou 
[Newchwang] relations were “correct, but not particularly friendly”, H. Phillips, “Inspection of 
Consulate-General in Tientsin”, 15/2/28, FO369\2019 K10346/10346/210; H. Phillips, “Inspection of 
Newchwang Consulate”, 15/9/28, FO369\2019 K10348/10348/210. 
89 Canton No.19, 19/2/29, FO228\3940\29 3. 
90 On Jamieson see Coates, China Consuls, pp. 453-55, 461-63; on Eastes see ibid., pp. 476-69. 
differences in diplomatic stance, the 1931 negotiations on extraterritoriality were 
conducted on a house-boat on a river near Nanjing91 and Lampson’s relations with 
Jiang Jieshi were good.92 These attempts to ease social relations were also import
because of the leading role consuls played in British treaty port society and the 
example they could set, whilst also enabling Britons and Chinese to meet.  They were
largely initiated by Lampson and the new career diplomats from the Foreign Office
requested, who were not men of the China establishment.
ant 
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 with local Chinese.94 
                                                          
93 Other individuals playe
important local roles; Hewlett, when in Xiamen, managed to prevent the feelings of 
the British getting out of hand and rupturing relations
 
The Consular Service 
 As well as these informal moves Lampson was aware of the need for 
institutional reform to improve the Consular service.  It had to be made more aware of 
Chinese affairs and opinion.  Diplomatically, as a service, it was at a disadvantage 
compared to the Japanese establishment with its greater resources and its readiness to 
resort to “devious methods.”95 The complacent, insular cosiness encouraged by 
conditions during the Warlord era was unsuitable when it came to dealing with the 
accelerated pace of change in Nationalist China, and was a liability in political 
91 Lampson Diaries, 24/5/31. 
92 See, for example, his comments in Lampson to Wellesley, 8/9/33, P2394/2394/150, FO395\502. 
93 Lampson instead requested men he had previously worked with in the Central Department of the 
Foreign Office, Lampson Diaries, 17/3/27. 
94 Hewlett, Forty Years, pp. 151-64. 
95 G. Moss, “Reports on Anti-Japanese Boycott at Foochow”, Foochow No.34, 2/7/28, FO228\3726\1 
2t. A good description of the better resources of the Japanese in China can be found in Douglas R. 
Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands: Toa Dobun Shoin and its Precursors, 1886-1945”, in Duus, 
et al., eds., Japanese Informal Empire in China, pp. 210-71. 
reporting.96 In 1928 proposals were launched for the creation of a Special Department 
of Chinese Affairs at the Shanghai Consulate-General.  This would interview: 
Chinese officials, keep track of native public opinion as reflected in the 
Chinese press, and in a general way, by means of making a special study of 
Chinese problems and by establishing personal contact with Chinese officials 
and local personalities, keep [the Consul-General] in touch with the trend of 
Chinese activities and movements. 
 
Anything that would help the cultivation of closer relations with the Chinese was 
desirable, added Lampson.97 In 1930, “at this transitional phase of our relations with 
the Chinese”, he requested a Chinese university-educated translator for the Legation’s 
Chinese Secretariat to keep track of the Chinese press and official published 
opinion.98 This should have been work for a British official but there were Treasury 
stringencies and a shortage of good, linguistically able staff.99 The establishment of 
the bureaucrat-heavy National Government unleashed a flood of statistics and officia
publications and, despite censorship, there was a thriving press; this flood prompted 
the consular reforms.  It is clear that this wealth of material now had to be analy
because British official observers were beginning to take a much closer interest in 
Chinese affairs and, in fact, took many of them seriously for the fir
l 
sed 
st time. 
                                                          
 One of the first things Lampson did on arrival in China was set up a Legation 
committee to investigate the state of the Consular service and suggest reforms.  The 
1928 report recommended lowering the retirement age, redistributing the work to a 
smaller number of larger centres and increasing remuneration.  Ostensibly the aim 
96 See Teichman’s description of concession-life before 1927, Affairs of China, pp. 140-41. Lampson 
was not sorry to say farewell to the Legation’s Military Attaché in 1928 as, “being resident in Peking, 
he naturally gravitated very much to the Northern camp, which was in fact good business as far as it 
went”, but which did not go very far, and supplied the Legation with a good deal of Fengtien 
propaganda, Lampson Diaries, 22/8/28. 
97 Lampson to FO, 26/5/28, No.523, FO369\2019 K8024/6379/210. 
98 Lampson to FO, 8/12/30, No.1758, FO369\2188 K50/50/210. 
99 The standard of Chinese ability attained by the student-interpreters in Beijing was still considered 
unsatisfactory in 1937, D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825 (London, 
1971), p. 188. 
was to attract more and better recruits by improving conditions of service and 
reducing chronic promotion blockage, this would also encourage the earlier arrival of 
able men in important posts.  The sub-text was an attempt to adapt the service to a 
rapidly changing China and reform the system whereby “average” men were 
promoted on length of service alone into the top jobs.  This situation made for 
complacency and dissatisfaction and kept men in China who were liabilities to the 
service or unsuitable agents for carrying out new policies and altering old ways.  
Lampson tried this in specific cases, such as by passing over for promotion the 
“gentle and retiring” 59 year-old Consul King in 1928.100  
 The service had its external critics.  It did serve, after all, as the Foreign 
Office’s first line of defence against grumblers and opponents of policy change.101 
G.W. Swire felt it needed reforms to improve morale and local flexibility on treaty 
issues.  Drafting in men from outside the service for key posts was also suggested.  
Swire was an impatient and acidic man but his criticisms indicated a wider 
dissatisfaction at the ability of consuls to execute the policy changes required after 
1927.  Despite some improvements to the career structure and the amalgamation of 
the service with the general consular service in 1936 many of these problems 
remained unresolved.102 
 The service also suffered a familiar identity crisis in that it was part of the 
British Community.  Instructions to student-interpreters going to Beijing laid most 
stress on the sporting accessories and social outfits needed for treaty port life, whilst 
                                                          
100 Lampson to FO, 24/10/28, No.1264, “Proposals for the Reorganisation of H.M. Consular Service in 
China”, FO369\2020 K13934/12995/210; Newton to Wellesley, No.128, 10/2/28, FO369\2017 
K2299/2299/210. In both 1926 and 1934 it was commented that the service’s recruits were men from 
the “bottom of the examination barrel”, Coates, China Consuls, p. 432. 
101 Platt, Cinderella Service, p. 218. 
clerical officers going to Hankou were told about the facilities at the Hankow Club 
and sporting life there.103 Many consuls, or their relatives, married into treaty port 
families and all lived and worked among them.104 This could cause conflicts of 
interest.  In most ports consuls were honorary presidents of their local British 
Chamber of Commerce; Giles in Tianjin so far took the local merchant’s point of 
view as to deeply offend the head of the visiting British Economic Mission in 1931.105 
 Consuls had to change their behaviour and the character of their responses to 
many issues.  Rigid official stances and direct intervention, over taxation, in shipping 
disputes, or over the forcible occupation of mission premises began to be recognised 
as anachronistic,106 and were also increasingly ineffective.107 Forcing the issue at 
Wanxian had only led to a bloody and inefficient naval action, still unresolved in the 
early 1930s.  The time for ““incidents” and teach them a lesson” is definitely past” 
reported Consul-General Handley-Derry, “direct co-operation” was now necessary.108 
It was also more in keeping with a situation where the Nationalist propagandists 
would exploit any British mistakes, especially given the implications of Britain’s de 
jure recognition of the National Government in 1928. 
 
Sinification 
                                                                                                                                                                      
102 The service needed “men and gentlemen and not mere rabbits, who can pass competitive entrance 
exams and spend the rest of their careers in wondering, how they can afford to live in retirement”, 
G.W. Swire to John Swire and Sons, 11/1/29, SP ADD 15. Platt, Cinderella Service, pp. 225-30. 
103 Legation to FO No.563, 29/5/28, “Hints for Newly Appointed Student Interpreters”, FO369\2017 
K8289/3238/210. A. Veitch to W.C. Scott, 28/3/28 “Report on Conditions in Hankow affecting 
Clerical Officers”, FO369\2018 K6175/6175/210. 
104 For an indication of the network of relationships with trading, missionary and Customs families see 
Coates, China Consuls, Appendix II, “Chronological List of Members of the Chinese Consular 
Service”, Column V, pp. 491-547. 
105 Ingram to Crowe, 22/1/31, and enclosures, FO369\2189 K2877/2877/210. 
106 Foochow No.68, 22/12/28, “Irregular Taxation of Foreigners”, FO228\3792\1 19p.  
107 At Chongqing Consul Blunt was roundly told off for “instructing Shipping companies how to act, 
Legation Tel .to Chunking No.10, 8/4/28, FO228\3880\11 67b. 
 Outside the establishment proper diplomats had to come to terms with losing 
influence over bodies such as the Customs, Posts and Salt.  The most important of 
these was the CMC, on foreign control of which various foreign loans were secured.  
It was also the service with the strongest British connections.  There were two issues, 
control of the Inspector-Generalship [the IG] at the top, local control, and the “threat” 
to business practice and European jobs posed by “sinification”, or, as one Consul-
General put it, “infiltration of Chinese” into the service.109 The struggle between 
A.H.F. Edwardes and Sir Frederick Maze for the top Customs post was badly 
mishandled by the Legation which backed the loser, for the wrong reasons, and 
vilified Maze.110 The articulation of the principle at stake summed up the dilemma 
facing this conservative establishment that was losing areas of influence and what it 
perceived to be the foundations of British prestige in China.  Lampson angrily asked 
the Foreign Office if it was going to “allow a hardly fledged Chinese Government” to 
dismiss “for purely personal reasons a British subject who has rendered their 
predecessors loyal service in a position of great difficulty and responsibility.”111  
In a conversation fending off Japanese interest Lampson stated that: 
the Customs had been built up by British effort and was organised 
upon purely British lines.  Behind it lay British tradition, and I did not 
                                                                                                                                                                      
108 Chunking No.13a, 11/5/28, FO228\3880\43 67b. 
109 Hankow No.103, 14/10/29, FO228\3943\45 52. For a full treatment of the CMC in this period see 
Jean Aitchison “The Chinese Maritime Customs Service in the Transition from the Ch’ing to the 
Nationalist era: An Examination of the Relationship between a Western-style Fiscal Institution and 
Chinese Government in the Period before the Manchurian Incident”, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1981). 
110 Maze was “frankly a swine” wrote Lampson in an unsent draft of a letter to Ronald Lindsay at the 
Foreign Office, 10/7/29, FO228\3943\38 5a. Edwardes, the Officiating IG, was considered unsuitable 
for the post by the National Government because of his closure of the Guangzhou Customs during the 
1925 “Shameen Incident” and because of his “devious” handling of the dispute in 1927-28. Maze was 
seen as free from British influence and sympathetic to nationalist aspirations and the need to reform the 
CMC, “Chang Fu-Yun, “Reformer of the Chinese Maritime Customs””, an oral history conducted 
1976, 1979, and 1983 by Blaise C. Gaustad and Rhoda Chang, (Regional Oral History Office, The 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1987), pp. 117, 124. 
111 Lampson to FO No.735, 3/7/28, FO228\3741\91 5a. 
believe it would continue to function efficiently and satisfactorily 
under any but a British hand.112 
 
He even sounded out Shanghai about the “means at our disposal” in case a resort to 
force was necessary.113 The other line of objection offered was the necessity of 
safeguarding the service for the protection of Chinese trade and the vital role the 
foreign staff played in bolstering the “moral flabbiness of the Chinese mind” as 
represented by morally weak Chinese customs officials.114 An altruistic appeal was 
also made to the financial needs of the National Government which, it was claimed, 
could only be secured by the CMC as it stood.  Lampson later described his 
misgivings as an “instinctive mental reserve” about Chinese corruption and 
inefficiency.115 The contradictory internal logic of this prejudice later led to 
complaints that Chinese customs examiners were over-diligently applying the letter of 
the regulations to foreign merchants, as a result of their instinctive xenophobia, whilst 
foreign customs officials were also “held down to strict instructions” for fear of 
disciplinary action.116 Opposition to sinification must also have been partly motivated 
by the desire of consuls to protect the livelihoods of friends and relations who 
participated fully in the activities of their local foreign communities.117 
 In early 1929 steps were taken to prepare the service for sinification.  Maze 
issued a circular stressing that it was “natural” that more Chinese would become 
eligible for the higher posts.  This was partly in immediate response to Chinese staff 
unrest and ill-discipline, which had been widespread since 1927, but it tied in neatly 
                                                          
112 Minute of H.M.M. Conversation with Mr Yoshizawa, 24/1/28, FO228\3740\17 5a. 
113 Lampson to Barton, S/O, 1/2/28, FO228\3740\31 5a. 
114 “Local Chinese Commissioner of Customs anxious for return of an European”, Chunking S/O, 
13/6/28. This despatch was forwarded to the Foreign Office with the principles restated in the covering 
letter, Lampson to Chamberlain, 14/7/28, FO228\3741\96 5a. See similar comments in Hankow 
No.103, 14/10/29, FO228\3943\455 5a. 
115 Lampson to Henderson, No.1015, 15/7/29, FO228\3943\34 5a. 
116 Tientsin No.20, 5/4/30, FO228\4206\3 32g. 
with longer term needs.  Customs officials were encouraged by Maze to improve 
relations with local Chinese officials, in fact to act as fellow Government servants, 
and the security of foreign jobs was assured.  Educational opportunities for Chinese 
staff were improved and in March a reorganisation of the service was announced, 
based on the principle of equality between Chinese and foreign staff; foreigners were 
no longer to be recruited.118 Some troublesome foreign staff were already being 
weeded out, such as those whose temperament “gave the Chinese real ground for the 
complaint of “imperialism” in the Customs service.”119 Chinese tidewaiters were 
recruited and it was decided that customs documents should be published in Chinese 
as well as in English.  After 1928 the annual Service List was no longer divided into 
foreign and Chinese staff sections.120 Chinese started entering the higher ranks of the 
service in more than nominal numbers in 1928.121 There were problems raised by this 
recruitment and promotion of Chinese.  The defence given in 1926 by Aglen, for the 
existence of the foreign element in the service, that it had “collectively a higher 
standard of personal honesty than the people in whose midst we work”, was still 
widely felt to be pertinent.122 The efficacy of appointing Chinese commissioners in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
117 Foreign staff had even, for example, always served in volunteer units such as the SVC. Maze put a 
stop to this practice in 1926, Aitchison “The Chinese Maritime Customs Service”, p. 449. 
118 See the circulars dated 21/1/29, 4/2/29, and 14/3/29 in Chinese Maritime Customs, Documents 
Illustrative of the Origin, Development, and Activities of the Chinese Customs Service, Volume IV - 
Inspector-General’s Circulars, 1924-1931 (Shanghai, 1939), pp. 149, 163-65, 174-80, 187. On staff 
unrest in 1927 see, for example, W.R. Myers to Maze, 9/12/27, Maze Papers, Confidential Letters, 
Vol.18. 
119 This meant men like Castle in Wuhu whose faults lay in their “uncontrollable temper or their 
intolerant sense of personal dignity”, Edwardes to Maze, 3/1/28, Maze Papers, Confidential Letters, 
Vol.20. Colonel Hayley-Bell, who mishandled the 1930 Tianjin Customs Crisis largely because of his 
old-fashioned ways, which rendered him “unfit... for work in modern China” retired in 1931, Maze to 
Stephenson 20/10/30, Maze Papers, Semi-Official Letters 5; Ting Kwei Tang to Maze, 2/7/30, Maze 
Papers, Semi-Official Letters 4; Chinese Maritime Customs, Chinese Maritime Customs IV. Service 
Series No.1 Service List, 1931 (Shanghai, 1931). 
120 Maze Semi-Official Letters 9, No.822, 8/6/28, and No.824, 26/7/28. Tidewaiters were the Customs 
officials who boarded ships, on their arrival in port, to impose Customs regulations. 
121 CMC, Service List, 1928. 
122 IG to Shanghai Foreign Staff Meeting, 28/3/26, Maze Papers, Confidential Letters Vol.19, Staff. 
major revenue centres was questioned on these grounds; foreigners, it was believed, 
would not bow to local demands and pressures.123 
 Maze claimed all along that he intended to preserve the foreign element in the 
Customs and he largely succeeded.124 This was partly to ingratiate himself with 
anyone influential and British, a characteristic habit, but it was borne out by the facts.  
Although control of the service and its revenues passed effectively into Chinese hands 
its character did remain semi-British, with enough concessions to satisfy the demands 
of Chinese staff and the propriety of the National Government.125 
 The Postal service was run by a French Co-Director General, H.  Picard-
Destelan, (who found it “a bore... to maintain personal relations with his Chinese 
colleagues”)126 under a Chinese Inspector General whose post was largely nominal.  
Foreign staff predominated in the higher positions (and not for reasons of 
competence, it was claimed)127 and relations with their Chinese subordinates were not 
felt to be good.128 In 1928 Nationalist control was extended to the whole service, 
Picard-Destelan went, employment grades were reorganised, lower-level grades were 
upgraded, more higher level grades were given to Chinese, Chinese was to become 
the official language of the service and foreign staff below Deputy Commissioner 
were in future to make do with second-class passages home.  Foreign staff began 
leaving the service in relatively high numbers and no new ones were recruited.129 
                                                          
123 Maze to Dodwell, 28/3/31, Maze Papers, Semi-Official Letters 5. As for Chinese tide-waiters they 
were found to be too intelligent, compared to their foreign counterparts, a result of the high educational 
standards required for Chinese staff, and unwilling to do “dirty work”, Edwardes to Maze, 8/8/28, 
Maze to Edwardes, 20/8/28, Maze Papers, Semi-Official Letters 3. 
124 Maze Telegram, 20/1/30, Maze Confidential Letters Vol.2. 
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126 L.C. Arlington, Through the Dragon’s Eyes: Fifty Years’ Experiences of a foreigner in the Chinese 
Government Service (London, 1931), p. 228. 
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 Similar unsuccessful arguments were used against sinification as were heard 
from defenders of the foreign-run Salt Gabelle.130 In all these cases the Legation and 
consuls attempted to preserve as much of the status quo as possible by claiming that 
the running of these foreign-staffed and structured services was incompatible with the 
loyalties of Chinese social life and individual characteristics. 
 
Extraterritoriality and Reform 
 The issue of extraterritoriality was the major immediate threat to the treaty 
port status quo.  The “unequal treaties” were easy targets for Guomindang and 
Communist propaganda.  The best case against reform was put forward in Sir Richard 
Feetham’s Report which concluded that extraterritoriality was vital for the continued 
running of the Shanghai International Settlements.  Treaty port counter-propaganda 
against rendition was less legalistic and much cruder.131 Abolition of extraterritoriality 
would leave Britons under the jurisdiction of Chinese police and courts when it was 
widely assumed that both were corrupt, unjust, and cruel, even though the British 
Government had accepted the competence of modern-style Chinese courts in the 
“January Offer”.132 Historical cases which prompted the creation of the extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
been halved by 1931, Directorate General of Posts, Reports, 1923-1930/31. The first bi-lingual Report 
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first. For a hostile account by a member of the foreign staff see IWM Boxall NWJB/8, Anon., “Essay 
on the Chinese Postal Service”, c.1932. 
130 E.W. Mead to Hussey-Freke, 30/5/28, FO228\3768\1 12c; G.E. Hubbard to Lampson, 8/6/28, 
FO228\3769\34 12c; Mead to Aveling, 4/6/28, FO228\3769\35 12c and Shanghai No.260, 2/10/28, 
FO228\3770\102 12c. 
131 Report of the Hon. Mr Justice Feetham, C.M.G., to the Shanghai Municipal Council, Part 2 
(Shanghai, 1931), pp. 149-50; for propaganda see Gilbert, Unequal Treaties, passim.. 
132 For ex-Hankow lawyer, A. Perry: “It must be borne in mind that it is merely utopian optimism to 
believe that Chinese Courts will not remain venal, corrupt and inefficient for many, many decades, 
and, in fact, unless the Oriental acquires an entirely different ratiocination, for ever”, “Memorandum 
for the Consideration of HM Foreign Office on the proposed setting up of machinery for the 
incorporation of genuine Sino-British Companies to control or operate vessels in Chinese Territorial 
Waters”, in FO to Legation No.478, 5/6/28, FO228\3881\55 67b. See the text of the offer in CYB 
1928, p. 761. 
system were recalled to justify its existence.  Apocalyptic visions of racial revenge 
were conjured up on the basis of lawlessness in the interior and the Nanjing 
incident.133 Some of the worries were sincere and the Chinese legal system was, at this 
point, occasionally far from legal and equally far from systematic.  Opposition, 
however, was largely grounded in perceptions of the Chinese character and on 
perceptions of British prestige.  To pre-empt the Foreign Office on the question of 
reform of extraterritoriality, Lampson ordered consuls to prepare material on Chinese 
judicial abuses in their districts in 1929, although few needed prompting; photographs 
of slow strangulation, or other executions, were always useful and passed on to 
London.134 
 In 1929 the Nationalist government requested the opening of discussions on 
extraterritoriality, was politely rebuffed and unilaterally declared abolition from 
January 1st, 1930.135 There was a justified fear of losing the position completely 
through this creeping Chinese abolition.136 Talks were held on and off until the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 led to the suspension of the process until 
1943.  Treaty port lore had it that its own propaganda, especially about the Thorburn 
case which was widely misrepresented in the press, undid the talks.137 
                                                          
133 On lawlessness see, for example, Foochow No.7, 19/2/30, FO228\4116\49 2. When Nationalist 
forces neared Tangshan (Hebei) in 1928 it was feared that there was “at the worst an outside 
possibility of massacre” of foreigners working there for the KMA, Shanghai No.115, 26/5/28 
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137 A.S. Henchman to J.R. Jones, 12/2/52, HSB S16.1 “Personalities and Narratives”. 
 Fear of Chinese xenophobia was widespread, especially as an undercurrent in 
the extraterritoriality negotiations; and there was always “the psychological effect of 
removing “the divinity that doth hedge” the foreigner” to be considered.138 Without 
extraterritoriality, it was believed, Chinese xenophobia would be unbridled and, by 
implication, dangerous.139 This was also the argument used to dispute the related issue 
of the abolition of Chinese Commissioners of Foreign Affairs through whom consuls 
represented British problems.  Abolition would lead to direct dealings between British 
subjects and Chinese officials who would be “not only ignorant of western ideas and 
methods but deliberately obstructive where ever foreigners are concerned”.140  
 One longer-term worry lay in the Guomindang’s educational policy, its 
content, and in the question of control.  In 1929, in response to complaints to the 
Foreign Office the Legation prepared a report on the use in Chinese schools of text-
books which were “inculcating xenophobia.” Sun Yatsen’s Sanminzhuyi was felt to be 
purely xenophobic; one series of text-books was found to be “definitely anti-foreign 
in tone, eight of them essentially so because they were San Min Chu Yi”.  Anti-
imperialism and anti-foreignism were seen as synonyms.  The evidence for the use of 
such books in schools was ambiguous although one consul complained that whatever 
text-books were or were not used the young were still taught to hate foreigners.141 
Objections to various Government-approved primers continued; in 1930 the Nanjing 
Consul-General asked the Minister of Education, Zhang Moulin if he agreed that “an 
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excuse”, Shanghai No.191, 24/9/28, FO228\3826\6 32m. 
140 Legation to FO No.1243, 28/8/29, FO228\3938\16 2e. 
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instruction based on hatred, even if historically accurate, was harmful.”142 For similar 
reasons the British complained about the official “humiliation days” promulgated by 
the National Government which, it was felt, would do nothing except stir up hatred.143 
In this case, again, a real understanding of the motivation and force of nationalism 
was obscured by the prevailing discourse about the Chinese character. 
 The issue had wider implications amongst the Chinese communities in the 
Straits Settlements and in Hong Kong where the Guomindang was proscribed, but 
where it nevertheless attempted to control Chinese education.  The use of anti-British 
text-books in schools on colonial territory was not to be relished.144 
 
In the conduct and language of their treaty negotiations and quotidian dealings with 
the National Government then, the British Legation and its consuls interpreted events 
and trends through their own preconceptions of often-clichéd Chinese national and 
individual characteristics.  In the conduct of their “retreat” from a relationship based 
on the structures of informal empire, the understandable aim was to salvage as much 
as was possible from the pre-Nationalist era.  This was reinforced by a need to 
salvage as much as was necessary to protect Britons in China from the possible 
cruelties and arbitrary injustices of life in what was always felt to be an unpredictable 
land.  This clichéd unpredictability served conservative rather than informed and 
analytical appreciations of the situation in China. 
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 Part III Changing British Behaviour 
 The British establishment had to balance the protection of the livelihood of its 
charges with the demands of revolutionary nationalism and the safety of the wider 
community.  Many individuals were better off outside China, Sir James Jamieson, 
who feared assassination in Guangzhou because of his role in the Shamian incident, 
was moved to Tianjin and then retired, his reputation a liability.145 Even after the 
climacteric of early 1927 the situation was still bad for many people’s nerves.  
Individual behaviour was felt to affect and, at times, threaten the safety of whole 
communities.  One such case was that of Customs Commissioner Castle in Wuhu in 
1928, subject of a struggle for control over the customs there, or Commissioner 
Johnston in Nanjing.146 Others were more a danger to themselves.  The Deputy 
Customs Commissioner in Fuzhou threatened to sack his servants if they attended a 
May Day parade and had his house attacked by a mob in response.  Two other Fuzhou 
foreigners caused more problems by tearing down a union banner.147 
 Keeping the wider communities calm was also important.  In Shanghai, 
especially with jurisdictional disputes between the SMC, SMP and Chinese 
authorities, the atmosphere was often tense.  In 1930, for example, an ex-
Commissioner of the Police Specials was reported to have armed himself before 
driving on the extra-settlement roads where Chinese police road-blocks had been set 
up to thwart kidnappers by searching all cars.  “The foreign community...  are mostly 
                                                          
145 Coates, China Consuls, pp. 461-63. 
146 “Owing to his nervous condition I think his presence in Wuhu is a danger to everyone”, Hewlett to 
Lampson S/O 4/1/28, FO228\3740\12 5a. Johnston was attacked by a Chinese soldier and afterwards 
talked “in such an unrestrained manner about his hatred for all Chinese” that the Consul-General asked 
for him to moved for his own and the community’s safety, Hewlett to Lampson 6/10/28, FO228\3794\3 
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in that state of mind which considers it derogatory to foreign prestige to be ordered to 
do anything by a Chinese” reported the Consul-General.148 In a related issue, 
Lampson sent all consuls a telegram instructing them to try and avoid incidents 
involving cars by discreetly persuading British citizens not to drive their vehicles 
themselves in Chinese territory, as accidents quickly became incidents.149 
                                                          
 On less tangible issues there was the problem of restraining the Shanghai 
community which was apt to be swayed by die-hard activists and by the press.150 In 
1930 the ratepayers annual meeting was roused by a British lawyer, Ranald G.  
McDonald, into overthrowing a motion to increase Chinese representation on the 
Council.151 The Consul-General panicked and suggested the forcing through of the 
change by the Consular Body in Shanghai and the Diplomatic Body in Beijing.152 An 
emergency meeting was called instead and intense lobbying engaged in to warn the 
British community of the seriousness of the matter.153 Fear of the possible Chinese 
reaction was the motivating force and memories of May 30th were fresh.154 An 
148 Shanghai No.329 2/12/30, FO228\4284\4 69h. 
149 Circular tel. to Consuls No.10 4/3/30, FO228\4312\172 84. These instructions were passed on to 
individuals by companies and councils, to the contemptuous amusement of the press, NCH, 25/3/30, 
pp. 466, 483. 
150 Teichman, in 1927 for example, felt that the atmosphere was “consistently inflamed by the North 
China Daily News and the Fascisti gentlemen who want to make Shanghai a free and independent 
city”, Minute on Shanghai No.328, 21/10/27, FO228\3677\13 69. In 1929 Green was still a source of 
problems in and outside the paper. At the 1929 Ratepayers Annual General Meeting he denounced the 
Provisional Court agreement in strong terms which were warmly received by his audience but 
denounced by the diplomats, NCH, 20/4/29, pp. 101-102; Chamberlain to Lampson, 16/5/29, FO to 
Shanghai No.17, FO228\4045\15 69. The following year, on the same issue, he was described by 
Lampson as “a public nuisance” who worked up” feeling against the SMC among the ratepayers, 
minute on Brenan to Lampson S/O, 27/2/30, FO228\4283\13 69b. 
151 SMC, Municipal Gazette, 17/4/30, in Shanghai No.103, 24/4/30, FO228\4283\27 69b. McDonald 
spurned critics of “die-hards” who believed that “foreigners out here still painted themselves with 
woad”, claimed that the problem lay in the absence of a sincere Chinese desire for co-operation and 
finished with a sizeable quotation from the Emperor Qian Long’s dismissive address to George III as 
proof of Chinese arrogance. 
152 Shanghai No.71, 17/4/30, FO228\4283\18 69b. 
153 Brenan to Lampson, Private, 22/4/30, FO228\4370 30b; Shanghai No.103. 18/4/30, FO228\4283\27 
69b. 
154 “Violent agitation is likely”, warned Brenan, Shanghai No.71, 17/4/30 FO228\4283\18 69b; on Yu 
Xiaqing see Brenan’s telegram to Lampson, 22/4/30, FO228\4370 69b. 
exceptionally large meeting of ratepayers was drummed up and the resolution passed 
by a bored majority before McDonald could finish a repeat speech.155 
 
The Press 
 The Legation’s isolation, the Consular service’s insularity, and the 
conservatism of the treaty port British caused worries in the Foreign Office and in the 
press about the effectiveness with which Britain’s dramatic policy changes were 
publicised in China.  (Publication of the “January Offer” on the second day of the 
Chinese New Year festival was a case in point).156 This worry was strengthened by 
the aggressive die-hardness of the British treaty port press and by the sending of the 
SDF, which was hailed by the British community as a reversion to the policies of 
force and “relegated to an indefinite future the prospect of reining in the press.”
Other publicity schemes were toyed with, such as a semi-official news bureau o
appointment of an information officer to the Legation, but objections to personnel and 
the desire to avoid the danger and embarrassment of association with die-hard 
propaganda kept the Foreign Office and the Legation warily distant.
157 
r the 
                                                          
158 
 However, the English-language press in China was a prime target for reform, 
firstly because it was a continual catalyst of minor disputes with the Chinese 
authorities, and secondly because it was a short-cut to influencing the behaviour of 
the wider community.  In 1929 British diplomats privately agreed that: 
155 Shanghai No.113, 5/5/30 enc. SMC, Municipal Gazette, 3/5/30, FO228\4283\37. 
156 Mounsey Minute, “British Propaganda in China”, 20/2/27, FO371\12430 F1715/1715/10. 
157 Ibid.. 
158 G. Vereker to Sir A. Willert [Head of the FO News Department], 21/3/27, FO371\12430 
F4684/48/10; for discussions on news management see FO395\419 passim., and especially the 
documents dealing with Lenox Simpson’s scheme, P331/57/150 passim., and Lampson to Willert, 
28/2/27 and enclosures, P1292/57/150. Lampson initially recommended “Close, but unofficial liaison” 
with the Shanghai Publicity Bureau, but Chinese complaints and the shrillness of the Bureau’s 
propaganda turned Legation and Foreign Office officials against it, minute on Garstin to Aveling, 
In the peculiar conditions of privilege still prevailing but already threatened in 
China, it is of special importance that the foreign controlled press should be 
circumspect and if possible friendly in their reference to Chinese politics and 
personalities.159 
Chinese political opinion, for example, viewed the North China Daily News as an 
official British mouthpiece (the “kept lady of the Bund”), a claim not helped by the 
Foreign Office’s policy of refusing to censure the press directly for criticism of 
foreign governments.160 This was unfortunate as the paper’s reputation for die-
hardness was thoroughly deserved.  It was also hostile towards British policy.  O.M. 
Green, editor since 1911, was frequently called upon to mend his ways on both 
counts.  In 1929 it was temporarily banned from the Chinese mails, for criticism of 
the Guomindang, and Green was advised to tone things down by the Consul-
General.161 Similar problems were presented by H.G.W. Woodhead and the Peking 
and Tientsin Times in Tianjin.  In 1927 he was asked to “exercise discretion” in 
reports on the Hankou agreement and subsequent events.162 At the same time 
journalists perceived as being pro-Nationalist were also restrained informally, if 
possible, whilst in early 1927 Lampson asked the Foreign Office News Department to 
divert press attention to the virtues of Zhang Zoulin.163 
 Lampson used all his influence to “get a different and better type” to replace 
Green, to the point of seeing the proprietor to impress on him the “need for a change 
of policy by the paper.” He had already received a deputation, containing Lionel 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5/10/28, FO228\3883\3 69k; Garstin to Aveling, S/O, 28/1/29, FO228\4046\2 69k; Hewlett to 
Lampson, 26/3/29, FO228\4046\4 69k; Lampson Minute, 8/7/29, FO228\4046\10 69k. 
159 Newton to Lampson, No.18, 19/4/29, FO228\3987\6 22z. 
160 Wellington Koo, Memoirs (New York, 1948), Volume 2, p. 46; China Critic, 23/1/30, p. 75; SMC, 
Annual Report, 1925, p. 66; P. M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British overseas publicity and 
propaganda 1919-1939 (Cambridge, 1981), p. 26. 
161 Legation dossier 22z 1929, FO228\3987, passim.; Lampson Minute on Shanghai No.133, 22/4/29, 
FO228\3987\5 22z. Privately Lampson felt that “the man is an ass”, Lampson Diaries, 19/1/30. 
162 Lampson Diaries, 12/10/27. 
163 Lampson to Wellesley, 28/6/27 and enclosures dealing with F.B. Riley, pro-Nationalist Special 
Correspondent of The Times, FO395\419 P899/57/150. The unfortunate Riley was kidnapped and 
killed by Chinese soldiers; “Thank God” minuted G.W. Swire in response: The Times, 7/10/27, p. 14, 
Curtis and Swires’ N.S. Brown, suggesting a better man.164 In this he seems to have 
succeeded, at least temporarily, Green was replaced by Edwin Haward, twenty years a 
journalist in India and recently Information Officer at the India office.165 Three years 
earlier Chamberlain had persuaded Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times to seek 
Lampson’s help in getting a correspondent for the paper to replace Green.166 Whilst in 
January 1930 Lampson lectured Fraser of The Times “about the advantages of taking 
a somewhat more sympathetic attitude” in his messages home to the paper.167 
 The fear of causing Chinese public disorder through injudicious foreign 
collective or individual behaviour was real.  The danger was two-fold: firstly the 
threat of civil disorder; secondly the fear that the Guomindang could use such an 
opportunity as a pretext for either unilaterally seizing the settlement or forcing an 
immediate agreement on the issue akin to the Chen-O’Malley pact.  This insecurity 
was constant and called for vigilance and faster and better reactions than had been 
evidenced by the May 30th shootings.  Better relations with Chinese community 
leaders were required and sought.  In the case of the 1930 Ratepayers Meeting Brenan 
quickly arranged a meeting with Yu Xiaqing to try to head off any agitation.168 
 Better relations would only emerge from the sustained efforts of those in 
authority to set good examples to the British communities.  This required, of course, 
such relations to have palpably successful diplomatic and commercial results. 
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167 Lampson Diaries, 20/1/30. 
168 Shanghai No.104, 22/4/30, FO228\4283\13 69. Better policing was required to back up these 
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 The Legation and the British Community 
 Privately, the diplomats admitted that the situation in the concessions had long 
been in need of reform.  However,  the inertia of the status quo had encouraged 
complacency on the issue until the Nationalist Revolution.169 These municipal 
structures had not accommodated shifts in economic power in the communities, and 
in China generally; the SMC, for example, was described as a “dictatorial self-
controlling bureaucracy” in 1929.170 In fact, the concessions had never been intended 
to be the European quasi-colonies that many residents evidently thought they were (as 
opposed to residential and trading areas for foreign businesses).171 Nor were they 
intended to be examples and schools of municipal behaviour for the Chinese, nor 
could they be whilst they excluded Chinese from active participation in municipal 
affairs and took little interest in the welfare of Chinese residents.172 Nor had they been 
intended to allow foreign landholders to profit from Chinese tenants, who took 
advantage of second-hand extraterritoriality by sheltering in the concessions when 
political conditions prompted prudence.  Defence of this profitable mechanism was an 
implicit theme throughout the history of the concessions, Zhenjiang, for example, was 
described as “a concession of absentee rent collecting land lords, the reductio ad 
                                                          
169 “...Every sane man must realise that all these political servitudes hither to existing in China must 
gradually be done away with, I have never had any delusions on that subject; take the Concessions and 
settlements for example”, Lampson to Chamberlain 1/3/27, FO800\260. See also Teichman, Affairs of 
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absurdum of the object of holding concessions in China.”173 The concessions were in 
fact, remarked J.T. Pratt, irrelevant as far as trade was concerned.174 
 The implication of their imputed colonial status was that the moral rights of 
the British residents of the treaty ports ought somehow to be paramount, and their 
wishes heard.175 The implication of the over-elaborate municipalisation was that 
financial security for landlords, bondholders and British municipal employees ought 
to be confirmed.176 One school of thought in Shanghai, notably popularised by O.M. 
Green and by Huntley-Davidson of the Shanghai Publicity Bureau, was that the 
foreign residents had every right to demand the establishment of a free port akin to 
Danzig.  This view was presented by Huntley-Davidson to the Foreign Office on 
behalf of the SMC’s British and American Councillors, and the Chairman of the 
British Chamber of Commerce, in their “personal capacities only”, in 1929.177 In fact 
the jurisdictional powers of the SMC within the settlement were so vague that the 
Legation and Foreign Office worried about actions of the Council which exposed that 
vagueness to Chinese criticism, and possible official or popular retaliation.  It 
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full-time staff in 1926, Hankow No.30, 15/3/26, BMC Hankow, Annual Report, 1926, p. 54, 
FO228\3187\105 26. 
appeared to the diplomats that the SMC was deciding the limits of its own powers178 
and that it remained ambitious for expansion.  Elements in Shanghai were still trying 
to assert council control over the whole of the external roads areas in the 1920s and 
1930s, especially in response to the Shanghai Incident of 1932.179 Some much smaller 
communities had acquired spurious municipal structures, based on grounds 
unjustifiable by treaty, which they attempted to protect and legalise, the holiday 
resorts of Guling and Mogan Shan, for example, and Ningbo.180 
 By creating a council in the old British concession at Hankou that included 
three British members, the Chen-O’Malley agreement raised false hopes that British 
residents would also be allowed representation on other retroceded authorities.  In 
Tianjin Sir James Jamieson was so surprised that he raised the issue of “most 
favoured Concession treatment.”181 In Jiujiang the British community refused to pay 
any taxes, except as voluntary contributions, without adequate representation.  This 
“settler mentality” had to be disabused, as was Huntley-Davidson’s at the Foreign 
Office.  The Legation issued King’s Regulations ordering the Jiujiang residents to pay 
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found); Mogan Shan was run by the quasi-municipal Monkanshan Summer Resort Association, Crow, 
Handbook for China, p. 169, NCH, 18/8/24, p. 274. A Sino-Foreign Committee for the foreign area in 
Ningpo ceased to exist in 1927, H. Phillips, “Inspection of the Ningpo Consulate”, FO369\2018 
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181 Jamieson to Lampson, S/O, 28/2/27, FO228\3179\60 108c. 
taxes whilst Brenan starkly told the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce that 
British subjects in China: 
who are pursuing legitimate interests other than trade... as far as they 
look to support from the home country... are inevitably subordinate to 
the exigencies of trade.182 
The exigencies of trade and of the new diplomatic relationship dictated compromise 
and reform in the British concessions.  Impetus was also supplied by pragmatists 
within the communities themselves.  The aim, generally, was to protect essentials but 
to reform where necessary and where unavoidable.  Gradual reform and sinification 
was preferable to courting armed recovery, or other measures that would threaten 
British trading interests.183 
 
Shanghai 
 In pursuit of these mildly reformist aims, as much as in an effort to restrain 
treaty port opinion, the Legation, sometimes directly, but mostly through the Consul-
General, attempted to influence the composition of the Shanghai Municipal Council 
and urge it to reform.  Barton was slow about reform184 but Garstin, temporarily in 
charge from 1928 for 18 months, was much more active.185 In 1930 the new Consul-
General Brenan announced that “Four out of the six British members are old personal 
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friends of mine and I think that all six will work well together and with me.” 
Chairman H.E. Arnhold lost his seat, a welcome departure as the Legation felt him to 
be a die-hard.186 More indirect methods were used to impress on the SMC the need for 
various policies or concessions to the Chinese whilst more progressive younger 
figures in the business community were courted and encouraged.187 
 In April 1928, with “the whole situation in China, so far at least as the foreign 
side is concerned, vastly improved of late”, it became necessary to think of the 
future.188 Lampson was still quite ready on occasion to defend the treaty port British 
to the Far East Department at the Foreign Office: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
What they are being asked to do is to prepare to sacrifice what they have built 
up, and hand it over sooner or later to what there is every reason to suppose 
will be a corrupt and incompetent administration.189 
 
but the response was unsympathetic, what they were being asked to do was: 
 
surely rather to adapt themselves at long last to the new conditions 
which they have for so long refused to recognise and to secure their 
present position and future prospects by embarking on a frank policy 
of sincere co-operation with the Chinese on a basis of equality.190 
 Contact between the Shanghai community leaders and the National 
Government began slowly and suspiciously in 1928 when R. Calder-Marshall, 
Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce, met Song Ziwen (who was dined at 
the Shanghai Club) and Kong Xiangzi.191 Appeasement of the local Chinese 
community leaders began in early 1928 when three Chinese councillors were allowed 
on to the council.  This measure had been approved in 1926, but suspended, and 
 
suggested Lampson should appeal to the 3 extra candidates to withdraw “on patriotic grounds”, 
Lampson to Legation, TS 34, 25/1/30, FO228\4283\8. 
186 Brenan to Lampson, S/O, 13/3/30, FO228\4283\15 69b; Lampson minute on Shanghai No.129, 
20/4/29, FO228\4046\16 69b. 
187 Such as the Keswicks at Jardines, Lampson Diaries, 21/2/31 and 27/3/31. 
188 Lampson to Chamberlain, 8/4/28, FO800\262. 
189 Lampson to Mounsey, S/O, 4/11/27, FO228\3677\15 69. 
Barton had been loathe to initiate the Consular meetings which had to be held in order 
to confirm constitutional change.192 The measure was accompanied by provisos that 
the number would be increased at some point; possibly within a year promised 
Lampson.193 
 In 1929 there was pressure for a further increase.  This was resisted by the 
foreign councillors who praised their Chinese colleagues in public but complained 
about them in private.194 “They have some difficulty in realising... that... “there is a 
world elsewhere”, besides Shanghai or even China” complained the Acting Consul-
General.195 The Foreign Office was driven to complain that the tone of the rebuff was 
“injudicious” and that foreign opinion might well provoke the Chinese.196 In January 
1930 the non-Chinese councillors bowed to foreign and Chinese pressure, and 
announced the intention of the Council to propose an increase.197 
 There was more to the problem than municipal representation.  “If only we 
could reach the terms of dining together and slapping one another on the back, so to 
speak, so many of these things become so much easier to handle” mused Lampson in 
1929.198 A successful International Club already existed in Qingdao and ran 
smoothly.199 Back-slapping was not encouraged by the isolation of the British and the 
exclusiveness of their social structures.  Shanghai’s public image was irredeemably 
harmed by the parks issue: the city’s Chinese residents were not allowed to use the 
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197 Feetham, Report, Volume II, p. 109. 
198 Lampson Diaries, 25/2/29. 
settlement’s municipal parks.  Objectors to Chinese use had their way in 1927 but the 
issue was resolved, and the parks opened to ticket-buying Chinese, in 1928.  Some 
later memoir-writers were still bitter about the decision; contemporary news reports 
were happier about the results.200 
 Encouraging people to mix socially was more difficult.  Where British Clubs 
relied on Chinese goodwill to function, such as the Boat Club with its “Hen-Li” 
Regatta or the Paper Hunt Club, but instead began to meet official obstructions, 
limited concessions and compromises could be, and were extracted.  Attempts were 
made to maintain racial and class taboos.  N.S. Brown was instrumental getting the 
Paper Hunt Club to make an effort to enrol more “Chinese gentlemen riders” as a quid 
pro quo for the rescinding of restrictions on hunting in the countryside around 
Shanghai.201 The Boat Club was asked, by Education Minister Wang Zhonghui, to 
make the regatta “less European.” It took steps to “induce Chinese educational 
establishments locally to train for and take part in the regatta.” Actual membership of 
the Club for Chinese was refused, because this would raise the issue of the club’s 
mixed-bathing facilities, Chinese participation in which remained a social taboo.202 
 Social intercourse would only ever arise if Shanghai became the international 
community it symbolised itself as being, in work and at play.  The Union Club of 
China was unsuccessful, only ever used on special and ritualistic celebrations of 
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unity.203 At one stage O.M. Green was even advocating admission of Chinese to the 
Shanghai Club, but nothing came of this.204 In 1931, in recognition of the fact that: 
social contact between Chinese and foreigners is, except in a small way, 
nonexistent, and it is, indeed, somewhat difficult for foreigners and Chinese to 
meet socially 
ambitious plans were floated for an International Club which would take over the 
premises of the Majestic Hotel.  Nothing came of what one paper described as “one of 
the most important innovations in the social history of Shanghai.”205 
 Freemasonry was also a slow adaptor.  An International Lodge was formed in 
Beijing in 1916 but this was exceptional.  Some Chinese did, however, join American 
Lodges after the 1920s.206 Early Chinese applicants to British Lodges had been 
discouraged, a policy that had been upheld at the end of the nineteenth century.207 
Between 1933 and 1938 relations between other Grand Lodges and that of the 
Philippines were suspended, because it was felt that the Philippine Grand Lodge was 
allowing too many Chinese lodges to be established under its authority, after the 
Grand Lodge in London had refused permission to some Chinese and others to form a 
Lodge in Shanghai in 1930.  By 1937 six Lodges had been founded.  Chinese 
exclusion was partly explained because of Masonic belief in God, and the ceremonial 
use of the bible, which non-Christian Chinese would be unable to share.208  
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 The clichés of cooperation were often heard, and ritualistic get-togethers were 
held but in the main the cultural gaps were too great, and the Shanghai British 
community too large and insular; the British also constantly complained that they 
were “expected to do all the cooperating, and the Chinese do not do their share.”209 
Some progress was made at elite levels, British business leaders learned the value of 
friendly social intercourse with their Chinese counterparts in the 1930s, although 
there were still divisions.  N.S. Brown provoked resentment, even “disgust”, among 
other Shanghailanders as a result of his “fraternization” with the Chinese.210 Swires 
made moves to “entertain more Chinese” and recognised that there were other 
advantages to mixing with them: “It won’t be a case of everlasting shop with these 
people, who have more to talk about than the foreigners here.”211 By 1937 the Bank of 
England’s representative in Shanghai felt progress on the issue great enough and 
important enough to report to his superiors.212 
 The SMC in 1927 issued a “Manifesto” declaring that it was “fully alive to the 
fact that the rapid growth of the Chinese population of Shanghai has rendered an 
alteration in its constitution desirable.” This had wide-ranging implications.213 The 
Council set up an economy committee in 1927 which concluded that more could, and 
should, be done to employ Chinese municipal staff and to make the SMC more aware 
of its new Chinese electors, and its Chinese residents (who paid a majority of the rates 
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in 1927).214 The printing, in Chinese, of the annual report, and a weekly summary of 
the Municipal Gazette, was begun as was a programme of translations of municipal 
regulations.  Efforts were also made to improve the Chinese language skills of the 
Council’s foreign employees, whose efforts had previously been nominal and poor, 
but which were compulsory by 1930.215 In December 1930 the Council announced 
that no new foreign employees would be appointed, unless it was clear that the posts 
involved could not be “satisfactorily filled by Chinese”, and Chinese cadets were 
appointed as engineers, health inspectors and to the fire brigade.216  
 Chinese education was a contentious issue, especially given its expense, but in 
1931 the Council Chairman announced that “it is the duty of this Settlement to 
provide improved educational opportunities for the children of Chinese residents”.  
Similar noises were made about health-provision, previously concerned mostly with 
the foreign population.217 
 The lesson of foreign and Chinese press hostility towards the SMC was that 
reform involved publicity and propaganda as much as anything concrete.  In the face 
of the May 30th movement the SMC had found it necessary to publish counter 
propaganda in Chinese, and this had evolved into a policy of sending translations of 
Municipal Gazette items to Chinese newspapers week by week.218 The Council then 
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became directly involved in the Shanghai Publicity Bureau which widened this work 
and distributed anti-communist material in Chinese.  At the close of 1927 the SMC 
withdrew its direct links with the Bureau, which went on to direct most of its attention 
to foreign opinion outside China.219 In 1931 a Press Information Office, with Chinese 
and Japanese assistants, was started to “prevent the publication of misleading 
articles.” It was closed down for financial reasons in 1936, by which time foreign 
press coverage of China was more concerned with the Japanese and communist 
threats.220  
 The most important publicity move was the commissioning of the Feetham 
investigation in 1930.  Sir Richard Feetham was instructed to advise the Council 
“with a view to assisting them in formulating some constructive plan or scheme” 
which would satisfy Chinese aspirations and protect business interests.221 The report 
itself was an irrelevant restatement of the conservative case against any speedy 
retrocession.222 Its importance was that it could be pointed to as evidence of a sincere 
desire on the part of the SMC to reform, especially as it was critical of many aspects 
of the Council’s relationship with the Chinese population.  In fact the spirit of the 
investigation and report clashed with the spirit of the extraterritoriality negotiations 
then underway between Lampson and Wang Zhengting.  Feetham’s sponsors and 
supporters felt that Shanghai should be excluded from these negotiations.223 The 
Manchurian crisis rendered both projects obsolete. 
 These reforms were not as complete a surrender to sinification as they 
appeared.  “Looking to the time when Municipal Administration of the International 
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Settlement would pass into Chinese hands” the Council sold off its Power department 
to an American company, and the Waterworks to a British company, to protect these 
investments and the standard of service.224 It is also notable that the council’s pension 
list, for foreign, mainly European, staff, began to lengthen rapidly after 1925; that 
year there were barely fifteen pensioners, by 1939 there were 203.225 In this way the 
“self-controlling bureaucracy” protected the interests of its staff, whilst the 
privatisations protected the investments of local foreign businessmen from the 
Chinese.  Social relations at the elite level improved but for the majority of British 
residents there was no change.  The essence of the British presence was retained. 
 
Tianjin 
 In other communities reform ran more smoothly.  This was partly because of 
the greater direct control consuls had in smaller concessions.226 In Tianjin the British 
Municipal Council in the British Concession had had a Chinese representative since 
1919 and increased the number annually after 1925.  In 1926 it threw open its parks to 
all residents, regardless of nationality.227 In 1927 it decided (in Lampson’s words) to 
“eliminate all discriminatory provisions against the Chinese” and to appoint five 
Chinese councillors; new Land Regulations to that effect were drawn up in 1928, 
though not without some reservations, especially over the example being set to 
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Shanghai.228 A British advisory committee had been set up in response to 
Chamberlain’s “January Offer” on retrocession.  This body, which included the 
Municipal Chairman, reported various measures aimed at the “maximum of 
generosity, while safeguarding fundamental British interests.” Retrocession 
negotiations did begin, with the Northern Government, and a treaty was initialled, but 
quietly abandoned in favour of municipal reform.229 One vital concession involved 
increasing the number of Chinese appointed to the Council’s staff.  In 1930 the 
position of Vice-Chairman was given to the Chinese, but this was merely nominal as 
the Chairman had, by regulation, to be a British subject, as did anyone standing in for 
him.  A Chinese Deputy Chief Inspector was appointed to the Police and the Sikh 
constables removed.230 The minutes of the annual meeting of ratepayers were in future 
to be published in Chinese.231 
 This progress gratified the Legation and generally pre-empted criticism; the 
Chinese business community thanked the British with a celebratory dinner.232 As in 
Shanghai this was not a complete surrender.  Many ratepayers were disenfranchised at 
the same time to restrict the vote to the wealthier Chinese and British and, in effect, to 
de-politicize the more communally representative structure that was created.233 
Communal protection was to be achieved by reaching an accommodation with those 
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elements of local Chinese society which mattered, in partnership with the leaders of 
the British community, not the community as a whole. 
 In this way those with the “settler” mentality were politically marginalised.  
However there was some resistance to the employment of Chinese, ultimately in order 
to protect the livelihoods of British employees.  Diplomats worried that the Advisory 
Committee were too bellicose about the difficulty of finding suitable trained Chinese 
for municipal work.  In 1929 to protect the British employees in case of an 
“unsatisfactory change in administration”, the status of higher staff grades was 
changed from non-pensionable to pensionable.234 An ad-hoc body, the Tientsin British 
Committee of Information started publishing “memoranda” from 1926 onwards which 
largely contained propaganda, some of it quite virulent, against treaty reform.235 There 
had also been attempts to introduce an education policy discriminating in favour of 
British children, but this divisive talk was discouraged “as both Britain and China are 
placed on a footing of absolute equality”, although these questions still continued to 
surface unsuccessfully.236 
 
Hankou 
 The Hankou British Concession had been subject to pressures for change since 
the Chinese took over the former German and Russian concessions as Special 
Administrative Districts (SADs) after the Great War.  These were run by a Chinese 
Director and Sino-Foreign Councils of elected representatives.  Points of contention 
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included the Hankou International Hospital (funded by the SADs and the Concession 
Councils) which barred Chinese, and the question of Chinese representation in the 
Hankou BMC as a quid pro quo for foreign representation in the SADs. 
 After a riot connected to the May 30th Incident, the British Concession 
authorities began planning reforms in response to the country’s changing political 
atmosphere.  Chinese residents in the small, symbolically walled-in area had to 
register yearly for a permit and formed a quarter of the population.237 Despite some 
die-hard resistance, it was decided to allow two Chinese representatives on to the 
Council, increasing its number to six.  This was the logical outcome of permitting 
residence, it was also felt that it was “best to work with the persons amongst whom 
we live” while for the Chinese representation would also have “an educative 
value.”238 At the same time the International Hospital was opened to Chinese p
in response to Chinese threats to cut off funding from the SAD’s.
atients 
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 This small community was attempting to secure the status quo with the 
minimum concessions acceptable to the local Chinese authorities.  These moves were 
superseded by the seizure of the concession in January 1927 and by the Chen-
O’Malley agreement which ratified and legalised the transfer.  Under the agreement 
Hankou had been immediately retroceded and a municipality created to administer it, 
under a Chinese director and six elected councillors, three Chinese and three Britons.  
The Sikh constables were dismissed and a tablet commemorating the hand-over 
237 The wall was not unique, the Jiujiang concession had had gates which shut it off from the Chinese 
city and Shamian was only approachable across a guarded bridge, Woodhead, The Yangtsze and Its 
Problems (Shanghai, 1931), p. 116. 
238 For details and minutes of the ratepayers meeting at which this was decided see Hankow No.30, 
15/3/26, FO228\3187\10526; Hankow No.6, 4/5/26, FO228\3187\121 26. The fullest description of the 
riot can be found in the 1926 Annual Report of the Council in Hankow No.30, 15/3/26, 
FO228\3187\105 26. 
239 Hankow No.58, 30/4/26, FO228\3187\120 26. 
placed on the Municipal Building.240 The bitter atmosphere in Hankou was not 
conducive to municipal success despite the concession which allowed British 
residents to be involved in Chinese municipal affairs, a concession they never 
appreciated as such, preferring to see it as a right.241 
 Taxation was the usual cause for complaint.242 Parts of the community were 
apt to respond in die-hard terms about British prestige and still hankered for re-
occupation by force, such as the editor of the Central China Post (whose attitude must 
have been coloured by the fact that he had been in China since the 1870s).243 The 
behaviour of one British Councillor probably hastened the amalgamation of the SADs 
into the Wuhan municipality; his response was to retire to Britain.244 
 
The Smaller Communities 
 The smaller communities faced more immediate threats of retrocession, 
Zhenjiang was handed back in 1930 as were the Xiamen Concession and Weihaiwei.  
The process, however nobly intended and satisfactorily executed, involved taking 
risks with the totems and characteristics of treaty port life, risks which were well 
publicised by the press.  The Bund at Zhenjiang was used for public executions by the 
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Chinese and this was “undesirable from the point of view of British prestige”.245 
“New use for Kiukiang Bund”, drolly captioned the North China Herald on a front
page photograph of Nationalist troops squatting there (expressly to show their 
contempt for the foreigner, claimed another witness); William Sewell complained in 
1928 that the Hankou Bund was “no longer a very nice place to walk as it is so 
unsanitary and smelly”.
-
 
l-General.247 
                                                          
246 The war memorial at Hankou, damaged and defaced during
the takeover, was moved into the grounds of the British Consu
 Elaborate preparations were made for protecting as much as possible of the 
structures and integrity of treaty port life, especially in these smaller communities 
which, unlike Shanghai or Tianjin, would have little recognisable identity after 
retrocession.  Segregated recreational facilities were important; the Bund in the 
Hankou British Concession had previously been restricted to foreign use, as had the 
municipal school.  The Chinese authorities were unwilling to continue funding the 
school unless it admitted Chinese pupils - so the school became a private institution 
funded by British and American companies.248 In Jiujiang the public gardens had 
become part of the Kiukiang Club grounds, and the Club sold by its owners, the 
“foreign lotholders”, to the Kiukiang Club and Recreation Ground, a British 
registered company.  This procedure removed the gardens from municipal control and 
left them open only to club members, that is, to Europeans.249 When the Cheefoo 
245 Hugh Tweedie, R.A.Y., “Visit to British Concession at Chinkiang, 14/3/28”, enclosure No.2 in C-
in-C to Lampson, 26/3/28, FO228\3819\1 29a. 
246 NCH, 27/4/29, p. 1; caption by P. H.M-F., The Pipeline, 29/5/29, p. 170; Sewell, journal letter, 
4/3/28, Sewell Papers PPMS 16/3. 
247 Hankow No.40, 23/3/29, FO228\4017\2 40e. 
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A.E. Marker, explaining the changes, in BS Shanghai to JS, 31/8/28, JSS II, 2/7; H. Phillips, 
“Inspection of Hankow Consul-General”, 4/11/28, FO369\2021 K15531/15531/210. 
249 Unfortunately the Club building itself was a municipal property which, under the terms of the Chen-
O’Malley agreement, was to be sold to the Club’s company, this happened slowly and the Chinese 
International Committee was abolished in 1930 the same protective action was 
suggested for the recreation grounds there.  Similar measures were taken to safeguard 
British cemeteries from spoliation.250 
 On the island of Shamian in Guangzhou, plans were laid in 1929 as: 
If the Council became a Sino-Foreign body as at Hankow it is feared that their 
controlling vote may be used to throw the Swimming Bath Club open to 
Chinese and other Orientals and so render it practically useless to the present 
white membership. 
 
The Club leased land from the Council which in turn leased it from the Consulate.  It 
was decided that the Council should divest itself of the lot which would be leased 
directly to the Club from the Consulate via a trust fund.  The threat of forced 
assimilation was thereby removed.  Similar measures were taken to protect the Public 
Gardens, which were to be included in the Consulate’s own lot, whilst the Tennis and 
Football Clubs were transferred to the Shameen (Canton) Club.  “It is most desirable 
to have all this sort of thing fixed up well ahead of any talk of rendition”, minuted 
Teichman in 1929, “Certainly: most wise”, commented Lampson.251  
 The dismantling and reform of the institutions of British treaty port life was 
patchily accomplished.  This was motivated in many cases by the desire to protect the 
social institutions around which the British communities existed, such as clubs.  It 
was also a result of the still dominant attitudes fostering racial segregation.  
Furthermore, the cemeteries, parks and memorials were symbols of imperial status, 
setting the British apart from the native population.  That they raised obstacles to the 
smooth functioning of existing trade relations and the development of new ones was 
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not, ultimately, questioned by the more far-sighted in the British establishment.252 
They raised constant diversionary disagreements which were capable of poisoning 
relations.  The SMC attempted to give itself the appearance of functioning as a 
comprehensive municipal body attentive to the needs of all its inhabitants, in terms of 
representation, employment, health and education.  The effect of a successful reform 
would be to deflate local demands for retrocession, or give securer grounds for 
postponement of it for as long as possible.   
 Reform was ultimately irrelevant, although it defused immediate tensions in 
1927 and 1928 which may have led to stronger Nationalist demands for retrocession.  
In fact the Shanghai settlement’s authority over its Chinese community was negligible 
on major issues and it is clear that the maintenance of public order was always its 
main priority and the determinant of reform.253 After the 1932 “Shanghai Incident” the 
SMC became even more irrelevant, and impotent, in the face of Japanese activities. 
 
Opposition to Reform: The British Residents’ Association 
 There was resistance from those who ultimately had most to lose from the 
erosion of the structures of informal empire: the employees of the concessions, the 
customs, and those who serviced those communities: the treaty port British.  Where 
they could occasionally protest they would, as at the 1930 SMC ratepayers meeting, 
but mostly they were marginalised or, as in Tianjin, disenfranchised.  They felt that 
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they were being betrayed by the diplomats and their hostility often embraced, for 
example, the SMC itself; sometimes directly.  Supporters of a motion to allow the 
press into Council meetings attacked the Council’s “veil of mystery and secrecy” for 
precisely these reasons.254 
 This distrust was a problem.  The French Concession was run absolutely by 
the French Consul-General but the British were proud of the great example of 
municipal self-government they felt the settlement to be.255 The consequence of even 
this limited democracy was a lack of outright control over affairs in Shanghai.  
Indirect control and interference was feared and resented by ordinary Britons: 
“Beware of any vaguely worded promises - Beware even of statement made by senior 
members of the Council’s staff” warned the seconder of the press motion in 1930.256 
 Their response was to form the Shanghai British Residents’ Association in 
1931 (later styled the British Residents’ Association of China).  Prominent leaders of 
this organisation included Woodhead, Green and Ranald G. McDonald (apparently 
regarded by “the small person... as his special representative on the committee”).257 It 
was established by a mass meeting of British residents in November 1931, which was 
fuelled by opposition to the extraterritoriality negotiations and particularly by the 
outrage caused by the Thorburn case.  It attracted members quickly throughout the 
British communities in China, and especially represented those whose employers 
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discouraged or forbad political activism in the treaty ports.  It opposed further 
concessions to the Chinese and attempted to by pass the Legation by appealing 
directly to parliamentary and public opinion in Britain through a full-time London 
office.  It also attempted to influence the composition of the SMC by indicating to 
members which British candidates to vote for.  It was, in essence, an admission of 
defeat and impotence by the bulk of the British community, whose interests had been 
“subordinated,” to the exigencies of trade and pragmatic diplomacy.258 Swires, 
tellingly, refused to have anything to do with this desire of “the small treaty port 
people” to “go backwards.” The company was more concerned with “bigger national 
interests.”259  
 This was not a new phenomenon at a time of crisis.  A Shanghai Property 
Owners Association was formed in September 1927260 and in August 1927 a 
“Shanghai Fascisti” had been organised, to “support the authorities in the present 
crisis, and to act in the interests of the entire community”.  There was a great rush to 
enroll.261 It is clear, from letters and diaries, that disillusionment with the Foreign 
Office, Legation and business elites was thorough, and that the appeal of a 
paramilitary organisation tapped into the rich vein of subdued violent discontent.262 
[See figure 5, following page].  So much so that Council leader Fessenden took pains 
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to urge great caution on the organisation for fear of incidents.263 It was one of the 
precursors of the BRA, its leadership was mainly British, while at least one local 
journalist was actively involved in both.264 
 British resentment was also symbolised by the widespread support for the 
Japanese in the aftermath of the invasion of Manchuria.  Japan’s strong-arm actions 
appealed to those who felt betrayed as the British Legation oversaw the dismantling 
of the structure of informal empire in China.  Some of the most prominent treaty port 
Britons, such as Woodhead, voiced such opinions.265 
 
Part IV Education and Restraint  
Educating the Chinese 
 The question of educating the Chinese was often raised.  It was one of the 
clichés of the imperial relationship and the December Memorandum had specifically 
renounced the idea of “foreign tutelage.” In a more specific sense education was 
recognised as an extension of the pro-British propaganda that was seen to be needed 
in China.266 British policy was not intended to be a policy of unconditional retreat and 
education was one method of minimising damage.  Education also complemented 
efforts to improve the structures and habits of concession life. 
 It was widely felt that the perceived primacy of American influence in China 
was a direct result of the large number of Chinese students who studied in the United 
States.  Dislike of Britain, British methods and moderation, were thought to be 
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instilled by the American cultural environment with its republican and democratic 
ideals.267 The situation was also bad for trade.  This view was strengthened by the 
widely held belief that the Chinese instinctively liked the straightforward and honest 
British more than other foreigners.268 
 The Boxer Indemnity Commission recommended a programme of 
scholarships for Chinese students to study in Britain, but stressed that the desired 
emphasis should be “more cultural than technical.”269 A programme of academic 
exchanges and scholarships began in 1932-33.270 The Federation of British Industries 
(FBI) and China Association also put forward a technical training scheme and their 
selectors were told to “pick future leaders.”271 Efforts were made to improve the 
quality of the experience of Chinese students in Britain.272 This also involved keeping 
in touch with them when they returned to China and employment: for this reason the 
Joint Committee of the China Association at Shanghai entertained the British 
Returned Students Union to a garden party in 1932.273 The widespread personal bias 
against the Westernised students may well have remained, but it was no longer 
politically expedient and grew increasingly anachronistic.  In 1934 a Sino-British 
                                                                                                                                                                      
266 See enclosure No.10, “War with China” in C-in-C (China), China Station General Letter No.3, 
11/3/27, ADM\116\2509 MO1165/27. 
267 See, for example, Eastern Engineering, 12/7/28, p. 173, “Opportunities in China”; and Hong Kong 
University Chancellor W.H. Hornell’s comments quoted in CHAS/MCP/35 Papers Circulated, 5/7/28. 
Britain was recommended in preference to the United States by the Joseph Bailie, as it was easier to 
get long-term work-placements there, NCH, 23/2/29, p. 310. 
268 For example see Hugh Tweedie, R.A.Y., to First Sea Lord, 21/6/29, FO228\3961\42 10q. 
269 Report of the Advisory Committee... respecting the China Indemnity, pp. 22, 151. The “China 
Indemnity (Application) Act”, was first announced in 1922 and passed into law in 1925. It allowed for 
receipts collected after 1922 to be used for educational or other purposes “beneficial to the mutual 
interests” of Britain and China. ibid., pp. 5-7. 
270 Report of the Executive Council of the Universities’ China Committee in London for 1932-33, pp. 2-
6. 
271 Sir Frank Gill “The Chinese Engineering Apprentice and the Federation of British Industries”, 
UCC, Annual Proceedings, 1942-43, p. 27. 
272 A China Institute was set up in London to provide a focus for Chinese students, who also had a full-
time adviser, UCC, Report 1933-34, p. 9. 
273 Minutes of Meeting of Joint Committee Shanghai, 19/9/32, CHAS/MCP/37. 
Cultural Association was formed in Nanjing with a similar educational purpose, 
Lampson became its Honorary President although there were no Foreign Office funds 
available for such initiatives.274 
 Hong Kong University was, theoretically, a more cost-effective way of 
inculcating such cultural influence, (Clementi described it as “a most valuable asset of 
the British Empire in the Far East”).275 However, according to its former Chancellor 
mainland Chinese students apparently resented discriminatory treatment in the 
colonial atmosphere of Hong Kong, such as being pushed off the pavements, whilst 
British firms in China were wary of employing the university’s graduates.  They were 
too bookish, and too many of them were Straits Chinese and not, therefore, 
“gentleman’s sons.”276 It had yet to live up to its potential.  The British educational 
effort in China was often lauded for fostering the “English public school spirit” there; 
however, as most British Public Schools in China continued to exclude Chinese 
pupils, this was an unreliable source of influence.277 
 Much of this educational debate remained theoretical, however, as financial 
constraints were strong.  By 1939 only 58 students had arrived on the FBI scheme; 
between 1925 and 1931 an estimated 5,700 Chinese students went to study in the 
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United States.278 A Sino-British Cultural Association was set up in Nanjing in 1933 to 
facilitate academic and cultural links but there were to be no funds from the 
Government.279 Efforts were made to push specific cases, such as the education of 
Zhang Xueliang’s son.280 
 The issue of education was closely allied to that of British advisors to China.  
The British Naval Advisor of 1931-1933 certainly felt that his chief duty was to 
alleviate British unemployment by selling battleships, but he also constantly stressed 
the value of British training for Chinese Naval Officers; as far as the Legation was 
concerned his chief duty was to prevent any other nation filching the position.281 This 
was an extension of the perceived need for closer personal relations.  There was no 
proof that foreign advisors were influential or that they at all strengthened the position 
of their home nation in the eyes of the National Government.282 They did, however, 
provide a channel through which personal relations could be further eased.  Sir 
Frederick Whyte, advisor from 1929 to 1931, had originally been sent out to China by 
an ad-hoc consortium of firms with China interests and these links were maintained, 
albeit informally, when he became advisor.  When G.W. Swire visited China in 1929, 
he was advised to see Nationalist ministers such as Song Ziwen, Kong Xiangxi and 
Wang Zhengting and businessmen such as Chen Guangfu, Xu Xinliu and Li Ming, 
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and to arrange these meetings through Whyte.283 Britain’s share of advisers was not 
large and only the Leith-Ross mission in 1935-6 had any major influence.284 
 
Educating the British 
 If Chinese students feared that they would be shoved off the pavements in 
colonial Hong Kong it seemed that it would make more sense in the first instance to 
change the behaviour of those shoving them.  Meeting returned students at garden 
parties in Shanghai would be a wasted effort if Britons were still encouraged by the 
dominant forces of socialisation to have no real social contacts with Chinese.   
 It was widely acknowledged in British commercial and diplomatic circles that, 
for reasons of politesse, trade and pragmatism, there was a need to change social 
behaviour.  In response to this the Department of Overseas Trade published a 
pamphlet for young businessmen in 1934.  In June 1932 Louis Beale, Commercial 
Counsellor at Shanghai, wrote to Sir Edward Crowe at the DOT about the then 
missionary E.R. Hughes who “while in England on leave intends to spend some time 
exploring the possibilities of closer intimacy between Shanghai British and Chinese.” 
Hughes was encouraged in this by N.S. Brown and by G.E. Hubbard, political agent 
of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, who had prepared a memo describing “a 
somewhat nebulous project for the inculcating into younger minds of a somewhat 
better conception of, and attitude towards, the Chinese and China.”285 Various 
approaches were suggested.286 Beale favoured a handbook of some sort and thought 
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the project vital for British trade.  Hughes’ dislike of British treaty port behaviour has 
already been noted.287 
 Whatever the aim, the DOT was favourable and anxious that any document 
would be under their control “in order to prevent any tendency to go the other 
extreme, namely, one of sentiment, overlooking the realities of certain Chinese 
delinquencies.”288 Sir John Pratt at the Foreign Office, always a critic of treaty port 
ignorance, was enthusiastic.289 An unofficial committee of academics and 
businessmen was brought together and their reaction was generally favourable.  
Leefe, for Mathesons, identified the problem as: 
a tendency for youngsters arriving out in China to be either entirely 
unreceptive of the point of view of the native and to condemn every overture 
by them as requiring either an ignominious kowtow from us -...  - or else to go 
the other extreme and in an impulsive effort to get a reputation for breadth of 
mind and condemn the institutions of their own country.290 
 
A meeting was held at the DOT in September which included the usual China 
worthies.291 Two things came of this, an offer from Sir Denison Ross, at the School of 
Oriental Studies to run “Special Courses of Study for Commercial Students” and 
instructions to Consul A.G.N. Ogden to write a pamphlet.292 Not much came of the 
Denison Ross proposal although BAT and Swires sent a steady flow of people to the 
School after the mid-1930s.293 Whether the special courses would have produced 
Hughes’ gentlemen is open to question. 
                                                          
287 Hughes to Crowe, 15/12/32, BT 60/31/5/65. 
288 Farrer Minute, 6/7/32, BT 60/31/5/1. 
289 Pratt, War and Politics, pp. 19-20; see his minute in BT 60/31/5/1-5. 
290 Leefe to Crowe, 29/8/32, BT 60/31/5/18. 
291 Including Crowe, Sir Charles Addis, Arthur Balfour, Robert Waley Cohen, Hughes, Gull, Stanley 
Dodwell and Pratt: “Minutes of a Meeting Held at the Department of Overseas Trade in 13th 
September 1932 to Discuss Anglo-Chinese Relations”, BT 60/31/5/35. 
292 Sir E.Denison Ross to Crowe, 14/11/32; BT 60/31/5/70a, 1/2/33, BT 60/31/5/59a. 
293 12 from BAT and 18 from Swires were registered from 1934 to 1936: SOS, Annual Reports, 1934-
35 to 1937-38, SOAS CHAS S.I.3. 
 The booklet was quite good.  Ogden’s original text was fair but needed toning 
down to avoid unhelpful comments about the “ingrained” propensity of the Chinese to 
“squeeze” and lamentations about the declining “general standard of commercial 
morality” among Chinese businessmen.294 A single pamphlet, despite all the sound 
and fury, was unlikely to affect things too greatly, but the realisation of its necessity 
was indicative of the shift in progress, in the attitudes of influential Britons.  It 
compares very favourably, in its evaluation of the Chinese character and its 
bibliographical suggestions, with the 1928 War Office Pamphlet Notes on 
Shanghai.295 
 
Conclusion 
 It is clear that the relationship of the British establishment in China with the 
Guomindang was affected by, and to some extent, especially in the early days, 
actively hindered by, received notions of the Chinese character.  Political reporting 
and analysis were seriously affected by this, by the structures of treaty port life and 
the plurality of social factors which contributed to the discourse.   
 The British establishment, particularly individuals such as Lampson, Brown 
and Hughes, made significant efforts to reform; compromising and liberalising as far 
as was practical and its personnel were able.  It also had some later doubts as to the 
wisdom of its earlier shrill opposition to the Guomindang.296 But it would only reform 
on its own contradictory terms - these involved both conscious and unconscious 
loyalty to the British community on many basic and “instinctive” issues, together with 
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a sense of Empire and its dignity.  Purging unsuitable personnel was sensible and did 
bring some benefits.  Younger and more progressive businessmen were encouraged 
by the Legation, younger men encouraged too within the Consular service to replace 
those whose experience had made them conservative or cynical, and those who had 
identified themselves too closely with the interests of the British community.  The 
new emphasis was on objectively protecting those interests within Chinese law and 
the context of diplomatic policy. 
 The institutional structures reformed in and after 1927 had upheld and 
strengthened the insularity of the British treaty port community, and also left it 
vulnerable to criticism and attack.  The public privileges British and other foreign 
residents reserved for themselves (parks, representation, employment), were easy 
targets for the mobilisation of discontent and political opposition as were the more 
obvious colonial trappings, such as Sikh policemen.  They also made it difficult for 
the treaty port British to understand the nature of their own position in China and their 
own obstructive irrelevance when it came to changing patterns of trade.  “Prestige”, 
too, was an impediment to trade - in the responses with which it encouraged, and in 
the attitudes it bred.  It functioned not just as a determinant of relative standing but 
was also important to the self-esteem of representatives of an empire which could no 
longer rely on defending itself militarily.  The Chinese world-view was still fiercely 
Sino-centric and it is not surprising that the British were sensitive about their prestige, 
the limits of their strength had been fully exposed in China. 
 It is clear that the British establishment was piqued and bewildered that its 
liberal protestations and concessions were not widely believed by the Chinese.  
Lampson found it perverse that one group of nationalists he talked to in 1927 “simply 
could not believe that our policy was as liberal and conciliatory as I explained.”297 
Wang Zhengting was driven to note in 1928 that “the liberalism which you claim to 
be characteristic of your race never takes concrete form except under direct pressure 
from those who expect to benefit from it.”298 This British reaction shows how the 
motivations and implications of Chinese nationalism were not at all well understood 
or appreciated.  It is also related to an almost obsessive desire to be liked and to be 
thought fair (hence Lampson’s “justice with firmness”) which was an aspect of the 
imperial mentality and of the thriving legacy of condescension rooted in the period of 
informal empire. 
 Much of this reform was nominal and at elite levels.  Social and cultural 
relations between the British and the Chinese were now seen to exist whereas before 
they had been mostly ceremonial.  The work of the UCC or the effect of the Nanjing 
International Club was small in scale but rich in symbolism and example.  Consul 
Stark-Toller returned from secondment to the Foreign Office Far East Department to 
Chunking and announced that: 
I don’t think one would get very far out here by taking a rigid stand on legal 
principles and treaties...  Liu Hsiang’s Chief of Staff... said “I don’t know 
anything about the treaties, but I’ll do anything you want for the sake of 
friendship.299 
 
This statement says as much about the evolving discourse that informed his work as it 
does about local conditions in Sichuan.  Johnston at Weihaiwei had feared that 
retrocession there would contribute to another discourse and the: 
creation of a legend that the inhabitants of the Territory, having been ground 
under a merciless foreign yoke for over thirty years, had welcomed their 
liberators with tears of joy, 
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and that the “liberators” would remove all traces of the British past.300  The avoidance 
of such extinction, and complete loss of influence, was as important a factor in the 
reform of the structures and attitudes of the British establishment in China as practical 
necessity. 
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Chapter 5 
BAYONETS INTO SHARES 
 
Introduction: British Businesses and Revolutionary Nationalism 
 
 
Ross (Jardine’s Agent) dined with me, the usual subject of what policy to 
pursue came up. Old Ross, who has been in this country for ages remarked 
“We’ve always Traded at the point of the Bayonet, and we shall have to 
go on doing it, or clear out altogether. These people require to be taught a 
lesson about every ten years!”1 
 
Businesses formed the largest part of the British community in China. Their structures 
and practices exhibited many of the attitudes towards the Chinese discussed in previous 
chapters, often in more concrete forms than possible in other spheres. The necessity of 
changing both attitudes and practices was, as chapter 4 has shown, an underlying theme 
in the thinking of the British Legation, especially as it was a fecund source of complaint 
and incident. Those who believed, like Ross, in the bayonet approach to Chinese 
problems were numerous and vocal. While their stance was understandable during the 
crisis of the Nationalist Revolution itself, after 1928 their continuing conservatism was an 
obstacle to improving relations with the Chinese. 
 There were two parts to this problem. Firstly, there was the climate engineered by 
socialisation in the treaty ports. Changing this involved dealing with language training, 
the general sinological education of new staff, and especially with social patterns in 
treaty port business circles. In general it involved attempting to change the insular 
outlook that existed among Britons and replacing it with one transparently more attuned 
to the Chinese markets and customers, on which British businesses were ultimately 
reliant. 
 Secondly, there was the more tangible process of changing the structures of 
British businesses in China, in order to strengthen their presence there. Events after May 
1925 showed how far their overt and exclusive Britishness left them perilously 
vulnerable to political attack, both metaphorically and literally. Reform involved making 
them more adaptable to local conditions, less obviously completely British, and more 
integrated within the Chinese economy. In practical terms this meant getting on with 
Chinese business leaders, politicians and military men, cooperating with Chinese 
business, setting up Sino-British companies and employing more Chinese staff in more 
responsible positions. In effect this meant moving towards the sinification of British 
business structures.  
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 Sinification generally also involved removing or reforming business practices 
which actively discriminated against Chinese, whether customers or staff. There was 
discriminatory segregation, for instance, on ships, in British-owned hotels and in other 
buildings,2 whilst businesses also upheld and enacted the British community’s taboos, 
such as the prohibition against mixed marriages.3 Such discrimination contributed 
significantly to the social exclusivity of the British in China. It largely grew out of 
distrust of the Chinese that was rooted in accepted constructs of the Chinese character, 
for example: that Chinese staff could not be trusted, the Chinese mind could not be 
understood (middlemen were therefore required), and Chinese were incapable of taking 
responsibility. 
 Reform involved rethinking by British businessmen both of the nature of their 
presence in China and their behaviour as institutions, as employers, as providers of 
services to Chinese customers, and as individuals. They had to put into practice the often 
quoted platitude (even voiced by Jiang Jieshi) that, “the interests of both foreign and 
Chinese” businessmen were “essentially the same.”4 
 The alternative to reform was withdrawal from China. This was unacceptable for 
various reasons: much capital was tied up there and retreat would damage British 
imperial prestige, and could adversely influence the political debates underway in India 
about the rights of British commerce there. Furthermore, the history of British trade with 
China was intimately linked to the successful use of force, and it was widely felt that 
withdrawal would betray that legacy whilst peaceful trade was assumed to be mutually 
beneficial and sensible. 
 For two further reasons Britain could not afford to lose the opportunity to exploit 
what was, when settled conditions returned to China, a potentially vast market. The myth 
of the China market was still strong and was boosted by the fact that, despite chaotic 
trading conditions, increasingly good business was being done in China.5 Furthermore, 
Britain could not afford to lose overseas markets for domestic reasons, especially when 
competition for those markets was international. Warren Swire claimed in 1930 that: “it 
is desirable in the national interest for British trade in China to continue.”6 The 
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Department of Overseas Trade’s [DOT] 1930-1931 Economic Mission to China and 
Japan was careful to stress the importance of trade with China to the British economy, 
and especially to British employment. The onset of the depression in Britain accentuated 
this necessity, which was also politically informed and often articulated as a response to 
labour conflict in Britain in the 1920s. These pressures made political conciliation with 
the Nationalists vital. Consul-General Brenan in Shanghai made it clear, in a speech to 
the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce in 1930, that: 
 
In these days of financial stringency and unemployment in Great Britain 
the maintenance and increase of our exports, the keeping of old markets 
and the development of new ones is a matter of vital necessity, and any 
policy which seems likely to achieve that object will inevitably prevail 
over a course of action that might endanger it.7 
The onset of the depression followed the steady decline in the value of silver in China. 
This decline raised the price of imported goods and make foreign staff and other 
overheads more expensive for British companies in China, especially when the value of 
sterling depreciated in 1929-30. Economic change forced changes in the structure and 
practice of British business, in attempts to keep costs down in order to compete, if not to 
survive, in China.8 
 
I The Structure and Mores of British Business 
British Staff, the Compradore and Chinese Staff 
 As a parallel to their Legation-encouraged reforms in areas of settlement political 
and social life, various businessmen were responsible for attempts to reform their own 
businesses and the culture of British business in China. Individuals such as G.W. Swire 
and N.S. Brown of Swires, and Archibald Rose at BAT had prominent voices in the 
ongoing debate about the necessity and practicalities of this reform. 
 The strengths and characteristics of British treaty port socialisation have been 
shown in chapter 2. British business leaders met each other as young newcomers to 
China, and in the clubs, lodges, saloons and resorts of treaty port life from which the 
Chinese were excluded. They had little direct knowledge of China’s social, business and 
political personalities. They had little inclination to improve that knowledge. For a long 
while, for example, the influential Yu Xiaqing “was seen as the arch-enemy of the 
foreign community, who, however, knew very little about him except by hearsay”. In 
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1928 Swires were using the Lunchuan Zhaoshangju [China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company, CMSNCo] as a mediator and channel of communication with him, despite 
repeated urgings from London to “cultivate” him.9 
 Their servants and rickshawmen apart, the major link between British 
businessmen and the Chinese was, or was provided by, the compradore. “Compradore” 
was a loose term, which on ships could mean purser, and elsewhere local manager, but 
generally meant the head of a firm’s, often informal, Chinese organisation. The 
compradore’s functions usually involved dealing with a firm’s Chinese business and 
customers, recruiting the Chinese staff and guaranteeing both them and Chinese 
customers, keeping the company informed of Chinese market and other news, and 
generally acting as a middleman between the company and Chinese society and the 
Chinese market. The compradoric approach to trading was still dominant in the 1920s 
even though some felt that they were a “dying race”.10 In fact this structure characterised 
most British institutions in China, even the consulates.11 
 The compradore system made theoretical sense, using local men to get the best 
out of local conditions who also acted as a bridge between two initially very different 
business cultures. However, it also raised a variety of problems. It further deepened the 
insularity of British communities from local Chinese communities, and this absence of 
close links between the community leaders was deeply felt after 1925.12 It was felt that 
closer links with local Chinese leaders would also probably have averted most of the 
major incidents that involved British companies - such as the Wanxian incident. In 
Shanghai, where relations were least evident and the situation most strained, the social 
taboos and mores which were so inexpedient in the outports were very much stronger. 
This despite the fact that leading Chinese and foreign businessmen had, ultimately, much 
in common and much to protect.13 As Chinese commerce and industry modernised and 
Western-style firms emerged, the continued use of the compradoric structure became a 
barrier resented by Chinese businessmen.14 
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 These criticisms have to be partly qualified as businessmen had to be pragmatic. 
The picture, too easily portrayed, of the drunken die-hard at the bar of the Shanghai Club 
was not completely accurate.15 This was especially true in the interior along the “up-
country” distribution networks, where itinerant British agents inspected local stocks and 
lubricated relations with Chinese agents, and was true also for travelling salesmen. 
However, much of this activity was more ceremonial than social and often had the 
flavour of a small-scale royal progress, or of institutionalised alcoholism.16 
 In physical terms the compradore and his staff were segregated and distrusted. His 
position was ambiguous and more that of a contracted partner to whom work was farmed 
out (literally so in the case of the ship compradores and the dockyard labour suppliers) 
than an employee.17 He was not privy to all the information that, for example, Swires’ 
British management had, as he was never quite trusted, and not even Chen Zhaorui [Chun 
Shutkai], their powerful and well-liked Shanghai compradore, was regularly in direct 
official communication with London in the 1920s.18 Physically the compradore was often 
excluded from the Private Office suite of a company’s offices, in Swires’ case until 
1929.19 
 Most companies relied heavily, of course, on their Chinese staff, but few of them 
seem to have trusted their Chinese employees at all. Ships’ crews were routinely 
suspected of involvement in piracies, and in smuggling of drugs or of “pidgin” 
[unmanifested] cargo, whilst it was “perfectly reasonable” for Swires to assume that all 
godown [warehouse] staff were “generally indulging in malpractices”.20 Chinese agents 
in the interior, who were sent goods on consignment, were routinely inspected by 
European staff, accompanied by interpreters, to check against fraud.21 Certainly there was 
                                                          
15 A sense of proportion must be kept; even taking the most reactionary and sinophobic businessmen into 
account it is difficult to agree with Jerome Ch’en’s blanket assertion that the Shanghai merchants wanted to 
“wipe the [Chinese] race from the face of the earth”, China and the West, p.45. 
16 Logan, China, pp.58-59; Dobson, China Cycle, pp.17-22. The APC’s agent in Nanning was often drunk 
with the local Chinese clients and officials and this was an accepted part of the job, Benson diaries, 
21/1/30, 31/1/30; see also the description of a dinner party for local Chinese officials given by Philips of 
the APC in Wuzhou, J.M. Philips Papers, Letter to P.S. Jones, 4/5/25. 
17 “You were both in partnership really”, ST - 19, p.12. 
18 This reflected in part the structure of Swires’ business with the parent company John Swire and Sons 
based in London with subsidiary companies, which in turn employed the compradores, such as Butterfield 
and Swire in China. The chain of responsibility went from company and departmental heads to London. 
The compradore was never a departmental head in these terms. There are no letters from or to Chen 
Zhaorui [Chun Shutkai] in the private and semi-official correspondence to and from Swires’ managers in 
China. 
19 G.W. Swire to C.C. Scott, 31/1/29, SP ADD 15. 
20 On piracies see, for example, BS Shanghai to JS London, 4/1/29, JSS III 2/8, and BS Hong Kong to JS 
London, 2/11/28, JSS III 1/6; on godowns see G.W. Swire to J.K. Swire, 7/2/30, SP ADD 15. 
21 Cook, Lion and the Dragon, pp.35-36, 44-45; Sherman Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign 
Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980), pp.29-30; the 
consignment system allowed British companies to claim that as the goods were still their property they 
were protected by extraterritoriality, this device allowed compensation claims to be routinely made against 
the central authorities. 
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enough pilfering and fraud to warrant precaution, but it is clear that the dishonesty of 
Chinese staff and agents and the need for supervision was taken for granted: when the 
Swire agent in Shashi was praised for his knowledge of local affairs it was pointed out 
that he was probably working “in collusion with other agents” to improve his 
commissions.22 It was usually in tones of surprise that the ability of Chinese to work 
satisfactorily without supervision was noted.23 Such evidence was slow to be accepted. 
Companies were also aware of the prejudices of the foreign community in China. 
European stores, for example, would not accept Chinese salesmen, nor would dockyard 
clients be happy with Chinese staff.24 The question of trust also arose; some consuls 
preferred to deal with British agents of British companies: because “occasions must not 
infrequently arise in which I am able to give confidentially to a British agent certain 
information which I must withhold from a Chinese.”25 
 
Labour 
 Most of these companies used large Chinese labour forces, especially the 
manufacturing, mining and shipping concerns. The Kailan Mining Administration 
[KMA], and especially BAT, were usually at pains to point out the good treatment 
accorded to their workforces, in terms of accommodation and education for workers’ 
children.26 Their strike problems, however, were not always politically motivated.27 In the 
shipping business Chinese passengers and crews were often lumped together in 
discussions by British management; their race took precedence over their business on 
board ship. Facilities for the crews were bad, distinctive messing facilities, for example, 
not being provided as a rule until after the war. On some ships there was no 
accommodation for the compradore’s staff, who slept anywhere they could.28 Ships’ 
foreign officers left the running of the ship to the compradore and, especially at this time 
when piracy was a major problem, retreated, with the foreign passengers, behind their 
piracy grilles.29 Ship owners had very little control over a great deal of the 
                                                          
22 BS Shanghai to JS London, 17/7/31 and G.W. Swire’s marginal notation, JSS III 2/12. 
23 For example, in a time of political unrest the Swire “Interpreters alone made inspection trips, and gave 
satisfactory service”, “Up-Country Selling Organisation 1929”, JSS V 6/3. 
24 Taikoo Sugar Refinery, Letters of Instruction, No.4, 29/8/30, JSS V 6/6; G.W. Swire to JSS, 31/5/29, SP 
ADD 15. 
25 H.I. Harding to Lampson, S/O 10/7/30, FO228\4276/2 63b1; Harding was strongly rebuked by the 
Legation which issued a circular to consuls forbidding them to refuse access to employees of British 
companies, see Legation dossier 63b1 1930, passim., FO228\4276. 
26 Cochran, Big Business, p.137; B.A.T. Bulletin, May 1925, p.16. 
27 On the economic motivations behind strikes at BAT see Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour 
Movement, 1919-1927 (Stanford, 1968), pp.156-59, 382-84. 
28 BS Shanghai to JS London, 9/11/28, JSS III 2/7. 
29 The Report of the Anti Piracy Committee to the Hongkong Government in 1929 bore this out: “ships’ 
officers have generally disassociated themselves from anti-piracy measures and have avoided interfering 
with the passengers which they consider to be the sphere of the Compradore,” “Report of the Anti-Piracy 
Committee, Hongkong”. Commodore Hongkong 0260 [30/10/29] to C-in-C China, PRO ADM 116/2761, 
“China Piracy 1930-31.” 
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accommodation in their vessels, let alone their staff.30 On the Upper River political chaos 
compounded this lack of control. This indirect system was inefficient. Firstly, ships’ 
compradores were never trusted to remit in full the farmed-out passenger earnings. 
Secondly, the lack of control over contractors who catered for the Chinese passengers, 
and whose attentions were, at best, an expensive nuisance, also became self-defeating. 
 
Chinese Customers 
The example of Chinese passengers on British steamships 
 Most British firms did not deal directly with their Chinese customers. Most rarely 
needed to, the Chinese agents who staffed the distribution agencies did that. However, 
those who did realise the value of direct contacts did reap rewards - this was the secret of 
the success of BAT and Imperial Chemical Industries [ICI] in establishing themselves in 
China.31 There were, especially in shipping circles, indirect contacts through the 
compradore. This persisted even though British firms realised the value of personal 
contact with their shippers and consignees. 
 The structure and quality of steamship passenger accommodation provides a well-
recorded example, and case study, of British attitudes to Chinese customers. Conditions 
on board foreign-owned ships replicated and enhanced patterns of social and racial 
division in treaty port society. What amounted to European-only bastions were built into 
them to prevent piracy. In practice there was segregation in nearly every part of the 
travelling process. Passengers travelled in separate classes, disembarked in separate 
ways, and were sold tickets by parallel but separate organisations, by the Butterfield and 
Swire Agency office for Europeans travelling on China Navigation Company ships, and 
by the compradore’s office for Chinese passengers. Foreigners were generally not 
allowed by that company, and by Jardine’s Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, to 
travel in Chinese accommodation.32 
 Conditions in the different classes of ship-board accommodation were rigidly 
different. Traditionally there was usually a Saloon class for foreign travellers, with 
foreign food and furniture and a Chinese First Class, with Chinese food and round tables. 
                                                          
30 ST - 7 p.35; see also the memorandum by Erich Teichman on the “S.S. Tuckwo Incident”. Teichman 
was on board the Jardine’s Indo-China SNCo vessel when an opium smuggling-related fracas took place. 
He commented that “the officers concern themselves only with the navigation of the ship and know 
nothing about what goes on amongst the Chinese passengers and crew”, “S.S. Tuckwo Incident”, memo by 
Mr Teichman, 17/1/30, Minister’s Tour Series No.26, FO228\4224\13 37a. 
31 Cochran, Big Business, pp.10-24; Patrick Brodie, Crescent Over Cathay: China and I.C.I., 1898-1956 
(Hong Kong, 1990), pp.100-109. 
32 ST - 13 p.35; BS Shanghai to JS London, 24/4/31, JSS III 2/9; NCH, 30/6/28, p.564. Foreigners were 
also restricted to First Class passages on the Yantai to Shanghai steamers, “News Letters from China 
Between 1926 and 1938”, April 1938, p.531, E.J. Mann papers, SOAS Mss.380302/2. Before 1925 all 
shipping companies had farmed out their Chinese accommodation on the Shanghai to Hankou route to the 
Yangtsze Passenger Syndicate, a Chinese organisation. This had been stopped by the anti-piracy guidelines 
of the British Government, NCH, 30/6/28, p.564. 
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This was described, on various ships, as being below the foreign level in “bath, sanitary 
conveniences...”33 and lacking the “deck space and other comforts”34 of the saloon class. 
There was also, depending on the ship, a 2nd Class Chinese and 3rd Class or steerage.35 
 Much of this differentiation was economically motivated and concerned with 
arranging accommodation to suit all pockets. But there was a transparent indifference 
towards the conditions in which Chinese passengers ate, slept, bathed, relieved 
themselves and promenaded.36 On the CNCo ships Poyang, Tatung and Ngankin in 1928 
there were only: 
 
two water closets, both situated on the upper deck, on which there is 
accommodation for 144 Chinese passengers and ship’s staff. On the bridge deck 
where there are berths for 30 first class and 38 second class passengers there is no 
lavatory at all.37 
After this shipboard discrimination the final insult for Chinese passengers on China 
Navigation Company ships before 1930 would have been that the Yangzi steamers 
berthed at the Pudong side of the Huangpu at Shanghai. A launch met all steamers to land 
saloon, that is foreign, passengers 
 
on the Shanghai side leaving most of the better class of Chinese ...to take a 
sampan... and put up with exorbitant overcharges on the part of 
sampanmen and coolies at Pudong. 
Not surprisingly “friction has been experienced in preventing native passengers... from 
boarding her, and resentment is often shown at this “preferential” treatment.” European 
saloon passengers had also complained - about “being swamped with Chinese” as a result 
of one unsatisfactory attempt at mollifying better class Chinese.38 
 
II The Changing Nature of Trade in China 
General Factors and Foreign Competition 
 Various factors, internal and external, combined to add a sense of almost 
desperate urgency to attempts to alter this unsatisfactory state of affairs. Demands by 
Chinese commercial and political opinion for the Nationalist regime to institute 
nationalist economic policies worried British opinion. The iniquities of foreign 
businesses were stock components of anti-imperialist propaganda [see figure 6, following 
                                                          
33 JS London to BS Shanghai, 15/6/28, JSS III 2/7. 
34 BS Shanghai to JS London, 10/8/28, includes D.H. Whamond (Hankou) to C.C. Knight, 28/7/28, JSS III 
2/7. 
35 JS London to BS Shanghai, 7/2/30, JSS III 1/8. 
36 This was not restricted to the China coast. Indian passengers on the Bombay-east African line had 
similar causes for complaint in 1930, Inchcape to W.F. Jenkins, 10/1/30, BIS 8/6. 
37 BS Shanghai to JS London, 3/8/28, JSS III 2/7, it should be noted that there was no differentiation 
between Chinese passengers and crew; See BS Shanghai to JS London, 24/2/28, JSS III 2/7, for evidence 
of Swires’ competitive interests with Jardines over the question of conditions in Chinese accommodation. 
38 BS Shanghai to JS London, 10/1/30, JSS III 2/9. 
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page].39 ICI, for example, feared protective barriers would be erected to protect the 
nascent modern Chinese chemicals industry.40 Some observers saw the logic of some 
trade protection, for example, in the shape of “national products” (guohuo) campaigns, 
but others saw it only as an extension of the political use of the economic boycott.41 
                                                          
39 See Victor Purcell on the implications of Sun Yatsen’s Sanminzhuyi, Problems of Chinese Education 
(London, 1936), p.198. 
40 J.W. Gibb, May 1931, “The Possibilities of Chemical Manufacture in China and the Prospects of ICI 
Participation Therein, Political Considerations”, ICI ICHO/REP/0486. 
41 See Teichman’s minute on Shanghai No.178, 2/7/30, FO228\4279\7 67w; on the boycott weapon see 
Remer, Study of Chinese Boycotts, passim., and D.A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs: 
the failure of China’s “Revolutionary Diplomacy”, 1931-32 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1991). 
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 Firms in China were as aware, as the Foreign Office, of the trend of events in 
India where debates about economic nationalism had been raised by the 1930 Simon 
report. Discussions of the reservation of coastal trade in India for Indian companies had a 
disturbingly familiar ring to them and, it was felt, would fatally undermine British 
attempts to thwart, evade, and survive these and similar manifestations of economic 
nationalism in China.42  
 Economic and political nationalism aside, war, and the banditry and lawlessness it 
bred continued to be the biggest disrupter of trade after 1928, although for political 
reasons the extent was often exaggerated. Ships and rolling stock were commandeered or 
pirated, boycotts launched, stocks seized or destroyed. Disruption, however, as the trade 
figures show, was not always that damaging. “Whilst... the threat of civil war continues, 
the best the firms can do is to mark time with small sales, until the militarists consent to 
compose their difficulties”, was the advice of the Jinan acting Consul-General in 1930, 
whilst simultaneously announcing big increases in local sales for BAT and ICI.43 
Extraterritoriality did save lives and property and frequently made it possible for foreign 
merchants to keep on trading when conditions made it impossible for their Chinese 
competitors. Some businessmen found the warfare exceedingly profitable. Illegal 
munitions imports (they were banned by a British instigated international agreement), 
sales of war-related material and expert work, such as that of the Briton Frank Sutton for 
Zhang Zoulin, all paid well.44 
 Foreign competition and British uncompetitiveness were identified as further 
major problems facing British trade in China. Worries about the effects of British 
attitudes were not confined to the China market,45 and were also part of the wider 
“salesmanship” debate in British trade, the subject, for example, of a Mansion House 
speech by the Prince of Wales in 1929.46 The DOT’s mission to the Far East reported that 
Britain’s exports to China were declining rapidly, when those of the United States, 
France and Germany were soaring. Their explanation lay in British high prices, bad 
marketing and poor advertising. ICI’s success with its “Crescent” brand of fertiliser, and 
                                                          
42 See BS Shanghai to JS London, 24/5/29, which quotes pertinent parts of the “Report of the External 
Capital Committee 1929 (India), JSS III 2/8. On protectionist debates in India see B.R. Tomlinson, The 
Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947,: The Economics of Decolonisation in India (London and 
Basingstoke), 1979, pp.60-74, 118-20.. 
43 Local sales for BAT rose from $3,500,000 to $5,410,000 and for ICI from $360,000 in 1927 to 
$1,050,000 in 1929. APC sales rose from $1,130,000 to $1,560,000 in 1928-29. None of that appears to be 
“marking” time, especially in the year which saw the Nationalist attack on north China and the Jinan 
incident, Tsinan No.7, Six Month Intelligence Report, 31/3/30, FO228\4205\3 32a. 
44 Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928 
(Vancouver, 1982), pp.49-53, 57-64, 79-82, 122-23; see also Drage, General of Fortune, passim.. 
45 See, for example, “British Prestige in Malaya”, Eastern Engineering, 14/3/29, pp.55-56; Eastern 
Engineering, 26/9/29, p.224, on tales from the Straits Settlements. 
46 Ibid., and “Salesmanship Abroad: The Prince’s Stirring Speech”, Eastern Engineering, 14/3/29, p.61. 
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BAT’s aggressive marketing campaigns were the great exceptions.47 Germany’s success 
was not based on treaty privilege, but on better marketing, better language study amongst 
foreign staff, better treatment of Chinese staff and a greater interest in Sino-foreign 
enterprises.48 
 
Internal Factors 
 
In every field one fundamental change which has come in recent years has 
been apparent: the emergence of the Chinese themselves as competitors 
for business in and with China, 
wrote Grover Clark in 1932.49 This was not just a by-product of political change, but 
resulted from social change in Chinese society and also from the evolution of Chinese 
business practice in the face of Western competition. “Modern” Chinese firms, such as 
the Yong Li Soda Company were beginning to operate in Western controlled (and often 
created) markets.50 They were also beginning to do so with specific national or local 
support, and with supporting legislation, or harassment, to disbar foreign activities.51 
 The DOT identified as the major trend the fact that more and more Chinese 
companies were trading directly with foreign firms, thereby cutting out the old-fashioned 
foreign agency houses such as Dodwells or Arnholds, which was agent for 35 firms.52 
Chinese banks and other firms were becoming more numerous and sophisticated, and 
were capable of taking over work previously done by foreign and more old-fashioned 
Chinese institutions. DOT reports stressed that most trade difficulties were due to 
unsettled conditions and different cultural and business practices. They concluded in 
1930 that the most immediate way of coping with this change was for companies to 
secure the “goodwill of the Chinese people”, and therefore their market, which would 
require “a more intimate knowledge of the Chinese and their ways of life and thought 
than, speaking generally, businessmen in China at present possess”.53 
                                                          
47 DOT, Report of the British Economic Mission to the Far East, 1930-31 (London, 1931), pp.10, 55-56; 
W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume 1, The Forerunners 1870-1926 (London, 
1970), p.341; Cochran, Big Business in China, passim.; Brodie, Crescent over Cathay, pp.97-97, 106-109. 
48 Thomas, “Foreign Office and the Business Lobby”, p.331; for comments on this from a British 
businessman see ST - 13, pp.38-39; “German Commercial Methods in China”, FO No.503, 10/5/29, 
FO228\4044\6 67; see a generalised acceptance of this problem in Eastern Engineering, 26/9/29, p.224. 
49 Grover Clark, Economic Rivalries in China (New Haven 1932), p.132. “The foreign businessman in 
China is the unhappy victim of his times... Foreign business in China - not foreign business with China-is 
doomed... it will be done by the Chinese themselves,” Peffer, China, p.277. 
50 Brodie, Crescent, pp.76-87. 
51 James Reardon-Anderson, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949 (Cambridge, 1991), 
p.279; On the local level see the relationship between warlord Liu Xiang and the Minsheng Shiye 
steamship company on the Upper Yangzi route, Robert A. Kapp, “Chunking as a Center of Warlord Power, 
1926-1937”, M. Elvin and G.W. Skinner, eds., The Chinese City Between Two Worlds (Stanford, 1974), 
pp.150-52. 
52 DOT, 1931-33, p.27; CYB 1931, p.III. 
53 DOT, 1930, p.61. 
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 This growth of Chinese business was partly caused by, and partly caused, the 
growth of a nationalist Chinese middle class (although descriptions of a homogeneous 
class can be misleading). It was largely urban, frequently grew out of successful 
compradore families, and supplied the competitors, the compradores, the staff, and the 
increasingly vocal and discerning customers of foreign companies; those in the shipping 
business where customers voted with their wallets, could not afford to ignore it.54 It was 
responsible for the modernisation of towns, which caused a reassessment of insurance 
scope and practice amongst foreign companies. It also supplied the most vocal 
opposition, through various organisations, to the trading and other privileges of foreign 
business.55 In April 1925 Swires were aware of this change, although some of its political 
repercussions had yet to hit them: 
 
I am... wondering whether we are not too inclined to regard the Chinese 
businessman as he was twenty years ago rather than as he is today with his 
European and American education... the modern young Chinese can and does run 
many thoroughly efficient concerns.56 
However politically unsuccessful the “modern young Chinese” were, especially in 
getting their economic-nationalist agenda enforced by the National Government, they 
still remained a social, economic and ticket-buying force, which had to be better catered 
for, as did the Nationalist military-bureaucratic elite.57 
 
Staying on: How and Why 
 There was an ideological strain to the determination of British businessmen to 
stay in business in China. This involved an element of practical realism in the assessment 
of the role that foreign firms played in some sectors of the economy; there was also an 
element of racial condescension towards Chinese capabilities, combined with a belief in a 
sense of imperial mission.58 “I can’t save China” admitted Warren Swire in 1929, but he 
still believed that: 
 
our position in China depends in the last resort and perhaps all the way through 
on Faith in our destiny. I’m sure it is principally the moral factor, which will 
win... They [foreign Shanghai] don’t realise that there is more in business than 
                                                          
54 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nanking Government, 1927-37 (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 1986), pp.13-18. 
55 Coble, Shanghai Capitalists, pp.1-2, 10-11, 18-27; Marie-Claire Bergère “‘The Other China’: Shanghai 
from 1919 to 1949” in C. Howe, ed., Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis 
(Cambridge, 1981), pp.1-34. 
56 J.K. Swire to JS London, 17/4/25, SP ADD 15. 
57 Coble, Shanghai Capitalists, pp.261-69. 
58 “The serious Chinese quite realized that to cut out foreign shipping would be fatal to China itself”, 
“Minister’s interview with Mr. [N.S.] Brown”, Tour Series No.49, 6/2/30, FO228\4273\7 63; see also 
Lampson ‘s minute, 29/3/30, ibid.. 
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cash and I believe that Young China expects more from the foreigner than a mere 
material desire to make money.59 
Businessmen such as Swire felt the Chinese still needed foreign economic tutelage. 
Indeed, without the propaganda of altruism the British were vulnerable to anti-imperialist 
criticisms.60 Chinese companies were still characteristically “Chinese”: they were ripe for 
tutelage. They needed to be taught fair trading practices (“devote your efforts to 
educating people like [Yu Xiaqing’s San Bei shipping company] up to a foreign sense of 
commercial honour”61), they needed to be trained in Western ways of running businesses 
and in Western types of business (such as insurance) and also to be taught the right ways 
of carrying out their social and political duties. It was claimed that they lacked, for 
example, the sense of democratic restraint and responsibility needed in the Shanghai 
Municipal Council.62 
  In the face of political and economic change, and foreign and Chinese 
competition, the British were in danger of leaving the China market by default, they 
would be squeezed out when they felt they could not afford to be squeezed out anywhere. 
Lampson was circumspect about the problems facing British business in China but easily, 
if ambivalently, identified areas where adaptation to the threats posed by change could 
take place: 
 
it is perhaps in his stiff-necked insistence on hard business facts, and 
unwillingness to appreciate, or perhaps pander to, Chinese mentality and 
custom, that the British trader in China fails, if he really does fail, in 
competition with his rivals.63 
“Stiff-necked” Britishness then, was an identifiable problem. The climate engineered by 
British treaty port socialisation was increasingly seen to be a hindrance to British trade. 
Minimising the effects of that process and actively countering some aspects of it were 
proposed solutions to some of the problems facing British firms in 1928. They also 
surfaced in most other areas where reforms or compromises were contemplated. 
                                                          
59 Sir Frederick Whyte probably could save China thought Warren Swire, G.W. Swire to J.K. Swire, 
23/2/29, SP ADD 15. Lampson thought Swire “a curious downright sort of fellow, hard-headed and 
shrewd, and yet with a streak of rather surprising idealism in his nature”, Lampson Diaries, 29/2/29. 
60 “We often think that more harm than good is done by the stress so often laid in public speeches on our 
wish being merely to trade with China in peace and quiet and not to acquire territory etc. etc. It is rather apt 
to lay us open to the reply “All the interest you take in us Chinese is to make money out of us and go away. 
You do not want to help us in our difficulties”, G.W. Swire to T.H.R. Shaw and N.S. Brown, 17/1/30, 
Swire Archives, Misc. 121/IV, Inter-War Political Letters, 1925-38 (Sept.). 
61 JS London to BS Shanghai, 8/6/28, JSS III 2/7; also G.W. Swire to N.S. Brown, 16/5/29, SP ADD 15: 
“For the sake of our future influence and position in China we have got to do our best to train up in this 
way competitors for ourselves and, although I can quite understand caution, we cannot afford to be sticky. 
Things are moving quicker than many people think.” Japanese companies also needed to be raised to “a 
higher state of commercial civilization” as well, JS London to BS Shanghai and Hongkong 25/10/29, JSS 
III 2/8. 
62 BS Shanghai to JS London, 6/5/27, enclosing BS Tientsin to BS Shanghai, 28/4/27, JSS II 2/6; G.W. 
Swire to C.C. Scott, 22/10/26, SP ADD 15. 
63 Lampson to Sir E.F. Crowe (DOT), 20/10/30, FO228\4280\39 67x. 
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III Reforming relations between British Businesses and the Chinese 
Cooperation 
 It was often stated that the education of Chinese businesses was to result 
from the example set by British commercial behaviour and from cooperation with 
British firms. 
 
No matter what treaty rights may be given up by deliberate negotiation... 
we English will stay in China and have an ever-increasing amount of face 
and influence. The situation in an Oriental country is in my opinion 
largely psychological... the Chinese want us in their hearts to stay and 
appreciate our straightforward way of running things.64 
wrote Warren Swire in 1929. This identification of the “real” desires of the Chinese was 
quite usual as was the emphasis on psychology. Swire’s idealism tapered in nicely with 
its practical conclusions that Britain’s physical presence in China was widely seen to be 
grounded on her psychological presence. The only way to guarantee that presence, war 
apart, was through cooperation. Closer links were also the only way the ability of 
foreigners to “handle” orientals could be used advantageously.65 
 “Cooperation”, as well as being an economic and political necessity was a vague, 
modish, term and was used as such. It encompassed active business partnership, friendly 
business and social relations, and a more realistic and conciliatory approach to Chinese 
nationalism.  
 
Municipal and Social Life 
 Cooperation began with public moderation. Firms attempted to restrain the die-
hards and extremists. In this they followed the lead of the Legation. Swires were wary of 
active involvement with the Shanghai Publicity Bureau, the London office was quick to 
instruct its Shanghai managers to push for treaty port moderation, for instance in the Joint 
Committee of the British Chamber of Commerce and China Association at Shanghai.66 
ICI kept out of public treaty port life until 1933 as a matter of policy, probably for 
pragmatic reasons, although the advantages of involvement eventually outweighed the 
disadvantages.67 N.S. Brown was made Swires’ Shanghai Manager in 1929 in order to 
“get on to the Council and try and get a real move on progressively”, by acting as a 
                                                          
64 G.W. Swire to Lampson, 4/5/29, FO228\4044\13 67b. 
65 JS London to BS Shanghai/Hong Kong, 25/10/29, JSS II 2/8. 
66 For Swires’ actions to curb the impact of the “die-hard contingent” see, for example, the instructions on 
allaying tendencies to “War Fever”, BS Shanghai to JS London, 4/2/27, JSS II 2/6; BS Shanghai to JS 
London, 9/3/28 and ibid., 25/5/28, JSS II 2/7; Swires were wary of the SPB’s public belligerence in its 
Bulletin: “We propose to take no active part in disseminating this literature in view of its critical, if not 
unfriendly, tone towards matters Chinese”, BS Shanghai to JS London 31/8/2, JSS II 2/7. 
67 Brodie, Crescent, p.186. ICI had a reputation for trying not to involve the British Legation and Consular 
service in taxation disputes, A.H. George minute on Foochow No.39, 8/10/30, FO228\4232\67 41c. 
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conciliatory and restraining influence in its politics and society.68 He was a personable 
mixer although it was felt that he needed a “Chinese ADC” to interpret for him and 
‘nurse’ the right people. This was a concession to the obvious need to have a Chinese 
middleman of some sort but not the Chinese barrier the compradores had always been. 
His personal contacts with the Chinese became his “very great asset.”69 The Consul-
General and the Legation felt he was “overenthusiastic” but recognised that he was: 
 
partly for business reasons no doubt, dead set on cultivating the Chinese 
who matter; and he has tackled his task in a thorough-going way - much to 
the disgust of the average “Shanghailander”.70 
Another problem such a high-profile appointment solved was that Chinese business 
leaders were generally dealing with British managers whose seniors were in London. 
This coloured direct contacts and allowed the Far East taipans to be rather more 
conservative than their distant British seniors. This was the same problem faced by the 
Legation in the case of individuals such as Sir Sydney Barton. The more colonial 
atmosphere in Hong Kong also affected companies based there, such as Jardines or the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. It was increasingly realised that the more mature, senior, 
and independent those in control in the East were, the better, although the diplomatic 
energy of the Keswick brothers at Jardines, or ICI’s V. St John Killery, was a good 
substitute for maturity.71 
 British companies like Swires and BAT used their oligarchic control of the SMC 
to introduce Chinese representation on to the council. This marked their public 
acceptance of the equal social status of Chinese leaders such as Yu Xiaqing. G.W. Swire 
felt, in 1928, that: 
 
it is perfectly obvious, that for whatever cause, our present sources of information 
are useless. We must try to get more in touch with the Chinese and with 
happenings behind the scenes.72 
Next year he was planning, on the recommendation of Sir Frederick Whyte, to meet a 
formidable list of businessmen and politicians (but businessmen had priority) such as 
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Chen Guangfu (“K.P. Chen”, of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank), Xu Xinliu 
(National Commercial Bank), Li Ming (Chairman of the Bank of China) Song Ziwen, 
Kong Xiangxi and Wang Zhengting.73 The Chinese he met on that trip were all at pains to 
“lay stress on personal private entertainment”.74 In view of the success of Sir Frederick 
Whyte, Swires also contemplated appointing their own “diplomatic agent”.75 They later 
delegated a compradore to work as an adviser at the National Government’s Ministry of 
Finance. (This was not a totally new policy, Chen Zhaorui had previously been an adviser 
to the Ministry of Communications in the Northern Government and a member of the 
Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, but these links do not appear to have been 
used for Swires’ benefit and were anachronistic by 1927).76 ICI in 1931 was “almost out 
of touch with influential Chinese”, and therefore with Nanjing, and this was felt to be its 
“chief weakness”. In tandem with its reorganisation in 1933 the company’s new manager 
set out actively to cultivate influential Chinese and later appointed one as a director of the 
China company.77 In 1929 the KMA took on C. Ku [Gu Zhen] from the Peking-Mukden 
railway and set him to work in the Head Office preparing himself in case it was 
“necessary at some future date to send him to Nanking.”78 Swires employed a relative of 
Wellington Koo in the 1930s, probably as much for his family links as for his British 
education.79 
 In 1929 Arnhold’s Peking manager, warning of the danger to Britain’s prestige 
and position in China unless there was a “radical alteration in British policy and trade 
methods”, asked the Governor of the Bank of England to use any influence “it might 
possess in commercial circles... to induce them to send out first-class representatives 
charged with a mission to establish closer personal relations with Chinese circles.”80 
This, in fact, was what Sir Frederick Whyte had already done. Other individuals such as 
N.S. Brown and Lampson had also contributed. High-profile links did become common, 
the SMC even renamed a road in honour of Yu Xiaqing, but these conciliatory moves 
served to obscure the continuing lack of more widespread social intercourse amongst 
junior figures, which continued to have longer-term implications.81 
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 The question of routine “entertaining” of Chinese clients, competitors, and 
worthies, vexed Swires in the late 1920s. Foreign agents were told in 1925 that they 
should call on Chinese shippers monthly “and not just leave it to their compradore as at 
present” but there was little progress.82 Erecting a special building in Hankou was 
suggested at one point, although this was scaled down to a planned special reception 
dining room in the Hankow shipping hong. This was felt to be the compradore’s job, but 
this traditional view was increasingly untenable.83 It was becoming clear that such social 
cultivation ought to be more personal, less ceremonial, and involve more directly the 
foreign staff and the Chinese: 
 
when it is necessary to get in touch with some important Chinese for any 
purpose... you will have to do so in your own houses, ...a much better compliment 
than entertaining in a hotel.84 
To this end the Shanghai manager’s house was replaced in 1934 by a much grander 
building, (“the only gentleman’s house in the place”85) reservations about the cost being 
overruled for pragmatic reasons.86 The situation appears to have improved with staff in 
Hankou, for example, getting into closer direct contact with Chinese shippers and 
consignees by 1931.87 
 
Sino-British Companies 
 In 1925 G.W. Swire had described Swires’ idea of Sino-British cooperation as “to 
keep ourselves to ourselves... but to work in friendly competition with Chinese concerns 
of standing”. This generally meant market-sharing agreements. Events moved too far to 
allow this complacent approach to continue. In 1930 N.S. Brown described the intent of 
the company’s plans for a Sino-British shipping company as to “Give the Chinese the 
shadow and keep the substance - that was, as usual, the ideal at which to aim.”88 The 
psychological repercussions of cooperation were still widely felt to outweigh practical 
ones, but this approach was becoming anachronistic. The DOT’s 1933 report bluntly 
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stated for the first time, that cooperation with Chinese businesses would be the surest 
way of being successful in China. By this it meant active collaboration for which British 
companies would have to be better prepared than before. Still paternalistic in tone, it was 
an improvement on previous DOT reports; usually they had restricted themselves to dire 
warnings about the dangers of direct contacts with unknown, and possibly untrustworthy, 
Chinese firms.89 
 Cooperation now meant planned or realised Sino-British companies. These were 
undertaken largely for political reasons, as expressions of goodwill but also as ways of 
cementing the presence of British companies into the Chinese economy in a less 
obviously alien way.90 They were also undertaken to solve local and short-term problems. 
Cooperation was not entirely new. To gain mineral extraction rights jointly-owned 
companies had had to be formed although such enterprises were usually under de facto 
foreign control.91 At the annual meeting of shareholders of one KMA subsidiary “a 
certain amount of tact [was] apparently required... to avoid emphasising the foreign 
influence”.92 Other foreign companies, especially BAT and ICI, had traditionally relied 
on mergers and cooperation to knock out their competition.93 Jardines and Swires 
cooperated with the CMSNCo to run Yangzi steamers as a joint company, the Luen 
Steamship Company, under CMSNCo management.94 In effect this involved subsidising 
the perennially penniless Chinese company which was able to run these steamers under 
the British flag, and therefore under British protection, as it suffered greatly from ship-
commandeering during the warlord era.95 
 Swires and Jardines were worried by the threat of the restriction of coastal and 
inland navigation rights to Chinese companies. The Legation felt that Chinese public 
interest (“insofar as it exists in China at all about anything”) was interested in the 
question.96 Swires felt the need to further placate their competitors and pre-empt 
nationalistic policy decisions by the National Government; closer cooperation was 
required, at the very least.  
 Swires formed the Taikoo Chinese Navigation Company for their Upper Yangzi 
trade. This was incorporated in 1930, after two years deliberation, in the face of these 
threats and in the light of the continuing boycott of British trade at Wanxian. In a 
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memorandum prepared by A.V.T. Dean the reasons for setting up the company were spelt 
out: 
 
- A desire to try out Anglo-Chinese co-operation so as to have some idea 
before restrictive navigation legislation is enacted, of the best way to adapt 
ourselves to changed conditions not only above Ichang but elsewhere. 
- To dispel the distrust felt for the Four Companies’ motives on the Upper 
River - without this there can be no progress or prosperity on the run. 
- Identify ourselves more closely with Chinese shipping circles and 
thereby 
- minimize popular prejudice against our steamers.97 
That the company came to be run on the Upper Yangzi rather than, as originally planned, 
the middle river, shows the politically expedient nature of these plans and negotiations; 
they became linked more to Swires’ political problems on the Upper River, and the 
structure of their carrying trade, than to any long term goals.98 For similar reasons in 
1929 Arnholds set up the Upper Yangtsze Engineering Works at Yichang as a subsidiary 
of their Shanghai-based New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works. Their site in Yichang 
was without the treaty port boundary, and a “Chinese facade” had to be created 
“involving local Chinese cooperation” to keep the project going.99 
 In face of the expected growth, with probable Government aid, of Chinese 
insurance companies, Swires decided to try and adapt themselves “to the course of events 
so as to turn it to our mutual advantage”. In cooperation with Chen Guangfu’s Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank they founded the jointly owned Pao Foong Insurance 
Company. Despite praiseworthy reports of the honesty, esprit de corps, and quality of the 
bank’s officials, trust extended as far as Swires trying to insist on an “annual audit of 
books by a British firm of chartered accountants” although this demand had to be 
dropped. That left Swires’ interests, Shanghai mused, “at the mercy, and subject to the 
pleasure of a Board of Directors with a Chinese majority.”100 
 Swires stole a march on other companies. Jardines rejected jointly owned 
companies in 1928 as unfeasible as “the Chinese would at once want things done their 
own way”, while Chinese management would lead to abuses.101 In 1931 Jardines 
appeared to their Hong Kong manager to be “left behind owing to their illiberal and 
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conservative attitude which they were adopting as contrasted with [Swires]”. His pleas in 
Shanghai for “some sort of co-operation” with the Chinese foundered on the attitude of 
the manager there. Lampson felt that they were “unwisely lagging behind” compared to 
the others who, if inland water navigation rights were withdrawn, “might to some extent 
have met trouble in advance by coming to some sort of arrangement for Chinese 
participation.”102 
 In May 1931 ICI felt that “manufacture in China... would greatly improve our 
position there” and structural cooperation with the Yong Li Soda Company seemed to be 
the answer, although a joint venture never materialised.103 The same year Sir Hugo 
Cunliffe-Owen, Chairman of BAT, told Lampson that: 
 
he was now forming, as a sort of subsidiary enterprise, a Chinese tobacco 
company... in case... the position of foreign controlled companies should become 
too difficult.104 
Although three out of the four Sino-Foreign banks begun before 1932 had failed, the 
Standard Chartered Bank apparently had informal, tentative talks with Chen Guangfu 
about a possible complementary link in 1930.105 Swires passed on to the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank a proposal, deemed to be “fantastic”, from their new Chinese friends for a 
Chinese Navigation Bank. Based in Hong Kong, the Bank’s approach was more 
conservative than the British companies in China. Its policy in the 1930s was to adapt 
itself and attempt “to prove its continued value to the Government of China”.106 
 Another aspect of cooperation was the involvement of leading Chinese figures as 
directors of companies or as participants in bodies previously restricted to European 
members. This was an especial feature of Victor Sassoon’s dramatic entry into the 
Shanghai business world. The International Investment Trust, set up in 1930, included 
many of the Chinese names on G.W. Swire’s “hit-list”. Sassoon’s Shanghai Land 
Investment Company also counted Yu Xiaqing as a director. Sassoon’s biggest 
investments were in property: in the long term he needed all the Chinese friends he could 
get.107 Even the Shanghai Stock Exchange elected its first Chinese member in 1929.108 
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 Some of these moves were indicative of panic amongst the British business 
community. Mostly, they were evidence of a major shift in attitudes towards the Chinese 
as businessmen, and towards the nature of business in China. An aloof “Britishness”, and 
largely ceremonial personal relations with the Chinese, began to be replaced by a 
compromise relationship, based on the shared identification of key interests with specific 
individuals or interest groups. 
 
IV Reforming Company Structures 
British Staff 
 Attitudes and structures within British companies were also in need of analysis 
and reform. In chapter two it was shown how customary was denigration of Chinese 
abilities and status. E.M. Gull claimed in 1931 that there was even serious discrimination 
against Chinese businessmen in Britain itself.109 
 Swires and others were concerned about the characters of their men, managers or 
otherwise. In 1930 G.W. Swire stressed the need for a head of the China Navigation 
Company department who: 
 
understands and acts on the present need for cultivating in and out of office and 
so educating Chinese ship-owners and businessmen. ...All this presupposes that 
the head of the Department finds it easy, if not congenial, to establish these 
personal relations... [A.V.T. Dean] was too direct in his manner to please the 
Chinese, who had spoken to Lamb about it... In other words when he caught a 
Chinese out in a mis-statement, he called it straight off a damned lie, instead of 
asking politely, whether there was not some misunderstanding. That is a fault 
which must be corrected.110 
In 1929 E.J. Nathan, manager of the KMA  in Tianjin, was anxious to have better-trained 
senior staff and also felt that bad labour relations at one mine were due to the manager 
there being “temperamentally unsuited for handling delicate situations, being far too 
excitable and irascible”.111 Other companies were anxious to get rid of such dead wood, 
as they always had been if individuals got in the way of business. There was, however, a 
powerful political push to remove compromising personalities in the years after 1925. 
 Changing private attitudes among new staff and those who remained in China was 
difficult, if not impossible. Little things helped. Company house journals had long 
perpetuated the clichés of treaty port lore and opinion112 and poked fun at the attempts of 
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Chinese and other foreign correspondents to write English. In 1931 the APC’s The 
Pipeline announced that its column “Epistolary Eccentricities” was to be discontinued, it 
was “below the belt”, especially given the poor linguistic standards of its British 
readership.113 As has been shown in chapter 4, some of the commercial elite considered 
the problem of attitudes so intractable that it was only worth tackling in London, in 
particular amongst new recruits.114 The efforts of E.R. Hughes and the DOT in 1932 were 
mis-timed. The following year the School of Oriental Studies annual report pointed out 
that there were fewer commercially-minded or employed students than was usual because 
of the depression.115 Their efforts also dealt with the questions of understanding, attitude 
and behaviour. The lessons in etiquette on the curriculum of the Shanghai British 
Chamber of Commerce’s Chinese Language School were not enough.116 Unlike business 
leaders and officials at the Board of Trade, Hughes was worried that the problem was 
only seen as one which was damaging British trade prospects, he felt that the solution, “a 
new cultural approach to China”, was needed because “there is some point in being a 
gentleman.” His moral concern was not widely shared, however.117 Joseph Bailie 
suggested that Swires replaced their: 
 
staff as they become superannuated, by young men who know the Chinese language, 
customs and manners, and who go out determined to retrieve the good name of Britishers 
in the Far East.118 
In fact economics dictated that the new generation of men was recruited to supervise an 
expansion in Chinese employees, but similar skills and sensitivities were required. In 
1931 BAT’s Cunliffe-Owen told Lampson that: 
 
the future of such enterprises as his lay in the development of the Chinese element. He 
was accordingly now going to concentrate on getting fewer foreigners; but these 
foreigners were to be men of good calibre, and must all of them have a good working 
knowledge of Chinese.119 
After studying at the School of Oriental Studies BAT sent its men to Beijing for eighteen 
months language study.120 The KMA was starting to think along similar lines, it wanted 
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to recruit tactful men who already had Chinese language ability; learning the language o
the job was not good enough.
n 
                                                          
121 Swires planned to send men to Nanjing for similar 
reasons, after office-hours cramming for an exam carrying a financial bonus did not 
work.122 
 
The Compradore 
 When discussing the treatment of Dr.T.Z.K. Woo [see page 7], Joseph Bailie went 
on to lay a large part of the blame for such attitudes on the structure of Swires’ business: 
 
May I say that I believe the crux of the situation is the present system of transacting 
business through Compradores... your hands are tied in your attempts to make the proper 
friendly gestures to the Chinese. 
This point was also stressed by Chinese businessmen themselves, for example, by Chen 
Guangfu in conversation with Warren Swire in 1929.123 
 Many British businessmen also felt that the compradore system needed replacing 
or modernising. Scandals and inefficiency provided further reasons; in 1927 the 
Hongkong Bank’s Beijing compradore absconded with around $1.4 million that had been 
paid in only as far as the compradoric “bank within a bank”.124 This revealed the essential 
problem of indirect control, especially as Chinese customers tended to identify the 
compradore more closely with his foreign company than was actually the case under the 
existing system.125 
 There were other reasons: 
 
In the latish 1920s the compradores tended to lose their grip... chaotic political 
conditions... and all that kind of thing and the[y]... tended to be squeezed a little bit one 
way or the other, 
remarked one ex-taipan in the 1980s. Although a former Swire director remarked that 
“there were times when they found it financially advantageous all the same.”126 However 
advantageous, the trend in business was towards more direct contacts between buyers and 
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sellers, which bypassed the commissions of the agency houses like Swires and of their 
compradores’ organisations. Increasing competition from Chinese and foreign companies 
made for much more complex business which required strict delineations of business and 
control which the compradoric partnership failed to deliver.127 Improvements in relations 
with the Chinese business community also came at the expense of the compradores. At 
Sassoons, for example, the role of the compradore declined steadily in the interwar 
period.128 
 Swires’ cost-conscious response was to attempt to set up a system of salaried 
“Chinese Managers”, whose time and work would be fully committed to the firm and 
would be fully integrated into its structure. This was accompanied by a concerted drive to 
reclaim sensitive areas of business from compradoric control. Labour contracts were 
farmed out through compradores and efforts were made, for financial reasons, to find the 
true levels of costs and investigate the savings possible through direct hire. European 
indifference was no longer cost-effective.129 This was paralleled by moves to reassert 
total control over all aspects of Swires’ shipping business. It accompanied moves 
elsewhere in the Swire organisation to cut out contractors and compradores, and thereby 
become more responsive to the conditions and demands of Chinese passengers. Forei
travelling inspectors were introduced in 1928 (and were moved from ship to ship to o
the danger of bribery). Their job was to check that compradores remitted earnings in fu
With the development of new ships in the early 1930s European pursers took over the 
duties of the compradores as they affected the first class Chinese passengers. Swires 
failed to get rid of the tea boys, union power was too strong.
gn 
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 British companies were also aware of how firms from other nations treated their 
staff, German businesses for example, or American insurance companies which in 1928 
did not: 
work very much through the old Compradore and agent type, but through Foreign 
educated men who are members of their own staff, and have titles such as Branch or 
Departmental Manager. These men have a standing which is flattering to them and which 
gives them “face” with their countrymen”; 
This also enabled the Americans to keep a closer watch on squeeze. Another report cited 
an: 
127  See for example DOT, 1928 p.62, and later reports, passim.; on complexity see ST - 13 pp.38-39. 
128 Zhang, Shasun tuanji, p.141. 
129 JS London to BS Shanghai/Hong Kong, 27/4/28, JSS III 2/7; Alfred Holt and Co to JS London, 5/4/28 
and enclosures, JSS XI 1/6. 
130 BS Shanghai to JS London, 16/3/28, JSS III 2/7; BS Shanghai to JS London, 4/5/28, JSS III 2/7; BS 
Shanghai to JS London, 5/4/29, JSS III 2/8 JSS III 2/8; BS Shanghai to JS London, 9/8/29, JSS III 2/8; BS 
Shanghai to JS London, 24/10/30, JSS III 2/10; BS Shanghai to JS London, 28/11/30, JSS III 2/10. On the 
teaboys see the file JSS X 1/3; Other companies planned similar changes, the China Merchants, in one of 
its frequent reorganisations promised to rid itself of compradores and tea boys in 1936, Oriental Affairs, 
March 1936, pp.133-35. 
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interesting illustration of German methods towards Chinese [which] was observed in the 
shape of a gold watch carried by [compradore Chang Peilin] bearing his monogram in 
enamel, a gift of appreciation from Arnholds for some successful deal.131 
 There were also attempts at Swires to identify their compradores more closely 
with the company by allowing them room in a section of the Shanghai Private Office 
Suite. The following year J.K. Swire informed London that another British manager had 
decided: 
 
to have his Compradore to sit in his room with him; he is a long way the best of the 
young school and the sort of man that it will pay to treat as a colleague.132 
 Insurance was the area chosen by Swires’ for introducing this managerial system. 
Their insurance business was under threat from foreign competition, whilst the old-style 
compradores considered the work beneath them. Swires also distrusted the Chinese 
agents feeling that they, like all Chinese, were likely to be corrupted by local elites and 
relatives.133 To counter this a new, young Chinese Insurance Organisation was installed. 
This was also designed to handle the rapid growth of potential of the industry in the 
1920’s, especially as town improvement schemes opened up more towns to commercially 
less hazardous business.134 Chinese clerks took over routine work and freed foreign staff 
to drum up and inspect new business.135 Swires also took other new measures to reform 
their traditional workings and save money. They planned to appoint a Chinese agent in 
Zhenjiang in 1929. In 1931 their Weihaiwei agency was given to a Chinese firm, with an 
English-speaking manager, instead of a foreign agency, saving them an estimated $2,000. 
A similar office was planned for Guangzhou and this was felt to be the future pattern for 
the outports.136 
 
Sinification 
  Replacing the compradore involved integrating his staff into the existing British 
structure whilst recruiting new men not tainted with old fashioned ways. “A buck 
                                                          
131 On American companies see BS Shanghai to JS London, 2/3/28 enc. BS Shanghai to all ports, 
“Insurance”, 15/2/28, JSS II 2/7; For the watch see BS Shanghai to JS London, 14/2/28 enc. A.D. Gallows 
“Upper River: Future Policy in Szechwan”, p.19, JSS III 2/7. Arnholds was, of course, a British registered 
company at this point. 
132 G.W. Swire to C.C. Scott 31/1/29, SP ADD 15; J.K. Swire to G.W. Swire, 10/5/30, SP ADD 15. 
133 ST - 16 p.25; Hamilton was told by a Mr. Fleming, an American lawyer in Shanghai (and resident for 
21 years), that the Chinese considered arson “a perfectly legitimate way of enriching themselves at the 
Insurance Company’s expense,” Hamilton Papers, Journal, 12/11/27. 
134 BS Shanghai to JS London, 2/10/31 p.4, JSS II 2/10. 
135 BS Hong Kong to JS London, 5/9/30, JSS II 2/9. 
136 G.W. Swire to J.K. Swire , 8/2/29, SP ADD 15; BS Shanghai to JS London, 23/1/31, JSS III 2/11; BS 
Hong Kong to JS London, 1/6/28, JSS II 2/7; JS London to BS Shanghai, 9/8/29, JSS III 2/8. By 1932 only 
the APC’s agent in Zhenjiang was British, Directory of China and Japan, 1932. 
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Chinese over the whole lot/Insurance dept. to learn Chinese” were the options Warren 
Swire scribbled on a letter dealing with the future of the Chinese insurance organisation. 
There were “obstructionists” among managers in China who were opposed to employing 
Chinese in formerly European posts.137 Swires’ man in Shantou declared in 1931 that, as 
he was old-fashioned, as his Chinese staff were old-fashioned, and as his customers were 
old-fashioned, he failed to see the need for change. London were always afraid that 
change would be merely cosmetic, with due cause: the Yichang Chinese Manager’s 1935 
contract reads much like any older compradore contract.138 Old segregationist thinking 
found the employment of Chinese to previously-European staffed positions difficult to 
accommodate.139 
  There were tremendous potential savings to be made from employing “good class 
Chinese” (“none are overpaid at present” was a J.K. Swire understatement in 1930) 
especially as it was reported as early as 1925 that there were “very few jobs of a routine 
nature which can not be done as well, if not better, by good Chinese or by women 
clerks”. Unlike women clerks, Chinese employees would not leave their jobs on getting 
married. In early 1925 Swires had talked enthusiastically of recruiting a “definite class of 
“B and S Chinese”... and getting the reputation among educated Chinese of being the 
firm to get into”. Added impetus, in the shape of immediate political and, more 
especially, economic crisis, was needed before this was properly embarked upon. As 
Swires remarked in 1928, “there is a limit beyond which it no longer pays to employ 
foreigners.140 Appointing Chinese as agents in the smaller treaty ports would allow 
                                                          
137 Marginal notation on BS Shanghai to JS London, 2/3/28, JSS II 2/7; on obstructionists see G.W. Swire 
to JS London, [February] 1929, SP ADD 15. 
138 For defenders of the system see: Mackintosh to N.S. Brown 28/3/30 on “Running Nanking without a 
Compradore”, JSS ADD 15; King, History, Volume three, p.348. For opposition in Swatow see C.C. Scott 
to JSS, 19/6/31, JSS I 3/6; for expected slowness see ST - 20 p.7: “the system continued to be a little 
“compradoric” for quite a long time afterwards”. For the Yichang compradore’s contract see Compradore’s 
Security Book 1904-1937, p.154, JSS I 8/3. Also in Shantou, which appears to have been a hot bed of 
business reaction, Jardine’s manager was described as having been “a dyed in the wool old China hand... 
he would sort of frown on any fraternising with the Chinese or anything like that”, ST - 20 p.21. 
139 Integration was a problem raised by employing Chinese ships’ engineers. In initial plans for the CNCo 
ships Wuhu and Wusueh the 3rd Engineer’s cabin was placed aft, amongst the Chinese crew. Even though 
ships’ crews were rigidly stratified, race would still transcend class and status in this plan, and a Chinese 
would still be cabined amongst Chinese. Furthermore it was wondered whether he would be Chinese, as it 
was such a complicated and modern ship. Eventually it was decided to furnish the room in a “manner 
suitable for a European third engineer” and Shanghai came to the conclusion that perhaps he should be 
amongst his “professional kind”, JS London to BS Shanghai, 12/7/29, JSS III 2/8; BS Shanghai to JS 
London 5/7/29, JSS III 2/8. Even so, Wuhu was to have a bath and w.c. solely for the use of the 3rd 
engineer and the Chinese pilot; professional integration did not extend as far as the bath or the toilet. 
(Incidentally, latrine provision for the pilot was a new idea, on many ships he’d had to make his way to the 
Chinese passenger latrines when circumstances and rapids allowed.) 
140 J.K. Swire to JS London, 20/5/30, SP ADD 15; J.K. Swire to JS London, 5/6/25, SP ADD 15; it was 
estimated that the savings from employing a full time Chinese pilot instead of relying on the Pilots 
Association to provide one could be 600 taels a month in Shanghai, BS Shanghai to Alfred Holt and Co., 
21/11/30, JSS II 2/9; JS London to Alfred Holt and Co., 27/4/28, JSS XI 1/6. As part of its emergency 
reorganisation after 1933 ICI cut down its foreign staff by 20%, Chinese staff costs were so low that no 
worthwhile savings could be made by pruning them, Brodie, Crescent, pp.185-86. 
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British staff to be used where they could be most effective and where the lonely haza
of outport life, which could undermine their usefulness, could be avoided.
rds 
 
                                                          
141
 By 1930 the formation of a Chinese House Staff replacing foreign staff at Swires 
was in full swing, their loyalty assured by good salaries.142 Progress was such that the 
Shanghai Office was worried that it had very little margin for sickness and relief amongst 
the British staff.143 An attempt was made to apply to Chinese applicants the same class-
criteria that were applied to British staff. It was felt that “the House Staff, must be 
recruited in very much the same way as the foreign staff i.e. partly from the University, 
partly from the Public Schools and partly from the Grammar Schools”.144 There was a 
rationale to this, beyond an attempt to perpetuate as much as possible the character of 
treaty port business life. Personality problems were often raised by the old-fashioned 
compradores and by some of their old-fashioned replacements. Nepotism may have 
produced employees with excellent references, but it did not guarantee their ability. 
Opium-smoking mandarin types were unlikely to be taken seriously by conservative 
foreigners.145 Westernized young Chinese, in a radical departure from the usual 
prejudices, were seen as offering the best hope. 
 Sinification took place in other companies and paralleled changes in such British-
dominated institutions as the CMC, the Salt Gabelle and the Shanghai Pilots Association, 
albeit much more slowly.146 BAT, for instance, could already boast a reasonably thorough 
integration of Chinese into much of the company’s structure. It made much of this itself 
in its own publications.147 In fact the company relied on Chinese in all parts of its 
business for its success, but by contrast industrial management remained the preserve of 
foreigners whilst Chinese were left as clerks, distributors and advertisers.148 Furthermore 
with the Anglicization of BAT’s management in the 1920’s “the entire organisation 
seems to have become even more dependant on Chinese than it had been under American 
executive leadership”, which says much about British attitudes to management as well as 
to the Chinese.149 Sinification at BAT was a political response to Guomindang pressure. 
141 One young Briton “was rather shaken by his lonely [eight month] vigil at Shasi and should not be kept 
on the river too long”, J.K. Swire to N.S. Brown, 19/3/30, SP ADD 15. 
142 J.K. Swire to JS London, 5/6/25, SP ADD 15; J.H. Robertson to J.R. Hobhouse, 21/12/28, JSS XI 1/6. 
143 C.C. Scott to J.K. Swire 24/6/31, JSS I 3/6 p.137b. 
144 J.K. Swire to JS London, 3/3/30, SP ADD 15. A Chinese student studying at Oxford was interviewed in 
1929, J.K. Swire to G.W. Swire, 5/4/29, SP ADD 15. 
145 Perfume wearers too, see Consul Harding’s splenetic descriptions of Jardine’s Changsha agent Ching: 
“a perfume reeking, opium sot and congenital idiot”, whom he refused to see, H.I. Harding to Lampson, 
S/O, 10/7/30, enc., Harding to A.E. Smith, 19/6/30, FO228\4276\2 63b1. 
146 George Philip, The Log of the Shanghai Pilot Service 1831-1932 (Shanghai, 1932), pp.185, VI. 
147 Cochran, Big Business, pp.22-40; “The B.A.T. were probably the first of the big companies in China to 
realise the possibilities of Chinese accountants and Chinese clerks and to give them positions of 
importance and trust.”, Yueh Pao, 1st September 1923, pp.34, 33; (Interestingly in this bilingual company 
magazine the more prominent text is the Chinese and the magazine is bound and numbered in the Chinese 
fashion.) 
148 Cochran, Big Business, p.213, p.134. 
149 Ibid., p.165. 
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In late 1927 “the company temporarily stopped sending new American representatives to 
China and permanently appointed Chinese to fill many posts in the company’s marketing 
system previously held by Westerners” though it still kept industrial management in 
Western hands.150 The new generation of Western inspectors was recruited to supervise 
this expansion.151 
 Distrust of Chinese employees did not just centre on their questionable loyalty 
and honesty. Their competence was automatically seen as a problem and so was their 
reputed inability to take on responsibilities. For technical staff this partly resulted from 
restrictive practices - mostly, but not only, sins of omission - that prevented Chinese from 
employment in certain foreign dominated fields (the Shanghai Pilot Service for example). 
Active foreign involvement in training and employing Chinese engineers was also 
lacking. This resulted in a shortage of young Chinese trained in practical fields along 
Western lines, a fact always alluded to by opponents of sinification.152 
 As a result of political pressure, and the efforts of industrial reformers such as 
Joseph Bailie, this pattern began to change in the late 1920s. Private companies and the 
public utilities in Shanghai began to accept Chinese apprentices and also to employ them 
after training.153 Some foreign firms worked directly with the FBI/China Association 
scheme whilst Hong Kong University’s engineering graduates began to be more widely 
accepted.154 As a result of this increase in trained Chinese engineers the KMA, for 
example, were able to replace many foreign staff after 1934.155 Swires closed down their 
Hong Kong Sugar Refinery in 1928 for a major restructuring and sinification of 
employment there, largely in a bid to cut costs.156 Swires in the 1930s also employed their 
first Chinese wireless operators, accountants and wharfingers; both of the latter jobs 
required them to trust their Chinese staff in ways traditional attitudes about Chinese 
honesty did not allow.157 Chinese ships’ officers had been used on the Upper Yangzi in 
times of trouble for pragmatic and insurance reasons. By 1930 Chinese shippers, who 
wanted the cheapest shipping rates for their goods, were also objecting to the costs of 
                                                          
150 Ibid., pp.193, 213. 
151 Logan, China, pp.1, 50. 
152 H.W. Robertson to Alfred Holt and Co., 9/10/28, JSS XI 1/6; Other resistance came from the Shanghai 
Pilots Association which gracelessly felt that it “had no option but to comply” with the request of the 
Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce backed by the Consular Body when it agreed to take on Chinese 
pilots again after 60 years without. One was appointed in 1928 and another in 1930; see Philip, Log of the 
Shanghai Pilot Service, pp.185, vi; see, for example, Finance and Commerce, 31/1/34, p.123, “Are there 
too many College Graduates in China?”; This was also an echo of the general situation within Chinese 
technical and scientific professions. The geography (urban and coastal) and small numbers of 
establishments employing graduates prompted many to abandon science for other fields, Reardon-
Anderson, Study of Change, pp.177-85. 
153 G.W. Swire to JS London, 17/5/29, SP ADD 15. 
154 On the FBI scheme see chapter 4; on HKU see C.A. Middleton Smith, ““Practical Chinese Engineers”: 
The Demand and the Supply”, Far Eastern Review, July 1930, pp.344-48. 
155 Wright, Coal Mining, p.131. 
156 BS Hong Kong to JS London, 17/7/28, SP ADD 19. 
157 ST - 13, p.37; BS Shanghai to JS London, 9/10/31, JSS II 2/10. 
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foreign officers.158 Dodwells also experimented, to see if “reliable Chinese employees... 
are obtainable” and what savings they could lead to.159 
 Swires experimented with one J.C.L Wong, who was trained as an engineer in 
Liverpool and sent out to Hong Kong in 1928: 
 
Keep a watch on Wong, see that he is given as many jobs as possible to give you a line 
on his sense of responsibility, initiative and force of character-the characteristics, where 
most Chinese fail - and generally have him tried out... Even if Wong does not eventually 
enter our service, we shall have to employ many of his like in the near future, if only for 
reasons of economy. 
Wong was not tested on his skills as an engineer, but by the dictates of another agenda, 
sinification in the face of distrust and prejudice from British treaty port staff. He was to 
prove an initial disappointment: 
 
As a draughtsman Mr. Wong is excellent but on practical work his knowledge is very 
limited which of course is only to expected... His knowledge is increasing of course but it 
will be some time before Mr. Wong could be left in charge of work of any magnitude... 
he does not possess the characteristics necessary if he is to be looked upon as a likely 
candidate for a post where he will be called upon to give directions to British 
personnel.160 
C.P. Wong, however, at the Hongkong Taikoo Sugar Refinery was spoken of very highly 
but then he was: 
 
a type of Chinese, which it would be difficult to duplicate... he has stood up well to the 
foreigners at the refinery... apparently quite willing to make suggestions on his own... 
proved himself quite capable of continuing a day’s work which Farrel has started... 
apparently Farrel would go down to the refinery in the morning, leaving Wong to do his 
work, and then in the afternoon they would change places.161 
 
Chinese Labour 
 Political events, especially the anti-British boycott movement after the May 30th 
incident and the Hong Kong-Guangzhou strike, had shown the importance of good labour 
relations. In 1927 ICI were eager to build houses for its Chinese workforce “as a means 
                                                          
158 BS Shanghai to JS London, 7/2/30, JSS III 2/9; BS Shanghai to JS London, 2/5/30, JSS III 2/9. 
159 Minutes of Directors Meetings, Dodwell and Co., Ltd., 19/12/29; 20/2/30, Inchcape Papers, MS 
27,498/4. 
160 JS London to BS Shanghai, 10/2/28, JSS II 2/7; BS Shanghai to JS London, enc. BS Hongkong to 
Alfred Holt and Co. 25/1/29. He was kept busy on “painting and deck work” being “very useful in that 
capacity”, JSS II 2/8 1st half. 
161 G.W. Swire to JSS 11/1/29, SP ADD 15. 
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of retaining their goodwill”; they established a free staff-restaurant whilst Swires were 
eager to remind their Hong Kong managers of the political reasons for educating the 
children of their workforce.162 Swires also made some concessions towards conditions on 
board ships for the crews, and broke ranks with the more conservative Jardines in a pay 
settlement with the seamen’s union in 1930.163 BAT suffered from major strike action, 
much of it political, in the 1920s. In the mid-1930s close links with the Nationalists 
enabled British companies to have strikes settled in their favour, either by the Social 
Affairs Bureau of Greater Shanghai in that city, or more directly elsewhere.164 
  
Integrating passengers 
The best recorded, and probably most visible, example of attempts to alter the treatment 
of Chinese customers was provided by the debates about restructuring passenger 
accommodation on British steamers. 
 As well as starting to integrate (or re-title) their staff, Swires made moves to 
integrate their passengers. Jardines were already doing so on some of their ships. In mid-
1928 the Swire discussion centred largely on converting existing ship superstructures. 
Shanghai rejected change in January, but London wrote in August that in the future: 
“there will be no question in China of foreign or Chinese first class accommodation and 
therefore we had better meet probable future market requirements now”.165 
 Integration in existing ships raised some basic problems and encouraged 
paternalistic segregationism. The Hankou office claimed, in 1928, that “they don’t want 
our food forced on them” and “we must give them what they want” and “provide space 
for the Oriental and the Occidental.”166 Next year Shanghai paid lip-service to the 
principle, but their objections to de-segregating the Guangzhou-Hongkong-Shanghai 
ocean route mixed economics and prejudice: “foreign passengers would not travel... if 
they had to feed in a Chinese saloon... under conditions which we could not avoid-i.e. the 
normal lower middle class Chinese idea of comfort and ease”. Perhaps, it was suggested, 
tickets for the combined foreign/Chinese first class could only be bought “through our 
office on personal application, so that the standard of cleanliness, etc. be kept up.”167 
 The CNCo ships Wuhu and Wusueh were to be a new generation with 
accommodation supposedly reflecting the shift in Swires’ thinking by the end of the 
                                                          
162 “The Reorganisation of Sales Arrangements by ICI in China”, 28/10/27, ICI ICHO/CFD/0139 (ii); 
G.W. Swire to J.S. Scott, 31/5/31, SP ADD 15. 
163 Shanghai No.330, 2/12/30, FO228\4263\1 55c; Hong Kong No.61, 5/12/30 and enclosed “Confidential 
Report of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company,” FO228\4263\2 55c. 
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p.278. 
165 JS London to BS Shanghai, 21/9/28, JSS III 2/7. 
166 D.H. Whamond to C.C. Knight, 30/7/28, in BS Shanghai to JS London, 10/8/28, JSS III 2/7. 
167 BS Shanghai to JS London, 11/1/29, “Notes on Discussions Regarding New Tonnage Held at 
Hongkong on 2nd January 1929”, JSS III 2/8. 
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1920’s. An Intermediate Saloon was designed168 and economising on the fittings was 
warned against due to the attention to such details expected by “the growing numbers of 
Chinese who both demand and are willing to pay for comfort on the European Standard”. 
The first class accommodation was to be managed by a foreign purser and his Chinese 
staff, and was not included in the compradore’s contract. Chinese passengers wishing to 
travel saloon class would buy their tickets at the foreign agent’s office. Whether this was 
to give the passengers face or to check their personal appearance is not recorded.169 
 The new arrangements amounted to a clumsy attempt to pander to European 
expectations of segregation and Chinese consumer demands and was not successful. The 
Intermediate Saloon was too expensive and only 10% of its capacity was used, First 
Class accommodation was bathless and bedding-less and was soon put back into the 
compradore’s hands, but earnings from Chinese passengers were too low. Classes were 
regraded: “It only means changing the labels on the doors” wrote Warren Swire, and the 
designation Cabin Class come up with. The nomenclature was confusing, Swires were 
confused, so were their customers. “First Class” is certainly apt to be confused with 
“Saloon”, and it is difficult to get away from the inevitable “Chinese” in describing it, to 
avoid misunderstandings” was one comment.170 
 Jardines’ Indo-China line pipped Swires with the Pao Wo, built in 1931 as a river 
steamer and described as innovatory because all the passenger accommodation was on 
the same deck (steerage apart), and there was no purely Chinese accommodation of the 
traditional type.171 On Swires’ new Shanghai-Tianjin steamer, Shengkin, this meant that 
the “First Class Accommodation (Chinese)” should “be equipped in all respects nearly as 
well as the saloon, [as] we may be carrying foreign passengers here at times”. Whatever 
changes may have occurred two standards of comfort were seen to be the norm.172 
 Class names certainly referred as a shorthand to the facilities offered rather than 
to the passengers themselves. But the evidence shows that it was largely assumed that 
East ate East and West ate West and the two would find it impossible to eat together or 
share the use of a bathroom or lounge.]173 It was expected in Shanghai that Europeans 
                                                          
168 BS Shanghai to JS London, 24/4/31, JSS III 2/11. 
169 BS Shanghai to JS London, 18/4/30, JSS III 2/9. 
170 JS London to BS Shanghai, 15/5/31, JSS III 2/11; BS Shanghai to JS London 19/6/31, JSS III 2/11. 
171 BS Shanghai to JS London, 27/3/31, JSS III 2/11, and Far Eastern Review, November 1930, pp.655-56. 
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2/11; For the new steamer’s specifications see BS Shanghai to JS London 28/11/30, JSS III 2/10. Special 
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inevitable Lee and Perrin’s Sauce” James L. Hutchinson, China Hand (Boston, Massachusetts, 1936), p.20. 
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would not wish to sail in a mixed Saloon class because of the Chinese company.]174 The 
salient point, that Chinese passengers were the increasingly important market, was often 
blurred by the wish, fostered throughout treaty port socialisation, to protect the 
exclusivity of British treaty port life. 
 
V Conclusion - The Limits of Reform 
 There were significant concrete moves towards abandoning the exclusive 
traditional structures of many aspects of British business in China after the Nationalist 
Revolution. This process was compounded by Chinese economic development and the 
world economic depression. Pragmatic analyses of the nature of the Chinese as 
competitors, clients, employees and colleagues began to be substituted for those based on 
popular attitudes which informed the old complacent system. This process continued 
slowly throughout the 1930s. The rhetoric of Sino-British friendship became closer to the 
reality of Sino-British social relations than it had previously been. 
 The years 1928 to 1931 were a period of transition. Most of the structures and 
attitudes questioned were unresolved by 1931 and many were still unresolved by the time 
of the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars.175 The period 1925 to 1927 had been one of 
panicky belligerence. Peace after 1928 brought more panic, but panicky reform and the 
removal of “conspicuous grievances” from wherever they could no longer be defended. 
This process went together with attempts to alter the national character of businesses as 
much as necessary but as little as possible. Foreigners were conspicuous in China and 
easy targets for political or criminal attacks. Partial indigenisation of company personnel 
and character, if it could be effected (and the easiest way was to create joint companies) 
was a good insurance, for example, against unpredictable, and by 1931 extremely 
powerful, political boycotts.176 
 There was a widespread initial hostility to cooperation with Chinese businessmen, 
many of whom after the May 30th incident had been involved in business and political 
forums seen as hostile to the British, such as the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. 
Nevertheless, by 1933 Swires’ new Shanghai manager was to be chosen first and 
foremost for his ability to mix with the Chinese.177 It is clear that sinification was both a 
political and economic necessity. It was introduced haphazardly and in the context of 
persistent old attitudes. G.W. Swire was not sure Chinese store keepers could, as such, be 
                                                          
174 JS London to BS Shanghai, 28/3/30, JSS III 2/9. 
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trusted, and Chinese midshipmen were “good pieces of machinery” but he doubted “their 
guts in an emergency”; it was often felt that the new European employees needed to 
supervise the new Chinese workforces negated the cost savings.178 Both the wider debate 
about conciliation, adaptation and cooperation, and the more practical discussion of 
sinification of staff involved a continuous, if not always openly-stated, awareness of 
Chinese “characteristics”; only occasionally was this a misnomer for Chinese culture, 
habits or customs, social, business or otherwise. 
 For all the friendliness displayed at managerial and elite level, integration was 
passively resisted by British workforces, and its impact was softened, where possible, for 
European customers. For all of the advantages of employing Chinese in British 
businesses, in terms of propaganda, cost savings and the dangers of employing 
conspicuous foreign staff, the social and racial prejudice against accepting Chinese as 
equal militated against the bulk of the community effectively adapting itself to the 
situation, and also to the wider question of the growth of a Western-leaning Chinese 
middle class. In 1931, faced with a worsening depression and the need for “effecting 
economic readjustment by all concerned”, J.K. Swire recommended a 10% flat reduction 
of salaries and directors fees. London agreed but also suggested that, senior staff apart, 
all passages to and from home should be second class. Shanghai replied that: 
 
House 2nd class accommodation very limited standard inferior passengers undesirable 
many orientals therefore our opinion is everyone will pay themselves difference defeating 
essential object encourage individual economy.179 
The objection was partly snobbish: “any passage which is not called “second class” is 
unobjectionable”, but the prejudice was tangible and expected by the management.180 
 Problems also arose from the continuing social segregation and feelings of racial 
superiority. What, for example, was young Hong Cha in Shanghai going to call his 
foreign colleagues? “He probably called the others nothing at all, in order to avoid the 
“Mr.” or the name without the “Mr.”, replied Warren Swire, 
 
though he does not wine and dine with them, he does ask them to play tennis etc. at his 
house and probably that is the best way of starting the kind of relationship we want.181 
                                                          
178 G.W. Swire to JS London, 11/1/29, SP ADD 15; G.W. Swire to C.C. Scott, 21/11/28, SP ADD 15; JSS 
I 3/6 C.C. Scott to G.W. Swire, 21/8/31. A thorough investigation of the possibilities was undertaken by 
Swires in 1933-34, ST - 14, pt.2, p.3. 
179 Private Telegrams, from Shanghai, 18/6/31; to Shanghai, 24/6/31; from Shanghai, 26/6/31; to Shanghai, 
26/6/31, 30/6/31, SP ADD 19. 
180 C.C. Scott to J.K. Swire, 24/6/31, JSS I 3/6. 
181 G.W. Swire to JSS, 1/2/29, SP ADD 15; for another example of the power of the traditional 
relationships see the description of a Chinese pilot on probation who “lacks confidence in himself, being 
frightened to tell a foreign Master what is the best thing to do when the situation arises”. BS Shanghai to 
Managing Directors P and O SNCo., 21/11/30, JSS II 2/9. 
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The social taboos among non-managerial staff were still rarely disturbed except on a 
ritualistic level, and the tennis-party was the prime example of the newer, more intimate, 
but still ritualistic, get-together.182 
 The strong sense of community and nationalism exhibited by the British in China 
also caused problems. Their self-ascribed standards were threatened by the concessions 
beginning to be made to the Chinese. Companies knew that their compradores could 
commit business abuses that would be assumed to be instigated by the British 
management. Swires, for example, were keen to get their compradores to “understand our 
scruples” and strongly believed that the reliability of their own business ethics was a 
strong advantage in trade in China.183 This often-stated belief in the attractiveness of 
British honesty to the Chinese was related to wider paternalistic ideas about British 
policy and activities in China.184 It was a core communal myth. The danger of the new 
generation of businessmen’s much-heralded “greater understanding of, and sympathy 
with the Chinese” was best articulated by the hostile H.G.W. Woodhead: 
 
In the past the British merchant has gained a reputation for integrity and scrupulousness. 
Is he, in future, to resort to wholesale bribery to secure “justice” against defaulting 
creditors...?185 
In fact the whole process of arranging Sino-British companies and closer “cooperation” 
entailed an abandonment of some of the tenets of previous British practice. The need to 
openly identify British interests with those of Chinese business and the National 
Government was incompatible with the traditional apartness and neutrality practised by 
the British. It was much closer to the standard relationship between Chinese companies 
and their de facto local authorities.186 
 There was, then, confusion about the type of market businesses ought to target. 
Should they follow up on their structural integration in and dependence on the China 
trade, and truly sinify their public face and priorities, or else should they cling on to their 
Britishness and colonial trappings? Jardines and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank had 
their headquarters in colonial Hong Kong and were initially less willing to compromise 
                                                          
182 For other examples of tennis diplomacy see the efforts of Stella Benson’s husband, Benson Diaries, 
22/11/29, 23/11/29, 9/2/30; the limit of this socialising was revealed when several of the players were also 
invited for dinner: “except for tennis, they had nothing in common”, ibid., 17/3/30; see also Moneypenny 
Papers, “Ningpo more far”, p.30. 
183 JS London to BS Shanghai and Hong Kong, 11/5/28 and encs., JSS II 2/7; BS Shanghai to JS London, 
21/12/28 and encs., JSS III 2/7. This self-assurance was confirmed by, for example, leaked letters showing 
routine short measuring by a Danish firm with mainly German trade, Jebsen and Co., in Guangzhou, BS 
Hong Kong to Alfred Holt and Co., 27/7/28 and enclosures, JSS II 2/7. 
184 In later years J.T. Pratt echoed this belief; see his comments about the attractiveness of the British 
commercial approach in J.T. Pratt to B.D. Beith, 4/8/54, SOAS, Pratt Papers, PPMS 5/25. 
185 Woodhead, Yangtsze and its Problems, p.147. 
186 See the analysis of merchant cooperation in Sichuan with the Chongqing warlord, Liu Xiang, in Kapp, 
“Chunking as a Center of Warlord Power, 1926-1937”, pp.150-52, 158-59. 
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their British loyalties and character. Business dictated the necessity of sinification but 
distrust of the Chinese, and imperial dignity, suggested otherwise and there was a latent 
fear of giving encouragement to nationalist movements elsewhere. 
 Ultimately, legislative harassment from the National Government throughout the 
1930s, and the growing realisation that Japan’s strong-arm policy in China was not to 
Britain’s benefit after all, forced companies to adopt more cooperative (“un-British” 
Woodhead would have said) measures to anchor themselves into the China market. Even 
Jardines contemplated bringing Song Ziwen and his wealth in to the company in 1935.187 
Many of these were larger scale versions of a suggestion, floated by Swires manager in 
Chongqing, for the pattern of share distribution for the proposed Taikoo Chinese 
Navigation Company in 1929: 
 
It is the office not the man that is important and the only way of gaining the support of 
the military officials is... to attach the dividends from a certain number of shares to 
certain positions. The holders of these offices would then be directly interested in helping 
us earn a dividend - fairly frank bribery, but we cannot see how else our object could be 
achieved along these lines. 
“I must say, I do like this fellow’s tone and outlook”, noted G.W. Swire.188 It was a long 
way from that of Jardine’s Ross and his bayonets, but it promised a relationship very 
similar to that which existed between Chongqing’s warlord, Liu Xiang, and Swires’ local 
Chinese competitor, the Minsheng Shiye Company.189 
 
187 Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise, pp.88-92; Swires in 1937 offered Song a 30% share in CNCo, 
Jurgen Osterhammel “Imperialism in Transition”, p.284. 
188 BS Shanghai to JS London, 28/10/29 and enclosure E.G. Price (Chunking) to BS Shanghai, 29/8/29, 
JSS III 2/8. 
189 Kapp, “Chunking as a Center of Warlord Power, 1926-1937”, pp.150-52. 
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Chapter 6 
"To serve and not to rule"1 
 
British Protestant Missionaries and Chinese Nationalism, 1928-1931 
 
The Church's enemies dub us "running dogs of Imperialism", and while in 
the ordinary sense of the term there is no truth in the charge, yet in the 
spirit and methods of our work I find something which approximates 
closely enough to spiritual imperialism.2 
 
I Introduction 
General Attitudes 
This chapter examines the attitudes of a representative selection of British Protestant 
mission societies towards the Chinese and developments in the aftermath of the 
Nationalist Revolution.3 It will be shown that the mission world faced many of the same 
internal and external economic and political pressures that affected other Britons in 
China, and sought solutions along similar lines. With the aim of preserving their presence 
in China they attempted to change their attitudes towards the Chinese by reforming their 
institutional and social relations and structures.  
 Mission attitudes towards the Chinese, as shown in chapter two, were capable of 
great negativity on the basis of abstract mission ideology alone. Mission practices and 
structures reinforced this negativity to the extent that by 1927 they were clearly in need of 
reform. Furthermore, while the mission discourse about change was pre-eminently 
concerned with organisational, financial and doctrinal problems, it was pervaded by the 
vocabulary of Chinese characteristics derived from that constructed by A.H. Smith and 
others. This construct was used for analysis, explication and justification and its use was 
enmeshed with the unreformed structure of mission life. 
 Although apparently worlds apart, in their propaganda British missions and 
businesses shared at least one basic methodological belief - namely that the Chinese 
needed a period of Western tutelage without which they could not develop and during 
which they would be trained.4 The assumptions that China needed to develop Western-
style businesses or Western Christian morality were not questioned. They were rooted as 
                                                          
1 "The Society recognises that the new generation of missionaries must be well-
equipped intellectually for the work and be content to take a second place and to serve 
and not to rule the Churches in China", C.G. Sparham to F.H. Hawkins, 21/9/28, 
enclosure NCDN, 20/9/28, "Present Opportunities for Missionaries in China", LMS 
Central China Box 43. 
2  E.R. Hughes to F.H. Hawkins, 8/2/29, LMS China Fukien, Box 15. 
3 British Catholic missionary activity in China was negligible. Unless otherwise 
specified all missionaries discussed in this chapter were Protestant. 
4 C.H.B. Longman to F.H. Hawkins, 23/11/31, LMS North China Box 29. 
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much in commonly held views about the characteristics of the Chinese as in sectional 
self-interest and institutional inertia. Furthermore, a period of tutelage, by definition, 
presupposed transition and change, but the concept was often used to defend 
conservatism and opposition to change. As they shared such beliefs it should not be 
surprising that British missions and businesses faced broadly similar problems and 
adopted broadly similar solutions. Although many of the issues dealt with by missions in 
the late 1920s were ongoing, or rooted in the structure of the mission process, they 
acquired a new urgency and importance in that period. 
 
Organisation 
 There were, very broadly, three types of mission; firstly, there were those which 
were directly connected to a church in Britain, such as the Wesleyan Methodist 
Missionary Society [WMMS] of the Wesleyan Methodist Church and the English 
Presbyterian Mission [EPM] of the Foreign Missions Committee of the Presbyterian 
Church of England. Secondly, there were independents strongly identified with a 
particular church, such as the London Missionary Society [LMS] and the 
Congregationalist Churches. Thirdly there were the interdenominational missions, such as 
the China Inland Mission [CIM]. 
 Most of these had a British-based committee, the mission board, which dealt 
directly with area committees in China and often with a national committee there. It was 
responsible for funding and recruitment. The China committees met regularly, but their 
day to day running was in the hands of their secretaries. A great deal of influence could 
be wielded by a very few individuals within particular societies, such as F.H. Hawkins, 
London China secretary of the London Missionary Society [LMS], or a provincial 
secretary of the WMMS such as H.B. Rattenbury of the Hubei District. In China each 
mission society had its own mission stations, often with educational or medical 
institutions attached, and control over churches and church organisations and structures 
of its own making. 
 Metropolitan denominational and organisational differences and jealousies often 
made protestant mission unity difficult, the basic division being between "modernists" (or 
"liberals") and "fundamentalists". Protestant moves towards organisational unity in 
China, such as the setting up of the National Christian Council of China [NCC] in 1922, 
had prompted conservative groups to set up fundamentalist organisations such as the 
Bible Union, or to seek to establish conservative control over union organisations (that is, 
those run jointly by a group of societies) and institutions such as theological colleges and 
publishing bodies.5 These divisions were all too readily apparent from the pages of the 
                                                          
5 The aim of the NCC was to coordinate protestant activities in China and it grew 
out of the cumulative efforts of preceding conferences and a missionary-dominated China 
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influential Chinese Recorder, which was fairly broad in content but ultimately reflected 
the more liberal ideas of its British-born editor Frank Rawlinson.6 
 
Relations with each other 
 Missionaries by no means formed a homogeneous community. There were 
theological and national divisions which often far outweighed the community of purpose 
they shared, that is, the conversion of China to Protestant Christianity. Fundamentalist 
and liberal Americans were both generally more extreme than their British counterparts.7 
These divisions were often apparent within individual societies, but especially within 
union organisations where a continual struggle between liberal and fundamentalist 
elements was played out.8 These divisions were also exacerbated by political responses to 
the Nationalist Revolution in China, but reflected changes in patterns of belief in Britain 
and in other mission-supplying countries.9 
 The time-lag between home society and society in China was greater in mission 
work than in business. This was accentuated by the old age of many missionaries and 
especially of their leaders. D.E. Hoste, General Director of the CIM had first gone to 
China in 1885 and had held his post since 1902. C.G. Sparham, Secretary of the China 
Advisory Council of the LMS, had also first gone out in 1885. Hoste's replacement in 
1931 had arrived in China in 1894.10 Generational differences could poison relations at 
grass roots levels between older, conservative, Victorian missionaries, and the post-Great 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Continuation Committee. There was no direct representation of Chinese Churches until 
1929; K. Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions In China (London, 1929), 
pp.795-98; CCYB 1929, p.225. Bob Whyte, Unfinished Encounter: China and 
Christianity (London, 1988), p.155-58. 
6 On Rawlinson see Rawlinson, Rawlinson, the Recorder and China's Revolution, 
passim.. 
7 H.F. Wallace to Maclagan, 30/6/27, EPMA Lingtung Swatow Box 44; P. Green to 
Miss Hunter, 12/12/27, WMMSA Women's Work Collection [hereafter WW], Hupeh 
fiche 129. 
8 For opposition to the LMS at the Amoy Union Theological College see L.G. 
Philips to F.H. Hawkins, 5/1/31, LMS China Fukien Box 16; the CIM and the Southern 
Baptists were reported as having "captured" the China Sunday School Union at Shanghai 
by the liberal Ronald Rees, WMMSA South China fiche 593, Rees to K. Maclennan, 
26/10/30. See also Paul Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American 
Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton, 1958), pp.213-14. 
9 Fundamentalists "put down the whole of this revolution to the modern education 
which has come to China largely aided by mission schools," H.B. Rattenbury to C.W. 
Andrews, 24/2/28, WMMSA Hupeh, fiche 388. 
10 NCDN, 10/1/25, pp.13-14; CWM "Annotated Register of LMS Missionaries 
1756-1923", No.826; China's Millions, September 1931, p.174. 
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War generation.11 Attitudes formed in the "golden-age" of the missionary "occupation" of 
China could not be expected to be flexible and reform-minded. 
 
Missionary Lifestyles 
Socialisation 
Missionaries had some of the closest continual links with all types of Chinese 
communities of all foreign groups in China, but the structure of the missionary's life was 
as influenced by the lessons of socialisation - as a Briton in China as well as as a member 
of the mission community - as it was by the dictates of Christian evangelising. As in the 
business world the structures of mission organisation and its social life institutionalised 
distrust of the Chinese and the acceptance of Chinese difference and, thereby, 
segregation. The foreign-staffed missions generally ran Chinese church organisations. 
Chinese Christians were usually always in subordinate positions to Europeans. 
 Most British staff lived in large foreign-style houses in mission or educational 
compounds. They had servants and employed a variety of Chinese auxiliary staff in their 
schools, hospitals and Church and residential compounds, just as businessmen did. For 
the evangelical worker (that is, the active proselytisers and preachers) much of the hard 
work of evangelising was undertaken in the Chinese countryside, often in rough 
conditions, (the equivalent of the salesman's "up-country" tour); but there was always a 
compound to retreat to in which could be found a British house, British food, furnishings, 
company and the exaggerated trappings of a middle-class British life style.12 The British 
generally socialised with each other. This was especially true of their holidays in Guling, 
Mogan Shan, Beidaihe, and so on, retreats of Britishness which, together with regular 
district meetings and conferences punctuated missionary life.13 Then there were the 
generally seven-yearly year-long furloughs, which would "help to restore the sense of 
mental equilibrium dislocated" by conditions in China and by contact with the Chinese 
national character.14 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Clements to Mrs May, 11/4/32, 4/3/32, LMS China Personal 
Box 13; her aged colleagues reactions to her taste for golf was one of the symbolic 
reasons for the resignation of Miss J.M. Dixon from the LMS before completing two 
years service in Hong Kong, Dixon to F.H. Hawkins, 5/8/31, LMS, South China Box 27. 
12 When these virtues of their retreat were encroached on by the erection of Chinese 
dwellings around the EPM's Women's Missionary Association compound in Xiamen the 
inhabitants demanded the planting of trees to shield them and raised the question of 
abandoning the site for a more private one, "Amoy Mission Council Minutes" in H.J.P. 
Anderson to Maclagan, 3/10/30, EPMA South Fukien Box 12. 
13 CMYB 1911, appendix Vii, "Missionary Holidays", pp.xxiii-xxviii. Conferences 
were social events as much as business ones, see, for example, R. Rees, "All-China 
Conference on Religious Education: A General Account of the Conference", Educational 
Review [ER], October 1931, pp.377-78. 
14 A.P. Cullen, "Annual Report 1931", LMS North China Reports Box 11. 
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 It was widely accepted by the 1920s that missionaries had segregated themselves 
socially from their Chinese equivalents and that this was a structural result of mission 
socialisation. Students at the North China Union Language School in Beijing, for 
example, only met Chinese servants and teachers and generally socialised with other 
foreigners.15 Distance was maintained in other ways. The adoption of Chinese children by 
missionary women was usually deprecated by mission boards. The WMMS refused to 
permit such children to live in mission bungalows. Such adoptions could not be prevented 
but the society refused to pay travel expenses and also refused to accept them as bona fide 
adoptions.16 Intermarriage with Chinese was not condoned and was very rare. Refusal, or 
inability, to learn Chinese, notably by medical or educational workers, was also 
distancing, while formal language training for missionaries was still in its early days.17 
 The rawness revealed by accusations of social segregation, such as against Dr. 
Liddell of the LMS in a letter to the Christian World by a young LMS missionary, Henry 
Marsden, in 1928, is revealing.18 Marsden was severely censured by his colleagues and 
superiors, but his claim was generally justifiable.19 Marsden also joined in an ongoing 
debate in the Chinese Recorder about missionaries and their "standard of living". While 
liberal writers saw the mission life-style as exclusive, pragmatists saw it as sensible, and 
psychologically and physically necessary.20 Some claimed that the Western life-style of 
missionaries was not in itself a problem unless it was inflexible, segregated or zealously 
preserved.21 However, it was recognised that the existence of this situation automatically 
                                                          
15 David F. Anderson, 1930, "Report of the First Year's Work in China 9th 
December 1929 to 31st December 1930", LMS Central China Reports Box 11; "First 
Impressions of a Missionary", CR, October 1931, pp.616-17. 
16 WMMSA to the South China Missionaries' Meeting, 28/11/29, WMMSA Synod 
fiche 198; [?] to Miss Long, 20/1/32, WMMSA WW Hupeh, fiche 126; Nora Booth to 
Miss Heller, 23/3/24, WMMSA WW Hupeh, fiche 117; F.J. Griffith to Miss Heathcote, 
24/4/29, Scott Papers. 
17 Latourette, History of Christian Missions, pp.640-41. 
18 C.G. Sparham to F.H. Hawkins, 28/12/28, LMS Central China Box 45; E.A. 
Preston to F.H. Hawkins, 3/12/28, and enclosures, LMS China Fukien Box 15; Preston to 
Hawkins, 5/1/29 and especially the enclosed letter from E.R. Hughes to Preston, 
19/12/28, where Hughes states that his "own view is that in the past I have slipped into a 
way of living which was prevalent when I came to China and that way of living could and 
should be revised," LMS China Fukien Box 15. See also Hunter, Gospel of Gentility, 
pp.197-98. 
19 See, for example, William Sewell on attempts to exclude Chinese from temples 
used as holiday retreats in Sichuan, journal letter, 10/7/28, SOAS PP MS 16/3. 
20 Marsden, "Missionary Hindrances", CR, December 1928, pp.976-77; R.B. 
Whitaker, "A Missionary Confession", CR, January 1929, pp.7-14; K.A. Baird, 
"Missionary Mistakes", CR, July 1929, pp.460-61; M.S. Stewart, "Call to the Simple 
Life", CR, March 1930, pp.153-60. 
21 E.M. Rainey, "The Missionary as Neighbour", CR, September 1928, pp.554-58, 
CR, February 1929, p.125. 
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raised problems in relationships with the Chinese, habits of superiority or of indifference, 
of which missionaries were not always aware.22 
 In the larger treaty ports, such as Shanghai, Tianjin and Hankou some 
missionaries were members of masonic lodges and generally took part in the social and 
institutional activities of the British communities. Many missionaries openly identified 
themselves with the business communities and the political status quo. C.H.B. Longman 
was one such, he promised the London Secretary of the LMS "words which would 
harrow up your feelings on the treatment of Chinese and those foreigners who have lost 
their extraterritoriality." Others attacked nationalist demands using the language of 
business opposition.23  
 There were exceptions: Ronald Rees of the WMMS worked to foster better 
relations in Shanghai during the crisis of early 1927, by organising informal Sino-British 
discussion groups with British officers, businessmen and other non-missionaries.24 
However, treaty port life was seductive. Older missionaries worried that newer arrivals, 
especially those who went to the North China Union Language School, met too many 
American missionaries and secular language students, and were increasingly unprepared 
for the rigours of life in the interior.25 Furthermore, modernist Christians, especially those 
working for such Shanghai-based organisations as the NCC and the YMCA, were too 
secularly involved for the liking of the Victorian and Edwardian generations.26 In general 
they had a valid point. The particular requirements of missionary socialisation could be 
blurred by the pleasantries of treaty port life. The Baptist Missionary Society [BMS] 
worried about the rate their young female missionaries were "collapsing", and losing 
sight of their vocation and vocational celibacy.27 In the LMS Marjorie Clement's 
experiences, in her year of language training at Beijing, were quite obviously a liberation 
from a dull and predictable existence in Britain. There were holidays, the "whole of 
                                                          
22 E.M. Dixon, "On the Problem of Servants", CR, August 1931, pp.502-506. 
23 C.H.B. Longman to F.H. Hawkins, 20/9/31 and 23/11/31, LMS North China Box 
29; Rev. Hope Moncrief to Maclagan, 1/6/27, EPMA South Fukien Box 19. 
24 R. Rees, circular Letter, 30/3/27, WMMSA South China fiche 582; "Life in 
China", Sewell Papers, SOAS PP MS 16/38, p.8. 
25 Marion Broomhall to Miss Bowser, 18/10/30, BMSA CH/55; this was a 
continuing argument, "Memorandum of Meeting Concerning the Peking Language 
School, 16/11/20", CBMS, ET/China 49, China Political, file 4. Evacuation to Shanghai 
may have produced a stream of self-conscious comments on the shallowness of treaty 
port life from Miss Green of the WMMS, but it is evident from her letters that she 
enjoyed the change and the excitement, she also found herself a husband, Green to Miss 
Hunter, 30/3/27, 17/4/27, WMMSA WW Hupeh, fiche 130. 
26 On the likely effects of the "Shanghai atmosphere" on Ronald Rees when he 
moved to work for the NCC see Edgar Dewstoe to C.W. Andrews, 20/3/28, WMMSA 
South China fiche 576. 
27 Katherine M. Franklin to M.E. Bowser, 9/5/29, BMSA CH/70. For a near collapse 
see Clements to Mrs May, 11/2/32, LMS China Personal Box 13. 
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August free. Absolutely. It's a thing I have never had in my life before." There was a 
servant, (at one point she had no idea if the servants went home or slept somewhere in her 
house) and responsibility both to the local communities and to the wider Christian 
enterprise in China. For an ex-shop assistant and domestic help this was revelatory. Its 
consequences for her relations with the Chinese were tangible, as her letters, for example, 
repeat treaty port clichés about the modern Chinese.28 
 
Attitudes towards the Chinese  
Distrust 
 Segregation and distance bred distrust of the Chinese. This was most obviously 
expressed in British approaches to financial matters. European staff generally retained 
control of the disbursement of funds.29 Whilst it was argued that this was only proper, as 
mission funds were donations held and used on trust, it was a topic which could sour 
relations with Chinese Churches. Slowly-increasing Chinese participation and 
responsibility within decision making bodies, was of limited significance while missions 
retained complete financial authority.30 There were defalcations and insider-robberies, but 
pragmatic suspicion was of lesser importance than unsubstantiable generalisations, rooted 
in notions of Chinese characteristic dishonesty, in maintaining the institutional exclusion 
of Chinese from financial control: "We all know" wrote an member of the EPM: 
 
how ready they are to use money given for one purpose for some other, and to 
manipulate public funds for private purposes.31 
 Often, there was distrust of the motive of converts. It was still feared, sometimes 
with good reason, that conversion was sometimes an attempt, on the part of Chinese, to 
harness the residual prestige of foreign institutions, or of individual foreigners, for use in 
legal or other disputes.32 Distrust may also have been heightened by the fact that a good 
proportion of converts, if not exactly "rice-Christians", were "limpet-Christians": 
                                                          
28 Clements to May, 2/8/31, 4/3/32; see her description of a modern Chinese student, 
Clements to May, 23/9/32 and Chinese warlords, 23/9/32, LMS China Personal Box 13; 
LMS Candidates Papers 1900-1950, Box 8, M.G. Clements. See also Arthur Whitmore to 
C.W. Andrews, 29/11/28, WMMSA South China fiche 586. 
29 James Moulton Roe, A History of the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1905-
1954 (London, 1965), p.343. 
30 E.M. Bolton to Miss Hunter, 1/1/27, WMMSA WW Hupeh Correspondence, fiche 
122. 
31 A clerk at the LMS office in Shanghai, for example, was caught forging cheques 
in 1930, Edith Lane to F.H. Hawkins, 17/1/31, LMS Central China Box 47; H.F. Wallace 
to Maclagan, 30/6/27, EPMA Lingtung Swatow Box 44. 
32 "A delegation came... asking us to send them a preacher, as a group of the local 
gentry were anxious to form a Christian Church. Such a request in China at once aroused 
suspicions as to [their] motives", A.H.J. Murray, "Annual Report 1931", LMS North 
China Reports Box 11. This was a genuine enquiry but two years earlier his wife found 
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Their views of Christianity were distinctly bound up with a foreign organisation, 
with unlimited funds, which existed to find jobs for able-bodied members as 
Mission employés and domestic servants to foreigners in the large cities, and to 
educating, free of charge, all the children of converts, making suitable provision 
in each case for life.33 
Servants and ancillary medical and educational staff were prime converts, and often seem 
to have converted for pragmatic reasons, for scholarships for example.34 Such a 
relationship structurally encouraged insecurity and distrust, (and, of course, as in all 
foreign households, the Chinese servant was always subject to distrust - over "squeeze" 
on household accounts, petty theft, or as a bad influence on missionary children35). 
Furthermore there was always a fear of converts "slipping back" into "idolatry and 
superstition".36 This process could be widely defined, especially in view of the often 
comprehensive dismissal of Chinese customs and culture as heathen superstition; this 
approach raised difficulties when it came to such ceremonies as burial or marriage.37 The 
logical conclusion was that, without European supervision and authority, heathenism 
would quickly reassert itself. 
 
The Inferiority Complex 
 Distrust, then, permeated the largely two-tier structure of foreign control and 
Chinese dependence. This was true of relations with the Chinese church but featured 
especially in mission institutions where foreign workers supervised trained or untrained 
Chinese auxiliaries such as "bible women", colporteurs, nurses and teachers. This was an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
herself being used in the disputes of a Mrs Yu with her adopted son and her fellow 
villagers near Cangzhou, Hebei: "I helped her one day to gather some [fuel], and on our 
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increasingly anachronistic but deeply rooted relationship, and was influential in forming 
the paternalistic attitudes of many of those missionaries whose views were considered 
unsuitable by 1927. Its effect on the Chinese side was felt to be that the size of the foreign 
presence encouraged "spoon feeding" and an "inferiority complex"; it was not a healthy 
situation for either group.38 This structure, which denied the Chinese positions of 
effective responsibility, also contributed to the British assumption that the Chinese were 
actually incapable of running churches and mission institutions. The other factor in this 
"complex" was the clash between self-ascribed British characteristics and those assigned 
to the Chinese: 
 
English human nature being what it is, and Chinese human nature being what it is, 
before we had had time to think we shall have found Mr Hsin back in the old 
position of natural subordination, and Mr Rowley dominating in the usual English 
fashion.39 
The "usual English fashion" involved, ultimately, a lack of patience with normal patterns 
of Chinese social behaviour and proprieties and, as will be shown below, impatience 
fuelled insensitivity and disdain. 
 
II The need for reform 
These attitudes may have been necessary proselytising themes and morale-boosting 
props, in the face of slow progress but they were anachronistic by the 1920s; they 
belonged to the age of aggressive missionary expansion. Disenchantment with Western 
"civilisation" and "progress" was as common a post-Great War theme in China as it was 
in Europe.40 The changing intellectual climate in the West was experienced at first hand 
by many Chinese returned students, and also as a result of the visits of Western 
intellectuals, such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, to China in the 1920s.41 Younger 
Chinese intellectuals and students were interested in Western science by whose standards 
the fundamentalist Protestantism which so characterised mission Christianity was charged 
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with "obscurantism and social defeatism."42 By 1929, E.R. Hughes, who had worked as 
an evangelical missionary for the LMS in Fujian since 1911, had come to the conclusion 
that the mission enterprise had made no efforts to engage intellectually or sympathetically 
with Chinese culture and as a result its successes were shallow.43 Hughes resigned to 
work for the Chinese YMCA in Shanghai on literary and research work. The need to 
appeal to the "better educated" classes was well attested, and the success and influence of 
Dewey and Russell paradoxically gave some the hope that well-aimed and informed 
Christian work could also have similarly far-reaching results.44 Certainly, such 
organisations as the YMCA were popular, and Christianity had a higher public profile in 
Nationalist China than it had ever had before, most symbolically with the conversion of 
Jiang Jieshi and the influence of the Song sisters and Kong Xiangxi. David Yui of the 
YMCA had officiated at Jiang's wedding, Wang Zhengting was briefly General Secretary 
of the YMCA, Kong Xiangxi had been a secretary and so had an estimated 148 
Government officials.45 
 Anti-Christian thought was given a political articulation and structure throughout 
the politically contentious 1920s. An anti-Christian movement was launched by the Anti-
Christian Student Federation [Feijidujiao xuesheng tongmeng] and the Great Anti-
Religious Federation [Feizongjiao da tongmeng] in response to the 1922 National 
Christian Conference and its tactlessly-titled report The Christian Occupation of China 
(1922) (the military metaphor is worth noting, such terminology was prevalent in mission 
description and propaganda). In 1924, the Educational Rights Recovery movement 
organised student strikes and attacks on mission schools and colleges, initially in 
response to the heavy-handed actions of a British headmaster in Guangzhou who refused 
his students permission to form a student union. The May 30th movement and the 
Nationalist Revolution exacerbated this movement. Students rebelled, and often so did 
Chinese staff. This poisoned relations but also revealed, in effect, severe structural 
problems in mission education, in relations between staff and students and between 
foreign heads and teachers and Chinese staff.46 These experiences left a legacy of 
increased distrust of Chinese Christians among many missionaries and prompted others to 
                                                          
42 E.R. Hughes, "A background to the Problem of Christian Literature in China", 
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realise that relations with their converts, colleagues and organised Chinese Christianity 
had to be renegotiated.47 
 The speed of development of the NCC, and the pace at which reforms became 
necessary, caught many societies by surprise. The evacuations of 1926-27 "rudely thrust" 
autonomy and responsibility onto many Chinese Churches. Many missionaries 
retrospectively welcomed this shock-treatment, it was "the opportunity the Church of 
China was needing". Developments in national politics also often exposed "festering" 
problems, at local levels, between Church and Mission and offered real solutions, for the 
first time, through organisational sinification.48 
 Many individual missionaries were driven by the events of the Nationalist 
Revolution to question their own assumptions, and much of this debate, for example in 
the pages of the Chinese Recorder, was articulated as a question of race, and institutional 
and individual race relations.49 Ideas about the world-wide decline of "white" supremacy 
were as prevalent in mission debate as in other fields. This was not a debate unique to 
China, and it must be viewed in the context of missionary reactions to political 
developments in India (the Amritsar massacre and the May 30th shootings were often 
compared) and in the still wider context of the 1928 International Missionary Council 
meeting in Jerusalem. This body, which represented protestant groups world-wide, laid 
stress that year on the necessity of the process of "indigenisation" of Church and mission 
structures.50 
 The events of the years 1925 to 1927 culminated in the withdrawal of most 
foreign missionaries from the interior of China. This was unavoidable, but such 
evacuations were felt by some missionaries to undermine their relations with local 
Chinese Christians, as they solidly identified the missionaries with the general foreign 
community and called into question their commitment to the Chinese colleagues and 
converts that they left behind as they fled to safety. The lesson of 1927 was well 
remembered in the unsettled countryside afterwards, especially in areas subject to 
Communist attack: "We have not much to say about "dare to be Daniel" if we remove all 
                                                          
47 For a sample of distrust and bitterness see E.R. Rainey, "Report of Ting Chow 
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possible prospective Daniels away from the Lion's Mouth", wrote H.B. Rattenbury.51 In 
fact, it was often true that Chinese Christians were eager for the Westerners to leave when 
trouble began, otherwise it was more difficult for the Chinese church to take a lower 
profile and retain public integrity by distancing itself from the Western institution. 
 Evacuation also undermined the physical position of missions as their buildings, 
schools and hospitals were occupied by Nationalist or other troops, or seized, often by the 
Chinese staff of missions, and used as secular, or independently religious, institutions. 
Reclaiming such buildings or keeping hold of them was a constant problem after 1927 
when the return to China began. 
 
Sustaining their commitment to China. 
 Mission societies indulged in a fit of introspection in and after 1927. London 
deputations or secretaries from the LMS, BMS and the Friends Service Council [FSC] 
made investigative trips to China. The pages of the Chinese Recorder and the 
Educational Review (the journal of the China Christian Education Association) were also 
forums for this introspection.52 Union organisations and ad-hoc groups, such as 
representatives of the Christian Colleges and Universities in China, also met and 
discussed future plans.53 The deputations came up with similar, unsurprising, conclusions. 
They assessed the damage, physical and metaphorical, caused by the revolutionary 
period. They also identified social and other changes which could not be ignored and 
which had to be accommodated.54 In 1927 the CIM held a series of meetings both in 
London, and among their displaced workers in China, which assessed the situation there 
and discussed future tactics. It was widely realised that on their return a different 
relationship with Chinese Christians and Chinese Churches would be required.55 The 
BMS announced the need for "fraternal" relations to replace "paternal" ones.56 
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 Missionaries, like the business community, had no intention of pulling out of 
China. A certain amount of pride and an attempt to recoup some of the prestige lost 
through evacuation was involved.57 The BMS asserted that events had ultimately shown 
that withdrawal would be "premature" and that work needed intensifying.58 In 1929, the 
CIM decided to call for two hundred new missionaries to go to China, and this had been 
achieved by 1931.59 Theoretical writers stressed that there was still a place for 
missionaries in China, and, in principle, most Chinese Churches and Union organisations 
wanted them to stay.60 It was clear, however, that the old ways of life and structures were 
no longer tenable. The years since 1925 had seen crude propagandist attacks on missions 
[see figure 7, following page], sustained intellectual criticisms of their position, and 
frequent physical attacks on missionaries. This criticism came from both Chinese 
nationalists, from Chinese Christians and secular organisations such as the NCC and 
YMCA, and from the foreign business community, which tended wildly to blame mission 
education for the phenomenon of nationalism and often identified the NCC as a 
communist organisation. This foreign hostility was especially directed against American 
missionaries, but the British were tainted by association. The Tientsin British Chamber of 
Commerce accused British missionaries of being used by "certain Chinese circles... for 
propaganda", and attacked the "proclivity to dabble in questions of a political nature" of 
certain missionaries.61 
 Some of this criticism was reflected in missionary self-criticisms and analysis, 
with more self-styled progressive thinkers, such as E.R. Hughes or Ronald Rees of the 
WMMS and the NCC, allying themselves with the nationalist position to varying extents. 
There were also many within the community who refused to accept these criticisms or 
who opposed the nationalist movement. Many were extremely embittered by the events 
of 1925-1927, less affected workers professed themselves shocked by some of the 
reactions they witnessed.62 Some, like many British businessmen, sent home anti-
Nationalist propaganda. Others identified by their colleagues as possessors of the 
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"Shanghai mind" or as supporters of the views of the North China Daily News (for which 
paper many missionaries were also correspondents).63 
 After the May 30th incident most British societies issued a joint declaration 
proclaiming their wish to work without the treaty framework. Most missionaries in the 
field 
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also issued similar proclamations.64 It was realised, with relief by some, that sustained 
attacks on missions had forced the pace of reform and had cut the Chinese church off 
from "the remnants of the political prestige and the privileges which she has enjoyed as a 
quasi-foreign institution."65 
 Support for the mission enterprise was waning in some British circles. Both the 
spread of liberal theological ideas and secular intellectual changes caused this change. It 
was most apparent among more progressive Christian groupings (such as the Quakers, 
many of whom were loath to even use the word "mission").66 Interest in China quickly 
fell off in late 1927.67 Lack of support was also apparent from the funding difficulties 
many societies faced. This problem was long-term and only partly exacerbated by the 
world depression after 1929.68 Cutbacks necessitated by this decline also encouraged 
speedier sinification as missions, like British businesses realised that Chinese employees 
were cheaper.69 The drop in missionary numbers after 1927 did apparently ease the 
situation but this was not a desirable solution. The chaos in China also made funds more 
difficult to raise there, both from wealthy Chinese and from foreign and Chinese 
companies.70 
 
For a variety of reasons then, missionary societies were faced with the fact that the tone 
and structure of their presence in China was no longer tenable as it stood. If missions 
were to stay in China they would have to reform themselves, and the attitudes of their 
mission personnel, especially their foreign personnel, and their relations with the Chinese 
churches. 
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III Reforms 
Foreign Staff - Purging the Unsuitable 
 Many societies, from the start of the evacuation in 1926-27 and throughout the 
whole process of return and into the early 1930s, weeded out those they felt had become 
unsuitable, or whose unsuitabilities had come to be perceived as unhelpful, and those that 
Chinese mission workers intimated, or stated, were no longer welcome. Missions 
responded to similar criticisms of their personnel by Chinese workers as were directed 
against British businesses.71 Undiplomatic individual behaviour continued to be a 
contentious issue after the return of missionaries in 1928, especially in educational 
institutions.72 
 Miss Harrison, at the Lester Chinese Hospital in Shanghai, was sent home by the 
LMS ostensibly on "medical grounds" but really because of "temperamental difficulties". 
She was "not fitted for the fine team-work, and the understanding of the hundred and one 
little things that show under the polite exterior of a Chinese staff"; neither was Miss L.K. 
Rayner in Hong Kong. Dora Clarke, an LMS matron, who countermanded the orders of 
Chinese doctors, was eased out as it was feared that her attitude towards the Chinese staff 
"might easily provoke very serious consequences". Dr. E.F. Wills was also 
"temperamentally unsuited" to the new conditions.73 
 The WMMS was keen only to allow the return of those "acceptable to the 
Chinese". This excluded B.B. Chapman, with his "perhaps unconsciously overbearing 
temperament", a Mr Helps, the Rev Lindsay, who was "somewhat lacking in tact and 
sympathy and... not a persona grata to the Chinese", and Mr Scholes, "who had given 
offence in one or two directions almost past bearing."74 Quaker Chinese dropped hints 
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about the suitability or otherwise of British workers, and stated their desire only for 
"certain types" to return.75 
 The BMS asked Priscilla Willis to resign in September 1927 for "tactless 
interference". H.H. Rowley eventually resigned in protest against school registration, but 
his attitude was later described as combining "racial antipathy, political prejudice and 
self-confidence". Emily Pentelow was not wanted back. She intervened during classes 
taught by Chinese teachers and was rude, or withdrawn, towards her Chinese colleagues. 
Her superiors put it down to nervousness, but it gave an unfortunate impression.76 The 
CIM also decided that the old, unhealthy and those unable "to adapt his or her mind to the 
new conditions" should not be allowed to return. They also sent individuals who had 
caused particular problems back to different districts.77  
 This was not a phenomenon unique to British organisations, many North 
American missionaries did not return.78 Many others in all societies resigned from ill-
health or because of the trying experiences of the revolutionary years.79 
 
New Staff 
 A proportion of these missionaries were replaced; the WMMS saw a need for 
more foreign workers while the CIM launched its programme of expansion.80 This 
infusion of new workers was an opportunity for missions to adapt to changes at a greater 
pace and with greater ease. The CIM used the opportunity to use the experienced workers 
to establish new missions while allocating existing missions to new workers, 
uninfluenced by past-association or habits of leadership and authority, and theoretically 
more able to work liberally with the Chinese.81 Missions were widely aware that their 
                                                          
75 H.T. Silcock to Dr P.S. Lo and others, 19/9/28, FSC CH/11 Typed Letters to 
China Vol. 3, 1925-1928; Clifford Stubbs, circular Letter, 23/1/28, FSC CH/13. 
76 Margaret Thomas to E.M. Bowser, 1/7/29, BMSA CH/75; H.H. Rowley to C.E. 
Wilson, 4/1/29, C.E. Wilson to H.H. Rowley, 2/12/29, BMSA CH/64; Francis E. 
Coombes to M.E. Bowser, 17/7/29, BMSA CH/69. 
77 CIM London Council Minutes, 9/5/28, 14/11/28. 
78 A.J. Austin, Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom 1888-
1959 (Toronto, 1986), pp.219-20. 
79 CCYB 1928, pp.114-15. The BMS had 142 missionaries in 1925 but never 
regained this figure, which remained around 100 until the Sino-Japanese War, 
Williamson, British Baptists, p.276; In 1927 there were 8,250 Protestant missionaries of 
all nationalities allotted to missions in China, the following year 4,375. By 1930 this 
figure had only reached 6,346, and until 1936 it fluctuated below that figure, C.L. 
Boynton and C.D. Boynton, eds., 1936 Handbook of the Christian Movement in China 
under Protestant Auspices (Shanghai, 1936), p.ix. 
80 R. Rees, WMMSA Synod Minutes 1928, fiche 196. The CIM saw off 23 workers 
from Britain in 1930, its highest ever yearly total, CR, September 1931, p.602. 
81 Leslie T. Lyall, A Passion for the Impossible: The China Inland Mission 1865-
1965 (London, 1965), pp.100-102; China's Millions, 15/3/29. 
 19
new workers should be prepared to work on different terms with the Chinese than 
formerly.82 This was accompanied by a desire for a better quality mission staff than was 
previously used.83 Lack of professionalism, such as the behaviour of some of the nursing 
staff, exacerbated these problems. Difficulties in getting sufficiently motivated and well 
educated workers after the Great War arose from the general economic and social 
changes affecting missions. "Uncultured" staff in the field, who gave up too easily and 
failed to learn Chinese adequately, were a problem. A higher all-round education, instead 
of faith and a smattering of theology, was required of a wider range of staff. Inattention to 
Chinese language study in the past was to be corrected.84 This applied especially to 
nursing and medical staff, but also to evangelical workers. The Rev. A.A. Taylor and his 
wife [LMS] were not allowed to return to China and were recommended for service 
elsewhere, "where their lack of early cultural environment will not tell against them with 
the people whom they hope to influence".85 
 There were problems integrating this new wave of idealists, some of whose 
principles led to friction within the missions. Established patterns of mission socialisation 
could not quickly adapt, nor could the institutional and physical structures of mission life 
be expected to change quickly enough to accommodate progressive idealists. One such 
couple fell out with the Central China District of the LMS in 1930 (they "misunderstood 
distinctions that sometimes had to be made but do not indicate any failure in Christian 
grace") and Henry Marsden outraged his colleagues with his criticisms of their relations 
with the Chinese. He was said to "not have appreciated the meaning of team-work". The 
dictates of mission solidarity were strong and Marsden left the LMS in 1929.86 
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New Work 
 It was apparent that mission work could no longer be targeted largely at the 
villages of China and the Chinese peasantry. This historical solution to the steadfast 
opposition of the Chinese bureaucratic elite was inadequate on two counts. Firstly, the 
Chinese elite was now more Westernized than ever before and also stronger and more 
successfully anti-imperialist than ever before. For the mission enterprise to continue it 
needed to reach an accommodation with those elites at national and local levels and to 
accelerate and modernise the educational work it had begun in the early years of the 
century. For their part the "better educated classes" were felt by some to show a greater 
willingness and openness to Christian work, than was historically the case.87 Missionaries 
who would have been suitable "fifty-years ago" for 'muscular' work in the villages (such 
as A.A. Taylor) were now expected to interact intelligently with educated Chinese. 
Explicit inability to do this caused some to be eased out of Chinese mission work.  
 Secondly, the economic plight of the Chinese peasant was leading some societies 
to commit workers and funds to "social" goals, such as the work of John Lossing Buck 
(initially of the American Presbyterian Mission, North) and his co-workers at Nanjing.88 
This was accompanied by work with those caught up in China's industrial centres, such as 
that of Dame Adelaide Anderson and others dealing with industrial conditions in 
Shanghai. For example, an attempt was made to force the SMC to improve child labour 
conditions in 1925 but this was defeated by the political crisis.89 J.B. Tayler of the LMS 
took over the work and the files of Joseph Bailie, a pioneer worker for labour reform in 
Shanghai.90 Both of these themes were debated over and over in the Chinese Recorder, 
which gave much space to the Social Gospel view, the importance of which also reflected 
the interest taken in it by Chinese organisations such as the Chinese YMCA and the NCC 
and, it was felt, by Chinese students in general.91 
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IV Sinification 
Union Organisations 
The development of Chinese control of union organisations initially worried many British 
observers who were concerned about their involvement in what were seen as purely 
political affairs.92 Some conservatives felt that the were unrepresentative bodies, in thrall 
to Nationalist politics and too influential with Home Mission Boards. As tempers cooled 
in the aftermath of the Revolution it became apparent that sinification was unstoppable. 
The necessity of sending good foreign delegates was soon realised.93 The Chinese 
element in the NCC was strengthened in 1927 and in the following year there was a 
reorganisation after which both missionary and Chinese delegates were to be elected by 
the Chinese Churches. This strengthened the Chinese character of the NCC and it had the 
apparent virtue, for more hostile foreign observers, of strengthening the moderate 
presence in an organisation which had been set up, some felt, merely in order to act as a 
safety valve for Chinese Christians.94 The Nurses Association of China (which had 972 
Chinese members and 437 foreign ones) voted to appoint a Chinese General Secretary, to 
join the two foreign ones, in 1928.95 The composition of the executive committee of the 
China Christian Education Association was changed from 7 Westerners and 7 Chinese in 
1928 to 11 Chinese and 4 Westerners in 1931.96 Chinese churches took over much of the 
supervisory work of Bible colporteurs after 1927. A South China Bible Society was set 
up in December that year (against initial opposition) to take over British and Foreign 
Bible Society work in that region. An East China Bible Society was formed in 1934 but 
integration was slow.97 
 
 Some of this sinification was literally nominal. The China Mission Year Book 
became the China Christian Year Book in 1926, and the previous year the China Medical 
Missionary Association had become the China Medical Association. These changes were, 
none the less, symbolic, and did reveal shifts in emphasis from foreign mission to 
Chinese institution.98 
                                                          
92 The CIM withdrew from the National Christian Council and the Chinese YMCA, 
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Church structures 
 Indigenisation was a major theme in mission and Chinese Christian debate before 
1925. The ideal of the missions had always been to foster self-governing, self-financing 
and self-propagating churches. The actual attainment of this ideal was patchy.99 The 1922 
China National Christian Conference (the first with a majority of Chinese delegates and a 
Chinese chairman) had built on previous slow progress and created the National Christian 
Council, which was intended to help protestant missions work towards sinification.100 It 
also set in motion the formation of a Church of Christ in China [CCC] (Zhongguo 
jidujiaohui), which held its first general assembly in 1927. This was an 
interdenominational body mainly composed of Presbyterian and Congregationalist 
Churches. The crisis of 1925-7 prompted many other groups to join or to contemplate 
joining, sometimes in great haste.101 The LMS was more enthusiastic about the CCC and 
joined at its inception.102 Initially they were more concerned with their own Churches, but 
in 1928 the China Advisory Council declared its "willingness,... to accept appointment 
by, and work under, the direction of the Chinese Church".103 Other boards, suspicious of 
the politics, or opposed to the theology of the CCC, contemplated or enacted transfers of 
power from their missions to their Churches. Cautious progress was then underway in 
some regions but missions were such a target of the troubles after 1925 that the process 
was accelerated. The Shanghai Council of the CIM, for example, announced the need for 
"more speedy carrying out of the original policy of the Mission to establish self-
supporting and self-propagating churches." By 1931 the key aim of the CIM's forward 
movement was said to be the "rapid transfer to Chinese leadership of the pastoral care and 
oversight of the Chinese Churches."104 The Anglican Church in China was formally 
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recognised as an independent "constituent member" of the Anglican Communion in 1930 
whilst at diocesan levels the direction of missionary labour and the handling of funds was 
transferred region by region to diocesan, that is Chinese Church, boards.105 
 Different approaches characterised the reforms of different missions. The LMS 
was more open to reform than the publicly more cautious WMMS which was eager to lay 
stress on working together "with no question of who is head and who is tail."106 The BMS 
in Xiamen accepted in principle the transfer of authority over missionary allocation to its 
Church Synod Committee in 1928, a procedure adopted by all 3 mission councils in 
November that year.107 Variations may also have been related to geographical factors. 
H.B. Rattenbury was based in the treaty port of Hankou and the EPM Amoy Mission 
Council was also rather conservative (it accepted the "Church-centric principle in 
general" but did not wish to see it extended to medical and educational work).108 CMS 
missionaries in West China effectively stalled organisational changes which handed 
authority over to their Church in 1928 and in its South China Victoria diocese, based in 
Hong Kong, the devolution of authority to the Church in 1929 was actually reversed in 
1935. The presence of British congregations in colonial Hong Kong had previously been 
used to justify the establishment of a segregated Chinese-only Synod in 1913. It was 
claimed that British lay Anglicans would be unwilling to accept Chinese direction of 
Church affairs.109 
 The devolution of authority to Chinese churches involved many thorny issues - 
the ownership of church property, the control of mission funds and the final control of the 
direction of mission efforts and the place of the mission in general. Sinification often 
meant the merging of church and mission structures and the subordination of missionaries 
to the authority of the Chinese church. Transferring mission property to the Chinese 
church symbolised in concrete form the state of relations between Church and Mission 
and for these reasons was requested by the CCC in 1928.110 The role of the mission 
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councils in China was questioned by some Chinese christians. Missionaries were, 
unsurprisingly given the nature of the missionary vocation, unwilling to abolish their own 
jobs and were anxious to stress their continued usefulness. In response to such pressures, 
for example, the EPM announced that communications between the PCE and the Chinese 
Presbyterian Church would continue to be routed through the EPM Mission Councils.111 
 These issues and the nature of relations between Britons and Chinese within the 
Churches and missions, were influenced by perceptions of the Chinese character and 
abilities, and the expectations raised by missionary lifestyles. Such points involved 
questions of financial and doctrinal distrust. There was a grave danger, thought the CIM's 
London Council, that "power may fall into the hands of unspiritual men, as the true 
spiritual leaders do not necessarily come to the front." H.F. Wallace of the EPM foresaw 
"endless suspicions and slanders and faction feuds" resulting from the devolution of 
financial responsibility.112 Some feared that their "dramatic instinct" would sweep 
Chinese Christians into evangelistic excesses if there was no doctrinally consistent 
restraint from foreign supervisors.113 
 Many of these reservations were, of course, part of the long term debate about the 
process of conversion and the propagation of Christian churches. Christianity in China 
was still fairly recent and Chinese society was not Christian. It was in this context that the 
events of the 1920s unfolded. The problems of "indigenisation" acquired new political 
urgency and needed radical short-term solutions if the missions were not to lose their 
work altogether. 
 
Staff 
 The appointment of Chinese to staff mission educational and medical posts was 
the most visible aspect of sinification and was what was usually meant by the debate. The 
BMS announced that they were happy to appoint qualified Chinese leaders in all areas of 
Church work but stressed that this was not a process of replacement (which implied a 
responsibility on the part of the mission society to pay for them, or to pay for them at the 
same rate as foreign workers) but was a transference of all responsibilities.114 Chinese 
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church officials were, naturally, not always happy with this insistence but during the 
period of the evacuation Chinese Christians, if it was politically possible or expedient, 
generally got on competently with Church affairs themselves.115 Some were independent 
(or "bolshevised") enough to demand only the return of missionary "advisors."116 
 There was another aspect to indigenisation. This was a necessary process of 
sinification of what were specifically mission or mission support posts, especially in 
medical and educational areas. Social and intellectual changes were such that within the 
BMS it was thought that "a third class of mission worker,... the Chinese worker with a 
foreign training" would have to be recognised.117 This led to debates about the best way 
of getting and retaining Chinese workers which were also common in debate in British 
business circles in China. In the LMS it was pointed out that there was now no need for 
clerical missionaries, as so much work was being devolved into Chinese hands; this was 
especially true for nursery and primary schools where more administrative and teaching 
work could be done by Chinese teachers.118 The sentiments of the Synod Advisory 
Council of the WMMS Hupeh District were similar to those of the SMC when it came to 
training up Chinese leaders in positions of smaller responsibility in preparation for their 
taking over of more important posts.119 Getting suitable staff for schools and hospitals 
would also mean having to pay them more than Chinese staff had been paid before, 
paying them at the rates for comparable work outside the missions and, in some cases, 
almost on Western lines.120 It had been stated before, and was reconfirmed, that they 
would need to be given "a better status, more opportunity and more responsibility."121 
These moves raised new financial problems. In 1929 a Dr Hsia of the Central China 
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District of the LMS insisted on taking a furlough and expected financial arrangements 
comparable to those enjoyed by foreign mission workers (in this case 7 months paid leave 
and return travel expenses to Britain), to the impotent consternation of the District 
Council.122 
 Societies did begin to appoint more Chinese staff to mission educational and 
medical positions as well as to positions on joint organisations. The British and Foreign 
Bible Society appointed its first Chinese colporteur-supervisors after 1927 [five by 1929] 
although the regional sub-heads remained exclusively foreign until 1936.123 In 1931, for 
the first time, the LMS in North China had ordained Chinese mission workers in its 
employ. There was a recognised "dire need" for Chinese ministers in the Hunan District 
of the WMMS and by 1928 in their Hupeh District they had a Chinese minister in every 
Circuit or one on trial. In 1931 at the Hupeh Synod there were even three "pukker 
Chinese Deaconesses".124 The CIM aimed to train up Chinese evangelists more rapidly 
while the Amoy Mission Council of the EPM voted to appoint itinerant Chinese pastors 
instead of missionaries for "station visitation and the direction of the evangelistic 
enterprise in the country districts."125 
 
Education 
There had been debate within mission circles about the direction and nature of mission 
education before 1927. The 1921-22 China Educational Commission recommended 
greater integration of schools with the Chinese national and provincial educational 
systems. Many schools were seriously disrupted by Chinese students, and sometimes 
staff, as a result of political disturbances starting with the campaign for Educational 
Rights Recovery in 1924. By 1928 when mission schools and colleges were starting to 
reopen, it was realised that an "entirely new situation" was facing mission educationalists 
in which "the foreigner has no business in a position that could be occupied creditably by 
a Chinese associate."126 
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 In 1928, as part of its consolidation of political control, the Nationalist 
Government enacted educational legislation requiring the registration of all schools.127 To 
be registered it was necessary for all schools to have Chinese heads and predominantly 
Chinese boards of governors or trustees. This aspect of registration was widely accepted, 
and carried out, by mission societies, it was, after all, a "wise thing to do", and some 
schools had already devolved such authority.128 Most were happy with the results, which 
in some cases seem to have improved relations with Chinese staff, and restored discipline 
among rebellious students in ways no longer possible for foreign principals in the still 
politicised educational atmosphere.129 Other measures were introduced unilaterally by 
schools and colleges, such as racial equality in salary scales at Yenching University and 
elsewhere and a general diminution of the influence on college affairs of foreign staffs.130 
However, the continued mission presence in schools made for awkward relationships, 
especially as they affected missionaries who had previously worked in more leading 
roles, and it was expected that the strain of the new subordinate relationship would be too 
much for some.131 New recruits were preferred, such as Mr Monro at Medhurst College, 
Shanghai, who had "the right attitude towards the new regime of Chinese control in the 
college, and towards Chinese students [had] a feeling of intelligent sympathy".132 
 A further aspect of registration was the formal banning of religious education as 
part of the curriculum. This caused some resignations as societies opted to secularise the 
formal curriculum and concentrate more broadly on Christian education. The China 
Inland Mission was not happy about registration. but the BMS Home Committee 
accepted it in 1931.133 The public displays of Christianity widely demanded, even if only 
implicitly, by mission colleges and school were a sensitive issue, and were also 
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incompatible with the modernisation of mission education. At their graduation ceremony 
in 1928 the students of the West China Union University at Chengdu were each handed a 
bible. Such displays, they complained, lowered the value of the education they had 
received and gave the impression that they had to make a public profession of 
Christianity to obtain their degrees.134 Fearful of registration but also fearful of losing 
pupils the CIM in London stressed to opponents of the process in China the necessity of 
continuing to teach "secular subjects to secure pupils".135 
 Justification of fear of Chinese control was usually expressed as a distrust of 
Chinese educationalists diluting the Christian character of schools and colleges and 
generally lowering educational standards.136 Some felt, especially British educationalists 
and their supporters, that it represented a threat to British public-school educational 
methods. These defined, implicitly, a dismissive attitude to Chinese social and 
educational customs. Dr Lavington Hart, headmaster of the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese 
College, was praised by the Consul-General for what he saw as the spreading of the 
"English public school spirit in China;" his work there was "appropriately covered by the 
Motto of the Order of the British Empire which is "For God and Empire"."137 E.H. 
Clayton felt that foreigners would remain in schools as advisors, helped by the "prevalent 
and laudable spirit of willingness to profit from advice" shown by the Chinese. Raising 
the tone of a college and the character building of students through the inculcation of 
"Good Sportsmanship" and "fair play" were the specialities of British teachers; they 
needed reinforcing through continued British presence as they were "not quite strong yet - 
there is still a desire to cheer when the other man makes a mess of anything."138 
 
Medicine 
 Sinification of healthwork involved two basic processes; firstly, the provision of 
better-paid opportunities and more responsibilities for Chinese doctors; secondly, the 
devolution of control of medical missions to the Chinese churches. Both processes were 
intimately tied up with a third - the improvement of the standard of medical work. 
Despite such obvious exceptions as the Peking Union Medical College the 1922 Survey 
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of mission work had revealed an appalling overall picture of medical work.139 The 
situation in some hospitals - as regards standards of hygiene - often appalled doctors and 
new recruits fresh from Britain.140 It was also widely recognised that the prevailing 
general standards threatened the continuation of medical work, especially if the National 
Government chose to register teaching hospitals and nursing schools as it had educational 
establishments.141 The longer-term threat, however, lay in the inability of mission 
hospitals, as generally constituted and run, to appeal to bourgeois Chinese patients whose 
expectations of standards of cleanliness and comfort had greatly increased, in sickness, as 
in health - as steamship companies were realising.142 Improvements were aimed at this 
class, who would thereby be subsidising the more charitable aspects of hospital work and 
making up for the shortfall in funds from abroad.143 The medical missionary 
establishment in China had overreached itself and was far too large to be supported from 
Britain. This was, of course, a historical legacy, and one arising from the basic 
contradiction of medical work, its attempt to engage in medical and evangelical work in 
tandem.144 It also led to another basic problem of professionalisation - it tended to dilute 
the evangelical aspect of medical work; comments about the "heavy drinking" and 
"public frequenting of cabarets and other places" by "irreligious" professionals on the 
Peking Union Medical College [PUMC] staff, for example, were common.145 
                                                          
139 The Christian Occupation of China: A General Survey of the Numerical Strength 
and Geographical Distribution of the Christian Forces in China made by the Special 
Committee on Survey and Occupation, China Continuation Committee 1918-1921 
(Shanghai, 1922), pp.429-41; see also Harold Balme, China and Modern Medicine: A 
Study in Medical Missionary Development (London, 1921), pp.104-106. 
140 "Our large upper wards have no bathroom, closets, or baggage room or pantry 
attached to them. A patient has to go out o the building for a bath. An insanitary covered 
pail is under each bed," "Plan of Suggested Alterations in WMA Hospital Swatow", in Dr 
Winifred Heyworth to Miss Mitchel, 19/10/26, EPMA Lingtung Swatow Box 34. E.H. 
Scott, "First Impressions of the Swatow Hospitals," 17/2/31, EPMA Lingtung Swatow 
Box 38. 
141 H. Ross and W. Heyworth to P.J. Maclagan, 26/4/26, EPMA Lingtung Swatow 
Box 34; "Chuanchow Womens' Hospital Report 1929" in H.J.P. Anderson to Maclagan, 
3/10/30 EPMA South Fukien Box 12. 
142 "There is a growing feeling against contributing large sums to an institution [the 
EPM mission hospital in Shantou] which lays itself out to treat only those who cannot 
afford to pay for their treatment, and makes no special provision for better class patients 
who can afford to pay," D. Fraser, H.R. Watt, Campbell Gibson and G. Burt to P.J. 
Maclagan, 25/7/30, EPMA Lingtung Swatow Box 38; Hewitt, Problems of Success, v.2, 
pp.274-75. 
143 H.R. Worth, "Swatow Women's Hospital Annual Report, 1929", EPMA Lingtung 
Swatow Box 34. 
144 "A medical work on the large scale proposed might bring us kudos, but would it 
be effective from the missionary point of view in any proportion to its size and cost?" 
Maclagan to S.W. Carruthers, 27/11/30, EPMA Lingtung Swatow Box 38. 
145 E.C. Lobenstine to F.H. Hawkins, 19/6/29, LMS Central China Box 43. 
 30
 The 1922 Survey identified the "crux" of the problem as staff and urged an 
increase in foreign staff numbers to make up for the shortfall in Chinese doctors, who 
were also not impressed by mission standards - in their case of pay and accommodation, 
and, traditionally, of status.146 Increasing foreign staff numbers was no longer 
economically or politically affordable by the end of the decade. Unfortunately for 
missions, Chinese doctors, even those trained by missions, were still unwilling to work in 
mission hospitals.147 Some efforts were made to arrange foreign salaries for suitable 
candidates, or salaries which competed with the rates they would receive elsewhere in 
China.148 This was not always possible, but more Chinese doctors were employed and at 
market rates.149 By 1932 the EPM was planning to have Chinese workers appointed by "a 
Chinese body" and "orientated" towards the Chinese church or the institution they worked 
for, rather than the mission. By sinifying the appointments procedure the mission also 
intended to suppress salary demands based on foreign rates by distancing itself from the 
process.150 Patterns of responsibility, however, could be changed. One LMS doctor, for 
example, found himself "working with, indeed under, a Chinese Doctor." This did not 
always prove easy as British doctors usually felt that their own standards of medical 
hygiene were better than those of their Chinese colleagues.151 
 In a thorough report in 1928, an Inter-Council Conference of the EPM condemned 
its existing hospitals. It recommended a series of improvements, including organisational 
measures which would thoroughly anchor their hospitals into the communities they 
served by allowing the Chinese Churches and public, through Guilds and Chambers of 
Commerce, to join in their management. The EPM undertook to build a new hospital in 
Shantou with local Chinese financial contributions and in agreement with the Mayor. The 
level of sophistication and complexity of business required the appointment of a business 
manager. Traditionally most hospitals were administered by the foreign doctors 
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themselves but this was no longer sensible or possible.152 By 1932 they were planning 
with a view to "ultimate devolution" of the hospitals to the Chinese Church and a board 
of trustees, in line with a 1926 plan of the China Medical Association Missionary 
Division which also interested the LMS.153 Familiar doubts about "practical problems of 
ethics and religion" in handing over control to a "local heathen community" were raised 
by Rattenbury in Hankou.154 However, where the CMS handed over control to a Chinese 
Medical Superintendent it was noted that the work flourished, and relations with the local 
community and authorities flourished.155 
 There were other changes. Both the Peking Union Medical College and the Lester 
Memorial Hospital in Shanghai, for example, started to employ more nursing sisters. 
Indeed in some hospitals nurses and nursing procedures were introduced for the first 
time.156 
 
The sinification of the mission presence in China accompanied and characterised its 
modernisation and professionalization. Like British businesses and municipal institutions 
in China, British missionaries were no longer able to rely on the explicit protection of the 
structures of informal empire. As in those other spheres of the British presence they had 
to make significant compromises, with the de jure Chinese state, de facto local 
authorities, and those Chinese they were involved with, as institutions or as individuals. 
The complacency, encouraged by the post-Boxer decade and the Warlord era, which saw 
the publication of The Christian Occupation of China was anachronistic. This involved a 
significant shift in their attitudes towards the Chinese. "It had not been realised that in the 
Christian Church so many competent and responsible Chinese teachers were to be found," 
recalled H.B. Rattenbury, rather lamely, in 1942. This realisation was such a shock 
because of the prevailing attitudes towards Chinese capabilities and imputed 
characteristics.157 British protestant missions were forced to attempt to transform 
themselves from "foreign missions" to Chinese Christian Church and to compromise with 
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modernizing trends in Chinese society, in Chinese Christianity, and in education and in 
medicine. 
 
Physical Structures 
 The proper sinification of personnel and institutional structures also required 
changes in physical and social structures. To attract sufficiently qualified Chinese 
professionals, indeed to retain those trained in mission hospitals and colleges, it was 
realised that the housing traditionally allotted such Chinese staff was inadequate.158 In 
some cases Chinese staff, ministers and doctors, allowed to occupy foreign-style mission 
houses to deter looting or military requisition, were unwilling to leave.159 What was seen 
as discrimination by some Chinese professionals was seen by most Britons as part of the 
psychological necessity of recreating British homes on the mission stations. This 
phenomenon, of course, was neither exclusively British nor missionary.160 
 Missions' foreign-style buildings themselves created problems. They symbolised 
the essential foreignness of the mission institutions, and perhaps, of their message. 
William Sewell was "tempted to wonder if a few plaster houses put up by the Chinese 
themselves would not have been really better" than the "magnificent buildings" of the 
West China Union University in Chengdu.161 Foreign-style mission homes were accused 
of fostering social isolation and segregation, while the provision of homes along racial 
lines prolonged racial divisions.162 Large churches or educational buildings also sent 
misleading messages about mission society wealth. Their maintenance costs stretched the 
resources of the mission societies and were often cited as examples of the insupportable 
burdens that devolution would place on Chinese Churches.163 Foreign-style buildings 
were conspicuous and often arrogantly and uncompromisingly foreign, the achievement 
of a smaller scale fusion of the two increasingly became the aim of Church and 
educational architecture.164 The Fitch Memorial Church in Shanghai, completed in 1928, 
was a good example of this fusion.165 
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 The geography of building was also important. In 1928 the South China District 
Committee of the LMS decided to build a new residence in Kowloon rather than on Hong 
Kong island in order to disassociate themselves from its secular, colonial society by 
showing the Chinese that "we are in earnest and desire to be placed in the place where we 
consider work is to be done."166 
 
Social Structures 
 Alterations to institutional and physical structures needed to be matched by 
changes in missionary lifestyles and especially social and business relationships. Critics 
such as E.R. Hughes felt that in the past these had mitigated against the opportunity for 
close and intimate relations.167 British Quakers at the 1930 Sichuan Yearly Meeting "took 
their places freely and naturally in discussion and business, though no longer at the clerk's 
desk." At the opening of a new Church in Guangzhou it was pointed out that the six 
Chinese ministers and three Britons were symbolically arranged, by the Chinese 
organiser, "two Chinese to one English right across the great platform." Tea at meetings 
of the Senate of the West China Union University at Chengdu was, from 1927, "served by 
one Chinese and one foreigner. Chinese tea and pastry are served, and one foreign cake." 
In 1931 the All-China Conference on Religious Education delegates, for the first time, 
did not divide on racial lines and eat separately.168 Such measures do seem to have 
reflected or encouraged changes in patterns of social behaviour at such institutions as 
colleges and hospitals.169 Social relations were never without problems raised by cultural 
differences, but greater efforts had to be made than had been before.170 
 This informal equality in relations was accompanied and confirmed by a 
sinification of the language of mission work. Mission councils and institutions voted to 
provide Chinese language minutes of their meetings. Some societies had already begun 
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this process but were keen to reaffirm it.171 The LMS also adopted regularised official 
Chinese names for constituent bodies for the first time.172 The 1921 Nurses Association of 
China Conference "consisted almost exclusively of foreign nurses, and English was the 
only language spoken, except for half a day (of the week) when Chinese was spoken". By 
1930 with a majority of Chinese members Mandarin was on a par with English.173 Such 
was the sensitivity over this issue that at the 1929 NCC Conference there were "signs of 
revolt... at the apparent "English language" domination of the report and findings" 
although the NCC was officially bilingual and Chinese texts, of minutes, were 
authoritative.174 The accentuation of these linguistic demands defeated some 
candidates.175 Accommodating the internal shift in institutional life towards educated 
Chinese activists also affected the style of Chinese learnt. John Foster of the WMMS 
developed "into a splendid preacher in [Cantonese]... his style is of the very modern 
udent type."176 
 
certain practical difficulties. Although one strain of thought suggested that missionaries 
should renounce their nationality, this was not popular.178 In general this de-emphasis 
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New Relationships 
  Missionaries needed to redefine their relationship with their Chinese colleagues. 
The key elements of this relationship were their subordination to the Chinese Church, a 
new emphasis on racial equality (and thereby on "colleagueship"177) and a de-
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meant their not relying on consuls and gunboats in relations and disputes with local 
Chinese authority.179 
 "Subordination" and "colleagueship" do appear to have been achieved by some; 
for example, "oneness" was said to have replaced "cordial relations" among the WMMS 
in South China.180 Others rejected the former and concentrated on the latter fearing that 
subordination of the Mission to the Church was impractical and would reduce it 
ultimately to the impotent status of a fund raising and transmitting body.181 
 The new relationship raised practical difficulties. Indigenisation of control meant 
accelerating the employment of more Chinese in evangelical and pastoral positions. The 
CMS set up a new theological college for this reason in 1930, but Chinese evangelists 
were in short supply. It was considered by the Chinese to be a socially demeaning 
occupation, and paid too little, whilst graduates were "seriously out of touch with the kind 
of congregation to which they would be expected to minister".182 This was a corollary of 
the usual problem faced by the missions, a problem that was growing more acute. The 
Chinese doctors and nurses they trained, and the graduates of their universities and 
theological colleges, were more likely to take work in China's urban centres rather than 
work for little remuneration for the missions. Theologically-dedicated Chinese graduates 
were also more likely to either prefer educational positions, or to seek work with Union 
organisations such as the NCC or the Chinese YMCA.183 
 Impatience with their new position left some observers nostalgic for their old 
authority, or else assuming that it would eventually return: "if China insists on Chinese 
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Principals she must suffer for it."184 This they based on assumptions that the Chinese 
were, characteristically, not as self-sufficient or as strong as foreigners, especially 
Britons. They lacked "moral backbone" and the strength of a "Christian tradition" within 
a "heathen environment".185 New missionaries who arrived expecting to assume 
traditional positions of authority in relation to the Chinese were either surprised or even 
disappointed.186 One of the combination of factors leading to the quick resignation of 
Arthur Whitmore from the WMMS in 1929 was his disgust at the "second rate 
schoolmaster's job" he found waiting for him in China.187 
 This new relationship required patience and commitment on both sides. For the 
WMMS in the Hupeh District H.B. Rattenbury suggested mutual institutional restraints 
 
balancing his "occasionally... arbitrary" Chairmanship and an inexperienced Chinese 
Executive Committee. It certainly required equal treatment of foreign and Chinese 
workers by Church, Mission and Mission Boards.188 The "comparative excitements and 
the abounding sociability of the old-time foreign "Local Committee"" gave way to 
Chinese-dominated synods which were "uninspired" and "a necessary evil."189 The old 
ways did persist. Britons in the South China District of the WMMS met once a month 
"for a period of fellowship". The foreign staff at Lingnan University, Guangzhou, also 
continued to have a weekly meeting and in Hankou the WMMS held a weekly prayer 
meeting for "foreign workers only". The potential for this type of exclusive meeting to be 
misunderstood by Chinese co-workers was great.190 
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No amount of subordination to the Chinese Church, or integration with Chinese 
colleagues, circumvented the need most Britons felt for the company of their fellow 
ationals and, more importantly, the preference they felt for working with their fellow 
ty 
as the focussing of missionary efforts on the countryside and the poor until the 
beginning of the ce narrow" reputation 
n
nationals. Certainly they were never allowed to forget their foreignness. There were 
continued anti-foreign demonstrations or instances in many places. In times of wider 
crisis, such as the general evacuation or the Nanjing incident, they were all British, and 
all foreign, together; and they were all, of course, still protected by extraterritoriality.191 
 
Intellectual assessment of the Chinese Market 
 The historical legacy of the opposition of the Chinese intelligentsia to Christiani
w
ntury. This left the Churches with a "somewhat 
which made it difficult for them to tap into the intellectual ferment in China's education 
represented by the May 4th Movement, or into the new world of the Chinese 
bourgeoisie.192 An appeal to the educated Chinese could only be conducted through 
Christian literature in Chinese, but previous efforts to reproduce Chinese books were 
considered to be too narrowly didactic and lacking an awareness of "modern thinking and 
perplexities". The Christian Literature Society [CLS] was felt to have failed to produce a 
literature which would appeal to these Chinese groups; that is a literature "in Chinese 
with proper Chinese cultural background". It was stated, in fact, "that the imprint of the 
CLS is almost sufficient to kill the sale of a book."193 Transferring the management to a 
Chinese board was one suggestion for dealing with the similar problems of the Religious 
Tracts Society. However, content not management was the problem. Literary work 
required that closer investigation and understanding of Chinese culture and society which 
E.R. Hughes and others felt the mission body had neglected. He and others set out to 
remedy this by working with the Chinese YMCA to create acceptable Chinese works in a 
Chinese style. Such work was also being produced at Yenching University.194 Karl 
Reichelt's mission to the Buddhists, which did much to alter previously hostile Western 
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images of that religion, also set out to enlighten foreign missionaries.195 Having attended 
a series of lectures William Sewell agreed with those who said "if only they had known 
of these things before they would never have been so destructive in their approach to 
Buddhism."196 Also inspired by Reichelt, the CMS in Hangzhou set aside a building for 
contact with Buddhists.197 
 The same principle was applied to Chinese music and Chinese customs. 
Missionaries, like most foreigners, found themselves unable to appreciate Chinese music 
                                                          
which they found "loud, discordant and piercing". Most ignored it; Edith S. Murray had 
been in China for nine years before she saw her first Chinese opera in 1931.198 Others 
realised that attempts would have to be made to "sinify" hymn and psalm singing, which 
was "aggressively Western" in form, through the writing of Chinese hymns using Chinese 
music, and some progress was made.199 The adaptation of Buddhist chants was suggested 
but many thought the whole exercise impossible and claimed that Chinese Christians 
would find the use of Chinese music "meretricious."200 The CMS was involved with the 
CCC and others from 1931 to 1936 in the preparation of a Union Hymnal in which about 
an eighth of the tunes and hymns were Chinese.201 Using Chinese opera was also 
considered. Crowds could certainly be drawn to plays in rural China although it was 
found difficult to convert such audiences.202 
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 Reaching an accommodation with indigenous customs and religion was also a 
prominent theme, as it had been since the first Jesuit missions and the "rites 
aking in tongues and demon 
possession gripped even the bible-women in one North China village leaving the villagers 
   
controversy".203 Old-fashioned missionaries would still dismiss Confucianism as 
"backward looking and uninspiring" and Buddhism as "world-weary" or "a terrible 
admixture of devil worship, priestcraft, and empty ritual", but more liberal individuals 
were less dismissive. E.R. Hughes made an informal but symbolic pilgrimage to Qufu, 
birthplace of Confucius, in 1931.204 The difficulties provided by the tenacity of local 
custom, however, had to be faced more pragmatically, W.H. Geller of the LMS suggested 
a special Christian service to be held on the Chinese festival of Qingming, "giving thanks 
for Parents, Teachers, Heroes, Patriots and the like," to coopt some of the strength of such 
customs. The "mental attitudes" involved were considered to be of potentially "great 
value." More honestly it was admitted that abolishing the veneration of ancestors 
constituted "an obstacle to people desiring to adopt the Christian faith".205 It also left 
missions open to the charge that they cut off Chinese Christians from Chinese national 
life and deracinated them.206 The debate on the possibility of reaching a compromise on 
this topic was a perennial topic in the Chinese Recorder.207 
 A greater problem was presented by Chinese folk religion, elements of which 
occasionally fused into fundamentalist Protestantism. Spe
"more superstitious than ever" and causing a break in relations with the LMS mission.208 
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 In a similar way, BAT and Swires started their advertising in China with 
European scenes and figures, but soon came to realise that the best way to approach the 
Chinese market was through Chinese scenes and figures recognisable to Chinese 
customers.209 In missions and in businesses there were those who failed to realise the 
ed a 
institutions, and listening at last, rather than dictating, to them.211 It has been 
own that this was not an easy change for some to make, that the Chinese were often 
ation 
bout China to the British public. Their changing perceptions of their own relations with 
Chinese Christians and Chinese society were also reflected in their propaganda and in the 
conscious efforts of som elations. The efforts of 
                                                          
value of sinified packaging of their products, and some who objected on principle.210 
 Much of this reform of presentation grew out of the wider trends in Mission 
thinking represented by the 1928 Jerusalem Meeting and the ongoing debate about 
indigenisation. In general, however, it represented another facet of the dismantling of the 
"aggressively Western" characteristics of Missions and their Churches. It signall
change in attitudes from the contemptuous dismissal symbolised by The Christian 
Occupation of China to a greater understanding of the integrity of Chinese custom and 
culture. 
 
The result of this sinification was that missionaries found themselves generally working 
with, rather than over, Chinese Christians - in union organisations, in churches, and in 
mission 
sh
portrayed as being unready for new responsibilities and insecure in their new posts. 
Nevertheless many missionaries found the new situation satisfying. Although mission 
societies, by continuing to exist, still in fact kept the financial structures and the nature of 
mission intact, the character of the mission enterprise had been changed drastically. 
 
V Conclusion 
Missions and British images of China 
 Missionaries, with good reason, were key mediators of images and inform
a
e individuals to improve Sino-British r
E.R. Hughes have been noted in chapter 4. The logic of his intellectual development led 
him to return to Britain to a full-time academic career, although he continued to work to 
improve Sino-British cultural and social relations.212 Others also became important 
209 Cochran, Big Business, pp.35-38; JS London to BS Hong Kong (Taikoo Sugar 
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advocates of more informed and sensitive approaches to China, such as Henry Hodgkin 
of the National Christian Council of China.213 After 1937 the Sino-Japanese war 
prompted a pro-Chinese campaign although many missionaries had started stating China's 
case in 1931-32.214 The dictates of the anti-axis alliance after 1941 further fuelled this 
campaign, in such writings as those of H.B. Rattenbury, a late convert to the Nationalist 
cause.215 
 It is clear that, like the British business community, missions were prompted by 
the Nationalist Revolution into overhauling their staff, structures and attitudes. The 
political shock was very great. The anti-Christian assault also shocked mission societies 
to m
to get Chinese funds, either 
                                                                                                                                                                            
in odernising themselves in response to Chinese social change. The Chinese 
bourgeoisie was not, historically, the target of the mission enterprise, nor was it easy to 
approach, but it became clear that, to stay in China, it would have to be accommodated, if 
not targeted.216 Missionaries appear to have disliked this class as much as British 
businessmen, but it was no longer realistic to order business on such likes and dislikes.217 
The conversion of Jiang Jieshi and the Christian beliefs of his wife, her sister, and other 
prominent members of the National Government, were symbolic of the high-profile 
Christianity had in Nationalist China.218 This high profile could only benefit missions if 
they modernised themselves and their attitudes sufficiently. 
 Modernization meant that secular functions carried out by mission institutions 
were even more integrated into local life, or else were too complicated to be carried out 
without employing educated Chinese staff or attempting 
institutionally, as in the EPM's Shantou hospital, or individually from wealthy patients or 
parents.219 
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utions (such as the NCC and the Chinese YMCA) were only in the early days 
 Like businesses the missions - to stay put - had to get and keep friends in the 
Chinese establishment and in related institutions. Unlike Chinese companies many of 
these instit
of independence or semi-independence, from foreign control. This process was 
accelerated by the political situation after the May 30th incident. Like businessmen, 
missionaries had to prove that their community of interest with these Chinese 
organisations was strong - both in terms of their ultimate objectives and also defensively, 
by the fact that both were threatened by any disunity and by central government diktat. It 
was also recognised that this new government and its bureaucracy, significantly staffed 
by returned students and open Christians, was approachable directly and via the Chinese 
Christian organisations. The relationship was one of interdependence. In December 1931,  
for example, in a foretaste of the Guomindang propaganda campaign during the Pacific 
War, Jiang Jieshi met Church and mission representatives and asked them for their 
support during the Manchurian crisis.220  Like businessmen, missionaries had to tailor 
their organisation and services to the demands of social change which were self-evident 
in the society of Nationalist China. Their pre-revolutionary response to these changes had 
been complacently slow. This slowness had helped fuel the fury shown by some Chinese 
Christians towards the foreign missions. Like businessmen they also had to show both 
that they were aware of what were now perceived as the injustices of the past, and that 
"conspicuous grievances" had been dealt with. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to pursue; and I suppose the long tradition of missionary occupation of Chinese 
University chairs at home will come to an end", A.H. Jowett Murray to F.H. Hawkins, 
19/10/30, LMS North China Box 29. 
220 R. Rees to Mr Maclennan, 2/12/31, WMMSA South China fiche 593. On the 
propaganda campaign see Isaacs, Scratches, pp.161-62, 164-76. 
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Conclusion 
I 
 It is clear then, that the attitudes towards the Chinese of the most "representative" 
Britons, those living and working in the treaty ports of China, were a tangible problem in 
the later 1920s. They were not peripheral to the major themes identifiable in British 
responses to the triumph of the Guomindang but played a central role in those debates. 
These attitudes were propagated through the structures of treaty port life and business, 
and through the propaganda of the treaty port experts which built on prevailing 
imperialist and racist attitudes, including those transmitted through fictional media. The 
construct of China and the Chinese that was transmitted served to legitimise the 
informally colonial status quo that existed until 1927. It was used to defend that situation 
after 1927 and characterised, as far as it was practicable, the compromises worked out 
thereafter in many areas of treaty port life and business. It also characterised the die-
hardness of opponents of reform such as the BRA.  
 The reform of British attitudes was the target, often implicit, of many of the 
changes initiated in businesses, missions and in the concessions after 1927. It was 
predicated on the dismantling of the structures of colonialism and the disabusing of the 
settler mentality of treaty port Britons. It involved changing employment patterns, 
socialising patterns, the question of language learning and all the other myriad facets of 
intercourse with Chinese competitors, colleagues, employees, customers and authorities. 
 This reform was initiated by a variety of individuals, mostly acting autonomously 
within their own communities but often aware, like E.R. Hughes, of circumstances in 
other areas of treaty port life. The British Legation under the guidance of the Foreign 
Office was responsible for initiating reform where it could and encouraging it in other 
sectors. Mostly however, similar patterns of reform originated as a result of similar 
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patterns of dysfunctional relationships with the Chinese in different British communities 
and the shared experience and shock of 1927 and the triumph of Chinese nationalism. 
 The reform process involved the comprehensive erosion of the position of the 
treaty port experts and community leaders as arbiters of knowledge and discourse about 
China and the Chinese. There were new pragmatic leaders in the big British companies, 
who did not share the colonialist assumptions of their predecessors or, quite frequently, 
their own staff. The Legation and the Foreign Office insisted on the primacy of wider 
issues in Sino-British relations than those which concerned the treaty port communities. 
Lampson and his successors were career ambassadors who were not unduly influenced by 
the treaty port atmosphere, as had been, for example, his predecessor, Sir Ronald 
Macleay; they were also less autonomous and their views less deferred to by the Foreign 
Office, than had previously been the case.1 
 It is not therefore surprising that the treaty port British huddled together in the 
BRA after 1931 and attempted to by-pass the Legation and the Foreign Office and take 
their case directly to British politicians and the public. It is also not surprising that it is 
the years of friction with the Japanese, the Pacific War, and the experience of internment 
to which they accord much greater retrospective importance to than the years before 1931 
in their memoirs and in their histories of Shanghai.2 The shrillness of treaty port politics 
accompanied the noticeably greater shrillness of tone in the later works of the treaty port 
commentators.3 
                                                          
1 On Macleay see Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, pp.92-93. 
2 See, for example, Collar, Captive in Shanghai, passim.; Finch, Shanghai and 
Beyond, passim.; J.V. Davidson-Houston, Yellow Creek: The Story of Shanghai (London, 
1961), pp.138-87. 
3 "People like Sir Reginald Johnston who are practically Chinese... have loved and 
known China from end to end... (even think in Chinese)... are disillusioned altogether - 
cannot find and scarcely believe in now, the China that they loved -... all their memories 
are spoilt and blotted by the maniac present", Stella Benson to Stephen Hudson, 15/7/30, 
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 This necessity of modernising attitudes was intimately linked with reforms 
spurred by other economic and social trends. The growth of nationalism and the Chinese 
bourgeoisie, the threat of economic nationalism and the modernisation of Chinese 
commerce required the adoption of new business priorities which amounted to a 
sinification of the British presence in China. Competition from the United States, 
Germany and Japan also spurred on the abandonment of traditional practices and 
routines. In general terms a similar compromise had to be attempted by British missions, 
which were forced to match more closely the theory and practice of mission in order to 
survive in China. 
 
II 
 On September 18th 1931 officers of the Japanese Kwantung army exploded a 
small bomb on the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden (Shenyang). Denounced as 
the work of Chinese saboteurs it provided a pretext, quickly seized, for the spiralling 
conflict which saw the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and, from January to March 
1932, fierce fighting in Shanghai.4 The warfare saw the suspension of the 
extraterritoriality negotiations then underway between Britain and China, which were not 
actively resumed until the very different circumstances of 1942-43, when both countries 
were allied against Japan.5 
 From 1931 onwards the immediate political pressures on Britons in China to 
reform their relations with the Chinese were eased. In a sense the necessity of change 
became irrelevant as the focus of Chinese, and world, attention began to switch towards 
                                                                                                                                                                             
BL Add. Mss. 52916, Schiff Papers. For Bland the title of his last book is evidence 
enough, China: The Pity of It. 
4 Eastman, "Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945", Eastman, 
et al., Nationalist Era, pp.115-24; Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy, pp.204-10. 
5 Fishel, End of Extraterritoriality in China, pp.186-87, 207-15. 
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Japanese actions and designs, although the economic and social pressures remained. 
Echoes of the response to the Nationalist Revolution continued, however, to reverberate. 
When M.W. Scott arrived in Hong Kong in 1934 to work for Swires he was met at the 
quayside not by fellow Britons from the Butterfield and Swire office, nor by the sight of 
"sinister" coolies at work, but by J.C.L. Wong. Wong was a British educated product of 
Swires' slow commitment to sinification. It was one small way in which the structure of 
socialisation of Britons in the treaty port communities was changing and continued to 
change.6 
 Many Britons in the treaty ports, such as SMC councillor A.D. Bell, were 
sympathetic to, or supported, Japan's actions.7 They saw Japan as acting strongly to 
protect her interests in a way that contrasted favourably with their own "betrayal" by the 
British Government. Betrayal was sometimes personally felt. A.H.F. Edwardes, for 
example, vilified by the Nationalists during the contest for the CMC inspector-
generalship in 1929, became an adviser to Manzhouguo and later to the Japanese embassy 
in London.8 Where the British authorities had opened negotiations on the future of 
extraterritoriality and the status of the treaty ports, discussions which mocked the 
imperial pretensions of British residents, the Japanese had dealt in a strong, imperialist, 
manner with the Chinese. In fact hostility to China served, at least initially, to hamper the 
perception of the extent of the Japanese threat to British interests in China, even within 
the Legation.9 
                                                          
6 Scott papers, Letter to parents, 11/2/34. 
7 A.D. Bell to Lionel Curtis, 9/2/32, Curtis papers, Mss. Curtis 5. 
8 Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise, pp.74-77, 83-84. 
9 Reports and analyses of both the assassination of Zhang Zoulin in 1928 and the 
Jinan incident later that same year, were distorted by anti-bolshevism, anti-nationalism, 
and contempt for Chinese abilities. Any understanding of Japanese involvement or 
intentions in these cases was obscured. See the files on the killing of Zhang in 
FO228\3711 2 and FO228\3712 2. Lampson did not believe "for a moment" claims of 
Japanese involvement and the only foreign voice which did subscribe to that truthful 
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 This attitude started to change as the Japanese began to threaten British interests 
in China. The full-scale Sino-Japanese war which began in 1937 saw a concerted 
Japanese effort to erode or seize other foreign interests, especially in Tianjin and 
Shanghai. The SMC in particular became the target of a fierce struggle for control of the 
International Settlement which saw electoral gerrymandering and assassination attempts 
against British policemen and councillors.10 British businesses also came under attack 
from Japanese sponsored strikes and the blockade of Tianjin in 1939.11 
 By December 1941, when Japan declared war on Britain, "China" had effectively 
been rehabilitated. Moscow's xenophobic, queue-wearing puppets had been replaced in 
British popular perceptions by the doughty patriots of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai, 
brave resisters of a militarily superior aggressor. Jiang Jieshi had made the transition 
from "Red" general to Christian patriot. This revision of the construct of China dominant 
in Britain had several sources but mostly it resulted from the supersession of the treaty 
port dominance of the discourse on China. Just as the settler mentality and its supporting 
structures of socialisation had been attacked in British businesses, missions and 
concessions, so the monopoly of expert opinion held by the treaty port China experts was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
theory did so because "the outrage was too accurately planned to have been done by a 
Chinese", Lampson minute on a letter from a "Mukden resident", 5/6/28, 
FO228\3711\337 2; Dairen No.30, 13/6/28, FO228\3712\387 2. On the Jinan incident see 
Legation dossier 25L 1928. 
10 In 1940 both the head of the SMP's Special Branch and the SMC Commissioner 
General survived assassination attempts. The following year W.J. Keswick, Chairman of 
the SMC was shot and wounded by the president of the Japanese Ratepayers' Association, 
NCH, 17/1/40, p.92; 11/9/40, p.407; Davidson-Houston, Yellow Creek, pp.163-65, 168-
69. 
11 Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin, pp.62-71,172-80. One such strike was that at the 
China Printing and Finishing Company in Pudong, Shanghai, in May-June 1939, NARA 
SMP D863055. 
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also attacked in the British and world press. Their works, which had once been 
aggressively justificatory became elegiacally so during the Pacific War and thereafter.12 
 The period of the Nationalist Revolution saw the beginning of this erosion of the 
authority of the treaty port experts. The sheer scale of the foreign media attention that 
was focussed on China after 1925 but especially in 1927 was influential. From 1931 
onwards this attention increased and new constructs of "China" and the "Chinese" 
evolved. Early on press coverage was sympathetic to abstract notions of Chinese 
nationalism and discredited the treaty port writers whose strong conservatism in the face 
of the revolution undermined their authority with many.13 After 1931 it was increasingly 
anti-Japanese. Some writers and reporters deliberately set out to improve the picture by 
attacking old preconceptions.14 A different "expert" community became active in China, 
it was left-wing, and journalistic, and mostly American. It replaced one community of 
interest, the expatriate opinion-formers, with another, often political in origin and loyalty. 
Some represented active political interests, such as Agnes Smedley [in China from 1930] 
and Harold Isaacs [1930] who both worked with the Chinese Communist Party.15 Others 
                                                          
12 See, for example, Green's The Foreigner in China, passim.; ex-SDF officer turned 
Shanghai resident Davidson-Houston's Yellow Creek is dedicated "To the Men from the 
West who built Asia's Greatest City". See also John Pal, Shanghai Saga (London, 1963) 
and Finch, Shanghai and Beyond, passim.. 
13 Of Gilbert the US Consul-General wrote: "Toward the end of 1925 his opinions 
became very drastic and during recent months his views have not been regarded as very 
sound because he appeared to be a leader in the "die-hard" class", E.S. Cunningham to 
J.V.A. MacMurray, 2/3/29, No.5873, NARA RG 84 Shanghai Post Files 891, 1929. 
14 There were ripostes to die-hard diatribes, such as O.D. Rasmussen's What's Right 
With China aimed at "misanthropic morons" like Gilbert, which countered criticisms with 
a politically structured critique of Western activities in China (Shanghai, 1927, p.xiii.). 
There were also attacks on Gilbert's racial assumptions such as Paul Monroe, China: A 
Nation in Evolution (New York, 1928), pp.394-402. 
15 J.R. Mackinnon and S.R. Mackinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an 
American Radical (London, 1988), pp.134-59, afterwards passim.; Smedley in fact 
attempted to join the Chinese Communist Party in 1933, ibid., pp.186-87; H. Isaacs, Re-
encounters in China: Notes on a Journey in a Time Capsule (Armonk, New York, 1985), 
passim.. 
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were more broadly pro-Chinese, such as Edgar Snow [1928] or Emily Hahn [1935].16 All 
of them were influential and very critical of the foreign communities in China.17 They 
added serious weight to the more salacious portrayals of foreign life in China, that 
enjoyed a vogue in the 1930s and served to undermine it.18 There was also a small, but 
growing, number of Chinese writers, notably Lin Yutang, who enjoyed a great deal of 
popularity in the 1930s, and Chiang Yee [Jiang Yi].19 It is clear that the works of Lin and 
Pearl Buck substantially contributed to the sinophilia evident in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Both books were largely Chinese Characteristics writ newly, and more sympathetically, 
and were used as such.20 Active propaganda efforts on China's behalf after 1937, such as 
those of the China Campaign Committee, reinforced this influence.21 
 The establishment of the National Government in Nanjing in 1928 gave China a 
recognisable centre for the first time since 1911 and so undermined one of the 
assumptions of the past two decades of analysis. Chinese nationalists and government 
representatives were also more assertive and active in combatting foreign views they saw 
as offensive (with the "drastic, autocratic ruthlessness characteristic of Oriental 
                                                          
16 On Snow see J.M. Hamilton, Edgar Snow: A Biography (Bloomington, 1988). For 
Hahn's account see China To Me (Philadelphia, 1944). 
17 For an example of Snow's journalism see his article on "The Americans in 
Shanghai", American Mercury, 20, No.80 (August 1930), pp.437-45. 
18 Such works included Kisch, Secret China; Miller, Shanghai: Paradise of 
Adventurers; Hauser, Shanghai: City for Sale; Peters, Shanghai Policeman and Fontenoy, 
Secret Shanghai. 
19 Lin's works included the very successful My Country and My People (London, 
1936), The Importance of Living (London, 1938) and a series of propagandist novels and 
commentaries. Chiang's self-illustrated travel and childrens' books and works on Chinese 
painting enjoyed a great deal of popularity in the nineteen thirties, forties and fifties. Like 
Lin he also published translations of Chinese works. 
20 For the influence of the books see Isaacs, Scratches, pp.155-58. Buck wrote the 
introduction for Lin's book.  
21 On the campaign see Clegg, Aid China, passim.. 
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despotism" wrote Bland).22 An increasing tendency to object successfully to negative 
portrayals on screen and stage has already been noted. 
 The murder of Bertram Lenox Simpson in 1930, after his involvement in the 
Tianjin Customs crisis, marked the end of an era in which the China experts had dabbled 
in Chinese politics and felt personally invulnerable because of their disinterested distance 
and British status. This was felt by the wider community as well which until the 
Nationalist Revolution had considered itself safe from the fallout of events in China. As 
the Sino-Japanese conflict intensified the traditional security and insulation of Britons in 
China vanished. 
 There was also throughout the interwar period a slowly growing 
professionalization in Chinese studies, especially in the United States but more slowly in 
Britain.23 Much of this work was involved with reassessing the history of foreign 
relations with China. Before 1928 this had mostly been a subject left to the treaty port 
propagandists and scholars. In the 1930s it began to become a topic for serious and 
objective research. J.K. Fairbank investigated British consular archives in situ and indeed 
the assessment of the size and historical value of consular archives in China was one of 
the tasks of the peripatetic Inspector General of Consulates in 1928-29. A sense that this 
was the beginning of a time of historical reflection was evident.24 
                                                          
22 Bland, China: The Pity of It, p.156. As has been noted, in 1933, prompted by 
Chinese complaints, the Foreign Office was instrumental in getting Mrs C.K. Chesterton's 
Young China and New Japan withdrawn from sale because of libels about Jiang Jieshi. 
H.F. MacNair's condensation of Morse's International Relations of the Chinese Empire 
had been withdrawn earlier because of political objections to descriptions of the events of 
1926-27, Morse and MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1931), Preface, pp.viii-x. 
23 Barrett, Singular Listlessness, pp.92-101. Two of the major academics/publicists 
of the post-war period, Owen Lattimore and John King Fairbank, were working and 
studying in China at this time, see Lattimore, China Memoirs (London, 1991), passim., 
and Fairbank, Chinabound, pp.35-150. 
24 See, for example, Hughes, Invasion of China by the Western World; G.F. Hudson, 
Europe and China: A Survey of their Relations from the earliest times to 1800 (London, 
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 Mary G. Mason began her research on Western attitudes to China before 1934 
while Harold Isaacs, later to write Scratches On Our Minds, was living and working in 
Shanghai in the same decade.25  In this period when British attitudes to China were under 
severe scrutiny and had become the target of reform they also became, for the first time, a 
topic for objective academic historical study. 
 
 
1931). For the consular inspections see the reports by Herbert Philips in FO369\2018-
2021, FO369\2705 passim.. 
25 Mary G. Mason began her research before 1934, Mason, Western Concepts of 
China and the Chinese, p.ix. See also Xiao Qian's [Hsiao Ch'ien] later compilation of 
Western writings on China Harp with a Thousand Strings (London, 1944). 
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